Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-4969
Threat Intelligence Snapshot Week 37 2026: FortiGate CVE-2025-25249 Exploitation (PivotC2), StyleSmuggler Magento/Adobe Commerce Zero-Day (CVE-2026-75650), BigBear 2.0 AiTM and Related Campaigns
QuoIntelligence's week 37 2026 snapshot reports active exploitation of FortiOS CVE-2025-25249 (CAPWAP daemon heap overflow, used to deploy the PivotC2 Node.js RAT) and the StyleSmuggler unauthenticated RCE zero-day (CVE-2026-75650) against Magento and Adobe Commerce. It also covers the BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 AiTM PhaaS against Microsoft 365, PREY-0058 help-desk vishing, the Shai-Hulud npm worm payload resurfacing, rogue ScreenConnect clients spreading a four-stage VBScript chain, and a phishing campaign using invisible Unicode tag characters. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-4969, CVE-2025-25249, CVE-2026-75650, CVE-2026-84869 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | StyleSmuggler, PivotC2, BigBear 2.0, Shai-Hulud |
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS | 7.4 |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-25249 (added ), CVE-2026-75650 (added ), CVE-2026-84869 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2026-75650: 3.9% (90.1th percentile); CVE-2025-25249: 1.6% (75.7th percentile); CVE-2026-84869: 0.6% (51.1th percentile) |
| Affected products | Fortinet FortiOS; Fortinet FortiSwitchManager; Adobe Adobe Commerce / Magento Open Source; ConnectWise ScreenConnect client; Microsoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-122, CWE-94 |
| Attribution | UNC6671 (low confidence) |
| Malware | PivotC2, Shai-Hulud |
| Tools | evilginx2 - S9003 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.003 Cron, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1114.002 Remote Email Collection, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1213.002 Sharepoint and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | information-technology, finance, government administration, health, energy, utilities, industrials, real-estate, communication-services, consumer-discretionary, retail-ecommerce, construction |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, india, Middle East, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 12 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4969 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Rogue ScreenConnect Four-Stage VBScript Loader Chain (1.vbs-4.vbs, PyTorchFix.ps1) — Post-Exploitation
Detects the Huntress-reported worm-like loader chain run on newly connected hosts of rogue ScreenConnect clients: wscript.exe or cscript.exe launching 1.vbs through 4.vbs, and the PowerShell stage that runs PyTorchFix.ps1 after runner.ps1 decrypts out.enc. Payloads in this chain include a ScreenConnect backdoor, UAC-bypass tooling, tunneling utilities and XMRig.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1059.005, T1140, T1219
- Data sources: sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation windows
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval img=lower(Image), ci=lower(CommandLine)
| eval stage_vbs=if(match(img,"(wscript|cscript)[.]exe$") AND match(ci,"(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs"),1,0)
| eval stage_ps=if(match(ci,"pytorchfix[.]ps1") OR (match(ci,"runner[.]ps1") AND match(ci,"out[.]enc")),1,0)
| where stage_vbs=1 OR stage_ps=1
| stats sum(stage_vbs) as vbs_stage_events sum(stage_ps) as powershell_stage_events dc(CommandLine) as distinct_commands values(CommandLine) as commands values(ParentImage) as parent_images earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName in~ ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe') and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs')
or ProcessCommandLine has 'PyTorchFix.ps1'
or (ProcessCommandLine has 'runner.ps1' and ProcessCommandLine has 'out.enc')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Rogue ScreenConnect Four-Stage VBScript Loader Chain (1.vbs-4.vbs, PyTorchFix.ps1)
id: b2c4e6f8-1a3d-4e5f-8b7c-9d0e1f2a3b02
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe running 1.vbs to 4.vbs and the PowerShell stage that executes PyTorchFix.ps1 or runner.ps1 with out.enc, as seen in rogue ScreenConnect client campaigns reported by Huntress.
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/rogue-screenconnect-clients-spread-four.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-01
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219
- cve.2026-84869
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_vbs:
Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
CommandLine|re: '(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])[1-4][.]vbs'
selection_pytorchfix:
CommandLine|contains: 'PyTorchFix.ps1'
selection_runner:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'runner.ps1'
- 'out.enc'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators running legitimately named numbered VBScript files such as 1.vbs from a script share
level: highKnown false positives:
- Administrators or legacy logon scripts that happen to be named 1.vbs to 4.vbs and run through wscript.exe
- Software packaging or build scripts that use a runner.ps1 helper alongside an encrypted payload file named out.enc
Tuning notes: The numbered-VBS match is intentionally broad; restrict to hosts where a ScreenConnect client service is the ancestor, or to script paths under user profile or temp directories, to cut noise. Staging files value.txt, map.txt and out.enc in %TEMP% are useful pivots. Update ScreenConnect clients to 26.6.5 or later and audit for unsanctioned ScreenConnect installs.
