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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-4561

Operation Omegaline: FBI Seizes virtualine.net, Disrupting Omegatech / Virtualine Technologies Bulletproof Hosting (AS202412)

mediumMONITORING

On 2026-10-27 the FBI seized virtualine.net under Operation Omegaline, announced by the US Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Virtualine Technologies, which also operated as Omegatech (AS202412), sold bulletproof hosting to cybercriminals; Silent Push reports Omegatech is not fully offline and its prefixes show very low routing visibility.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-4561
Also known asOperation Omegaline
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsVirtualine Technologies / Omegatech LTD Bulletproof hosting infrastructure (AS202412, AS214943)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1059.001 PowerShell, T1106 Native API, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1566 Phishing, T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS, T1583.001 Domains, T1583.003 Virtual Private Server, T1583.004 Server, T1584.004 Server and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4561 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 40 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Operation Omegaline - PowerShell In-Memory Shellcode Loader (VirtualAlloc + Marshal.Copy + CreateThread)

Detects the in-memory shellcode execution method used by the ClickFix stager linked to Virtualine/Omegatech infrastructure: a PowerShell script block (EventCode 4104) that contains VirtualAlloc, Marshal copy and CreateThread primitives, used to run the position-independent 's_enterprise' payload without writing it to disk. Flags script blocks that also reference the known hosts 158.94.208.104, 91.92.240.121 or 91.92.240.5.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.001, T1106
  • Data sources: powershell_script_block_logging, windows_event_log_4104
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104 ```in-memory loader: all three Win32 and .NET primitives must appear in one script block``` | eval sb=lower(ScriptBlockText) | where like(sb,"%virtualalloc%") AND like(sb,"%marshal%copy%") AND like(sb,"%createthread%") | eval ioc_hit=if(like(sb,"%158.94.208.104%") OR like(sb,"%91.92.240.121%") OR like(sb,"%91.92.240.5%") OR like(sb,"%s_enterprise%"),1,0) | table _time host UserID Path ioc_hit ScriptBlockText

Microsoft KQL

Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell" and EventID == 4104
| where RenderedDescription has_all ("VirtualAlloc", "Marshal", "CreateThread")
| extend IocHit = RenderedDescription has_any ("158.94.208.104", "91.92.240.121", "91.92.240.5", "s_enterprise")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, UserName, IocHit, RenderedDescription

Sigma

title: PowerShell In-Memory Shellcode Loader via VirtualAlloc Marshal.Copy CreateThread
id: 3e9a5d14-8b27-4c63-a1f0-5d7b2c94e836
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell script blocks that combine VirtualAlloc, Marshal copy and CreateThread, the in-memory shellcode execution method used in the ClickFix stager observed on Virtualine/Omegatech infrastructure (Operation Omegaline).
references:
  - https://0xdevbot.substack.com/p/virtualine-clickfix-attribution
  - https://www.silentpush.com/blog/operation-omegaline-fbi-seizes-virtualine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-27
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1106
logsource:
  category: ps_script
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - 'VirtualAlloc'
      - 'Marshal'
      - 'CreateThread'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Red team or penetration testing tooling run with approval
  - Legitimate security products or game and driver tooling that use P/Invoke from PowerShell
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Authorized red team or penetration test frameworks that run shellcode runners from PowerShell
  • Security tooling or developer scripts that legitimately use VirtualAlloc via P/Invoke

Tuning notes: Requires PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to be enabled; Constrained Language Mode is also recommended per the research. Long scripts are split across multiple 4104 events, so consider reassembling by ScriptBlockId or dropping the all-three requirement to any two primitives. Allow-list approved security testing hosts by Computer name.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Operation Omegaline - ClickFix Lure Visit Followed by PowerShell Stager on Same Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - Command Line Retrieval of [indicator] Shellcode or Virtualine Stager Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - DNS Resolution of Virtualine/BPH Operator and Community TDS Domains with Fast-Flux Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - ClickFix Paste-and-Run Command Recorded in Run Dialog History (RunMRU) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - PowerShell Script Block Shellcode Loader or Virtualine Payload Reference · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - Web Proxy or Firewall Traffic to Virtualine, BPH Operator and Community TDS Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - ClickFix PowerShell IEX/IRM Stager Launched from Shell Parent · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation Omegaline - Endpoint Egress to Virtualine/Omegatech and Related BPH Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 40 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4561.

Sample indicators (3 of 40)

  • IP address: 91.92.240[.]5
  • Domain: virtualine[.]net
  • IP address: 91.92.240[.]121

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 40 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

40 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Operation Omegaline is a multinational law-enforcement action against Virtualine Technologies, a bulletproof hosting (BPH) provider that also operated as Omegatech. The FBI Washington Field Office led the investigation; the US Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia announced the seizure of the virtualine.net domain on 2026-10-27. Partners named in the Silent Push write-up are Germany's Polizei Hessen, the Netherlands' Politie Midden-Nederland, the UK National Crime Agency, OverRIPE and Lumen. Silent Push describes the hosting as supporting phishing, malware and ransomware infrastructure generically; no specific malware family or threat actor is named in the primary source.

