Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-4932
Pixel 10 0-click exploit chain: Dolby UDC CVE-2025-54957 plus VPU driver mmap flaw (Project Zero)
Project Zero (Seth Jenkins) describes a 0-click exploit chain for the Google Pixel 10 (Tensor G5) that pairs the Dolby UDC integer-wraparound heap overflow CVE-2025-54957 with a kernel VPU driver flaw. The VPU mmap handler for Chips&Media Wave677DV silicon let userspace map arbitrary physical memory. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-4932, CVE-2025-54957, CVE-2025-36934, CVE-2026-0106 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Pixel 10 0-click chain, When a Door Closes, a Window Opens |
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS | 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Public proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-54957: 1.5% (72.9th percentile); CVE-2026-0106: 0.1% (1.6th percentile); CVE-2025-36934: 0.0% (73.3th percentile) |
| Affected products | Dolby Unified Decoder (UDC); Google Pixel 10 (Tensor G5); Chips&Media Wave677DV VPU driver (/dev/vpu) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-190, CWE-787 |
| Malware | RCS |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1106 Native API, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1404 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1664 Exploitation for Initial Access |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | government administration, technology, finance, news - media, civil society |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4932 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 8 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Pixel 10 0-click chain - mediacodec domain access to /dev/vpu (VPU driver mmap EoP)
Detects SELinux AVC records in which a process in the mediacodec or mediaswcodec domain touches /dev/vpu (vpu_device), the Chips&Media Wave677DV VPU node whose oversized mmap lets userspace map arbitrary physical memory including kernel .text/.data (Project Zero issue 463438263, likely CVE-2026-0106). The mmap syscall against the device node is a native-API call from the decoder sandbox, and cross-domain access from that sandbox to the VPU driver is the privilege-escalation pivot of the chain.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1404, T1068, T1106, T1575
- Data sources: android_auditd, android_logcat
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=android (sourcetype="android:auditd" OR sourcetype="android:logcat") earliest=-24h avc ("u:r:mediacodec:s0" OR "u:r:mediaswcodec:s0") ("/dev/vpu" OR "vpu_device")
| rex field=_raw "avc:[[:space:]]+(?<decision>denied|granted)[[:space:]]+[{][[:space:]]*(?<perms>[^}]+?)[[:space:]]*[}]"
| rex field=_raw "scontext=(?<scontext>[^ ]+)"
| rex field=_raw "tcontext=(?<tcontext>[^ ]+)[[:space:]]+tclass=(?<tclass>[^ ]+)"
| stats count AS events values(perms) AS perms values(scontext) AS scontext values(tcontext) AS tcontext min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host, decision, tclass
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SyslogMessage has "avc"
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("u:r:mediacodec:s0", "u:r:mediaswcodec:s0")
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("/dev/vpu", "vpu_device")
| extend Decision = extract("avc: +(denied|granted)", 1, SyslogMessage), Perms = extract("[{] *([^}]+?) *[}]", 1, SyslogMessage), TClass = extract("tclass=([^ ]+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Perms = make_set(Perms) by HostName, Decision, TClass
| project HostName, Decision, TClass, Perms, Events, FirstSeen, LastSeenSigma
title: Mediacodec Domain Access To VPU Device Node (Pixel 10 Chain)
id: 9a1d47e2-5c3b-4f08-a6d1-2b8e07c3f5d4
status: experimental
description: Detects SELinux AVC records where the mediacodec or mediaswcodec domain accesses /dev/vpu (vpu_device). The oversized mmap on the Wave677DV VPU driver maps arbitrary physical memory and is the kernel privilege escalation stage of the Pixel 10 0-click chain.
