Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-4417
Common default passwords used to protect malware-sample archives and encrypted malicious documents (Hexacorn research, incl. Excel VelvetSweatshop)
Hexacorn compiled the passwords most commonly used on malware-sample archives (malware, virus, infected, 1337, 123456, VelvetSweatshop and others) using AI-assisted searching plus manual validation. Knowing these passwords helps defenders triage and unpack password-protected archives, and the VelvetSweatshop entry maps to a documented antivirus-evasion technique used in real Excel malware campaigns.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-4417, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2017-11882 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Malicious archive default passwords, VelvetSweatshop default Excel key |
| Severity | LOW |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2012-0158 (added ), CVE-2017-11882 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2012-0158: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2017-11882: 99.9% (99.9th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Microsoft Excel (default VelvetSweatshop decryption key) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-798 |
| Malware | LimeRAT |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | technology, government administration, finance, health |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4417 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 4 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE) Spawning Child Process - CVE-2017-11882 / VelvetSweatshop Excel Exploitation
Detects any process launched by EQNEDT32.EXE (Microsoft Equation Editor). Exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, as seen in VelvetSweatshop-encrypted Excel samples that evade antivirus (VMware TAU, Threatpost LimeRAT campaign), makes the vulnerable Equation Editor spawn a payload or shell. Legitimate Equation Editor use does not launch child processes, so this is a high-fidelity behavioural signal for TL-2026-4417.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1203, T1204.002
- Data sources: sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```CVE-2017-11882 Equation Editor exploitation: EQNEDT32.EXE spawning any child process (TL-2026-4417)```
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\EQNEDT32.EXE" earliest=-24h
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as child_images values(CommandLine) as child_commandlines by host, User, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "EQNEDT32.EXE"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE) Spawns Child Process - CVE-2017-11882
id: 3f0b7c1e-5a52-4d6e-9d0a-7a1c2e8b4f11
status: experimental
description: Detects any child process of EQNEDT32.EXE, the Microsoft Equation Editor, which is abused by CVE-2017-11882 exploits delivered in VelvetSweatshop-encrypted Excel documents (TL-2026-4417).
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/11/velvetsweatshop-when-default-passwords-can-still-make-a-difference.html
- https://threatpost.com/velvetsweatshop-bug-resurrected-limerat/154310
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/24
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1204.002
- cve.2017-11882
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy documents that legitimately launch a helper process from Equation Editor (very rare)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legacy workflows that embed Equation Editor objects and legitimately start a helper process (rare)
- Security-lab or sandbox detonation hosts that open known CVE-2017-11882 samples on purpose
Tuning notes: Exclude designated malware-analysis and sandbox hosts by host or DeviceName. EQNEDT32.EXE is deprecated and removed by the January 2018 Office updates, so any hit on a patched estate is suspicious; consider also disabling the component through ASR or registry kill-bit.
- Inbound Email With Archive or Excel Attachment Matching Password-Lure Subject or Known VelvetSweatshop Sample Hash · unlock with TL Creds
- Archive Extraction With Known Malware-Sample Password - Defender Process Telemetry (TL-2026-4417) · unlock with TL Creds
- Post-Exploitation After Office Exploit: Script Host / LOLBin Download and Run-Key Persistence (LimeRAT Chain, CVE-2017-11882) · unlock with TL Creds
- Equation Editor Child Process via Sigma - CVE-2017-11882 Exploitation (VelvetSweatshop-Encrypted Excel) · unlock with TL Creds
- Archive Tool Run With Malware-Sample Password Including Numeric and Community Variants (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Equation Editor Outbound Connection via Sigma - CVE-2017-11882 Payload Retrieval (LimeRAT) · unlock with TL Creds
- Archive Extraction With Known Malware-Sample Password (Hexacorn List) - TL-2026-4417 · unlock with TL Creds
- Equation Editor or Excel Outbound Connection to Public IP - CVE-2017-11882 Payload Retrieval (LimeRAT) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 4 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4417.
Sample indicators (3 of 4)
- File hash:
e1a5d3d99741296e1519c5dad5bd4dc96952c1d9e1b249707d4991613d5fbad8 - File hash:
9023313efec805a45cfdb98adf8116c81c5289a891703af682130345d7246b36 - File hash:
b8c1d84d4fd7b6bcf9972841e67d2c8c5190bfcd3da83a3ab32e95e47d53b028
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 4 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On 2026-10-24 the Hexacorn blog published part 2 of its 'Solving practical problems with AI' series, listing the passwords most popular for protecting malicious archives. The compiled list includes traditional passwords (malware, virus, infected, inf3cted, pass, god, qwerty, p@ssword), numeric passwords (1337, 123, 1234, 123456, 12345678, 123456789, 111111, 8466) and passwords tied to specific sample-sharing communities or vendors (mysubsarethebest, history, virussign, infected_pcap, infected666, velvet, VelvetSweatshop, S1BinaryVault, shipped, invoice, doc, clean). The post names its sources: the GitHub repository LJ9859/Malware-Database (1337), MalwareWatch (mysubsarethebest), snorrefagerland.github.io/virushistory (history), Kaspersky support documentation (pass), abuse.ch samples (123, 8466), a Reddit SentinelOne XDR discussion (S1BinaryVault) and the virussign.com free list (virussign). The infected666 convention places an extra character before the zip extension. The post describes an iterative AI workflow, starting from a Google search and then asking follow-up questions to widen the candidate list. Its stated conclusion is that the prompts that produced the list matter more than the list itself. The post discusses no malware families, CVEs, IOCs, actors or campaigns.
