Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-6072
Google Session Hijacking Campaign via Calendar Invite Lures and Live Reverse Proxy (Operation CloudFire, Nyasher)
Material Security tracks 'Operation CloudFire', a phishing campaign active since mid-August 2026 that sends lures as Google Calendar invites, routes victims through Google-hosted redirectors, and uses a live reverse proxy (the Nyasher framework) in front of the real Google sign-in page to relay passwords and 2FA in real time and capture authenticated sessions. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6072 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation CloudFire, Nyasher |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Google Google Workspace / Google Accounts (Calendar, Gmail, Drive sign-in); Microsoft Microsoft 365 sign-in (unfinished, non-functional branch in kit code) |
| Malware | Nyasher |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1114 Email Collection, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1550.004 Web Session Cookie, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1586.002 Email Accounts and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | enterprise, professional-services, legal, finance |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6072 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 8 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Operation CloudFire: Google Workspace Login Followed by OAuth Grant from a Second IP (Splunk)
After the Nyasher live proxy relays the victim's password and MFA, the operator replays the captured session from proxy-origin infrastructure and can grant OAuth access that survives a password reset. This search correlates Workspace login_success and token authorize events per user within 30 minutes and alerts when more than one source IP is involved (victim IP vs operator IP). Maps to T1539, T1550.004, T1078.004 and T1671.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1539, T1550.004, T1078.004, T1671
- Data sources: gws:reports:login, gws:reports:token, CloudAppEvents, google_workspace
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=gws (sourcetype="gws:reports:login" OR sourcetype="gws:reports:token") earliest=-4h
| eval user=lower('actor.email'), evname=mvindex('events{}.name',0)
| eval kind=case(sourcetype=="gws:reports:login" AND evname=="login_success","login", sourcetype=="gws:reports:token" AND evname=="authorize","oauth_grant")
| where isnotnull(kind)
| stats values(eval(if(kind=="login",ipAddress,null()))) AS login_ips values(eval(if(kind=="oauth_grant",ipAddress,null()))) AS grant_ips min(eval(if(kind=="login",_time,null()))) AS t_login max(eval(if(kind=="oauth_grant",_time,null()))) AS t_grant BY user
| where isnotnull(t_login) AND isnotnull(t_grant) AND t_grant>=t_login AND (t_grant-t_login)<=1800
| eval all_ips=mvdedup(mvappend(login_ips,grant_ips))
| where mvcount(all_ips)>1
| convert ctime(t_login) ctime(t_grant)Microsoft KQL
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(4h)
| where Application has 'Google Workspace'
| extend Kind = case(ActionType has_any ('login_success', 'Log on', 'Logon'), 'login', ActionType has_any ('authorize', 'OAuth'), 'oauth_grant', '')
| where Kind != ''
| summarize LoginIPs = make_set_if(IPAddress, Kind == 'login'), GrantIPs = make_set_if(IPAddress, Kind == 'oauth_grant'), FirstLogin = minif(Timestamp, Kind == 'login'), LastGrant = maxif(Timestamp, Kind == 'oauth_grant') by AccountId, Window = bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| where array_length(LoginIPs) > 0 and array_length(GrantIPs) > 0
| extend AllIPs = set_union(LoginIPs, GrantIPs)
| where array_length(AllIPs) > 1
| project Window, AccountId, LoginIPs, GrantIPs, FirstLogin, LastGrantSigma
title: Google Workspace OAuth Grant With Mail or Drive Scope (Operation CloudFire Persistence)
id: 0b9d7e44-81c2-4f6a-b3a5-2e1f9c6d4a77
status: experimental
description: Detects Google Workspace token authorize events granting Gmail or Drive scopes to a third-party app. Operation CloudFire operators use a hijacked session to grant OAuth access in the victim's name, which persists after a password reset. Correlate with a preceding login from a different IP.
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/calendar-invites-and-live-proxies.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1671
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1550.004
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: google_workspace
service: google_workspace.token
detection:
selection:
eventName: authorize
selection_scope:
scope|contains:
- 'mail.google.com'
- 'auth/gmail'
- 'auth/drive'
condition: selection and selection_scope
falsepositives:
- Users authorizing approved productivity or backup applications
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- Users who travel or switch between mobile and VPN networks and then authorize a legitimate app
- Admin-approved OAuth apps being authorized by many users during rollout
Tuning notes: Allowlist approved OAuth client IDs and corporate egress/VPN ranges. Field names depend on your Workspace ingestion (Splunk Add-on for Google Workspace flattening; Defender for Cloud Apps ActionType values) so verify them against sample events. Map the Sigma logsource to the Reports API 'token' application in your pipeline; this rule alone has no IP correlation, so pair it with the SPL/KQL form. Extend the window or add a new-device check for higher fidelity.
- Operation CloudFire: Calendar-Invite Email with [indicator]/url Redirect to Non-Google Host (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: Google Workspace Session Replay and OAuth Grant (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: Endpoint Reaches Turnstile and Google Lookalike Host (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: Google Redirector Abuse to Non-Google Destination (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: Google Workspace OAuth Grant With Mail or Drive Scope (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: DNS Query to Google Sign-in Lookalike Domain (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: [indicator]/url Redirector to Non-Google Destination (Splunk) · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation CloudFire: Turnstile-Gated Google Sign-in Lookalike Domain Access (Splunk) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 8 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6072.
Sample indicators (2 of 8)
- Domain:
google[.]com - Domain:
share[.]google
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 8 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Hijacked sessions give access to mail, Drive, and the ability to grant OAuth access in the victim's name.
Operation CloudFire is a credential-and-session theft campaign reported by Material Security's Threat Research team (vendor-reported; BleepingComputer coverage is sponsored/written by Material Security). The campaign has been observed since mid-August 2026 and, per The Hacker News (2026-11-12), appears to have wound down for now, with the researchers expecting a rebrand. Lures themed as voicemail notifications, RFP/RFI requests, court summonses and missed-payment notices arrive as Google Calendar invitations (sometimes BCC'd), frequently from organizations the recipient already corresponds with because the senders are compromised legitimate accounts that mail their owners' saved contacts. Send timing tracked US business hours.
Links in the lures mostly pass through Google's own /url redirector with the real destination in a query parameter, giving the first hop a trusted Google URL. Other waves used share.google links and Google Drive file links, and one variant used Intuit transaction-notification links. The victim then lands on an attacker gateway fronted by a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge (in some builds the genuine widget served from Cloudflare infrastructure). After the challenge passes, the password-capture page is built client-side by JavaScript, so no static page exists for crawlers to scan.
Behind the gateway a live reverse proxy sits in front of the genuine Google sign-in. The victim types credentials and approves prompts while the operator watches in real time. The proxy relays SMS codes, authenticator-app codes, Google's Tap-Yes number matching, and phone-based account recovery; none of these stop session capture because the authenticated session is taken after the victim completes MFA. The framework is Nyasher, publicly documented since February 2026 after researchers found a hardcoded key in its JavaScript. An unfinished Microsoft 365 branch was found in the code (stylesheet path, second harness, and a title string that decodes to a Microsoft sign-in prompt), though none of those paths currently resolve.
Infrastructure is disposable: many lure domains across several registrars, mostly registered days before use; receiving endpoints went live 1-20 days before the wave they served; and one wildcard certificate was issued 46 minutes before its domain was registered. Material reported gateway and backend URLs to Cloudflare's abuse system; Cloudflare confirmed them and placed phishing interstitials in front of them, forcing the operator to re-register, re-point and re-certify infrastructure. In one month of data from Material customers that share data (a lower bound), Material reports 68,676 campaign messages blocked, 2,112 unique malicious URLs, 897 domains taken down, and 8,570 compromised sender addresses across 6,354 root domains. Lure themes have since shifted to Google Drive file/document share invites.
Post-compromise, a live session exposes mail and Drive and allows the operator to grant OAuth access in the victim's name, which can persist after a password reset unless the grant is revoked. Hijacked sessions appear in Google Workspace audit logs. No threat actor has been named, and no specific domains, IPs or hashes are published in the public articles; Material points to a companion whitepaper (September 2026) for IOCs, which could not be read as text during this research. Severity is analyst judgment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Initial Access
T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
Command and Control
Credential Access
T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Collection
T1114 Email Collection; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
Execution
lateral-movement
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1586.002 Email Accounts
Persistence
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Revoke active Google sessions and OAuth grants for any account that interacted with a suspected lure; reset passwords and recovery info (target: within about an hour of detection)
- Review Google Workspace audit logs (login, token and OAuth grant events) for hijacked-session and unexpected third-party app authorization activity
- Search for and delete malicious calendar events already placed on user calendars, not just the originating emails
- Block or warn on links that chain through google.com/url and share.google to untrusted destinations where feasible, and report attacker gateway/backend URLs to Cloudflare abuse
Workarounds
- In Google Workspace Admin console (Apps > Google Workspace > Calendar > Advanced settings) set 'Add invitations to my calendar' so events are added only from invitations the user has responded to
- Train users that a calendar invite carrying a link to a sign-in page is a phishing indicator even when the sender is a known contact
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy phishing-resistant authentication (FIDO2/passkey security keys) because SMS, authenticator codes, and Tap-Yes number matching can all be relayed by a live proxy
- Treat calendar invites as a distinct threat surface and score multiple signals together (technical indicators, intent, link destination, sender relationship) rather than reputation alone
- Restrict OAuth app consent and monitor new grants; enforce session-lifetime and device-bound session policies
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- Material Security publishes 'The Quiet Phish', describing calendar-invitation attacks (auto-add abuse, payload in Location/Description/Join fields) as an increasingly common tactic affecting Google Workspace and Microsoft 365.
- Nyasher reverse-proxy framework becomes publicly documented after researchers find a hardcoded key in its JavaScript (source gives month only; February 2026).
- Campaign activity begins 'mid-August 2026' with Google Calendar invite lures sent from compromised legitimate accounts (source gives approximate date).
- Material Security publishes companion whitepaper with IOCs and timeline (file name indicates September 2026; contents not readable during this research).
- Material's response, Operation CloudFire, is launched 'by late September 2026' (approximate); gateway and backend URLs are reported to Cloudflare, which places phishing interstitials in front of them and forces the operator to re-register and re-point infrastructure.
- BleepingComputer publishes Material Security's write-up (sponsored): reverse proxy relays SMS, authenticator, Tap-Yes and recovery flows; 897 domains taken down over one month.
- The Hacker News reports the campaign appears finished for now, with lures shifted to Google Drive file/document share invites and an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch found in the kit code.
Sources cited
- Material Security companion whitepaper: Operation CloudFire calendar invite campaign (IOCs and timeline) content.material.security · Research · 2026-09-01
- The Quiet Phish: Stopping Calendar Invitation Attacks (Material Security) material.security · Vendor report · 2025-12-18
- Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions and bypasses MFA (Paubox) paubox.com · Blog
- Calendar Invites and Live Proxies: Inside a Google Session Hijacking Campaign The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-12
- Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA (BleepingComputer, sponsored by Material Security) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-11-04
- Operation CloudFire phishing campaign targets corporate Google sessions (SC Media brief) scworld.com · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.