Skip to navigation

Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-4969

Threat Intelligence Snapshot Week 37 2026: FortiGate CVE-2025-25249 Exploitation (PivotC2), StyleSmuggler Magento/Adobe Commerce Zero-Day (CVE-2026-75650), BigBear 2.0 AiTM and Related Campaigns

highACTIVE

QuoIntelligence's week 37 2026 snapshot reports active exploitation of FortiOS CVE-2025-25249 (CAPWAP daemon heap overflow, used to deploy the PivotC2 Node.js RAT) and the StyleSmuggler unauthenticated RCE zero-day (CVE-2026-75650) against Magento and Adobe Commerce. It also covers the BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 AiTM PhaaS against Microsoft 365, PREY-0058 help-desk vishing, the Shai-Hulud npm worm payload resurfacing, rogue ScreenConnect clients spreading a four-stage VBScript chain, and a phishing campaign using invisible Unicode tag characters. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-4969, CVE-2025-25249, CVE-2026-75650, CVE-2026-84869
Also known asStyleSmuggler, PivotC2, BigBear 2.0, Shai-Hulud
SeverityHIGH
CVSS7.4
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-25249 (added ), CVE-2026-75650 (added ), CVE-2026-84869 (added )
EPSSCVE-2026-75650: 3.9% (90.1th percentile); CVE-2025-25249: 1.6% (75.7th percentile); CVE-2026-84869: 0.6% (51.1th percentile)
Affected productsFortinet FortiOS; Fortinet FortiSwitchManager; Adobe Adobe Commerce / Magento Open Source; ConnectWise ScreenConnect client; Microsoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-122, CWE-94
AttributionUNC6671 (low confidence)
MalwarePivotC2, Shai-Hulud
Toolsevilginx2 - S9003
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.003 Cron, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1114.002 Remote Email Collection, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1213.002 Sharepoint and 9 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsinformation-technology, finance, government administration, health, energy, utilities, industrials, real-estate, communication-services, consumer-discretionary, retail-ecommerce, construction
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, india, Middle East, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4969 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Rogue ScreenConnect Four-Stage VBScript Loader Chain (1.vbs-4.vbs, PyTorchFix.ps1) — Post-Exploitation

Detects the Huntress-reported worm-like loader chain run on newly connected hosts of rogue ScreenConnect clients: wscript.exe or cscript.exe launching 1.vbs through 4.vbs, and the PowerShell stage that runs PyTorchFix.ps1 after runner.ps1 decrypts out.enc. Payloads in this chain include a ScreenConnect backdoor, UAC-bypass tooling, tunneling utilities and XMRig.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.005, T1140, T1219
  • Data sources: sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation windows
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval img=lower(Image), ci=lower(CommandLine)
| eval stage_vbs=if(match(img,"(wscript|cscript)[.]exe$") AND match(ci,"(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs"),1,0)
| eval stage_ps=if(match(ci,"pytorchfix[.]ps1") OR (match(ci,"runner[.]ps1") AND match(ci,"out[.]enc")),1,0)
| where stage_vbs=1 OR stage_ps=1
| stats sum(stage_vbs) as vbs_stage_events sum(stage_ps) as powershell_stage_events dc(CommandLine) as distinct_commands values(CommandLine) as commands values(ParentImage) as parent_images earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName in~ ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe') and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs')
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'PyTorchFix.ps1'
    or (ProcessCommandLine has 'runner.ps1' and ProcessCommandLine has 'out.enc')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Rogue ScreenConnect Four-Stage VBScript Loader Chain (1.vbs-4.vbs, PyTorchFix.ps1)
id: b2c4e6f8-1a3d-4e5f-8b7c-9d0e1f2a3b02
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe running 1.vbs to 4.vbs and the PowerShell stage that executes PyTorchFix.ps1 or runner.ps1 with out.enc, as seen in rogue ScreenConnect client campaigns reported by Huntress.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/rogue-screenconnect-clients-spread-four.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219
    - cve.2026-84869
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_vbs:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs'
    selection_pytorchfix:
        CommandLine|contains: 'PyTorchFix.ps1'
    selection_runner:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'runner.ps1'
            - 'out.enc'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators running legitimately named numbered VBScript files such as 1.vbs from a script share
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or legacy logon scripts that happen to be named 1.vbs to 4.vbs and run through wscript.exe
  • Software packaging or build scripts that use a runner.ps1 helper alongside an encrypted payload file named out.enc

