# Six Pre-Auth RCE Zero-Days in Danfoss AK-SM800A Refrigeration Controllers (Remote Root); Related Iran-Attributed Attacks on Exposed Danfoss/Copeland Controllers in France and Europe

> Midnight Blue researcher Carlo Meijer disclosed six pre-authentication stack-buffer-overflow RCE zero-days (CVEs pending) in Danfoss AK-SM800A controllers, all firmware up to and including 5.3.2, giving remote root. Separately, from October 11, 2026, attackers hijacked internet-exposed Danfoss and Copeland/Dixell refrigeration controllers in France and Europe, forcing defrost cycles, spoiling food worth tens of millions of euros and causing fires; France attributed the October wave to the IRGC-linked Shahid Kaveh unit.

- **Published:** 2026-11-13T23:53:59Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-15T15:31:28.856Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6010
- **ID:** TL-2026-6010
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** ICS_SCADA
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Shahid Kaveh - October 2026 France wave only (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 15

## Description

Midnight Blue's Carlo Meijer reported six pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerabilities in the Danfoss AK-SM800A (StoreView/AK-SM 8xxA series) refrigeration and HVAC controller after under an hour of manual firmware review, using QEMU user-space emulation of the web task in the monolithic sm_app binary. Five are similar stack-based buffer overflows in one small code segment; the sixth is a pre-authentication memory corruption flaw in sm_fcgi_app, the session-control component, and remains exploitable with strict session control enabled (the default since version 4.0). All firmware up to and including 5.3.2 is affected. Root causes are hundreds of unsafe strcpy() calls in unauthenticated handlers, no stack canaries, no PIE (NX enabled, partial RELRO), and the application running as root on Danux, a custom Yocto Linux for an i.MX6 SoC. Secure boot features of the i.MX6 are not in use per OTP fuse checks. Exact endpoints and exploit techniques are withheld pending coordinated disclosure with Danfoss; CVE IDs are pending and no patch is known.

Because secure boot is unused, a root attacker could plant an implant that survives factory reset and firmware updates, hide activity from logs, or brick the device by wiping flash or pushing malformed firmware, forcing physical replacement and days of freezer downtime. Midnight Blue advises removing internet exposure (VPN, private APN, or strict firewall-enforced IP allowlisting), inventorying exposure including integrator 4G modems, and not relying on patching or strict session control alone.

In parallel, a real-world campaign began overnight October 11-12, 2026. Attackers remotely altered defrost settings on internet-exposed Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC controllers (mostly end-of-life AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355, plus some outdated AK-SM 800A) and, per CERT-FR's updated alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 (October 13), Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB systems. About 700 French retail sites were affected, with at least 15 fires and tens of millions of euros in food losses; defrost cycles were reportedly extended from one hour to up to eight, delaying alarms. A second wave on about November 2 hit stores across Europe. The initial access vector has not been publicly tied to a specific vulnerability, and the article states the six new zero-days are not reported as exploited; public PoCs for earlier Danfoss CVEs reportedly appeared within 48 hours of the first attacks. On November 9, 2026 France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Center attributed the October wave to Shahid Kaveh, an IRGC Electronic and Cyber Center unit (previously linked by US agencies to CyberAv3ngers), citing Farsi-language artefacts, FOFA scanning use, infrastructure overlap with reconnaissance of Schneider Electric equipment, and the CyberbanNews propaganda outlet that publicized the attacks on October 13. The second wave was not attributed. Reuters noted it could not independently verify how officials reached their conclusion.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1596.005 Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
- T1495 Firmware Corruption
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
- T0883 Internet Accessible Device
- T0855 Unauthorized Command Message
- T0831 Manipulation of Control

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Refrigeration Controller Initiating Outbound Internet Connections (Implant / C2 Egress)** (`TL-2026-6010-SPL-003`)

Danfoss AK-SM800A units run the web application as root on Danux (Yocto, i.MX6) with secure boot unused, so a remote-root attacker can plant an implant that survives factory reset and firmware update. Controllers have no business initiating sessions to the internet beyond NTP/DNS. Flags connections from the controller VLAN to public addresses, including reverse shells and staged payload downloads after exploitation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1105
- **Data sources:** zeek:conn (bro:conn:json), firewall traffic logs (CEF / CommonSecurityLog)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** medium