references:
- https://projectzero.google/2026/05/pixel-10-exploit.html
- https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/2026/2026-02-01
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-31
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1404
- attack.t1068
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1575
- cve.2026-0106
logsource:
product: android
service: logcat
detection:
keywords_avc:
- 'avc:'
keywords_domain:
- 'u:r:mediacodec:s0'
- 'u:r:mediaswcodec:s0'
keywords_vpu:
- '/dev/vpu'
- 'vpu_device'
condition: keywords_avc and keywords_domain and keywords_vpu
falsepositives:
- Legitimate hardware-accelerated video decode on policy builds where the codec HAL is permitted to open the VPU
- Vendor-specific SELinux policy differences across Pixel firmware builds
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate hardware video decode where the media HAL is allowed by policy to open /dev/vpu (granted records appear only with auditallow)
- Vendor SELinux policy differences across Pixel firmware builds producing benign denials
Tuning notes: Baseline normal mediacodec/VPU access on a patched fleet first; if hardware decode legitimately opens /dev/vpu, alert only on perms containing map or on tclass values other than chr_file, or on denials. The research notes on-device detection is limited and denials may not be logged if policy allows access, so pair with patch-level compliance (2026-02-05 or later).
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - repeated codec2/mediacodec crashes on one device (exploit retry pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - SELinux AVC for physical memory device access (/dev/mem, /dev/kmem) · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - decoder crash followed by VPU or sandbox-escape AVC within 15 minutes · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - crash in dap_cpdp_init / evo_priv within the Dolby DD+ decoder · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - SELinux control change from a media or app domain (kernel-level tamper) · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - shell execution or executable memory from the mediacodec sandbox · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain (CVE-2025-54957) - Dolby DD+ decoder crash in codec2 process · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 0-click chain - network socket activity from the mediacodec sandbox (C2 / egress pivot) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 8 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4932.
Technical analysis
The VPU issue was patched in the February 2026 Pixel bulletin, 71 days after the November 24, 2025 report.
Google Project Zero published 'A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10: When a Door Closes, a Window Opens' on 2026-05-13. It adapts the earlier Pixel 9 chain (published January 2026) to the Pixel 10 (Tensor G5). The research is a vulnerability analysis with public proof-of-concept material in the Project Zero tracker. The sources report no in-the-wild exploitation and no network IOCs.
Stage 1 is Dolby Unified Decoder (UDC) CVE-2025-54957, affecting UDC 4.5 through 4.13. When Evolution/EMDF data is processed by evo_priv.c from a DD+ (EAC3) bitstream, the decoder writes it into a buffer. The length calculation can wrap on 64-bit platforms, so the allocation is too small and the later bounds check on the write is ineffective. Later members of the enclosing struct, including a pointer written on the next syncframe, can then be overwritten. NVD scores it CVSS 3.1 9.8 (CWE-190, CWE-787). The trigger is 0-click: Google Messages automatically decodes incoming SMS and RCS audio attachments for transcription, which puts the Dolby decoder in the codec2 process (mediacodec SELinux domain, /vendor/lib64/libcodec2_soft_ddpdec.so on Pixel 9) on the 0-click attack surface. Pixel 10 hardening needed adaptation: because of RET PAC, the Pixel 9 approach of overwriting __stack_chk_fail was unavailable, so the exploit instead targets dap_cpdp_init, an initialization routine called once during decoder start-up, and offsets are recalculated for the Pixel 10 library version. Devices with a security patch level of December 2025 or earlier are affected by the Dolby stage.
Stage 2 is a kernel privilege escalation in the VPU driver for the Chips&Media Wave677DV video silicon in Tensor G5, exposed as /dev/vpu and reachable from the mediacodec context. By specifying a size larger than the register region in an mmap syscall, the caller can map as much physical memory as they want into userland, starting from the VPU MMIO register base. Because the kernel image's physical location is deterministic on Pixel, the .text and .data segments can be mapped and modified directly, which gives kernel code execution with minimal implementation effort. This is the Pixel 10 analogue of the Pixel 9 BigWave driver bug (issue 426567975, CVE-2025-36934). The VPU flaw is tracked as Project Zero issue 463438263, was reported 2025-11-24, and was patched in the February 2026 Pixel bulletin (71 days). The Pixel update bulletin published 2026-02-03 lists CVE-2026-0106, a High-severity EoP in the VPU driver, as its single fix; it appears to correspond to this issue, but the Project Zero article itself gives no CVE for the VPU bug.
