# Evolving Email-Borne Social Engineering: QR Phishing, ConsentFix, ClickFix/AI-fix/CrashFix and Deepfake Impersonation

> ESET reports that email-borne social engineering is shifting toward session/token theft and user-executed commands: QR code phishing (one in nine detected phishing emails in H1 2026), ConsentFix OAuth authorization-code theft against Microsoft sign-in, ClickFix and its AI-fix and CrashFix variants, phishing-as-a-service kits, and AI-assisted lures and deepfake impersonation.

- **Published:** 2026-11-13T12:21:39Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-13T12:21:39Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5961
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-5961.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-5961
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

This record documents a trend overview published by ESET (WeLiveSecurity, 2026-09-28, author Tomas Foltyn) describing how email and web-borne social engineering has moved away from password harvesting toward techniques that either steal already-authenticated sessions/tokens or make the victim execute the attacker's command themselves. The ESET article itself names no CVEs, threat actors, malware families or IOCs; the technical detail and indicators below are drawn from the primary research that the described techniques correspond to (Push Security, NVISO, Huntress, Cloud Security Alliance) and are labelled as such.

QR code phishing: per ESET telemetry, QR codes accounted for one in nine phishing emails detected in H1 2026, and Microsoft ranks QR codes as the fastest-growing email-based attack vector. The destination URL is hidden inside the image and is opened on a personal phone, bypassing desktop email-gateway URL rewriting and endpoint controls.

ConsentFix (a.k.a. AuthCodeFix): the victim lands on a compromised but legitimate website showing a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare-Turnstile-style gate that filters targets by email address. The victim is sent through a genuine Microsoft sign-in (login.microsoftonline.com) for a pre-consented first-party application, most commonly Azure CLI (client_id 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46), with prompt=select_account and the victim's login_hint. Because an active Microsoft session exists, no password or MFA prompt appears; the browser is redirected to http://localhost:<port>/?code=<authorization_code>&session_state=<id>, which fails to load because nothing listens there. The victim is told to paste that URL back into the phishing page; the attacker redeems the authorization code at the Entra token endpoint for access and refresh tokens (scope https://graph.microsoft.com/.default) and verifies access with GET /v1.0/me. Because the code is issued after authentication has completed, passwords and even phishing-resistant MFA do not stop it. NVISO lists other first-party apps with Conditional Access bypasses (Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code, SharePoint Online Management Shell, Teams and others) and a KQL detection joining SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs on user, AppId and SessionId. The Cloud Security Alliance describes a ConsentFix v3 variant active as of May 2026 with an automated backend pipeline.

ClickFix and variants: ClickFix tricks users into pasting an attacker-supplied command into their own terminal (Run dialog / PowerShell / macOS Terminal); ESET notes detections are rising. AI-fix places fake troubleshooting instructions on legitimate domains belonging to Anthropic, OpenAI and Microsoft (publicly shareable AI chat pages), lending the lure the trust of a legitimate domain; public reporting ties such shared-chat lures to macOS infostealers (AMOS, MacSync). CrashFix is a fake ad-blocker browser extension that directs targets to the official Chrome Web Store and waits an hour after installation before showing its first bogus alert. Huntress attributes the CrashFix campaign to KongTuke: the NexShield extension (a uBlock Origin Lite clone, extension ID cpcdkmjddocikjdkbbeiaafnpdbdafmi) exhausts browser resources to force a crash, then on restart shows a fake 'browser stopped abnormally' scan prompt instructing the user to press Win+R and paste a clipboard-loaded command. The command copies finger.exe to %TEMP%\ct.exe and pipes its output to cmd, fetching a staged PowerShell script that fingerprints the host (50+ analysis tools/VM checks), profiles it as domain-joined or WORKGROUP, and for domain-joined hosts deploys the Python-based ModeloRAT (RC4-encrypted C2, Run-key persistence 'MonitoringService', 300-second beacon). Non-domain hosts follow a DGA/AMSI-bypass branch that was still in testing at time of analysis.

Deepfake impersonation and AI misuse: ESET notes AI tools clean up lure language, tailor messages per recipient and build rapport over time, and cites a case in which a finance employee joined a call populated by deepfake versions of senior colleagues and made wire transfers exceeding US$25 million (CNN reporting, 2024). ESET also notes phishing-as-a-service kits are sold ready-made but names none.

