# FaceStealer: North Korean (BlueNoroff) deepfake/ClickFix social engineering campaign behind $400M+ crypto theft disrupted by US

> The US government disrupted FaceStealer, a North Korean social engineering campaign that used hijacked accounts, recorded/deepfake video calls and ClickFix-style fake-error 'fixes' against crypto/Web3 workers and open-source developers, stealing more than $400 million over about 18 months. The US seized the campaign's cloud-based infrastructure; Arctic Wolf attributes the activity to BlueNoroff.

- **Published:** 2026-11-14T16:01:18Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-14T16:01:18Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6095
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6095.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6095
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT38 (North Korea)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 9

## Description

FaceStealer is the FBI's name for a North Korean social engineering scheme that ran for roughly 18 months and, per the US Department of Justice, stole more than $400 million in cryptocurrency. The DOJ (Central District of California, with the FBI Los Angeles Field Office) announced on 2026-11-12 that it had seized the scheme's cloud-based infrastructure, and the FBI seized more than 900 secretly recorded webcam videos of victims under a federal warrant. The DOJ lists the tracking names Sapphire Sleet, UNC1069, Dangerous Password, CryptoCore, APT38, BlueNoroff and Stardust Chollima for the North Korean actors; Arctic Wolf specifically attributes the campaign to BlueNoroff, a financially motivated Lazarus subgroup tied to the DPRK Reconnaissance General Bureau and active since at least 2014.

Attack chain: operators take over accounts on Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack and Discord (often belonging to earlier victims) and use them to send video-meeting invitations, reportedly via typosquatted meeting links. During the call the attacker plays recordings of people the target knows (including footage covertly recorded of earlier victims while they waited in the meeting) or deepfakes of prominent crypto/Web3 figures. The attacker then claims a technical fault such as broken audio, shows a fake error and sends a link or instructions for a purported fix (an update or installer). Running it installs malware. Arctic Wolf documents lures including shared financial documents, a fake Chrome PDF viewer update, a fabricated media player called 'NovaStream', identity-verification prompts, hardware-wallet access and security-audit workflows, with custom instruction videos that walk victims past browser warnings on macOS and Windows. On macOS the 'Update Now' button starts an AppleScript download; on Windows/Linux users are told to run commands that fetch a payload from a fake Chrome update site, after which a Chrome-branded 'Update Complete' dialog is shown. Arctic Wolf detection coverage references PowerShell, curl-piped and osascript execution patterns.

Impact and capabilities: the malware steals cryptocurrency data and credentials for video platforms (Zoom, Google Meet, Microsoft Teams), and accesses contact lists, social media, communication apps and webcam video. Victims' contacts and accounts are used to find the next targets, and victims were sometimes robbed or their accounts hijacked months to more than a year after the initial compromise. Arctic Wolf counted 677 targeted individuals across 58 countries (84% founders and C-suite; counts reflect targeting, not confirmed compromise), up from 400+ targets in 20 countries in its April report, and flagged 349 videos as likely modified as of 2026-11-06. Deepfake production moved from Adobe Premiere to generative AI tools (Google Generative AI, Grok Imagine, Wondershare AIGC, GPT-4o), attributed by provenance evidence rather than visual inspection. Arctic Wolf reports a coordinated server cluster (98 high-confidence domains, 73 not previously reported) linked by naming conventions, delivery commands and certificate habits; the domain list is in its PDF report and was not available on the public blog page.

