# Apify Internal Systems Breach – Compromised Credential Chain Exposes Customer Accounts; API Tokens Rotated, 2FA Resets Prompted

> On 9-10 November 2026 an unauthorized third party used a compromised credential to obtain further account credentials and access related accounts in Apify's internal systems; Apify detected it on 11 November at 12:13 UTC. Apify rotated internal secrets and customer API tokens/Proxy passwords, reset sessions, revoked some OAuth connections (including GitHub), and told notified customers to reset 2FA. Apify later confirmed customer personal information or stored data was accessed.

- **Published:** 2026-11-14T05:27:14Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-14T05:27:14Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6042
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6042.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6042
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** DATA_BREACH
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 8

## Description

Apify, a Czech web scraping and automation cloud platform (about 80,000 customers per Apify's company page as cited by BleepingComputer; about 91,000 per SecurityWeek), disclosed through its public status page that an unauthorized third party gained access to parts of its internal systems on 9 and 10 November 2026. The activity was detected on 11 November 2026 at 12:13 UTC, at which point Apify cut off access and started an investigation. The first status entry was posted on 11 November at 20:46 CET.

Initial messaging said Apify had found no indication that account data stored on the platform was affected. On 12 November Apify updated its status page: the attacker 'used a compromised credential to obtain a number of account credentials and accessed related Apify accounts'. Apify closed that access path, reported no further attacker activity since 11 November, notified the relevant authorities, and emailed customers whose personal information or stored data was accessed. Customers who received no email have not been identified as affected so far. The initial compromised credential and the means of its compromise have not been disclosed.

Response actions reported by Apify: internal credentials invalidated and 'various critical internal secrets' rotated; API tokens rotated and all active sessions reset; Apify API tokens and Apify Proxy passwords rotated for impacted customers (sample notice seen by BleepingComputer); some OAuth connections to external integrations, including GitHub, revoked as a precaution (Apify says its investigation did not find those connections were an attack vector); added monitoring. On 13 November Apify said API tokens are now stored only as hashes, added network restrictions between internal services and stronger internal authentication, and began a review of its whole stack. A root-cause post-mortem was promised within a week and the incident was still listed as unresolved at the time of research.

Customer guidance: follow instructions in any Apify email; reset 2FA through the Apify Console because 2FA codes may have been exposed (Apify states passwords remain safe); reconnect GitHub for Actors built from private GitHub repositories (Actor > Change provider > GitHub, once per account/organization); reconnect integrations if prompted; set Settings > General resource access to Restricted, since anyone who knows a storage ID can read that storage while access is open; be wary of phishing, as Apify says it will never ask for passwords, 2FA codes, or payment details.

Data exposure is reported inconsistently. SecurityWeek, citing a breach notification a customer shared on Reddit (not confirmed by Apify in the article), lists names, email addresses, billing details, account activity, IP addresses, salted password hashes, 2FA recovery codes, phone numbers, authentication tokens tied to Google and GitHub sign-ins, and limited card data (cardholder name, expiry, last four digits; no full numbers or security codes). Apify has not published an exact data list or the number of affected accounts. No threat actor, malware, CVE, or technical indicators have been published. The customer names in BleepingComputer's report (Microsoft, Samsung, T-Mobile, Accenture, Siemens, European Commission, Roche) come from Apify's marketing page and are not stated to be affected.

Defender relevance: organizations that use Apify should treat any Apify API tokens, Proxy passwords, storage IDs, and GitHub/Google OAuth links as potentially exposed, rotate them, audit Apify-linked GitHub repositories and Actor runs for unexpected activity, and watch for phishing that references the incident. Apify also disclosed an unrelated security incident on 6 March 2026 (employee GitHub account compromised in a known malware campaign; malicious commits force-pushed to non-default branches); no link between the two incidents has been reported.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Apify API / Proxy Access From Non-Approved Source (Pre-Rotation Token Abuse) — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6042-SPL-001`)

