Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-4846

BloodAlchemy RAT - Evolved Deed RAT Variant with ShadowPad Code Lineage

mediumACTIVE

BloodAlchemy RAT (TL-2026-4846), also tracked as BLOODALCHEMY, is a medium-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-10-30. It is linked to a China-nexus actor with low confidence, affects Microsoft Windows, maps to 15 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1027, T1053.005, T1055.004), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 16 indicators of compromise.

Severity
MEDIUMAssessed severity
CVEs
0None referenced
Techniques
15MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
0Not attributed
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
16Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-4846

Threat ID
TL-2026-4846
Also known as
BLOODALCHEMY, Deed RAT variant
Severity
MEDIUM
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution confidence
LOW
Nation-state nexus
China
Motivation
ESPIONAGE
Target sectors
government administration, technology
Target regions
Southeast Asia, South Asia, Asia
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
16

Malware and tooling in BloodAlchemy RAT

Malware and tooling: BloodAlchemy, SNAPPYBEE, ShadowPad, ShadowPad

How BloodAlchemy RAT works

ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence analysis identifies BloodAlchemy (BLOODALCHEMY) as an evolution of Deed RAT rather than new malware, with code similarities suggesting shared lineage with ShadowPad. It uses a multi-stage infection chain with legitimate-binary DLL side-loading, encrypted shellcode and Early Bird injection, and supports 15 backdoor commands.

BLOODALCHEMY is an x86 backdoor written in C, first documented by Elastic Security Labs on 2023-10-13 in connection with the REF5961 intrusion set targeting ASEAN government entities. ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence (2024-05-23) concluded that it is an evolved Deed RAT variant. Deed RAT was previously associated exclusively with the Space Pirates group, and is viewed as a successor to ShadowPad. The shared traits include the unique payload header data structure (magic 45 AB 45 AB, plugin ID 0x10) and a similar virtual function table per protocol ID. Lineage described in the source: ShadowPad -> Deed RAT -> BloodAlchemy.

Infection chain: the reported initial access vector is takeover of a vendor maintenance account on a VPN device. Three files are then placed in C:\windows\: the legitimate, signed Brother Industries binary BrDifxapi.exe (vulnerable to DLL side-loading), the malicious loader BrLogAPI.dll, and DIFX, an encrypted shellcode container. BrLogAPI.dll decrypts the shellcode from DIFX using AES-128-CBC, with the key being the first 16 bytes of the DIFX file. The shellcode then decrypts the final payload using a custom routine based on the FNV-1a hash combined with LZNT1 decompression. Configuration is protected by a custom single-byte XOR variant with bit rotation. Persistence for the loader set uses a scheduled task at C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Dell\BrDifxapi.

Run modes 0-6 control behavior: 0 is full operation (C2, backdoor, process injection, anti-debug, anti-sandbox, persistence); 1 is C2 and backdoor only; 2 is threading for C2; 3 is C2, backdoor, injection, anti-analysis and persistence; 4 is process creation for injection; 5 is named pipe creation; 6 is malware installation. Persistence selected by persistence_flag (1-4) uses a service, startup, and COM-based Task Scheduler in combinations, installing test.exe into %AUTOPATH%\Test\, %LocalAppData%\Programs\Test\, %ProgramFiles%\Test\ or %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Test\. Encrypted configuration is stored in C:\ProgramData\Store\ under a 15-character [a-zA-Z] file name. Injection uses the Early Bird technique (QueueUserAPC) into SearchIndexer.exe, wininit.exe, taskhost.exe, svchost.exe or taskeng.exe. Anti-sandbox checks process names (Trellix-focused), file artifacts and DNS results; anti-debugging is enabled in run modes 0 and 3.

The backdoor supports 15 commands (0x1101 update config, 0x1102 retrieve config, 0x1201/0x1202/0x1203 update test.exe/BrLogAPI.dll/DIFX, 0x1204 uninstall and terminate, 0x1205 launch test.exe, 0x1302 load payload and store in registry, 0x1303 delete registry value, 0x1401/0x1402 retrieve/update proxy info, 0x1501 gather victim information, 0x1502 echo, plus 0x1301 and 0x1304 of unknown function). Up to 10 C2 destinations are supported (one observed). Elastic reports communication over HTTP (URI /Inform/logger/), named pipes or sockets across DNS, HTTPS, TCP, UDP and SOCKS with optional encryption. Reported victims are government organizations in Southern and Southeast Asia (ASEAN); Trend Micro's Earth Estries research (Botconf 2024, Into the Vapor) also tied a new Deed RAT variant to government and technology targets in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Africa, Germany and the United States. Attribution is not confirmed: PolySwarm cites Vapor Panda as a suspected, unconfirmed actor, and the hunt context names Space Pirates, APT41, RedHotel and TAG-22 as related ShadowPad-family users. No domains, IPs or C2 infrastructure were published in the sources.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-4846

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574.001 DLL

Execution

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Privilege Escalation

T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

stealth

T1574.001 DLL

Affected products and versions in BloodAlchemy RAT

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows systems reachable via compromised VPN maintenance accounts

Remediation for BloodAlchemy RAT

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for BrDifxapi.exe, BrLogAPI.dll and DIFX in C:\windows\ and for the Dell\BrDifxapi scheduled task
  • Review and rotate vendor/maintenance accounts on VPN devices and audit their recent logins
  • Search for 15-character [a-zA-Z] config files in C:\ProgramData\Store\ and test.exe under ...\Test\ directories

Workarounds

  • Restrict vendor VPN account access to just-in-time, monitored sessions
  • Block execution of signed binaries from C:\windows\ root via application control

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with detection for Early Bird (QueueUserAPC) injection into SearchIndexer.exe, wininit.exe, taskhost.exe, svchost.exe and taskeng.exe
  • Enforce MFA and access monitoring on third-party and maintenance accounts
  • Monitor for signed-binary DLL side-loading from non-standard directories

Weaknesses (CWE) in BloodAlchemy RAT

CWE-427

Timeline of BloodAlchemy RAT

  • ShadowPad first seen (July 2017); Deed RAT later assessed as its successor and linked to the Space Pirates group.
  • Positive Technologies reports Space Pirates using Deed RAT against Russian aerospace and other entities in 2022.
  • BloodAlchemy first observed in the wild per PolySwarm (May 2023), targeting government entities in Southern and Southeast Asia.
  • Trend Micro publishes Earth Estries campaign research (August 2023) on government and technology targets; a Deed RAT variant is later tied to it.
  • Elastic Security Labs publicly names and documents BLOODALCHEMY, used by the REF5961 intrusion set against ASEAN governments.
  • ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence publishes 'Malware Transmutation!', identifying BloodAlchemy as an evolved Deed RAT variant with ShadowPad lineage and documenting 15 commands and run modes 0-6.
  • PolySwarm reports BloodAlchemy targeting government entities in Asia, noting Vapor Panda as a suspected (unconfirmed) actor.

Sources cited for BloodAlchemy RAT

Detection coverage for TL-2026-4846

As of 2026-10-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4846 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
16 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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