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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-5261

PolinRider Loader Reappears in Hijacked npm Packages (12 malicious releases across 10 packages)

highACTIVE

Sonatype reports 12 malicious releases across 10 hijacked npm packages (@adminide-stack/*, server-hemera-mongo, cdeops, @cdmbase/wiki-browser, @pubngo-stack/help-browser) carrying PolinRider loaders. The loaders decode payload-server IPv4 addresses from Ethereum transactions sent by a hard-coded wallet, fetch XOR-encoded JavaScript over plain HTTP on port 443, and execute it via eval()/Function constructor.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-5261
Also known asPolinRider, sonatype-2026-010515
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsnpm @adminide-stack/client-redux; npm @adminide-stack/health-api-server; npm @adminide-stack/user-activity-browser; npm @adminide-stack/utils; npm server-hemera-mongo; npm cdeops; npm @adminide-stack/forms-core; npm @adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser and 2 more
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-494
AttributionPolinRider operators (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea
MalwareDEV#POPPER, OmniStealer, PolinRider
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.001 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 10 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorssoftware development, open-source software, cryptocurrency
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-5261 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 48 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Loader Execution — Detached 'node -i' Spawned by Node

Detects the host-side execution marker Sonatype observed for the PolinRider loaders in hijacked npm packages (sonatype-2026-010515): a detached 'node -i' interactive process with piped stdin launched by another Node process. The hijacked releases have no install hooks and run at module load (e.g. require('cdeops/client')) or app start (server-hemera-mongo dist/main.js), so this child-process pattern indicates the loader executed and the host should be treated as compromised. TL-2026-5261.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.007, T1195.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, sysmon_linux
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="sysmon:linux") EventCode=1 (Image="*node.exe" OR Image="*/node") (ParentImage="*node.exe" OR ParentImage="*/node")
```TL-2026-5261 PolinRider loader: node -i interactive child spawned by a node parent```
| regex CommandLine="(?i)node([.]exe)?[^ ]?[ ]+(-i|--interactive)([ ]|$)"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_line values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_command_line by host User ParentImage Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('node', 'node.exe') and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('node', 'node.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex 'node([.]exe)?[^ ]?[ ]+(-i|--interactive)([ ]|$)'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: PolinRider Loader Execution - Detached Node Interactive Process Spawned by Node
id: 1a6f3c82-d4b7-4e95-a028-7c59b3e1d6f4
status: experimental
description: Detects a Node interactive process (node -i) launched by another Node process, the host-side execution marker observed for PolinRider loaders in hijacked npm packages (TL-2026-5261, sonatype-2026-010515).
references:
    - https://www.sonatype.com/blog/polinrider-loader-reappears-in-hijacked-npm-packages
    - https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-x-polinrider/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\node.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\node.exe'
    selection_cli_end:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' -i'
            - ' -i"'
            - ' --interactive'
    selection_cli_mid:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -i '
            - ' --interactive '
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Developers or build scripts that deliberately spawn a Node REPL from a Node-based tool
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Developer tooling or test harnesses that intentionally spawn a Node REPL from a Node parent process
  • Custom CLI wrappers that start 'node -i' for debugging sessions

Tuning notes: Exclude known developer workstations or specific ParentCommandLine values that legitimately launch a REPL. Prioritise hits on build servers, CI runners and production hosts, where an interactive Node child is highly anomalous. Correlate with npm install history for the 12 affected releases and, on a hit, rotate publishing keys, cloud credentials and CI secrets.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Hijacked npm Release Installed — Affected Package Versions in Package-Manager Command Lines · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Font-File Masquerade Artifacts — fa-solid-400.woff2 / fa-solid-300.ttf and Known Hashes · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) C2 Connection — Endpoint Traffic to [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Obfuscated Inline Node Execution — eval(atob()) / Function Constructor · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Node Executing a Font File as a Script (Masquerade File Type) · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Stage Retrieval — Plain HTTP on TCP 443 for /0x/cls and /0x/ls · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Runner Staging — .npm-ws-runner.js Under Hidden .node_modules · unlock with TL Creds
  • PolinRider (TL-2026-5261) Blockchain Dead-Drop Lookup — Node DNS Queries to Ethereum RPC / Blockscout · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 48 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-5261.

Sample indicators (3 of 48)

  • IP address: 95.135.181[.]151
  • URL: hxxps://eth[.]blockscout[.]com/api
  • File hash: b59e598ded824c7318ca9fae4e9a6d98c9600873677ece7d9896870e3e7ced8e

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 48 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

48 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Sonatype ties the activity to PolinRider through the same wallet and overlapping C2 infrastructure.

On 2026-11-04 Sonatype disclosed 12 malicious releases across 10 npm packages (tracking ID sonatype-2026-010515) that embed PolinRider loaders. The affected releases are @adminide-stack/client-redux 0.0.16-18, @adminide-stack/health-api-server 0.0.18-alpha.465, @adminide-stack/user-activity-browser 1.1.3-alpha.114, @adminide-stack/utils 0.0.16-129 and 0.0.16-130, server-hemera-mongo 0.0.15 and 0.0.16, cdeops 13.5.31, @adminide-stack/forms-core 5.1.9-alpha.3, @adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser 12.0.194, @cdmbase/wiki-browser 12.0.18-alpha.53 and @pubngo-stack/help-browser 12.0.23-alpha.3.