Tuning notes: The numbered-VBS match is intentionally broad; restrict to hosts where a ScreenConnect client service is the ancestor, or to script paths under user profile or temp directories, to cut noise. Staging files value.txt, map.txt and out.enc in %TEMP% are useful pivots. Update ScreenConnect clients to 26.6.5 or later and audit for unsanctioned ScreenConnect installs.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • FortiGate CAPWAP Daemon (CVE-2025-25249) Exploitation Attempts and cw_acd Faults — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • StyleSmuggler Rust Backdoor fc-cache/chronyd/kworker Masquerade and Cron Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID AiTM Session Token Replay from a Different IP/ASN (BigBear 2.0 / PREY-0058) — Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • BigBear 2.0 and PREY-0058 AiTM Phishing Domains and Evilginx2 VPS Nodes — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud npm Worm Payload Packages Installed (feishu-docx-mcp, bmc-i18n-extract-cli, blueai-cli, bmc-translate-utils) — Supply Chain · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rogue ScreenConnect Client C2 Infrastructure ([indicator], [indicator]:8041, [indicator]) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • StyleSmuggler (CVE-2026-75650) Magento Poisoned var/report, var/log or Media PHP Access — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • StyleSmuggler Rust Backdoor NTP-Masqueraded C2 and Known C2 Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4969.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • IP address: 99.84.67[.]186
  • Domain: ntp[.]timesync[.]to
  • File hash: e315687a1dfe61ef4a5a5642214db6d3b2b05d81391285eebc2af664641a26a7

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The QuoIntelligence snapshot (coverage 3-9 September 2026, published 10 September 2026) is a weekly roundup; the public page is a headline summary and the full detail is behind a newsletter subscription. This record therefore combines the snapshot with the primary and secondary sources for each item it names.

FortiGate / CVE-2025-25249: a heap-based buffer overflow in the CAPWAP Wireless Aggregate Controller Daemon (cw_acd) of FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager lets a remote unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary code or commands through crafted requests. Fortinet disclosed and patched it on 2026-01-13 (FG-IR-25-084). SecurityWeek and SOCRadar report exploitation since at least July 2026 to deploy PivotC2, a Node.js post-exploitation RAT for FortiGate offering an interactive shell, traffic tunneling, network scanning and configuration harvesting. Reported scale is over 30,000 targeted IP addresses and 178 confirmed infected devices, mainly US entities, with at least two data-exfiltration incidents. The suspected operator is a Russian-speaking cybercrime group and the malware may be AI-assisted. CISA added the CVE to KEV on 2026-09-09 (federal remediation deadline of 3 days under BOD 26-04 per SecurityWeek). Sources disagree on CVSS (7.4 per SecurityWeek, 9.8 per aggregators); no public IOCs were published for PivotC2.

StyleSmuggler / CVE-2026-75650: an unauthenticated RCE in Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce (2.4.4-2.4.9 supported lines; B2B 1.3.3-1.5.3; unsupported 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.0-2.4.3 also vulnerable), CVSS 10.0 per Sansec. PHP is injected into Magento's template system through 'styles' properties, via a generated failure report and execution through a failed-payment email or direct GraphQL requests reaching poisoned files in var/report or var/log. Sansec saw exploitation from 2026-09-04. A Rust backdoor masquerades as [kworker/u:8:0] (first variant), fc-cache (second variant, 2026-09-06) or chronyd and disguises its C2 traffic as NTP replies over UDP 123. The fc-cache variant copies itself to ~/.cache/fontconfig/fc-cache, installs a cron entry (13,43 * * * *) and writes a /tmp/.fc_<8hex>.lock PID file. Secondary tooling includes gs-netcat and WraithC2. Adobe released APSB26-146 with hotfix VULN-39341 on 2026-09-07.

BigBear 2.0 is an Evilginx2-based PhaaS ('General Boss') against Microsoft 365 using the 'offy' phishlet, with JavaScript injections that disable FIDO2/WebAuthn, block Microsoft anti-phishing telemetry and force Keep-Me-Signed-In. CloudSEK counted 5,137 records (4,148 session cookies, 1,032 plaintext passwords) across 461 organizations in 40+ countries, 42 Vultr VPS nodes, and Telegram bot exfiltration. PREY-0058 (Arctic Wolf; overlaps UNC6671) calls executives while impersonating IT help desk, directs them to passkey/MFA-themed AiTM domains, then replays stolen tokens from residential proxies (NodeMaven in all cases) to take data from Exchange Online, SharePoint and OneDrive for extortion.

The remaining items: Shai-Hulud npm worm payload resurfaced on 2026-09-07 in four packages, slipping past npm publish-time scanning; Huntress-reported rogue ScreenConnect clients (August 2026) run a worm-like 1.vbs-4.vbs chain on newly connected hosts, with payloads including a ScreenConnect backdoor, UAC-bypass tooling, tunneling utilities and XMRig (ConnectWise fixed CVE-2026-84869 in client 26.6.5); and a Microsoft-reported finance-themed phishing campaign inserting invisible Unicode Tags-block characters into keywords to defeat keyword filters (peak about 2.37 million messages per day, 148 sender domains). The QuoIntelligence snapshot itself gives no attribution, CVSS or IOCs; all values here come from the cited secondary sources and are not independently verified.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Persistence