The list is mostly a research-sharing convention rather than an attack. Two entries still have defensive relevance for adversary tradecraft. 'invoice', 'doc' and 'shipped' are generic words consistent with social-engineering lures. 'VelvetSweatshop' is not a sharing convention. It is the hard-coded default key that Microsoft Excel tries automatically when opening encrypted workbooks, so a file encrypted with it opens without a password prompt. Threatpost (2020-03-31) reported it resurrected in a LimeRAT campaign using read-only encrypted Excel files, and tied the technique to CVE-2012-0158 and to 2012-era use. VMware Carbon Black's Threat Analysis Unit (2020-11-19) documented encrypted samples exploiting CVE-2017-11882 and reported that VelvetSweatshop encryption cut antivirus detection by more than 50%. AES-256-encrypted samples were detected by under 15% of the engines tested, and five products missed the AES-128 and AES-256 variants entirely.
Defender value: SOC and malware-triage teams can use the list as a first-pass wordlist when unpacking quarantined or shared archives. Detection engineers should note that archive passwords are weak signals on their own and need pairing with file-type, delivery-channel and behavioral context. Email and endpoint scanners should attempt known default passwords, VelvetSweatshop in particular, when inspecting Office documents. Severity is LOW and informational: the source describes no active exploitation, but the VelvetSweatshop evasion technique has been exploited in the wild per the cited vendor reports.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Execution
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Initial Access
Remediation
Patches
- Apply Microsoft updates for CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2017-11882, the Office vulnerabilities cited in VelvetSweatshop-based campaigns
Immediate actions
- Add the Hexacorn password list to the malware-triage and sandbox wordlist for password-protected archives
- Configure email and web gateways to attempt known default passwords, including VelvetSweatshop for Excel, before scanning encrypted attachments
- Quarantine and alert on inbound password-protected archives and encrypted Office documents from external senders
Workarounds
- Block or sandbox encrypted Office documents opened read-only without a password prompt
- Use Protected View and Attack Surface Reduction rules for Office child-process creation
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy detection that unpacks and inspects password-protected content in a sandbox
- Train users that an archive password supplied in the same email as the archive is a phishing indicator
- Pair archive-password heuristics with file-type, sender-reputation and behavioral context, since the passwords are weak signals alone
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Microsoft Excel (default VelvetSweatshop decryption key)
Vulnerable versions: Versions that auto-decrypt with the VelvetSweatshop default key
Timeline
- Microsoft patched CVE-2012-0158. Threatpost ties the VelvetSweatshop encrypted-Excel evasion technique to this 2012-era vulnerability.
- The VelvetSweatshop default-key technique was presented at the Virus Bulletin conference in 2013 (per Threatpost; exact day not stated, month approximated to the conference year).
- Microsoft patched CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor memory corruption), later exploited in VelvetSweatshop-encrypted Excel samples analyzed by VMware.
- Threatpost reported the VelvetSweatshop default-key technique resurrected in a LimeRAT delivery campaign using read-only encrypted Excel files.
- VMware NSX detected VelvetSweatshop-encrypted malicious Excel samples exploiting CVE-2017-11882 delivered by phishing email.
- VMware ran its VirusTotal detection-rate analysis: encrypted samples were detected 55-60%, AES-128 variants 15-30% and AES-256 variants under 15%.
- VMware Threat Analysis Unit published findings that VelvetSweatshop encryption cut antivirus detection by more than 50% for CVE-2017-11882 samples.
- Hexacorn published part 2 of its AI-assisted series compiling the most common passwords for malicious archives, including VelvetSweatshop, infected and 1337.
Sources cited
- NVD: CVE-2012-0158 NVD (NIST) · Advisory
- NVD: CVE-2017-11882 NVD (NIST) · Advisory
- VelvetSweatshop: When default passwords can still make a difference (VMware Security Blog) blogs.vmware.com · Vendor report · 2020-11-19
- VelvetSweatshop: Microsoft Excel spreadsheet encryption rises again to deliver LimeRAT (Mimecast) mimecast.com · Vendor report
- Excel Malspam: Password Protected, Not! (LevelBlue SpiderLabs) levelblue.com · Research
- Solving practical problems with AI, part 2: the most popular and most commonly used passwords for malicious archives hexacorn.com · Blog · 2026-10-24
- 8-Year-Old VelvetSweatshop Bug Resurrected in LimeRAT Campaign (Threatpost) threatpost.com · News · 2020-03-31
- Attackers Leverage Excel File Encryption to Deliver Malware (Dark Reading) Dark Reading · News
Other reports on CVE-2017-11882
- XLoader (v8.9) infostealer delivered via purchase-order phishing DOCX exploiting CVE-2017-11882
- Q2 2026 Vulnerability and Exploit Landscape: Exploited AI-platform flaws (OpenClaw CVE-2026-25253, Dify CVE-2026-41948, Open WebUI CVE-2026-45386), Exchange CVE-2026-45501, and Linux kernel page-cache LPE exploit wave (Copy Fail, Dirty Frag)
- Agent Tesla .NET Remote Access Trojan — Credential and Data Theft via Keylogging and MaaS Operations
- CVE-2026-21509: Russian Hackers Exploit Microsoft Office Vulnerability Against Ukraine
Previous and next in threat intel
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.