Defensive takeaway: controls must cover token/session theft (monitor interactive-vs-non-interactive sign-in mismatches for first-party apps, Azure CLI sign-ins by non-admins, AADGraphActivityLogs), user-initiated command execution (Run-dialog/clipboard-to-shell chains, finger.exe use), and out-of-band verification for payment requests. ESET MDR Q1 2026 also found employees often delete phishing they recognise because no reporting channel exists.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1176.001 Browser Extensions
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1480.001 Environmental Keying
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CrashFix/ClickFix finger.exe LOLBin Copied to %TEMP%\ct.exe — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-5961-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the CrashFix (KongTuke) user-executed command chain: finger.exe is copied to %TEMP%\ct.exe and its output piped to cmd to retrieve a staged PowerShell script that deploys ModeloRAT. Detects a renamed finger.exe via OriginalFileName, the copy-to-temp command line, and finger.exe spawned by cmd.exe. finger.exe use is almost non-existent in modern enterprises, so noise is low.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.004, T1059.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon (EventCode 1), index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
(OriginalFileName="finger.exe" OR Image="*\\finger.exe" OR CommandLine="*finger.exe*" OR CommandLine="*\\ct.exe*")
| eval img=lower(Image), cmd=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(ParentImage), orig=lower(OriginalFileName)
| eval renamed_finger=if(orig="finger.exe" AND NOT match(img,"\\\\finger\\.exe$"),1,0)
| eval copy_to_temp=if(match(cmd,"copy\\s+\\S*finger\\.exe\\s+\\S*(%temp%|\\\\temp\\\\)\\S*\\.exe"),1,0)
| eval finger_from_cmd=if(match(img,"\\\\finger\\.exe$") AND match(parent,"\\\\cmd\\.exe$"),1,0)
| where renamed_finger=1 OR copy_to_temp=1 OR finger_from_cmd=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as images values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "finger.exe"
    or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "finger.exe" and FileName !~ "finger.exe")
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "finger.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ct.exe", "%temp%", "\\temp\\"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: CrashFix ClickFix finger.exe LOLBin Copy and Execution
id: 5b1d7c2e-3a64-5f0e-9c11-6a2f4d8e7b01
status: experimental
description: Detects the CrashFix/KongTuke ClickFix command chain where the Windows finger.exe LOLBin is copied to %TEMP%\ct.exe or executed from cmd.exe and its output is piped to cmd to fetch a PowerShell stage.
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/devil-email-wearing-new-mask/
    - https://blog.nviso.eu/2026/01/29/consentfix-a-k-a-authcodefix-detecting-oauth2-authorization-code-phishing/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke
    - https://pushsecurity.com/blog/consentfix
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_renamed:
        OriginalFileName: 'finger.exe'
    filter_real_name:
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    selection_copy:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy'
            - 'finger.exe'
            - 'ct.exe'
    selection_cmd_child:
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: (selection_renamed and not filter_real_name) or selection_copy or selection_cmd_child
falsepositives:
    - Administrators legitimately querying finger services (very rare)
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legacy administrator scripts that intentionally query finger daemons
- Security testing or red-team emulation of ClickFix

**Tuning notes:** Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 with OriginalFileName populated. Allowlist known admin hosts/accounts if finger is used legitimately. Pair with outbound TCP/79 blocking.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ConsentFix OAuth Authorization-Code Theft — Interactive/Non-Interactive Session Mismatch — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ConsentFix Stolen-Token Use — First-Time Abused First-Party App by User — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ModeloRAT 300-Second Python Beacon Pattern — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Pasted Command in Run Dialog (RunMRU) — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrashFix Staged PowerShell Host Fingerprinting and AMSI Bypass — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ConsentFix Delivery, temp.sh Staging and stream*.cyou Malvertising Domains — C2/Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ModeloRAT Run-Key Persistence and NexShield Extension Artifacts — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrashFix ModeloRAT C2 IPs, finger TCP/79 and NexShield C2 Domains — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `170.168.103[.]208`
- Domain: `nexsnield[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/6gscgf35byvflw4y6x4i0/b1.zip?rlkey=bk2hvxvw53ggzhbjiftppej50&st=yyxnfu71&dl=1`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The devil is still in the email, but wears a new mask (ESET WeLiveSecurity)](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/devil-email-wearing-new-mask/)
- [ConsentFix (Push Security)](https://pushsecurity.com/blog/consentfix)
- [ConsentFix (a.k.a. AuthCodeFix): Detecting OAuth2 Authorization Code Phishing (NVISO)](https://blog.nviso.eu/2026/01/29/consentfix-a-k-a-authcodefix-detecting-oauth2-authorization-code-phishing/)
- [Dissecting CrashFix: KongTuke's New Toy (Huntress)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke)
- [OAuth Consent Abuse: ConsentFix v3 and the SaaS Extortion Economy (Cloud Security Alliance)](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research-rb/csa-research-note-oauth-consent-abuse-consentfix-v3-20260505/)
- [New ConsentFix attack hijacks Microsoft accounts via Azure CLI (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-consentfix-attack-hijacks-microsoft-accounts-via-azure-cli/)
- ['CrashFix' Scam Crashes Browsers, Delivers Malware (Dark Reading)](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/crashfix-scam-crashes-browsers-delivers-malware)
- [Malicious Chrome extension crashes browser in ClickFix variant CrashFix (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/malicious-chrome-extension-crashes-browser-in-clickfix-variant-crashfix/)
- [How a Google Search for Claude Led to MacSync (Huntress)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-claude-macsync)
- [Fake Claude search results lure Mac users into ClickFix attack (Malwarebytes)](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/05/fake-claude-search-results-lure-mac-users-into-clickfix-attack)
- [Infostealer has entered the chat (Kaspersky)](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/share-chatgpt-chat-clickfix-macos-amos-infostealer/54928/)
- [ESET Threat Report H1 2026](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/threat-reports/eset-threat-report-h12026.pdf)
- [ESET MDR Threat Report Q1 2026](https://web-assets.eset.com/fileadmin/ESET/US/B2B_Resource_centre/reports/ESET_MDR_Threat_Report_Q1_2026.pdf)
- [CNN: Arup deepfake video-call scam, Hong Kong](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5961