- FortiGate CAPWAP Daemon (CVE-2025-25249) Exploitation Attempts and cw_acd Faults — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- StyleSmuggler Rust Backdoor fc-cache/chronyd/kworker Masquerade and Cron Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Entra ID AiTM Session Token Replay from a Different IP/ASN (BigBear 2.0 / PREY-0058) — Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- BigBear 2.0 and PREY-0058 AiTM Phishing Domains and Evilginx2 VPS Nodes — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
- Shai-Hulud npm Worm Payload Packages Installed (feishu-docx-mcp, bmc-i18n-extract-cli, blueai-cli, bmc-translate-utils) — Supply Chain · unlock with TL Creds
- Rogue ScreenConnect Client C2 Infrastructure ([indicator], [indicator]:8041, [indicator]) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- StyleSmuggler (CVE-2026-75650) Magento Poisoned var/report, var/log or Media PHP Access — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- StyleSmuggler Rust Backdoor NTP-Masqueraded C2 and Known C2 Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4969.
Sample indicators (3 of 30)
- IP address:
99.84.67[.]186 - Domain:
ntp[.]timesync[.]to - File hash:
e315687a1dfe61ef4a5a5642214db6d3b2b05d81391285eebc2af664641a26a7
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The QuoIntelligence snapshot (coverage 3-9 September 2026, published 10 September 2026) is a weekly roundup; the public page is a headline summary and the full detail is behind a newsletter subscription. This record therefore combines the snapshot with the primary and secondary sources for each item it names.
FortiGate / CVE-2025-25249: a heap-based buffer overflow in the CAPWAP Wireless Aggregate Controller Daemon (cw_acd) of FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager lets a remote unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary code or commands through crafted requests. Fortinet disclosed and patched it on 2026-01-13 (FG-IR-25-084). SecurityWeek and SOCRadar report exploitation since at least July 2026 to deploy PivotC2, a Node.js post-exploitation RAT for FortiGate offering an interactive shell, traffic tunneling, network scanning and configuration harvesting. Reported scale is over 30,000 targeted IP addresses and 178 confirmed infected devices, mainly US entities, with at least two data-exfiltration incidents. The suspected operator is a Russian-speaking cybercrime group and the malware may be AI-assisted. CISA added the CVE to KEV on 2026-09-09 (federal remediation deadline of 3 days under BOD 26-04 per SecurityWeek). Sources disagree on CVSS (7.4 per SecurityWeek, 9.8 per aggregators); no public IOCs were published for PivotC2.
StyleSmuggler / CVE-2026-75650: an unauthenticated RCE in Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce (2.4.4-2.4.9 supported lines; B2B 1.3.3-1.5.3; unsupported 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.0-2.4.3 also vulnerable), CVSS 10.0 per Sansec. PHP is injected into Magento's template system through 'styles' properties, via a generated failure report and execution through a failed-payment email or direct GraphQL requests reaching poisoned files in var/report or var/log. Sansec saw exploitation from 2026-09-04. A Rust backdoor masquerades as [kworker/u:8:0] (first variant), fc-cache (second variant, 2026-09-06) or chronyd and disguises its C2 traffic as NTP replies over UDP 123. The fc-cache variant copies itself to ~/.cache/fontconfig/fc-cache, installs a cron entry (13,43 * * * *) and writes a /tmp/.fc_<8hex>.lock PID file. Secondary tooling includes gs-netcat and WraithC2. Adobe released APSB26-146 with hotfix VULN-39341 on 2026-09-07.
BigBear 2.0 is an Evilginx2-based PhaaS ('General Boss') against Microsoft 365 using the 'offy' phishlet, with JavaScript injections that disable FIDO2/WebAuthn, block Microsoft anti-phishing telemetry and force Keep-Me-Signed-In. CloudSEK counted 5,137 records (4,148 session cookies, 1,032 plaintext passwords) across 461 organizations in 40+ countries, 42 Vultr VPS nodes, and Telegram bot exfiltration. PREY-0058 (Arctic Wolf; overlaps UNC6671) calls executives while impersonating IT help desk, directs them to passkey/MFA-themed AiTM domains, then replays stolen tokens from residential proxies (NodeMaven in all cases) to take data from Exchange Online, SharePoint and OneDrive for extortion.