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=network sourcetype="bro:conn:json" earliest=-24h
```comment TL-2026-6010 Controller egress. 10.60.0.0/16 is an example controller VLAN: replace with your refrigeration or OT controller subnets.```
| where cidrmatch("10.60.0.0/16",'id.orig_h')
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",'id.resp_h') OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",'id.resp_h') OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",'id.resp_h'))
| where 'id.resp_p'!=123 AND 'id.resp_p'!=53
| stats count AS conns sum(orig_bytes) AS bytes_out sum(resp_bytes) AS bytes_in dc('id.resp_p') AS distinct_ports values('id.resp_p') AS dest_ports earliest(_time) AS first_seen latest(_time) AS last_seen BY id.orig_h id.resp_h proto
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| sort - bytes_out
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let ControllerNets = dynamic(["10.60.0.0/16"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceAction in~ ("allow", "accept", "permitted")
| where ipv4_is_in_any_range(SourceIP, ControllerNets)
| where not(ipv4_is_private(DestinationIP))
| where DestinationPort !in (53, 123)
| summarize Connections=count(), BytesOut=sum(SentBytes), BytesIn=sum(ReceivedBytes), Ports=make_set(DestinationPort, 20), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, DestinationIP, Protocol
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Protocol, Ports, Connections, BytesOut, BytesIn
| order by BytesOut desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Refrigeration Controller Outbound Connection To Internet
id: a41e8b77-2c6d-4d59-8f13-9b0c5d7e3303
status: experimental
description: Detects allowed firewall sessions initiated from the refrigeration controller network (Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland/Dixell XWEB) to public addresses on ports other than DNS and NTP, a sign of a post-exploitation implant, reverse shell or payload staging after pre-auth RCE.
references:
    - https://midnightblue.nl/blog/multiple-rce-danfoss-aksm800a
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-03
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-shuts-down-refrigerators-at-french-supermarkets/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/13
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: firewall
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'allowed'
        src_ip|cidr: '10.60.0.0/16'
    filter_private_dst:
        dst_ip|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    filter_infra_ports:
        dst_port:
            - 53
            - 123
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Vendor cloud or remote-monitoring services the controllers legitimately use
    - Integrator 4G modem management traffic
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Approved vendor cloud monitoring or remote-support endpoints
- Firmware or licence checks performed by integrators

**Tuning notes:** Replace 10.60.0.0/16 with your controller subnets. Build an allow-list of approved vendor and integrator destinations and exclude them. Any new external destination from a controller should alert; consider blocking egress entirely at the OT firewall.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Internet Fingerprinting Sweep of Refrigeration Controller Web Interfaces (Recon / FOFA-Style Scanning) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Danfoss [indicator] / [indicator] Crash or Segfault (Exploit Attempt Indicator) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Controller Firmware or Flash Tampering Commands (Persistence / Brick) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Shell Command Injection Patterns in Requests to Controller Web Interface (Code-of-the-Day Bypass Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Flash / Firmware Write Tool Execution on Controller or Gateway (Linux Process Creation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Internet-Sourced Access to Refrigeration Controller Management Ports (Exposure Exploited in French Attacks) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Danfoss AK-SM800A Pre-Auth Stack Overflow Trigger - Oversized Request from External Source (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Refrigeration Controller Defrost Cycle / Setpoint Manipulation (Impact) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Researchers Discover 6 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers Allowing Remote Root Access](https://gbhackers.com/researchers-discover-6-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers-allowing-remote-root-access/)
- [Multiple RCE vulnerabilities in Danfoss AK-SM800A (Midnight Blue)](https://midnightblue.nl/blog/multiple-rce-danfoss-aksm800a)
- [Cyberattack shuts down refrigerators at French supermarkets (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-shuts-down-refrigerators-at-french-supermarkets/)
- [Supermarket Refrigeration Attack Widens to Copeland, Dixell Controllers (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/supermarket-refrigeration-attack-widens-to-copeland-dixell-controllers/)
- [France blames Iranian hackers for supermarket attacks that sparked fires (BleepingComputer)](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/france-blames-iranian-hackers-for-supermarket-attacks-that-sparked-fires)
- [France blames Iran for fridge cyberattacks (The Record)](https://therecord.media/france-blames-iran-for-fridge-cyberattacks)
- [CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-140-03: Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-03)
- [Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food: Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers (Claroty Team82)](https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers)
- [Danfoss Security Advisory DSA-2023-08-01](https://danfoss.com/en/service-and-support/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure/danfoss-security-advisories/dsa-2023-08-01)
- [Danfoss Security Advisories](https://www.danfoss.com/en/service-and-support/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure/danfoss-security-advisories/)
- [France blames Iran for supermarket fridge hacks (Axios)](https://axios.com/2026/11/10/france-iran-supermarket-refridgerator-hacks)
- [Unplug your smart fridges: French supermarkets warned after cyberattack (CSO Online)](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4235107/unplug-your-smart-fridges-french-supermarkets-warned-after-cyberattack.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6010
