Skip to navigation

Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-5210

CVE-2026-25600: Hard-coded Cryptographic Secret in Trac d.o.o. PDBM (Process Database Manager) 1.0.0.0 Enables Administrative Credential Decryption

mediumPATCHED

Trac d.o.o. PDBM (Process Database Manager) 1.0.0.0 embeds a static cryptographic secret in its executable (CWE-798) that decrypts the administrative credentials stored in its configuration file. A local attacker with high privileges can extract the secret and gain full administrative access to PDBM. First disclosed .

Key facts for Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

IdentifiersTL-2026-5210, CVE-2026-25600
SeverityMEDIUM
CVSS6.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
Exploitation statusNo known exploitation
EPSSCVE-2026-25600: 0.0% (1.6th percentile)
Affected productsTrac d.o.o. PDBM (Process Database Manager)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-798
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1552.001 Credentials In Files
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage for Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

As of 2026-11-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-5210 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 7 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: CVE-2026-25600 PDBM.exe Binary Inspected by Reverse-Engineering or Byte-Dump Tooling — Exploitation

Detects Sysmon process creation where a command line references PDBM and the process is a binary-analysis, string-extraction or dump tool (strings, certutil -encodehex, procdump, Ghidra, x64dbg, dnSpy, ILSpy, de4dot, FLOSS) or a PowerShell byte-read primitive (Format-Hex, ReadAllBytes, AsByteStream, -Encoding Byte). This is the first step of CVE-2026-25600 (CWE-798): the static cryptographic secret embedded in PDBM.exe 1.0.0.0 is identical across installations and is recovered by reading the executable. Behaviour-first hunting lead derived from the described exploitation method; no in-the-wild sample is known.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1005, T1059.001, T1140, T1552.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_process_creation
  • Severity: medium
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 CommandLine="*PDBM*" | where match(Image,"(?i)(strings|strings64|certutil|xxd|procdump|procdump64|ghidra|x64dbg|x32dbg|ollydbg|ida|ida64|dnspy|ilspy|dotpeek64|de4dot|floss|pestudio)[.]exe$") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)(Format-Hex|ReadAllBytes|AsByteStream|-Encoding[ ]+Byte|encodehex)") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host User Image ParentImage | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where ProcessCommandLine has "PDBM" | where FileName in~ ("strings.exe", "strings64.exe", "certutil.exe", "xxd.exe", "procdump.exe", "procdump64.exe", "ghidra.exe", "x64dbg.exe", "x32dbg.exe", "ollydbg.exe", "ida.exe", "ida64.exe", "dnspy.exe", "ilspy.exe", "dotpeek64.exe", "de4dot.exe", "floss.exe", "pestudio.exe") or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(Format-Hex|ReadAllBytes|AsByteStream|-Encoding\s+Byte|encodehex)" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: PDBM.exe Inspected by Binary Analysis or Byte-Dump Tooling (CVE-2026-25600)
id: 3f6b1c2e-8a41-4d7b-9c52-5e1a7d0b2a11
status: experimental
description: Detects binary-analysis, string-extraction or byte-read tooling targeting PDBM.exe, the first step of recovering the hard-coded cryptographic secret described in CVE-2026-25600 (CWE-798).
references:
    - https://www.cert.si/en/cve-2026-25600/
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25600
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026-11-04
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - cve.2026.25600
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains: 'PDBM'
    selection_tool_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\strings.exe'
            - '\strings64.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\xxd.exe'
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
            - '\ghidra.exe'
            - '\x64dbg.exe'
            - '\x32dbg.exe'
            - '\ollydbg.exe'
            - '\ida.exe'
            - '\ida64.exe'
            - '\dnspy.exe'
            - '\ilspy.exe'
            - '\dotpeek64.exe'
            - '\de4dot.exe'
            - '\floss.exe'
            - '\pestudio.exe'
    selection_tool_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Format-Hex'
            - 'ReadAllBytes'
            - 'AsByteStream'
            - 'Encoding Byte'
            - 'encodehex'
    condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_tool_*
falsepositives:
    - Vendor, QA or authorised penetration-test staff analysing PDBM.exe
    - Software-packaging or integrity-check scripts that hex-dump the executable
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Authorised penetration testers or vendor staff reverse-engineering PDBM.exe
  • Packaging or integrity-check scripts that hex-dump or hash the PDBM executable

Tuning notes: Allowlist known analyst workstations and approved test accounts by host/User. Widen the tool list with local reversing tools. Pair with the SHA-256 hash detection (KQL-001) to scope alerts to hosts that actually run the vulnerable 1.0.0.0 build.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • CVE-2026-25600 Vulnerable PDBM 1.0.0.0 Executable Present by SHA-256 — Exploitation Exposure · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 Command-Line Read or Copy of PDBM Configuration File — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 [indicator] Spawning Command Interpreters or LOLBins — Admin Interface Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 PDBM Executable or Config Copied to User-Writable Staging Path — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 PowerShell Decryption Routine Referencing PDBM Credentials — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 PDBM Configuration Modified by Non-PDBM Process — Administrative Credential Tampering · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 PDBM Configuration File Read by Non-PDBM Process — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • CVE-2026-25600 [indicator] Launched by Previously Unseen Account — Valid Account Use · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise for Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

As of 2026-11-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 7 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-5210.