Flags web/proxy traffic to api.apify.com or proxy.apify.com from sources that are not on the organisation's approved Apify client list. After the 9-10 Nov 2026 Apify breach (TL-2026-6042) an attacker may replay stolen Apify API tokens or Proxy passwords (T1078.004, T1528); no attacker IPs were published, so detection is behaviour-first: any unexpected client reaching the Apify API/Proxy is reviewed.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1078.004, T1528, T1078
- **Data sources:** splunk_cim_web_datamodel, proxy_web_gateway_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** medium

### Splunk SPL

````spl
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.url="*api.apify.com*" OR Web.url="*proxy.apify.com*") by Web.src Web.user Web.http_user_agent Web.url
```comment("TL-2026-6042 Apify breach: flag API/Proxy clients not in the approved source lookup")```
| rename Web.* as *
| lookup tl_apify_approved_sources src OUTPUT approved
| where isnull(approved)
| eval first_seen=strftime(firstTime,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(lastTime,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table first_seen last_seen src user http_user_agent url count
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let approved = _GetWatchlist('ApifyApprovedSources') | project SearchKey;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl in~ ("api.apify.com", "proxy.apify.com")
| where DeviceName !in~ (approved) and LocalIP !in (approved)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Scripted Client Access To Apify API Or Proxy
id: 3f6a1c52-8b7e-4d19-a0c4-6e2d5b91f301
status: experimental
description: Detects non-browser/scripted clients reaching api.apify.com or proxy.apify.com, a hunting pivot for replay of Apify API tokens exposed in the Nov 2026 Apify breach
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/apify-rotates-api-tokens-prompts-2fa-resets-after-breach/
    - https://status.apify.com/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/14
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_host:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - 'api.apify.com'
            - 'proxy.apify.com'
    selection_ua:
        c-useragent|contains:
            - 'python-requests'
            - 'curl/'
            - 'Go-http-client'
            - 'node-fetch'
            - 'axios'
            - 'okhttp'
            - 'apify-client'
    condition: selection_host and selection_ua
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Apify automation and CI jobs
    - Developer testing of Actors
level: medium

```

**Known false positives:**

- Developers or CI runners that legitimately call the Apify API but are not yet in the approved-sources lookup
- Newly onboarded scraping workers or cloud functions with new egress IPs

**Tuning notes:** Populate the tl_apify_approved_sources lookup (field: src) with known scraper hosts/egress IPs. Schedule over the last 24h and back-search from 2026-11-09. Raise priority when the user field is a service account or the user agent is a scripted client.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Apify API Token Exposed In Process Command Line — Exploitation Prerequisite (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bulk Apify Storage Reads (Datasets / Key-Value Stores) From One Source — Post-Exploitation Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Sign-In From New IP With MFA Satisfied By Token Claim — Credential Chain / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Apify / Google Sign-In Lookalike Domain Resolution — Phishing Follow-On (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitHub Repository Clone Via OAuth Token From Unapproved Source — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Apify Proxy Connection From Script Or LOLBin Process — Proxy Credential Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitHub OAuth Authorization Activity For Apify Application — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Security-Info (MFA) Registration Or Removal Burst — Credential Chain / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Apify rotates API tokens, prompts 2FA resets after breach](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/apify-rotates-api-tokens-prompts-2fa-resets-after-breach/)
- [Apify status page - security incident updates (Nov 11-13, 2026)](https://status.apify.com/)
- [Apify Confirms Customer Data Accessed in Cyberattack - SecurityWeek](https://www.securityweek.com/apify-confirms-customer-data-accessed-in-cyberattack/)
- [Apify rotates internal credentials following unauthorized system access - SC Media](https://www.scworld.com/brief/apify-rotates-internal-credentials-following-unauthorized-system-access)
- [Fireworks AI, Notion and Apify Breaches: AI Vendor Risk Guide - Safeguard](https://safeguard.sh/resources/blog/fireworks-ai-notion-apify-breaches-ai-vendor-risk-november-2026)
- [Apify Security Incident Notification - March 6, 2026 (separate, earlier incident)](https://status.apify.com/incidents/k950nq1k7lgl)
- [Apify company page (customer count cited by BleepingComputer)](https://apify.com/about)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6042