The remaining items: Shai-Hulud npm worm payload resurfaced on 2026-09-07 in four packages, slipping past npm publish-time scanning; Huntress-reported rogue ScreenConnect clients (August 2026) run a worm-like 1.vbs-4.vbs chain on newly connected hosts, with payloads including a ScreenConnect backdoor, UAC-bypass tooling, tunneling utilities and XMRig (ConnectWise fixed CVE-2026-84869 in client 26.6.5); and a Microsoft-reported finance-themed phishing campaign inserting invisible Unicode Tags-block characters into keywords to defeat keyword filters (peak about 2.37 million messages per day, 148 sender domains). The QuoIntelligence snapshot itself gives no attribution, CVSS or IOCs; all values here come from the cited secondary sources and are not independently verified.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Persistence
Execution
T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.007 JavaScript
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
Command and Control
T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1219 Remote Access Tools
Collection
T1114.002 Remote Email Collection; T1213.002 Sharepoint
Impact
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Lateral Movement
Resource Development
Remediation
Patches
- Fortinet FG-IR-25-084 (FortiOS 7.6.4, 7.4.9, 7.2.12, 7.0.18, 6.4.17; FortiSwitchManager 7.2.7, 7.0.6)
- Adobe APSB26-146 hotfix VULN-39341
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 (CVE-2026-84869)
Immediate actions
- Patch FortiOS to 7.6.4/7.4.9/7.2.12/7.0.18/6.4.17+ and FortiSwitchManager to 7.2.7/7.0.6+; hunt FortiGate devices for PivotC2 (Node.js processes, unexpected shell/tunnel activity)
- Apply Adobe hotfix VULN-39341 (APSB26-146) on Magento/Adobe Commerce; hunt for kworker/fc-cache/chronyd processes, PHP files under pub/media and burst of 'Payment Transaction Failed Reminder' emails
- Rotate Magento encryption keys, admin passwords, API tokens and database credentials on suspected compromise
- Revoke Microsoft 365 sessions and refresh tokens and reset passwords for users reaching BigBear/PREY-0058 domains; block listed domains and IPs
- Disable TransferFiles/TransferFilesInSession in ScreenConnect roles; update ScreenConnect client to 26.6.5+; audit for unsanctioned ScreenConnect clients and wscript.exe running 1.vbs-4.vbs
- Audit npm lockfiles and CI for the four Shai-Hulud packages and rotate developer/CI secrets if installed
Workarounds
- FortiOS: remove fabric access or disallow access to the CAPWAP daemon where patching is not immediately possible
- Magento: run Sansec Shield / eComscan 1.9.7+ for known variants until the hotfix is applied
- Educate executives on help-desk vishing; verify any IT-initiated MFA/passkey registration call out of band
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn) and Conditional Access requiring compliant devices
- Restrict sign-ins from residential proxy and hosting networks (e.g., NodeMaven) and alert on impossible-travel/token replay
- Normalize Unicode and strip Tags-block characters (U+E0000 range) before email keyword/regex/NLP inspection
- Restrict management-plane and CAPWAP/fabric access on FortiGate; enforce npm install-time controls and package cooldowns
Affected and fixed versions
- Fortinet — FortiOS
Vulnerable versions: 6.4.0-6.4.16; 7.0.0-7.0.17; 7.2.0-7.2.11; 7.4.0-7.4.8; 7.6.0-7.6.3
Fixed in: 6.4.17; 7.0.18; 7.2.12; 7.4.9; 7.6.4 - Fortinet — FortiSwitchManager
Vulnerable versions: 7.0.0-7.0.5; 7.2.0-7.2.6
Fixed in: 7.0.6; 7.2.7 - Adobe — Adobe Commerce / Magento Open Source
Vulnerable versions: 2.4.4-2.4.9; B2B 1.3.3-1.5.3; 2.2, 2.3, 2.4.0-2.4.3 (unsupported)
Fixed in: Hotfix VULN-39341 (APSB26-146) - ConnectWise — ScreenConnect client
Vulnerable versions: prior to 26.6.5
Fixed in: 26.6.5 - Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID
Vulnerable versions: Accounts using phishable MFA (non-FIDO2)
Timeline
- Fortinet discloses and patches CVE-2025-25249 (FG-IR-25-084), a heap overflow in the CAPWAP daemon of FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager; not known to be exploited at the time
- CloudSEK reports first detection of BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 PhaaS activity in June 2026 (exact day not stated)
- Exploitation of CVE-2025-25249 to deploy PivotC2 ongoing since at least July 2026 (exact day not stated); BigBear operators also begin deleting VPS nodes from late July