The releases contain no install or postinstall hooks. The code runs when the module is loaded (for example require('cdeops/client')) or at application start-up (server-hemera-mongo via dist/main.js). Two obfuscation styles were observed: six releases hide the loader behind eval(atob(...)), and six use a character-permutation bootstrap that ends in the Function constructor.

The loader queries Ethereum RPC endpoints, with a Blockscout API fallback, for transactions sent by the hard-coded wallet 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3. It reads the first four bytes of the transaction recipient address as a primary IPv4 address and the next four bytes as a secondary one. This lets the operator move the payload server without republishing any package. The loader then fetches XOR-encoded JavaScript over plain HTTP on TCP 443 from paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls on the advertised C2 95.135.181.151, decodes it and executes it with eval()/Function. The Sec-V request header differs by variant: A10-npm_inject for the base64 releases, A10-II for utils@0.0.16-130 and A10-E for cdeops@13.5.31. On the host, Sonatype observed detached 'node -i' processes with piped stdin launched by another Node process.

Sonatype ties the activity to previously documented PolinRider activity through the identical wallet, matching C2 infrastructure and overlapping stage-retrieval paths, citing GitGuardian's 2026-10-27 report. It notes the IP was also observed on 2026-11-03 (Greenflagged). Broader PolinRider reporting from Socket and SecurityWeek describes a North Korea-linked campaign associated with Contagious Interview / Famous Chollima activity. It spans npm, Packagist, Go modules and Chrome extensions (162 artifacts across 108 packages), uses blockchain and public RPC infrastructure to retrieve XOR-encrypted payloads, and delivers DEV#POPPER and OmniStealer. The Sonatype source itself does not name a final payload or an actor for this specific wave, so attribution of these 12 releases rests on shared infrastructure only. If the code ran, treat the host as compromised and rotate all reachable credentials (publishing keys, cloud access, CI secrets).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.002 Data Encoding; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Collection

T1115 Clipboard Data

Persistence

T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Search lockfiles and direct/transitive dependencies for the 12 affected releases and remove them
  • Block the affected versions in the repository manager / artifact proxy
  • Block outbound traffic to 95.135.181.151 and alert on plain HTTP requests on port 443 using /0x/cls or /0x/ls
  • Hunt for detached 'node -i' processes with piped stdin spawned by another Node process
  • Treat hosts where the code executed as compromised and rotate publishing keys, cloud credentials and CI secrets

Workarounds

  • Pin to versions published before the malicious releases until maintainers publish clean builds

Longer-term hardening

  • Pin dependencies and enforce lockfile integrity in CI
  • Monitor egress from build and developer hosts for Ethereum RPC / Blockscout lookups from Node processes
  • Apply a dependency-quarantine or cooldown policy for newly published package versions

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm — @adminide-stack/client-redux
    Vulnerable versions: 0.0.16-18
  • npm — @adminide-stack/health-api-server
    Vulnerable versions: 0.0.18-alpha.465
  • npm — @adminide-stack/user-activity-browser
    Vulnerable versions: 1.1.3-alpha.114
  • npm — @adminide-stack/utils
    Vulnerable versions: 0.0.16-129; 0.0.16-130
  • npm — server-hemera-mongo
    Vulnerable versions: 0.0.15; 0.0.16
  • npm — cdeops
    Vulnerable versions: 13.5.31
  • npm — @adminide-stack/forms-core
    Vulnerable versions: 5.1.9-alpha.3
  • npm — @adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser
    Vulnerable versions: 12.0.194
  • npm — @cdmbase/wiki-browser
    Vulnerable versions: 12.0.18-alpha.53
  • npm — @pubngo-stack/help-browser
    Vulnerable versions: 12.0.23-alpha.3

Timeline

Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 2× · latest source

  • Per Socket and SecurityWeek, the broader PolinRider campaign has been active since December 2025 (month-level date), using compromised repositories and obfuscated JavaScript loaders.
  • Socket reports synchronized malicious modifications (10:00 UTC) to repositories of the compromised Xpos587 GitHub account as the campaign expanded to Packagist.
  • Socket Threat Research publishes its PolinRider analysis: 162 malicious artifacts across 108 packages (npm, Packagist, Go modules, Chrome extension) delivering DEV#POPPER and OmniStealer.
  • SecurityWeek reports the North Korea-linked PolinRider campaign, active since December 2025, citing the Socket findings.
  • Earliest dead-drop transaction in the wallet history cited by Greenflagged; further C2 IPs encoded 2026-10-14 to 10-16.
  • GitGuardian reports the GhostAction operator pushing 72,026 commits to 22,964 repositories between 2026-10-13 and 2026-10-21, reusing PolinRider's VS Code folderOpen launcher for a font-file stealer.
  • Dead-drop wallet locked-ioc-11 funded from locked-ioc-12 (per Greenflagged); it later posts IP-encoding transactions about every 3h20m.
  • From 2026-10-22 to 2026-10-26, PolinRider loaders are force-pushed over GhostAction commits (188 commits overwritten), per GitGuardian.
  • GitGuardian's PolinRider report, which documents the wallet 0x1eef...cef3 and fallback C2 locked-ioc-25:443, is cited by Sonatype as the basis for linking these npm releases.
  • Greenflagged decodes the wallet's transactions and identifies locked-ioc-25 as the advertised C2.
  • Three packages get malicious 'next' releases (22:00-22:12 UTC) under the clockbook-app account; @adminide-stack/utils 0.0.16-130 (Variant B) follows at 22:48 and client-redux 'latest' moves to a malicious release by 23:34.
  • Greenflagged observes C2 IP locked-ioc-25, as cited by Sonatype.
  • npm removes all twelve malicious versions (~20:40 UTC); the dead drop remains live and Greenflagged fetches stage 2 from the C2 at 20:47 UTC.
  • Five more malicious releases are published under the pubngo-stack account (04:51-07:28 UTC).
  • Sonatype discloses 12 malicious releases across 10 hijacked npm packages carrying PolinRider loaders (sonatype-2026-010515) and ties them to PolinRider via the shared wallet and C2.
  • Cyber Security News publishes coverage of the campaign.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated .

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