Supply-chain risk: the FBI says the actors are now targeting open-source maintainers. It described a maintainer of a popular JavaScript library (tens of millions of weekly downloads, unnamed) lured into a fake Teams meeting, stopped by quick detection, and confirmed multiple other attempts against npm and Rust crate developers. BleepingComputer also notes an Amazon July 2026 report linking several open-source supply chain attacks to BlueNoroff. The Binance theft (about $6B, attributed to TraderTraitor) and the $1.2B seizure/restraint announced alongside it are a separate matter. Source note: no CVEs, hashes, IPs or domains were published in the public sources reviewed; the FBI page could not be fetched (HTTP 403) and Arctic Wolf's full PDF IOC appendix was not reviewed.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1586.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.002 AppleScript
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1534 Internal Spearphishing
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**FaceStealer ClickFix Payload Fetch - osascript, curl-pipe-shell, PowerShell Cradle (Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-6095-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the ClickFix fake-fix stage used by FaceStealer/BlueNoroff (TL-2026-6095): osascript do shell script downloads (fake Chrome PDF viewer Update Now), curl/wget piped to a shell on Windows/Linux/macOS, and powershell.exe download-and-execute cradles. Uses the CIM Endpoint.Processes data model so it works across Sysmon, EDR and Linux/macOS process telemetry.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.002
- **Data sources:** splunk_cim_endpoint_processes, sysmon, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("osascript","curl","wget","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bash","sh","zsh") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process
| rename "Processes.*" as *
| eval cmd=lower(process)
```FaceStealer ClickFix: victim-run fake fix fetches a payload; behaviours = AppleScript shell download, curl/wget piped to a shell, PowerShell download-and-execute cradle```
| eval osa_fetch=if(process_name="osascript" AND like(cmd,"%do shell script%") AND match(cmd,"(curl|wget|http)"),1,0)
| eval pipe_shell=if(match(cmd,"(curl|wget)\s[^|]*https?://[^|]*\|\s*(sudo\s+)?(ba|z)?sh"),1,0)
| eval ps_cradle=if(match(process_name,"(?i)^(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$") AND match(cmd,"(iwr|invoke-webrequest|irm\s|invoke-restmethod|downloadstring|downloadfile)") AND match(cmd,"(iex|invoke-expression|-enc|-encodedcommand|-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden)"),1,0)
| where osa_fetch=1 OR pipe_shell=1 OR ps_cradle=1
| eval technique=case(osa_fetch=1,"T1059.002",ps_cradle=1,"T1059.001",true(),"T1204.004")
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| table firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name process_name process technique
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("osascript","curl","wget","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bash","sh","zsh")
| extend cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend OsaFetch = FileName =~ "osascript" and cmd has "do shell script" and cmd has_any ("curl","wget","http")
| extend PipeShell = cmd matches regex @"(curl|wget)\s[^|]*https?://[^|]*\|\s*(sudo\s+)?(ba|z)?sh"
| extend PsCradle = FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
    and cmd has_any ("iwr","invoke-webrequest","irm ","invoke-restmethod","downloadstring","downloadfile")
    and cmd has_any ("iex","invoke-expression","-enc","-encodedcommand","-w hidden","-windowstyle hidden")
| where OsaFetch or PipeShell or PsCradle
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, OsaFetch, PipeShell, PsCradle
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: FaceStealer ClickFix Remote Payload Fetch via osascript, Shell Pipe or PowerShell Cradle
id: 6095a000-0001-4000-8000-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects victim-executed ClickFix style fixes used by the FaceStealer / BlueNoroff campaign (TL-2026-6095) - osascript do shell script downloads, curl/wget piped to a shell, and PowerShell download-and-execute cradles.
references:
    - https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-north-koreas-massive-theft-cryptocurrency
    - http://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/still-in-the-meeting-bluenoroff-six-months-on/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/us-disrupts-north-korean-campaign-behind-400-million-crypto-theft/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_osascript:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'do shell script'
            - 'http'
    selection_pipe_shell:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bash'
            - '/sh'
            - '/zsh'
        CommandLine|re: '(curl|wget)\s[^|]*https?://[^|]*\|\s*(sudo\s+)?(ba|z)?sh'
    selection_ps_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_ps_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'iwr '
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'irm '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'DownloadFile'
    selection_ps_exec:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'iex'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
            - '-enc'
            - '-w hidden'
            - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
    condition: selection_osascript or selection_pipe_shell or (selection_ps_img and selection_ps_download and selection_ps_exec)
falsepositives:
    - Developer install scripts such as curl https://... | sh for Homebrew, rustup or nvm
    - Administrator PowerShell deployment one-liners
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Developer or admin bootstrap scripts using curl-pipe-shell from trusted vendors (Homebrew, rustup, nvm)
- Software deployment tools invoking PowerShell download cradles

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist known installer hosts by extending the match with NOT match(cmd,"(brew.sh|rustup.rs|nodejs.org)"); scope to crypto/Web3 and developer hosts first; correlate with a Zoom, Teams or Google Meet process start within 10 minutes to raise fidelity.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- FaceStealer Windows ClickFix Fake Chrome Update Execution (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Package Manager or Build Script Spawning Remote Download-and-Execute (Supply Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer Typosquatted Meeting Link from Hijacked Account (Lateral Movement / Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer macOS osascript Downloader and Password Prompt (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer Webcam Capture via CLI Tooling (Post-Exploitation Collection) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer Lookalike Meeting Domain DNS Query (C2 / Delivery Infrastructure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer Credential and Crypto Wallet Data Staging (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FaceStealer Community-Observed DPRK Sibling Infrastructure (C2 / Resource Development) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [US disrupts North Korean campaign behind $400 million crypto theft](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/us-disrupts-north-korean-campaign-behind-400-million-crypto-theft/)
- [Justice Department Announces Actions to Disrupt North Korea's Massive Theft of Cryptocurrency](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-north-koreas-massive-theft-cryptocurrency)
- [FBI: FaceStealer cryptocurrency theft scheme](https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/facestealer-cryptocurrency-theft-scheme)
- [Arctic Wolf: Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On](http://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/still-in-the-meeting-bluenoroff-six-months-on/)
- [North Korea's Crypto Theft Operations: DOJ Seizes $1.2 Billion and Disrupts Hacker Infrastructure](https://securityaffairs.com/203012/cyber-crime/north-korea-crypto-theft-operations-doj-seizes-1-2-billion-and-disrupts-hacker-infrastructure.html)
- [DOJ Targets $1.2b from Binance Hack, Disrupts Facestealer](https://cointelegraph.com/news/doj-12b-north-korean-crypto-seizure-400m-facestealer-scheme)
- [FBI Disrupts North Korean Deepfake Crypto Theft Scheme](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/fbi-disrupts-north-korean-deepfake-crypto-theft-scheme-a-33381)
- [Amazon links debug, chalk npm supply chain attacks to North Korean hackers](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazon-links-debug-chalk-npm-supply-chain-attacks-to-north-korean-hackers/)
- [North Korean hackers deepfake execs in Zoom call to spread Mac malware](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-deepfake-execs-in-zoom-call-to-spread-mac-malware/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6095
