# Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report: Data Exfiltration Surges 275.8% to 896.2 TB Among Top 10 Groups; Spam Bombing, Teams Vishing and Quick Assist Abuse

> ThreatLabz (April 2025-March 2026 data) reports that combined exfiltration by the top 10 ransomware groups by leak volume rose 275.8% year over year to 896.2 TB, while leak-site victims fell 3% to 7,366 and known payments fell 15.8% to $327.8M. Intrusions commonly begin with spam bombing plus Microsoft Teams vishing that steers victims into legitimate remote support tools such as Quick Assist.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T00:41:04Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T00:41:04Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6111
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6111.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6111
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

The Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report analyzes ransomware and extortion activity from April 2025 through March 2026. Combined exfiltration by the top 10 groups by reported leak volume increased 275.8% year over year to 896.2 TB (versus 123.8 TB in the 2023-2024 period). Leak-site victims totaled 7,366 (down 3%), 52 newly active groups were identified, and 60% of the top 15 groups by victim volume were new to the rankings. Known ransom payment volume was $327.8M (down 15.8%), recorded payments fell 20.1%, and the average payment rose 5.3% to $431,995. Leak volume per the report's table: WorldLeaks 207.5 TB, Rhysida 112.6 TB, Qilin 110.1 TB, INC Ransom 96.6 TB, Genesis 75.7 TB, Interlock 71.9 TB, Payouts King 62.9 TB, DragonForce 61.1 TB, Sinobi 50.4 TB, Play 47.5 TB. Rhysida and Embargo each averaged at least 1 TB per victim.

Victim targeting is people-centric: 62% of victims held manager-level titles or above and roughly 75% worked in finance, sales, operations, HR or marketing. Intrusions often begin with routine-looking contact such as a support interaction, a Teams message or an IT-themed request. The reported playbook is spam bombing combined with Microsoft Teams vishing, steering the victim to start a legitimate remote support session (Quick Assist and other common remote support utilities), followed by reconnaissance, persistence, lateral movement, data theft and encryption. The report also cites trusted-tool abuse, GenAI-assisted malware development and use of scripting languages to adapt tooling. A companion Zscaler post reports sector shifts (utilities +622% to 65 victims; government -27%, healthcare -24%, education -17%), extortion without encryption (a healthcare victim reportedly paid $2 million without files being encrypted), and attackers citing HIPAA, SEC disclosure rules and GDPR during negotiations.

The summary blog names no families or IOCs. Supporting ThreatLabz research documents the same access pattern in detail. 'Helpdesk Hijackers' (2026-07-27) describes a likely ransomware initial access broker active since January 2026 that uses Teams vishing and Quick Assist, then a PowerShell one-liner that drops a binary to %APPDATA%, sets an HKCU Run key named 'Realtek HD Audio' and deletes PowerShell history. It deploys the Go gRPC backdoor GoGRPC (variants Lep, Giver, Pet, Kind) and follow-on tools BlindDoor, S3Siphon (S3 exfiltration with user agent BackupAgent/1.0), RevSocket, PyGRPC and RSOX. 'Payouts King Takes Aim at Ransomware Throne' (2026-04-16) attributes some spam bombing/Teams/Quick Assist intrusions to Payouts King with high confidence and documents its scheduled-task persistence and SYSTEM elevation, shadow copy deletion, event log clearing and partial encryption (RSA-4096/AES-256-CTR). IOCs below come from those two companion posts; attribution of the report-wide trend to any single actor is not made by the sources.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1566.004 Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
- T1090 Proxy
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GoGRPC Persistence: Realtek HD Audio HKCU Run Key to AppData Binary — Post-Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-6111-SPL-002`)