- Huntress observes rogue ScreenConnect clients running the 1.vbs-4.vbs loader chain on newly connected hosts during August 2026 (exact day not stated)
- Microsoft publishes research on finance-themed phishing hiding keywords with invisible Unicode Tags-block characters; the QuoIntelligence coverage week begins
- Sansec observes in-the-wild StyleSmuggler exploitation against Magento/Adobe Commerce; first Rust backdoor variant (kworker disguise) deployed
- Sansec publishes an early advisory on StyleSmuggler because stores are being compromised in real time
- Second StyleSmuggler backdoor variant (fc-cache disguise, cron persistence, NTP-masqueraded C2) appears
- Adobe releases APSB26-146 hotfix VULN-39341 for CVE-2026-75650; four npm packages carrying the Shai-Hulud payload uploaded within one hour, bypassing publish-time scanning
- Active exploitation of CVE-2025-25249 confirmed; Arctic Wolf and Help Net Security publish PREY-0058 help-desk vishing reporting
- CISA adds CVE-2025-25249 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (SecurityWeek reports the same week; date per aggregator reporting)
- QuoIntelligence publishes the Week 37 2026 Threat Intelligence Snapshot
Sources cited
- Arctic Wolf - CVE-2025-25249 Security Bulletin (Fortinet FG-IR-25-084) arcticwolf.com · Advisory · 2026-01-14
- Arctic Wolf - Active Cloud Data Theft and Extortion Campaign Targeting Microsoft 365 and SaaS (PREY-0058) arcticwolf.com · Advisory · 2026-09-08
- QuoIntelligence - Threat Intelligence Snapshot: Week 37, 2026 quointelligence.eu · Research · 2026-09-10
- SOCRadar - CVE-2025-25249 PivotC2 FortiGate RAT socradar.io · Research · 2026-09-09
- Sansec - StyleSmuggler: Magento/Adobe Commerce 0-day (CVE-2026-75650) sansec.io · Research · 2026-09-05
- CloudSEK - Tracking BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 Phishing Campaign cloudsek.com · Research · 2026-09-08
- SecurityWeek - Fortinet Code Execution Flaw Exploited in PivotC2 RAT Attacks SecurityWeek · News · 2026-09-10
- SecurityWeek - Adobe Commerce Zero-Day Exploited to Backdoor Online Stores SecurityWeek · News · 2026-09-08
- Help Net Security - IT help-desk vishing tricks executives into handing over Microsoft 365 access Help Net Security · News · 2026-09-08
- The Hacker News - Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Spread Four-Stage VBScript Chain (Huntress) The Hacker News · News · 2026-09-07
- SC Media - Shai-Hulud npm worm resurfaces, bypassing security scans scworld.com · News · 2026-09-08
- BleepingComputer - Attackers conceal phishing lures using invisible Unicode characters BleepingComputer · News · 2026-09-03
More from UNC6671
- Ongoing Help Desk Voice Phishing (Vishing) Campaign with AitM MFA Relay Targeting Canadian Organizations (AL26-028) - UNC6671 / BlackFile
- AI Voice-Cloning Vishing Wave Hits Point72, Citadel, Two Sigma, Millennium Management — Tied to UNC6671 (BlackFile/Redact) Extortion Group
- UNC6671 Rebrands BlackFile into Redact, Pink, Helix, Falcon: Vishing + AiTM Campaign Steals M365/Okta Data for Extortion
- UNC6671 Vishing Campaign Impersonates IT Support to Target 200+ Financial and Enterprise Organizations for Extortion
- UNC6671 Automates Microsoft 365 Data Theft via Vishing-Driven AiTM Phishing and Session Hijacking
- ShinyHunters Leaks 5.1 Million Panera Bread Customer Records
Other reports on CVE-2025-25249
- NCSC CTO Weekly Summary (week ending 2026-09-13): actively exploited Cisco FMC (CVE-2026-20079/20316), PaperCut NG/MF (CVE-2026-81578/82078), MikroTik RouterOS and FortiGate (CVE-2025-25249) flaws; NetScaler SAML bypass (CVE-2026-19490); BlueMoon exploit kit
- Multiple Vulnerabilities in Fortigate NGFW on RUGGEDCOM APE1808 Devices (SSA-864900) — Including Actively Exploited FortiCloud SSO Bypass (CVE-2025-59718/-59719) and FortiOS Heap Overflow (CVE-2025-25249)
- CVE-2025-25249: Fortinet Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Exploited to Deploy PivotC2 RAT on FortiGate Devices
Other reports on CVE-2026-75650
- Fake Kernel Threads Hiding Backdoors on Linux Servers and Appliances (StyleSmuggler, Tengu, Cyclops Blink; CVE-2026-75650, CVE-2026-20079)
- Critical BlockStrap flaw (CVE-2026-103849) lets attackers run code on Magento / Adobe Commerce servers
- StyleSmuggler — Unpatched Magento and Adobe Commerce Zero-Day Exploited to Backdoor Online Stores
Previous and next in vulnerability
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.