# SilentAir: New State-Level Actor Intercepting Calls and SMS via SS7/Diameter Signaling from Hijacked Mobile Operator Nodes

> Enea reports SilentAir, a previously unknown state-level threat actor (high confidence) that launches mostly SS7 and occasionally Diameter signaling attacks from hijacked mobile operator network nodes to redirect targets' incoming calls and SMS and harvest subscriber data. Taiwan is the primary target; activity has been monitored since early 2025 and is assessed with low confidence as China-nexus.

- **Published:** 2026-11-13T12:45:05Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-13T20:00:27.591Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5962
- **ID:** TL-2026-5962
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** SilentAir (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

SilentAir is a signaling-layer threat actor first publicly documented by Enea (blog 'The Enemy Within: Tracking LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir Through Mobile Networks', published 11 Nov 2026, updated 12 Nov 2026) and reported by SecurityWeek on 13 Nov 2026. Enea assesses with high confidence that SilentAir is a state-level actor rather than a commercial surveillance company, and with low confidence that it aligns with China-nexus operations, citing the primary focus on Taiwan, the absence of Chinese networks or subscribers among targets, and activity timing that matches a UTC+8 working day (starting around 09:00, dips in morning and evening, near-absent on weekends, pauses around Chinese holidays).

The actor sends signaling traffic from inside compromised network nodes belonging to mobile operators in at least six Asian countries (others suspected); Enea confirmed the source is a compromised node rather than a spoofed external origin. It uses SCCP Global Titles that resemble legitimate network elements and, unlike the surveillance-vendor actor HiddenArt, responds correctly to its own transactions and handles later uninitiated transactions for the target inconsistently (ignoring, aborting or acknowledging them). Enea could not recover the SilentAir binary because of strong OPSEC. Activity arrives in bursts separated by months of inactivity, ranging from one or a few subscribers to several thousand subscribers in a month.

Observed message types: information harvesting via SS7 SRI-SM, RestoreData and SendAuthenticationInfo and Diameter Authentication-Information-Request (AIR); location tracking via SS7 AnyTimeInterrogation (ATI) and Diameter Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request (cell IDs); and interception via SS7 UpdateLocation (UL) and Diameter Update-Location-Request (ULR), used to redirect voice and SMS for targets. 2FA codes were observed immediately after interception for some targets. Activity mix per Enea: interception 18.30%, information harvesting 7.21%, location tracking 0.22%, other (mostly silent SMS) 74.27% - the inverse of a typical surveillance company profile (61.89% harvesting, 30.90% location tracking). Large volumes of silent SMS, primarily aimed at Taiwanese subscribers and submitted via interim SMSCs in Southeast Asia and Taiwan, spike around midnight and are assessed as a way to confirm interception remains in place or to bulk-test interception. Targets include political and government VIPs in Taiwan and roughly a dozen further countries and territories (Southeast/East/South/Central Asia, East Africa, the Middle East, Europe).

Enea notes a possible but unconfirmed link to LIMINAL PANDA (CrowdStrike, low-confidence China-nexus; tracked by Unit 42 as CL-STA-0969), the only actor Enea knows to actively exploit the IPX interconnect network. Evidence for a link: SilentAir activity overlapped LIMINAL PANDA infection periods in some operators, SilentAir attacks were sometimes followed by GTPDoor tunnel attempts and vice versa, and both target Asian operators; against it, LIMINAL PANDA has no known Taiwan focus and the SCTPE SS7/Diameter injector only processes self-generated transactions within a 5-second window, which cannot explain SilentAir's handling of uninitiated transactions. Enea does not associate the two groups and says they may share access or operate in parallel. Indicators and ATT&CK mappings below that derive from LIMINAL PANDA / CL-STA-0969 reporting are therefore related-actor context, not confirmed SilentAir tooling.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1110.001 Password Guessing
- T1556.003 Pluggable Authentication Modules
- T1070.006 Timestomp
- T1070.003 Clear Command History
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021.004 SSH
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1090 Proxy
- T1584.008 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1205 Traffic Signaling