T1053.003 Cron

Execution

T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.007 JavaScript

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Collection

T1114.002 Remote Email Collection; T1213.002 Sharepoint

Impact

T1496.001 Compute Hijacking

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Lateral Movement

T1550.004 Web Session Cookie

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.003 Virtual Private Server

Remediation

Patches

  • Fortinet FG-IR-25-084 (FortiOS 7.6.4, 7.4.9, 7.2.12, 7.0.18, 6.4.17; FortiSwitchManager 7.2.7, 7.0.6)
  • Adobe APSB26-146 hotfix VULN-39341
  • ConnectWise ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 (CVE-2026-84869)

Immediate actions

  • Patch FortiOS to 7.6.4/7.4.9/7.2.12/7.0.18/6.4.17+ and FortiSwitchManager to 7.2.7/7.0.6+; hunt FortiGate devices for PivotC2 (Node.js processes, unexpected shell/tunnel activity)
  • Apply Adobe hotfix VULN-39341 (APSB26-146) on Magento/Adobe Commerce; hunt for kworker/fc-cache/chronyd processes, PHP files under pub/media and burst of 'Payment Transaction Failed Reminder' emails
  • Rotate Magento encryption keys, admin passwords, API tokens and database credentials on suspected compromise
  • Revoke Microsoft 365 sessions and refresh tokens and reset passwords for users reaching BigBear/PREY-0058 domains; block listed domains and IPs
  • Disable TransferFiles/TransferFilesInSession in ScreenConnect roles; update ScreenConnect client to 26.6.5+; audit for unsanctioned ScreenConnect clients and wscript.exe running 1.vbs-4.vbs
  • Audit npm lockfiles and CI for the four Shai-Hulud packages and rotate developer/CI secrets if installed

Workarounds

  • FortiOS: remove fabric access or disallow access to the CAPWAP daemon where patching is not immediately possible
  • Magento: run Sansec Shield / eComscan 1.9.7+ for known variants until the hotfix is applied
  • Educate executives on help-desk vishing; verify any IT-initiated MFA/passkey registration call out of band

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn) and Conditional Access requiring compliant devices
  • Restrict sign-ins from residential proxy and hosting networks (e.g., NodeMaven) and alert on impossible-travel/token replay
  • Normalize Unicode and strip Tags-block characters (U+E0000 range) before email keyword/regex/NLP inspection
  • Restrict management-plane and CAPWAP/fabric access on FortiGate; enforce npm install-time controls and package cooldowns

Affected and fixed versions

  • Fortinet — FortiOS
    Vulnerable versions: 6.4.0-6.4.16; 7.0.0-7.0.17; 7.2.0-7.2.11; 7.4.0-7.4.8; 7.6.0-7.6.3
    Fixed in: 6.4.17; 7.0.18; 7.2.12; 7.4.9; 7.6.4
  • Fortinet — FortiSwitchManager
    Vulnerable versions: 7.0.0-7.0.5; 7.2.0-7.2.6
    Fixed in: 7.0.6; 7.2.7
  • Adobe — Adobe Commerce / Magento Open Source
    Vulnerable versions: 2.4.4-2.4.9; B2B 1.3.3-1.5.3; 2.2, 2.3, 2.4.0-2.4.3 (unsupported)
    Fixed in: Hotfix VULN-39341 (APSB26-146)
  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect client
    Vulnerable versions: prior to 26.6.5
    Fixed in: 26.6.5
  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID
    Vulnerable versions: Accounts using phishable MFA (non-FIDO2)

Timeline

  • Fortinet discloses and patches CVE-2025-25249 (FG-IR-25-084), a heap overflow in the CAPWAP daemon of FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager; not known to be exploited at the time
  • CloudSEK reports first detection of BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 PhaaS activity in June 2026 (exact day not stated)
  • Exploitation of CVE-2025-25249 to deploy PivotC2 ongoing since at least July 2026 (exact day not stated); BigBear operators also begin deleting VPS nodes from late July
  • Huntress observes rogue ScreenConnect clients running the 1.vbs-4.vbs loader chain on newly connected hosts during August 2026 (exact day not stated)
  • Microsoft publishes research on finance-themed phishing hiding keywords with invisible Unicode Tags-block characters; the QuoIntelligence coverage week begins
  • Sansec observes in-the-wild StyleSmuggler exploitation against Magento/Adobe Commerce; first Rust backdoor variant (kworker disguise) deployed
  • Sansec publishes an early advisory on StyleSmuggler because stores are being compromised in real time
  • Second StyleSmuggler backdoor variant (fc-cache disguise, cron persistence, NTP-masqueraded C2) appears
  • Adobe releases APSB26-146 hotfix VULN-39341 for CVE-2026-75650; four npm packages carrying the Shai-Hulud payload uploaded within one hour, bypassing publish-time scanning
  • Active exploitation of CVE-2025-25249 confirmed; Arctic Wolf and Help Net Security publish PREY-0058 help-desk vishing reporting
  • CISA adds CVE-2025-25249 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (SecurityWeek reports the same week; date per aggregator reporting)
  • QuoIntelligence publishes the Week 37 2026 Threat Intelligence Snapshot

Sources cited

More from UNC6671

Other reports on CVE-2025-25249

Other reports on CVE-2026-75650

Previous and next in vulnerability

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats