# Tor Releases Emergency Security Update 0.4.9.17 as Ongoing DDoS Attack Overwhelms Network Relays

> An ongoing distributed denial-of-service attack, a flood of client circuits, is overwhelming Tor network relays and has affected most relay operators. The Tor Project announced security release 0.4.9.17 on 2026-11-13, singling out a fix to IPv6 handling in relay DoS defenses, and urges every relay operator to upgrade immediately.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T03:36:10Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T08:38:28.812Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6113
- **ID:** TL-2026-6113
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 11 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-11-13 the Tor Network Team (developer dgoulet) published 'Security Release 0.4.9.17' on the Tor Project forum. The announcement states the Tor network is under an ongoing DDoS attack that has affected most relay operators, in the form of a massive flood of client circuits that the team calls 'not an easy problem to address'. The release contains a series of security fixes; the one called out as most important concerns how relay DoS defenses handle IPv6. Operators are told 'If you run a relay, please upgrade as soon as possible' and that no further action or configuration change is required after upgrading. The Tor Project says developers are still testing additional defenses and expect more releases soon, and thanks relay operators, especially those on the tor-relays mailing list. Cyber Security News (2026-11-16) reports that the release targets the core tor relay daemon and is not a new Tor Browser build.

The public sources do not provide a CVE identifier, the underlying code defect, trigger conditions, affected version ranges, traffic volumes, or attacker attribution. The attack should not be treated as ended. Neither source describes the flood's technical details beyond 'client circuits'.

Context (not confirmed to be the same campaign): relay operator 1AEO documented a circuit-building DoS against its guard-relay fleet from 2026-06-25, with open circuits peaking near 18.5x-20x baseline on 2026-07-05, ntor_v3 handshakes making up roughly 90-97% of worker assignments during peaks, INTRODUCE2 rejections near 12,000/second, relay OOM-killer activity, and an onion-service introduction component. 1AEO explicitly does not attribute the traffic or tie it to a common attacker, and no source links that activity to the November 2026 attack. Tor's earlier 2022-2023 DDoS and circuit-creation floods, and a separate multi-month DDoS reported by SecurityWeek, show the network has faced repeated resource-exhaustion attacks that the built-in per-address DoS mitigations (circuit-rate, burst and concurrent-connection limits) do not fully cap.

Defender guidance: relay operators should upgrade to 0.4.9.17 (or a distribution package carrying it) immediately, watch for further releases from the Tor Project, and monitor relay metrics such as open circuits, onionskin load, DoS-defense counters and overload-general reports in the server descriptor. Upgrading does not confirm the disruption is over.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1499.002 Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood
- T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service
- T1498 Network Denial of Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Tor Relay DoS-Defense Heartbeat Shows Client Circuit / INTRODUCE2 Flood (TL-2026-6113)** (`TL-2026-6113-SPL-001`)

Detects the Tor relay circuit-flood DDoS described in TL-2026-6113 (fixed in tor 0.4.9.17) by computing per-heartbeat deltas of the relay's own 'DoS mitigation since startup' counters (circuits rejected, same-address concurrent connections rejected, INTRODUCE2 rejected). A large jump means the built-in DoS defenses are absorbing a flood of client circuits. Thresholds are starting points, not validated against the November 2026 attack, whose traffic volumes are not public.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1499.002, T1499, T1499.003
- **Data sources:** tor_relay syslog (index=tor_relay, sourcetype=syslog), Linux Syslog (Sentinel Syslog table)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=tor_relay sourcetype=syslog "DoS mitigation since startup" earliest=-24h
```Tor relay DoS-defense heartbeat counters: TL-2026-6113 circuit flood, fixed in tor 0.4.9.17```
| eval circ_rejected=tonumber(replace(_raw,"^.*?(\\d+) circuits rejected.*$","\\1")), conc_conn_rejected=tonumber(replace(_raw,"^.*?(\\d+) same address concurrent connections rejected.*$","\\1")), intro_rejected=tonumber(replace(_raw,"^.*?(\\d+) INTRODUCE2 rejected.*$","\\1"))
| sort 0 host _time
| streamstats current=f window=1 last(circ_rejected) AS prev_circ last(conc_conn_rejected) AS prev_conn last(intro_rejected) AS prev_intro BY host
| eval d_circ=circ_rejected-prev_circ, d_conn=conc_conn_rejected-prev_conn, d_intro=intro_rejected-prev_intro
| where d_circ>=10000 OR d_conn>=5000 OR d_intro>=50000
| stats max(d_circ) AS max_circuits_rejected max(d_conn) AS max_concurrent_conn_rejected max(d_intro) AS max_introduce2_rejected latest(_time) AS last_seen BY host
| eval last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| sort - max_circuits_rejected
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ProcessName =~ 'Tor' and SyslogMessage has 'DoS mitigation since startup'
| extend CircRejected = tolong(extract(@'(\d+) circuits rejected', 1, SyslogMessage)), ConcConnRejected = tolong(extract(@'(\d+) same address concurrent connections rejected', 1, SyslogMessage)), Introduce2Rejected = tolong(extract(@'(\d+) INTRODUCE2 rejected', 1, SyslogMessage))
| sort by Computer asc, TimeGenerated asc
| extend dCirc = iff(prev(Computer) == Computer, CircRejected - prev(CircRejected), long(null)), dConn = iff(prev(Computer) == Computer, ConcConnRejected - prev(ConcConnRejected), long(null)), dIntro = iff(prev(Computer) == Computer, Introduce2Rejected - prev(Introduce2Rejected), long(null))
| where dCirc >= 10000 or dConn >= 5000 or dIntro >= 50000
| summarize MaxCircuitsRejected = max(dCirc), MaxConcConnRejected = max(dConn), MaxIntroduce2Rejected = max(dIntro), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer
| order by MaxCircuitsRejected desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Tor Relay DoS Defense Counters Show Circuit or INTRODUCE2 Flood
id: 3b1f7a2e-5c84-4e19-9d6a-0f2c8e41a7b1
status: experimental
description: Detects a Tor relay heartbeat line whose cumulative DoS-mitigation counters (circuits rejected, INTRODUCE2 rejected, same-address concurrent connections rejected) are large, indicating the client circuit flood described in TL-2026-6113. Counters are cumulative since relay startup, so pair with the SPL/KQL delta versions for rate.
references:
    - https://forum.torproject.org/t/security-release-0-4-9-17/22454
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/tor-ddos-attack/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002
    - attack.t1499
    - attack.t1499.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: syslog
detection:
    selection:
        Message|re: 'DoS mitigation since startup.*(?:[1-9]\d{4,} circuits rejected|[1-9]\d{4,} INTRODUCE2 rejected|[1-9]\d{3,} same address concurrent connections rejected)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Long-running relays that accumulate large cumulative counters from normal background abuse
    - Busy onion-service introduction points with legitimate high INTRODUCE2 volume
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Long-running relays that accumulate large counters from routine background abuse; compare deltas to the host's own baseline
- Heavily used onion-service introduction points with legitimately high INTRODUCE2 rejection counts

**Tuning notes:** Technique rationale: T1499.002 service exhaustion (circuit flood), T1499.003 application exhaustion (per-circuit onionskin and INTRODUCE2 work in the tor daemon), T1499 parent. Tor's default heartbeat is every 6 hours, so deltas span that interval; set thresholds from each relay's 30-day baseline. Adjust index/sourcetype and the syslog identity (Tor) to match your forwarder. Counters reset on restart; negative deltas are ignored. Wording of the heartbeat line can differ between tor versions, so confirm the regexes against a real log line.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Tor Relay ORPort Inbound Connection Flood or Sweep by Source (IPv4 / IPv6 /64) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor Relay Opened-Circuit Rate Spike Versus Baseline (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Endpoint Connecting to Multiple Tor Relays or Running Tor Client (MDE Network Events) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor Relay DoS-Defense Action Counter Spike (tor_relay_dos_total) / INTRODUCE2 Rejections (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor Relay Running a Version Older Than 0.4.9.17 (Patch Gap) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor Daemon or Tor Browser Process Launch on Windows Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor Relay Resource Exhaustion — Low Memory, Circuit Creation Overload or OOM-Killed tor (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Internal Hosts Connecting to Multiple Tor Relays (Firewall Traffic) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 11)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- URL: `hxxps://forum[.]torproject[.]org/t/security-release-0-4-9-17/22454`
- URL: `hxxps://spec[.]torproject[.]org/dos-spec/overview.html`
- URL: `hxxps://gbhackers[.]com/tor-releases-emergency-security-update/`

Full set of 11 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Tor Releases Emergency Security Update as Ongoing DDoS Attack Overwhelms Network Relays](https://cybersecuritynews.com/tor-ddos-attack/)
- [Security Release 0.4.9.17 (Tor Project forum)](https://forum.torproject.org/t/security-release-0-4-9-17/22454)
- [Tor Project forum: Tor release announcements](https://forum.torproject.org/c/news/tor-release-announcement/28)
- [Tor Relay Operations Guide](https://community.torproject.org/relay/)
- [Security Release 0.4.9.13 and earlier 0.4.9.x security fixes (Tor Project forum)](https://forum.torproject.org/t/security-release-0-4-9-13/)
- [Circuit-building DoS wave: 20x peak, 8x sustained circuits on guard relays since Jun 25 (tor-relays)](https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-relays@lists.torproject.org/thread/VCUWQJ7KECAOL5ADPFWGX5OMYPQJAWG3/)
- [Anatomy of a Circuit-Building DoS: Three Waves on a Guard Fleet (1AEO)](https://1aeo.com/blog/circuit-building-dos-anatomy-june-2026.html)
- [Tor Network Under DDoS Pressure for 7 Months (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/tor-network-under-ddos-pressure-for-7-months/amp/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6113