Fires when the HKCU Run value 'Realtek HD Audio' is set, or any Run value points to %APPDATA%\sekv*.exe. This is the persistence ThreatLabz documents for the GoGRPC staging binary dropped after Quick Assist access.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1036.005, T1059.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" (TargetObject="*\\Run\\Realtek HD Audio" OR Details="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv*.exe") NOT Details="C:\\Program Files*" | eval scripted_writer=if(match(Image,"(?i)\\\\(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\\.exe$"),"yes","no"), masquerade_name=if(like(TargetObject,"%\\Run\\Realtek HD Audio") AND NOT like(Details,"C:\\Program Files%"),"realtek_name_non_driver_path","other") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Details) as run_value_data values(Image) as writer_process values(scripted_writer) as scripted_writer values(masquerade_name) as masquerade_name by host User TargetObject | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey has @"\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "Realtek HD Audio"
    or RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv[a-z0-9]*\.exe$"
| where RegistryValueData !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
| extend ScriptedWriter = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe"), MasqueradesAsRealtek = RegistryValueName =~ "Realtek HD Audio" and RegistryValueData !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, ScriptedWriter, MasqueradesAsRealtek
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious Realtek HD Audio Run Key Pointing to AppData Binary (TL-2026-6111 GoGRPC)
id: 7b2e9d14-0c3a-5f68-8d1b-4a6c5e2f9d02
status: experimental
description: Detects the HKCU Run value 'Realtek HD Audio' or a Run value pointing to AppData Roaming sekv random named executables, the persistence used to start the GoGRPC staging binary.
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/helpdesk-hijackers-teams-vishing-quick-assist-and-gogrpc-backdoor
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/payouts-king-takes-aim-ransomware-throne
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ransomware-leverage-growing-terabyte-takeaways-threatlabz-2026-ransomware
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentVersion\Run\Realtek HD Audio'
    selection_path:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Details|re: '(?i)\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv[a-z0-9]*\.exe$'
    filter_legit:
        Details|startswith: 'C:\Program Files'
    condition: (selection_name or selection_path) and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Genuine Realtek driver packages that register a Run value from Program Files (excluded by filter)
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Realtek audio driver installers (they normally write from Program Files, which the query excludes)
- Per-user portable applications that register an AppData Run value with a random-looking executable name

**Tuning notes:** Extend the Program Files exclusion with your signed driver paths. Alert regardless of path when the value name is exactly 'Realtek HD Audio' and the writer is PowerShell or cmd.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Quick Assist Session Followed by Scripted Download or Persistence — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payouts King Scheduled Tasks \Mozilla\UpdateTask and \Mozilla\ElevateTask — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- S3Siphon Exfiltration: BackupAgent/1.0 PUT Uploads to Cloud Storage — C2/Exfiltration Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Payouts King Ransom Note / .ZWIAAW Encryption and GoGRPC Log and Staged Binary Artifacts — Impact Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell PSReadLine History Deletion — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Shadow Copy Deletion and Event Log Clearing Before Encryption — Impact Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoGRPC Staging: PowerShell Download to AppData, Unblock-File and Realtek HD Audio Run Key — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoGRPC / RevSocket / RSOX C2 and Staging Infrastructure Contact — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `5.253.59[.]222`
- Domain: `scansec-upd[.]com`
- File hash: `9136ffb749c6cec13b826cd4f25ffdcf170375889feba9fee28dd74c32578f52`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Ransomware Leverage is Growing by the Terabyte: Takeaways from ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ransomware-leverage-growing-terabyte-takeaways-threatlabz-2026-ransomware)
- [Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report (campaign page)](https://www.zscaler.com/campaign/threatlabz-ransomware-report)
- [ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Analysis (PDF)](https://www.zscaler.com/resources/industry-reports/threatlabz-2026-ransomware-analysis.pdf)
- [Helpdesk Hijackers: Teams Vishing, Quick Assist, and GoGRPC Backdoor](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/helpdesk-hijackers-teams-vishing-quick-assist-and-gogrpc-backdoor)
- [Payouts King Takes Aim at the Ransomware Throne](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/payouts-king-takes-aim-ransomware-throne)
- [Ransomware Data Theft Surged 275% in 2026: Schools, Hospitals and Government](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/product-insights/ransomware-data-theft-surged-275-2026-schools-hospitals-and-government)
- [Access to Exfiltration: What Defenders Need to Know](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/access-exfiltration-what-defenders-need-know)
- [Collaboration and Support Platforms Are the New Attack Surface](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/cybersecurity-best-practices/collaboration-and-support-platforms-are-new-attack-surface)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6111