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SilentAir SS7/Diameter Interception — UpdateLocation Followed by Silent SMS (Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-5962-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the SilentAir interception pattern reported by Enea (TL-2026-5962): an SS7 UpdateLocation or Diameter Update-Location-Request that redirects a subscriber's voice/SMS, followed within an hour by silent SMS (SMS-PID 64 / silent type) to the same subscriber to verify interception is in place. Enea also observed 2FA codes arriving immediately after interception. Covers compromised operator-node abuse (T1584) and adversary-in-the-middle interception (T1557.001). Requires normalized signaling-firewall logs.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1584, T1557.001
- **Data sources:** telecom_signaling:signaling:firewall, SignalingFirewall_CL, ss7_signaling_firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=telecom_signaling sourcetype="signaling:firewall" earliest=-24h
```SilentAir pattern: update-location interception followed by silent SMS verification for the same subscriber```
| eval op=lower(signaling_op)
| eval stage=case(match(op,"^(updatelocation|update-location-request|ulr)$"),"intercept", match(op,"^(mt-forwardsm|forwardsm|mt-forward-short-message)$") AND (tostring(sms_pid)="64" OR like(lower(sms_type),"%silent%")),"silent_sms", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(stage)
| eval sub=coalesce(imsi,msisdn)
| stats min(eval(if(stage="intercept",_time,null()))) AS first_intercept max(eval(if(stage="silent_sms",_time,null()))) AS last_silent count(eval(stage="silent_sms")) AS silent_sms_count dc(stage) AS stages values(src_gt) AS src_gt values(smsc_gt) AS smsc_gt BY sub
| where stages=2 AND last_silent>=first_intercept AND (last_silent-first_intercept)<=3600
| eval first_intercept=strftime(first_intercept,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_silent=strftime(last_silent,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table sub first_intercept last_silent silent_sms_count src_gt smsc_gt
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let Window = 1h;
let SilentSms = SignalingFirewall_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where tolower(Operation) in ("mt-forwardsm", "forwardsm", "mt-forward-short-message")
| where tostring(SmsPid) == "64" or tolower(SmsType) has "silent"
| project SilentTime = TimeGenerated, Imsi, SmscGt;
SignalingFirewall_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where tolower(Operation) in ("updatelocation", "update-location-request", "ulr")
| project UlTime = TimeGenerated, Imsi, SrcGt
| join kind=inner SilentSms on Imsi
| where SilentTime between (UlTime .. (UlTime + Window))
| summarize FirstUpdateLocation = min(UlTime), SilentSmsCount = count(), SrcGts = make_set(SrcGt, 10), SmscGts = make_set(SmscGt, 10) by Imsi
| order by SilentSmsCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SilentAir-Style Update Location From Untrusted Global Title
id: 3f6b1c52-8a4e-4d17-9b0a-5c2e7d41a601
status: experimental
description: Detects SS7 UpdateLocation or Diameter Update-Location-Request received from a Global Title or Diameter peer not on the trusted-partner list, the interception primitive used by SilentAir to redirect voice and SMS. Correlation with follow-up silent SMS is performed in the SPL and KQL flavors.
references:
    - https://www.enea.com/insights/the-enemy-within-tracking-liminal-panda-and-silentair-through-mobile-networks/
    - https://www.securityweek.com/silentair-hackers-intercept-calls-sms-from-inside-mobile-networks/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-13
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1584
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    product: ss7_signaling_firewall
    service: events
detection:
    selection:
        Operation|contains:
            - 'UpdateLocation'
            - 'Update-Location-Request'
        SrcGtTrusted: false
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Roaming partner not yet onboarded in the trusted GT list
    - Steering-of-roaming platforms sending legitimate location updates
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate roaming UpdateLocation followed by a network-originated silent SMS used for reachability checks by the home operator
- Steering-of-roaming platforms that send location updates and test SMS for the same IMSI

**Tuning notes:** Map signaling_op, imsi, msisdn, src_gt, smsc_gt, sms_pid and sms_type to your signaling firewall's field names (these are normalized names, not a specific vendor schema). Exclude trusted roaming-partner GTs and your own SMSC GTs via a lookup, and widen or tighten the 3600-second correlation window. Prioritise results for VIP / government subscribers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SilentAir Signaling Probe-to-Interception Chain From a Single Global Title (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Anti-Forensics — Timestomping and History Clearing on Telecom Linux Hosts (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NoDepDNS DNS C2 Channel and DNS-Tunnel Volume From Core Hosts (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SilentAir Silent-SMS Burst Against a Single Subscriber (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CL-STA-0969 / LIMINAL PANDA Tooling, Hashes and Service Masquerading on Linux Core Hosts (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SSH Password Guessing Then Valid-Account Login on Core-Network Linux Hosts (Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PAM Backdoor — pam_unix.so Tampering on Telecom Core Hosts (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GTPDoor Covert C2 Over GTP-C [indicator] Across IPX/GRX (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `pgw-s5s8[.]mpgw001[.]node`
- File hash: `35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc`
- File hash: `da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [SilentAir Hackers Intercept Calls, SMS From Inside Mobile Networks (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/silentair-hackers-intercept-calls-sms-from-inside-mobile-networks/)
- [The Enemy Within: Tracking LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir Through Mobile Networks (Enea)](https://www.enea.com/insights/the-enemy-within-tracking-liminal-panda-and-silentair-through-mobile-networks/)
- [Infiltration of Global Telecom Networks - CL-STA-0969 (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/infiltration-of-global-telecom-networks/)
- [Nation-state group CL-STA-0969 targeted Southeast Asian telecoms in 2024 (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/180737/apt/nation-state-group-cl-sta-0969-targeted-southeast-asian-telecoms-in-2024.html)
- [CL-STA-0969 Installs Covert Malware in Telecom Networks (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/cl-sta-0969-installs-covert-malware-in.html)
- [Year in review: key insights from the global signaling threat landscape (Enea)](https://www.enea.com/insights/year-in-review-key-insights-from-the-global-signaling-threat-landscape/)
- [The Hidden Global Battlefield (Enea / AdaptiveMobile Security, ENISA presentation - HiddenArt comparison)](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/all_files/11%20220629_Enea_AdaptiveMobile_Security_The_Hidden_Global_Battlefield.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5962