Defensive notes: apply Pixel security patch level 2026-02-05 or later, which includes the VPU fix, and keep the Dolby UDC fix from the January 2026 patch level. Consider disabling automatic audio transcription or media auto-decode where policy allows. Detection on-device is limited. Telemetry of interest includes crashes or tombstones in the codec2/mediacodec process (libcodec2_soft_ddpdec.so), unexpected mediacodec access to /dev/vpu, and SELinux denials from the mediacodec domain. CISA KEV status for CVE-2025-54957 could not be confirmed from the feed fetch, so none is asserted. No CVSS exists in the source for the VPU issue, and HIGH severity is an analyst judgment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Execution
T1106 Native API; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1404 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Initial Access
Remediation
Patches
- Dolby UDC fix delivered by the January 2026 Pixel security patch level (Dolby advisory CVE-2025-54957, Oct 14 2025)
- VPU driver fix in the February 2026 Pixel Update Bulletin (patch level 2026-02-05)
Immediate actions
- Update Pixel devices to security patch level 2026-02-05 or later
- Hunt for mediacodec/codec2 crashes and tombstones involving libcodec2_soft_ddpdec.so
- Review SELinux denials originating from the mediacodec domain
Workarounds
- Disable automatic audio transcription / auto-download of RCS and SMS media attachments on unpatched devices
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce minimum Android security patch level through MDM compliance policy
- Restrict or disable automatic media decoding/transcription features in messaging apps where policy allows
- Retire Pixel models that no longer receive monthly security updates
Affected and fixed versions
- Dolby — Unified Decoder (UDC)
Vulnerable versions: 4.5 through 4.13
Fixed in: Per Dolby advisory dated 2025-10-14 - Google — Pixel 10 (Tensor G5)
Vulnerable versions: Security patch level 2025-12 or earlier (Dolby stage); Before 2026-02-05 (VPU driver stage)
Fixed in: Security patch level 2026-02-05 or later - Chips&Media — Wave677DV VPU driver (/dev/vpu)
Vulnerable versions: Builds before the February 2026 Pixel bulletin
Fixed in: Pixel patch level 2026-02-05
Timeline
- Dolby publishes security advisory for CVE-2025-54957 (UDC 4.5-4.13); Project Zero tracks it as issue 428075495
- CVE-2025-54957 published in NVD with CVSS 3.1 score 9.8 (CWE-190, CWE-787)
- Seth Jenkins reports the Pixel 10 VPU driver mmap flaw to Google (issue 463438263)
- Dolby UDC and BigWave (CVE-2025-36934) fixes land; Project Zero publishes the Pixel 9 0-click chain write-up in January 2026
- February 2026 Pixel Update Bulletin published; its single listed fix is a High-severity VPU driver EoP (CVE-2026-0106), patch level 2026-02-05 (71 days after report)
- Project Zero publishes the Pixel 10 0-click exploit chain analysis, with exploit code in the issue tracker
Sources cited
- NVD: CVE-2025-54957 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2025-10-20
- Debian Security Tracker: CVE-2025-54957 security-tracker.debian.org · Advisory · 2025-10-20
- A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10: When a Door Closes, a Window Opens projectzero.google · Research · 2026-05-13
- A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 9 (Part 1) projectzero.google · Research · 2026-01-05
- Dolby Security Advisory CVE-2025-54957 professional.dolby.com · Vendor report · 2025-10-14
- Pixel Update Bulletin: February 2026 source.android.com · Vendor report · 2026-02-03
- Project Zero issue 428075495 (Dolby UDC, exploit attachment) project-zero.issues.chromium.org · Proof of concept · 2025-10-14
- SC Media: Zero-click attacks possible with Dolby decoder bug scworld.com · News · 2025-10-21
- heise: Patchday Android - Driver vulnerability endangers Pixel smartphones heise.de · News · 2026-02-03
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.