Sample indicators (1 of 7)

  • File hash: 62901707602CB8822B7A84B1B361961C0C0562D24E6CDE4F4A39016ACC51F1CE

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 7 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

7 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

How Trac PDBM hard-coded secret works

Fixed in 2.0.0.0, available since 2020; no known exploits per the advisory.

SI-CERT published an advisory on 2026-05-29 (CVE published in NVD on 2026-06-01) describing a credential exposure vulnerability in PDBM (Process Database Manager) from Trac d.o.o. The product embeds a hard-coded cryptographic secret directly within its executable. The secret is used by the application's internal encryption and decryption routines, including the mechanism that decrypts the credentials stored in the application's configuration file.

Because the secret is constant across installations, any attacker with sufficient local privileges can extract it from the binary, use it to decrypt the stored password, and authenticate as the user defined in the configuration file. That user is configured with administrative privileges, so the result is full access to PDBM's management interface and its underlying operational functions.

The CVSS 3.1 vector is AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (6.4 MEDIUM): exploitation is local-only, requires high privileges and non-trivial conditions, but impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability is high. The weakness is classified as CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials). Affected: PDBM 1.0.0.0 (NVD: versions below 2.0.0.0). Fixed: PDBM 2.0.0.0, which uses hash-based authentication and has been available since 2020. The advisory states no public exploits were known at the time of publication, and the hunt review found no CISA KEV listing and no public PoC.

Coordinated disclosure timeline: initial report 2026-01-15, detailed technical information 2026-01-21, vendor notification 2026-02-03, advisory 2026-05-29. The finding is credited to Mijo Mišić, penetration tester at Combis d.o.o., Croatia. The only indicator published is the SHA-256 of the vulnerable executable. No threat actor is associated with this vulnerability and no network infrastructure is identified. Recommended actions: upgrade to 2.0.0.0, restrict access to the application environment and configuration files, and monitor and log unauthorized access attempts.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Privilege Escalation

T1078 Valid Accounts

Persistence

T1078 Valid Accounts

Defense Evasion

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Credential Access

T1552.001 Credentials In Files

Remediation for Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

Patches

  • Upgrade PDBM to version 2.0.0.0 or later, which uses hash-based authentication

Immediate actions

  • Restrict access to the PDBM application environment, executable and configuration files to the minimum set of administrators
  • Implement monitoring and logging for unauthorized access attempts to PDBM and its configuration file
  • Hunt for the vulnerable executable by SHA-256 62901707602CB8822B7A84B1B361961C0C0562D24E6CDE4F4A39016ACC51F1CE

Workarounds

  • Limit local access to hosts running PDBM 1.0.0.0 and protect the configuration file with strict file-system permissions

Longer-term hardening

  • Rotate the administrative credential stored in the PDBM configuration file after upgrading
  • Review administrative logins to the PDBM management interface for unexpected use of the configured account

Affected and fixed versions

  • Trac d.o.o. — PDBM (Process Database Manager)
    Vulnerable versions: 1.0.0.0
    Fixed in: 2.0.0.0

Timeline of Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

  • Initial vulnerability report submitted by locked-ioc-5 (locked-ioc-3, Croatia) through coordinated disclosure
  • Detailed technical information about the hard-coded secret provided to the coordinating party
  • locked-ioc-4 notified of the vulnerability; PDBM 2.0.0.0, which uses hash-based authentication and had been available since 2020, is the fixed release
  • locked-ioc-7 published the advisory for CVE-2026-25600; no known public exploits at time of publication
  • CVE-2026-25600 published in NVD with CVSS 3.1 base score 6.4 (MEDIUM) and CWE-798
  • NVD record for CVE-2026-25600 last modified; affected range stated as locked-ioc-4 PDBM versions prior to 2.0.0.0

Sources cited for Trac PDBM hard-coded secret

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

[ 0 threats ] [ 0 det ] [ CRIT: 0 ] [ HIGH: 0 ]
// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats