# StingyBasilisk espionage group abuses Windows named pipes and SMB to spread malware across isolated government networks (CunningDoor, SilentCOM, TediousLoader, HenMapCaCon)

> Positive Technologies incident response findings describe StingyBasilisk, a previously unreported espionage group present in a government agency network since at least April 2022 (about 1,398 days before detection). It uses custom in-memory loaders and agents whose C2 is relayed host-to-host over Windows named pipes, with SMB + Impacket atexec lateral movement from February 2026, and COM hijacking (TreatAs) and a rogue W32Time time provider for persistence.

- **Published:** 2026-11-13T21:42:33Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-14T00:20:10.633Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6000
- **ID:** TL-2026-6000
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** StingyBasilisk
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 31 (1 shown free below)

## Description

StingyBasilisk was named by Positive Technologies (PT ESC) after an incident investigation in early 2026 at an unnamed government agency. Analysis showed the group had been resident in the infrastructure since at least April 2022 and had dwelled in the internal network for 1,398 days before detection. Initial access could not be determined and no known threat group has been reliably linked; PT suspects the operators run their own C2 framework. The assessed goal is cyberespionage, based on the stealth of the operation.

From February 2026 the group became more active inside the network. Malware was copied over SMB to C:\Windows\Temp and executed remotely with Impacket atexec, which connects to the \pipe\atsvc named pipe and calls the Task Scheduler RPC interface (ITaskSchedulerService, SchRpcRun) to create and immediately run a scheduled task. Task names were random GUIDs rather than the default atexec naming (example observed 2026-02-12: \11BBA9EF-3528-C48C-2221-D0D4DD92D971, Event ID 106), followed by rundll32.exe IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (Event ID 4688).

Three previously unknown DLL loaders deliver the in-house RAT as shellcode that runs only in memory and uses direct syscalls and Ldr functions. CunningDoor is launched through DLL side-loading of signed SafeNet libraries (IKEYUI64.dll loading malicious iKeyAPI.dll; eToken.dll loading malicious DLPReel.dll with the REEL_Initialize export); it decrypts shellcode using three XOR layers (a static key, the key file C:\Windows\Temp\sqlslzgqpukrpd, and the first 32 bytes of C:\Windows\Temp\oluivzdz), and talks over named pipes matching \\.\pipe\[a-z]+.[a-f0-9]{8} with AES-256-CBC framing (the DLPReel.dll variant uses an IP and port instead of a pipe). SilentCOM persists by hijacking the TreatAs keys of the Network List Manager ({DCB00C01-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}) and Network Configuration ({5b035261-40f9-11d1-aaec-00805fc1270e}) COM classes, with proxy DLLs (netprofmprox.dll, netcfgprox.dll, and a third spelled netprogmprox.dll) that forward calls to the real libraries and exit unless running inside svchost.exe -k netsvcs; it communicates over GUID-named pipes, using Curve25519 ECDH key exchange and ChaCha20 with a modified constant. TediousLoader (wgtdgr.dll) registers as a W32Time time provider (TimeProvOpen export) so svchost runs it as Local System at boot; it opens raw sockets (SIO_RCVALL) on each adapter, looks for a magic signature in received packets, and the packet supplies connect/listen/bind parameters; payloads are AES-256-CBC encrypted and run in memory.

