# Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA (ClickFix) Campaign Delivers Malware Hidden Inside PNG Images and Sideloaded DLLs

> ClickFix lures posing as Cloudflare 'Verify that you are human' Turnstile checks, delivered through Bing malvertising, SEO poisoning and compromised websites, trick victims into pasting a PowerShell command. Observed chains rebuild executables hidden in PNG pixel data, sideload DLLs through signed Microsoft binaries, and lead to persistence, AD reconnaissance, credential theft and lateral movement.

- **Published:** 2026-11-14T15:34:22Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-14T15:34:22Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6094
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6094.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6094
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Huntress (Nov 10, 2026, 'Beyond the clipboard: The evolving tradecraft of ClickFix') and GBHackers (Nov 11, 2026) describe several ClickFix intrusion chains. Victims reach fake Cloudflare Turnstile pages via a Bing malvertising ad for 'Westlaw' (redirect through vvestalw.ghost.io and moziw.com/vvestalw/ to westlaw-signon.com), SEO-poisoned spoofed LinkedIn and real-estate sites, and a compromised dental practice website that shows a fake 'Manage Consent' pop-up. Ticking the box copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard and the victim pastes it into the Run dialog or a terminal. Some lures print fake colored 'verification' output or animated progress bars while the payload runs.

Steganographic chain: the stager downloads benign-looking PNG files whose pixel data contains complete executables (an earlier variant carried only shellcode). The stager rebuilds and runs them. verify_pkg.zip is dropped in Temp, 1.bat launches a multi-stage PowerShell stager, and the signed Microsoft binary LockScreenContentServer.exe sideloads the malicious dui70.dll. Persistence is a scheduled task and Run key named LockScreenContentServer_qQrRrJiHX. Post-compromise activity includes persistence, reconnaissance, credential theft and lateral movement.

Browser-cache chain (credited to John Hammond): a compromised site silently caches a 17,635-byte file. The ClickFix command, which varies by browser (Firefox, Chrome, Brave), searches that browser's cache for a file of that exact size, copies it to %TEMP%\t.bat and executes it, launching multiple second-stage payloads. One resulting payload is DuskDesk, a Node.js RAT disguised as a remote monitoring tool (LimeMint.js, launch.js, UmberOceanTan.dat; Run key 'DuskDesk'; TCP C2 167.148.201.104:3861; MSI delivered from apirequestaccess.com / 151.240.151.76).

Early-September hands-on-keyboard chain: cf_verify.zip; 1.bat runs CertEnrollCtrl.exe, which sideloads a malicious CertEnroll.dll and launches PowerShell. A Base64 command in 6341434163416441.txt writes C:\ProgramData\ShService\r.ps1 for a reverse SSH tunnel to 23.227.199.41 (scheduled task SysyService). The operator ran nltest, net, whoami and findstr for AD recon, used WinRM to reach the primary domain controller, created a new user and attempted to add it to local administrators, and opened a second tunnel. Earlier incidents: February (Matanbuchus 3.0 then AstarionRAT, credential theft, PsExec to a Windows Server and two domain controllers) and May (Potemkin loader, RMMProject, EtherRAT, SMBExec spreading to 11 hosts). The articles also mention an Amazon-themed lure abusing the Windows finger utility to deliver Lumma Stealer and NetSupport RMM, a ChatGPT Custom GPT lure leading to a Cloudflare-themed lure and a DLL-sideloaded RAT (at least 40 related incidents), and a fake Google Doc prompt delivering AMOS (macOS) and NetSupport RAT (Windows). Attribution is not stated in the sources. Month references in the sources carry no year; timeline dates for them are approximate. BeaconBeagle lookups for the two published IPs returned HTTP 502 and no C2 correlation was obtained.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1608.006 Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
- T1583.008 Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising
- T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1021.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ClickFix Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Execution (T1204.004)** (`TL-2026-6094-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the ClickFix execution stage in TL-2026-6094: PowerShell/cmd/mshta started by explorer.exe (Run dialog) or a browser, carrying fake Cloudflare/CAPTCHA verification text, hidden or encoded download-and-execute stagers, the browser-cache variant that searches for a 17635-byte file and copies it to %TEMP%	.bat, or known campaign infrastructure (westlaw-signon.com, moziw.com, apirequestaccess.com, cf_verify.zip, verify_pkg.zip). Requires Sysmon process creation (EventCode 1).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, index=windows sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, windows_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
(Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe")
(ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\chrome.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\firefox.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\brave.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\msedge.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(ParentImage)
| eval parent_browser=if(match(parent,"\\\\(chrome|firefox|brave|msedge)\.exe$"),1,0)
| eval cache_bat=if(match(cl,"17635") AND match(cl,"t\.bat"),1,0)
| eval verify_lure=if(match(cl,"(captcha|cloudflare|turnstile|verify.{0,20}human|i am not a robot|verification id)"),1,0)
| eval download_exec=if(match(cl,"(^|[^a-z])iex([^a-z]|$)|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-webrequest|(^|[^a-z])(iwr|irm)[^a-z]|bitsadmin") AND match(cl,"-w(indowstyle)?\s+h(idden)?|-enc|frombase64string|-nop"),1,0)
| eval known_ioc=if(match(cl,"westlaw-signon\.com|moziw\.com|vvestalw|apirequestaccess\.com|23\.227\.199\.41|151\.240\.151\.76|167\.148\.201\.104|cf_verify\.zip|verify_pkg\.zip"),1,0)
| where cache_bat=1 OR known_ioc=1 OR (verify_lure=1 AND download_exec=1) OR (parent_browser=1 AND download_exec=1)
| eval reason=case(cache_bat=1,"Browser-cache ClickFix: 17635-byte cached file copied to Temp t.bat", known_ioc=1,"Command line references TL-2026-6094 ClickFix infrastructure or staged archive", verify_lure=1,"Fake CAPTCHA/Turnstile lure text with download-and-execute PowerShell", true(),"Browser-spawned shell running hidden/encoded download-and-execute")
| table _time host User ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine reason
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "msedge.exe")
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend ParentBrowser = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "msedge.exe")
| extend CacheBat = cl contains "17635" and cl contains "t.bat"
| extend VerifyLure = cl matches regex @"(captcha|cloudflare|turnstile|verify.{0,20}human|i am not a robot|verification id)"
| extend DownloadExec = (cl matches regex @"(^|[^a-z])iex([^a-z]|$)|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-webrequest|(^|[^a-z])(iwr|irm)[^a-z]|bitsadmin")
    and (cl matches regex @"-w(indowstyle)?\s+h(idden)?|-enc|frombase64string|-nop")
| extend KnownIoc = cl matches regex @"westlaw-signon\.com|moziw\.com|vvestalw|apirequestaccess\.com|23\.227\.199\.41|151\.240\.151\.76|167\.148\.201\.104|cf_verify\.zip|verify_pkg\.zip"
| where CacheBat or KnownIoc or (VerifyLure and DownloadExec) or (ParentBrowser and DownloadExec)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, CacheBat, VerifyLure, DownloadExec, KnownIoc
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: ClickFix Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Shell Execution
id: 6f1c2a4e-3b7d-4e58-9a10-5c2d8e7f1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects shells launched from the Run dialog (explorer.exe) or a browser with fake-CAPTCHA lure text, hidden or encoded download-and-execute PowerShell, the Chrome/Firefox/Brave browser-cache 17635-byte copy to t.bat, or campaign infrastructure in the command line.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-evolving-tradecraft-of-clickfix
    - https://gbhackers.com/fake-cloudflare-captcha-2/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
          - '\powershell.exe'
          - '\pwsh.exe'
          - '\cmd.exe'
          - '\mshta.exe'
    selection_parent_explorer:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    selection_parent_browser:
        ParentImage|endswith:
          - '\chrome.exe'
          - '\firefox.exe'
          - '\brave.exe'
          - '\msedge.exe'
    selection_cache_bat:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
          - '17635'
          - 't.bat'
    selection_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
          - 'westlaw-signon.com'
          - 'moziw.com'
          - 'vvestalw'
          - 'apirequestaccess.com'
          - '23.227.199.41'
          - '151.240.151.76'
          - '167.148.201.104'
          - 'cf_verify.zip'
          - 'verify_pkg.zip'
    selection_lure:
        CommandLine|contains:
          - 'captcha'
          - 'cloudflare'
          - 'turnstile'
          - 'i am not a robot'
          - 'verification id'
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
          - 'iex '
          - 'iex('
          - 'invoke-expression'
          - 'downloadstring'
          - 'invoke-webrequest'
          - 'iwr '
          - 'irm '
          - 'bitsadmin'
    selection_hidden:
        CommandLine|contains:
          - '-w hidden'
          - '-windowstyle hidden'
          - '-enc'
          - '-nop'
          - 'frombase64string'
    condition: selection_img and (selection_cache_bat or selection_ioc or (selection_parent_explorer and selection_lure and selection_download) or (selection_parent_browser and selection_download and selection_hidden))
falsepositives:
    - Administrators pasting legitimate hidden PowerShell one-liners into the Run dialog
    - Software installers launched from a browser that use cmd.exe with -enc style bootstrap commands
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators or helpdesk staff pasting legitimate hidden/encoded PowerShell into the Run dialog
- Browser-launched installers or enterprise software agents that bootstrap through cmd.exe with -enc style commands
- Security awareness phishing simulations that reproduce fake CAPTCHA lures

**Tuning notes:** Change index=windows to the index that holds your Sysmon data. Exclude known software-deployment parents and admin accounts via a lookup. Raise the parent_browser branch to alert-only for users without developer roles. Add additional browser binaries (vivaldi.exe, opera.exe) if used. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 with CommandLine and ParentImage populated.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ClickFix Stager Chain: Browser-Cache [indicator], PNG Steganography Loader and [indicator] / [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Post-Compromise AD Recon (nltest/net/whoami) and Local Account Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Lateral Movement: WinRM, PsExec Service and SMBExec to Servers and Domain Controllers (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Signed-Binary DLL Sideloading (LockScreenContentServer.exe/dui70.dll, [indicator]/[indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Node.js RAT Execution and Run Key Persistence ([indicator] / [indicator] / [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Reverse SSH Tunnel C2 (SysyService task, ShService r.ps1, [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Persistence via Run Keys and Scheduled Tasks (SysyService / LockScreenContentServer_ / CertEnrollCtrl_ / [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix C2 Network Activity: [indicator] node.exe TCP/3861, Published IOC IPs and Sibling Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `23.227.199[.]41`
- Domain: `vvestalw[.]ghost[.]io`
- URL: `hxxps://moziw[.]com/vvestalw/`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Use Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Checks to Deploy Malware Hidden Inside PNG Images (GBHackers)](https://gbhackers.com/fake-cloudflare-captcha-2/)
- [Beyond the clipboard: The evolving tradecraft of ClickFix (Huntress)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-evolving-tradecraft-of-clickfix)
- [ClickFix Gets Creative: Malware Buried in Images (Huntress)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/clickfix-malware-buried-in-images)
- [From ClickFix to Metastealer: Dissecting Evolving Threat Actor Techniques (Huntress via BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/from-clickfix-to-metastealer-dissecting-evolving-threat-actor-techniques/)
- [Huntress, Microsoft Detail the Continued Popularity, Evolution of ClickFix Attacks (Security Boulevard)](https://securityboulevard.com/2026/02/huntress-microsoft-detail-the-continued-popularity-evolution-of-clickfix-attacks/)
- [GBHackers: related fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA coverage](https://gbhackers.com/fake-cloudflare-captcha/)
- [GBHackers: macOS AMOS stealer coverage](https://gbhackers.com/macos-amos-stealer/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6094