Routing and ownership history: throughout 2025 Railnet LLC (AS214943) provided the routing backbone for infrastructure used by Virtualine Technologies, letting it operate without directly owning IP space. Per Recorded Future Insikt Group (as summarised by secondary sources), announcements shifted to AS202412 Omegatech LTD as early as 2026-01-21, and Insikt assesses with high confidence that Omegatech LTD is operated by Virtualine. Silent Push independently detected the Railnet-to-Omegatech infrastructure shift on 2026-02-11, using 91.92.240.5 as an example (on BPH feeds since 2025-10-22). Per the Justice Department as quoted by Silent Push, in March 2026 Virtualine advertised an 'additional protection plan' that moved customers' criminal infrastructure, including to shell companies. The model enables frequent rotation of short-lived prefixes, complicating attribution and prolonging the lifespan of malicious infrastructure.

Observed customer abuse (independent researcher write-up, lower confidence): Virtualine/Omegatech address space was used in a ClickFix campaign. A compromised Brazilian site (absoluteinvestimentos.com.br, 191.233.203.32) presented a fake Cloudflare Ray ID verification page that led victims to run an obfuscated PowerShell (IEX/IRM) stage from 91.92.240.121, which fetched a position-independent shellcode binary ('s_enterprise') from 158.94.208.104 and executed it in memory via VirtualAlloc, Marshal.Copy and CreateThread. BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 for 91.92.240.5, so no C2 correlation could be recorded.

Status: Silent Push states Omegatech is not fully offline and its prefixes show very low routing visibility. Silent Push notes that a BPH can have a new ASN issued in two to five business days and that 50 of the BPH providers it tracks lost their ASNs, so re-emergence under new ASNs/shell companies is expected. Wider context: May 2026 Dutch FIOD seizure of 800+ servers (THE.Hosting/WorkTitans BV, AS209847); July 2026 US charges against three Russian nationals over BPH services and EU sanctions on Media Land and ML Cloud (2026-07-13); OFAC sanctions on Aeza Group (2025-07-01). The justice.gov announcement was not independently retrieved.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1106 Native API; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS; T1665 Hide Infrastructure

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1657 Financial Theft

Credential Access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1583.004 Server; T1584.004 Server; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1595.001 Active Scanning

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block or alert on traffic to/from AS202412 (Omegatech), AS214943 (Railnet LLC) and the listed IPs; review historical logs for contact
  • Hunt egress logs for connections to 91.92.240.5, 91.92.240.121 and 158.94.208.104
  • Add virtualine.net to DNS blocklists and review historical resolutions

Workarounds

  • Use PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and script block logging to limit and detect ClickFix-delivered stagers

Longer-term hardening

  • Subscribe to bulletproof-hosting ASN/prefix feeds and refresh blocking as operators re-emerge under new ASNs and shell companies
  • Apply the CISA et al. 'Bulletproof Defense' guidance for mitigating risk from bulletproof hosting providers
  • Train users to recognise ClickFix fake verification pages and restrict paste-and-run into Run dialogs/PowerShell

Affected and fixed versions

  • Virtualine Technologies / Omegatech LTD — Bulletproof hosting infrastructure (AS202412, AS214943)

Timeline

Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source

  • Virtualine joined the Exploit cybercrime forum, advertising bulletproof hosting and claiming operations since 2019.
  • June 2025 (day not stated): Virtualine posts on HackForums claiming it 'ignored more abuse than your last three therapists'.
  • US Treasury OFAC sanctioned Aeza Group, part of the wider 2025-2026 pressure on bulletproof hosting providers.
  • September 2025 (day not stated): Spamhaus reports Virtualine-linked AS209800 expansion routed via aurologic GmbH.
  • locked-ioc-8 began to be tracked on Silent Push bulletproof hosting feeds.
  • CISA, UK NCSC, AWS, RedSense and partners published the 'Bulletproof Defense' joint guidance on mitigating risks from bulletproof hosting providers.
  • From January 2026 (month precision), law enforcement, NCMEC and a victim's attorney reported CSAM on a forum hosted by Virtualine; hosting reportedly continued.
  • Per Recorded Future Insikt Group (secondary report), Virtualine infrastructure began being announced from AS202412 Omegatech LTD, moving off Railnet LLC (AS214943).
  • Silent Push detected the infrastructure shift from Railnet LLC to the newly registered Omegatech ASN.
  • March 2026 (exact day not stated): per the Justice Department, Virtualine advertised an 'additional protection plan' that moved customers' criminal infrastructure, including to shell companies.
  • May 2026 (exact day not stated): Dutch FIOD seized 800+ servers and arrested two individuals in the THE.Hosting/WorkTitans BV (AS209847) action.
  • EU sanctioned Media Land, ML Cloud and director Aleksandr Volosovik; July 2026 also saw US charges against three Russian nationals over BPH services.
  • During the takedown AS202412 and 24 IPv4 CIDR blocks (6,144+ IPs) were reported withdrawn from global routing (secondary reporting); Silent Push nonetheless reports Omegatech partially operational.
  • FBI seized locked-ioc-3 under Operation Omegaline, announced by the US Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia; Silent Push reported Omegatech not fully offline with very low prefix routing visibility.
  • Per The Record (single source), physical servers were reportedly seized in a Limburg data center in the Netherlands and information on more than 3,000 customers engaged in criminal activity was reportedly obtained; no operator identities or charges announced.
  • TRM Labs, Silent Push, Chainalysis and Help Net Security published analyses; locked-ioc-6 remained active with an open letter and Omegatech infrastructure was reported partially operational.
  • locked-ioc-6 and the Telegram channel @virtualine_net became inaccessible (The Hacker News), after Virtualine had posted a rebuttal open letter on locked-ioc-6 within hours of the seizure. This updates the earlier note that locked-ioc-6 remained active.

Update history

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

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