HenMapCaCon.dll is a Go (1.18-1.19) component that runs a TLS server (go-winio) over the named pipe \\.\PIPE\ProProBitOpen and exposes /, /qr and /fetch routes; /fetch (parameters key and path) is used to pull files off the host. Infected hosts relay commands to each other so only one node needs external communication, which lets the operators reach network segments with no direct internet access. PT captured and decrypted a payload by monitoring named-pipe traffic for the known name patterns. No hashes, IPs or domains were published in the secondary coverage; the full IOC set is in the original PT report.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1106 Native API
- T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking
- T1547.003 Time Providers
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1218.011 Rundll32
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1040 Network Sniffing
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1090.001 Internal Proxy
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1573.002 Encrypted Channel
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**StingyBasilisk CunningDoor rundll32 SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll Side-Loading Launch (Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-6000-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the observed StingyBasilisk execution step: rundll32.exe running IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (or eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll REEL_Initialize) so a signed SafeNet library side-loads the malicious iKeyAPI.dll and launches the in-memory CunningDoor RAT. Also flags rundll32 loading DLLs from C:\Windows\Temp, where atexec-delivered payloads are staged (TL-2026-6000).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1218.011, T1574.002, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\rundll32.exe" earliest=-24h
  (CommandLine="*IKEYUI64.dll*ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA*" OR CommandLine="*DLPReel.dll*REEL_Initialize*" OR CommandLine="*eToken.dll*" OR CommandLine="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*.dll*")
| eval sideload_family=case(like(lower(CommandLine),"%ikeyui64.dll%"),"CunningDoor via IKEYUI64.dll / iKeyAPI.dll (T1574.002)", like(lower(CommandLine),"%dlpreel.dll%") OR like(lower(CommandLine),"%etoken.dll%"),"CunningDoor via eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll (T1574.002)", true(),"rundll32 loading DLL from C:\\Windows\\Temp (T1218.011)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User, sideload_family
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "IKEYUI64.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA")
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "DLPReel.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "REEL_Initialize")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "eToken.dll"
    or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\Windows\\Temp\\[^\s,]+\.dll"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: StingyBasilisk CunningDoor rundll32 SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll Side-Loading Launch
id: 6b1f0c2e-5a3d-4e71-9c28-7d4a1e9b3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32.exe launching the signed SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll export ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (or eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll REEL_Initialize), the observed StingyBasilisk CunningDoor launch command after Impacket atexec delivery.
references:
    - https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/apt-stingybasilisk-malware-is-spreading-through-the-pipes/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/13
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    selection_ikey:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'IKEYUI64.dll'
            - 'ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA'
    selection_reel:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DLPReel.dll'
            - 'REEL_Initialize'
    selection_etoken:
        CommandLine|contains: 'eToken.dll'
    condition: selection_img and (selection_ikey or selection_reel or selection_etoken)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate SafeNet Authentication Client invoking its own UI libraries from Program Files
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- SafeNet Authentication Client legitimately invoking its own UI library through rundll32
- Admin or software-packaging scripts running rundll32 against DLLs staged in C:\Windows\Temp

**Tuning notes:** Drop the C:\Windows\Temp wildcard branch if your software deployment tooling stages DLLs there; keep the IKEYUI64.dll/ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA branch unfiltered. Replace index=sysmon with your Sysmon index.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- StingyBasilisk SMB-Delivered Loaders and Key Files in Windows Temp (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk TediousLoader Rogue W32Time Time Provider (Post-Exploitation Persistence) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk CunningDoor Named Pipe Pattern from rundll32 or svchost (C2 / Internal Proxy) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk CunningDoor Malicious [indicator] / [indicator] Side-Loaded (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk SilentCOM and TediousLoader DLLs Loaded by svchost (Post-Exploitation Persistence) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk HenMapCaCon TLS-over-Named-Pipe ProProBitOpen (C2 / Internal Proxy) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk SilentCOM COM TreatAs Hijack (Post-Exploitation Persistence) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- StingyBasilisk Impacket atexec Remote Scheduled Task via atsvc Pipe and GUID Task Name (Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 31)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `DD2B6E282712502D3C36B6FEC8B2B9561BC9CEA94586803C889EC9214BCFAC06`

Full set of 31 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Use Windows Named Pipes and SMB to Spread Malware Across Isolated Government Networks (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/windows-named-pipes-and-smb/)
- [Positive Technologies: APT StingyBasilisk malware is spreading through the pipes](https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/apt-stingybasilisk-malware-is-spreading-through-the-pipes/)
- [StingyBasilisk technical analysis (Habr, Positive Technologies blog)](https://habr.com/ru/companies/pt/articles/1106872/)
- [Шпионы притворялись защитой. Новая APT-группировка почти четыре года сидела в сети госучреждения (SecurityLab)](https://www.securitylab.ru/news/579382.php)
- [Positive Technologies: incident investigation and retrospective analysis results 2025-2026](https://ptsecurity.com/research/analytics/itogi-proektov-po-rassledovaniyu-inczidentov-i-retrospektivnomu-analizu-2025-2026/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1547.003 Time Providers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/)
- [Impacket (atexec.py)](https://github.com/fortra/impacket)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6000
