# Fake Linkt Toll Balance Phishing Campaign Targeting Australian Drivers (Credential and Card Theft)

> Email phishing campaign impersonating Linkt, an Australian toll road brand, using the subject 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' and claiming A$112.38 is due. A GeoTargetly short link leads victims to linktaccount.sbs, where a fake login page and a fake payment page capture Linkt credentials and full credit card details.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T06:27:42Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T06:27:42Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6116
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6116.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6116
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 17 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 16 November 2026 (17:17:54 AEDT) MailGuard documented a phishing email impersonating Linkt, the Australian toll road brand. The message uses the display name 'Linkt Customer Service', the generic greeting 'Dear customer', and the subject 'Action required: outstanding toll balance'. It claims Linkt 'attempted to charge your saved payment method' and that the payment 'could not be completed'. The same amount, A$112.38, appears in every observed email, which MailGuard considers unusual for a genuine notice. Recipients get seven days to pay to avoid 'additional fees or enforcement action'. The email has a green 'Pay now' button, a reference number, an 'Amount due' panel, and a footer that references linkt.com.au/help and borrows trademark wording from genuine Linkt communications.

Sender infrastructure uses two pairs of domains. The display-address domains are dropazz.com and 5kay.store, and the actual sending domains are send.dropazz.com and rsend.5kay.store. Sending addresses are unique per message and use long random alphanumeric strings, which undermines sender-based blocklisting. The 'Pay now' button routes through a shortened link, gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T, created with GeoTargetly (a legitimate link-management service), and then to the phishing site linktaccount.sbs.

The phishing site has two stages. First, a replica Linkt login page asks for an email or username and a password, and these are captured. Second, a 'Make a payment' page repeats A$112.38, shows an 'Action required' banner, and tightens the deadline to 'You must pay within 2 days or a penalty may apply', which contradicts the seven days in the email. The page displays a 'Secure payment processed by Stripe' notice and requests full card details. Fake errors such as 'Your card number is incorrect' and 'We are unable to authenticate your payment method. Please choose a different payment method and try again.' push victims to submit additional cards. MailGuard could not progress past this stage, so downstream behavior (OTP collection, exfiltration, monetization) is not documented in the source.

This campaign continues a long-running pattern of Linkt-themed fraud. MailGuard documented earlier Linkt campaigns on 12 December 2025 (failed auto top-up lure, linkt-transurban.diia-gov.com, $115.27), 19 February 2026 and 17 April 2026 ('overdue Final Toll Invoice', image-only emails, card and SMS code capture). Linkt's own scam page lists outstanding-balance, account-on-hold, SMS and fake-rebate lures across 2023-2026. No threat actor attribution is stated by any source, and infrastructure overlap between this campaign and the earlier ones is not established. Severity MEDIUM is an analyst assessment.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1598.003 Spearphishing Link
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Linkt Toll Phishing — Proxy Access to linktaccount.sbs / gtly.link Pay-Now Redirect (Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-6116-SPL-001`)

Detects web proxy traffic to linktaccount.sbs (fake Linkt login and A$112.38 card-capture pages) or the GeoTargetly short link gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T behind the 'Pay now' button of the 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' phishing email (TL-2026-6116). A hit identifies users who clicked through and may have submitted credentials or card data.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.001
- **Data sources:** proxy, pan:url, zscaler:nss:web, bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:url","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h
| eval host=lower(coalesce(dest_host,url_domain,cs_host)), url_full=lower(coalesce(url,cs_uri,request_url)), method=upper(coalesce(http_method,cs_method))
| where host="linktaccount.sbs" OR like(host,"%.linktaccount.sbs") OR like(url_full,"%gtly.link/udsgkbl-t%")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url_full) as urls values(action) as actions by src_ip, user, host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen src_ip user host urls actions count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "linktaccount.sbs" or RemoteUrl has "gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Linkt Toll Phishing Proxy Access to linktaccount.sbs or gtly.link Redirect
id: 6f1c2a10-6116-4b1e-9a01-3d5e7c0a0001
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy requests to the Linkt-impersonating phishing site linktaccount.sbs or the GeoTargetly short link gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T used in the fake outstanding toll balance campaign.
references:
    - https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/fake-linkt-toll-balance-notice-targets-drivers-with-phishing-scam
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_host:
        c-uri|contains: 'linktaccount.sbs'
    selection_short:
        c-uri|contains: 'gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or mail-security analysts detonating the phishing URL
    - Threat-intel sandbox or URL-scanning traffic
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security team members or sandboxes opening the phishing URL during analysis
- Mail-security vendors rewriting and scanning links in quarantined messages

**Tuning notes:** Adjust the index and sourcetype list to your proxy (field names are coalesced across Palo Alto, Zscaler and Blue Coat). Exclude known sandbox and analyst source IPs. gtly.link is a legitimate shortener, so the match is on the full short-link path only; extend with new gtly.link paths as they are reported. Escalate any hit with POST activity (see TL-2026-6116-KQL-003) to a credential reset and card-reissue workflow.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Linkt Toll Phishing — User Click-Through on [indicator] / [indicator] Short Link (Safe Links) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Display-Name Impersonation From Non-Linkt Sender (Toll Lure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Toll Phishing — HTTP POST Credential/Card Submission to [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Lookalike Domain Access — 'linkt' Host Not on linkt.com.au (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Toll Phishing — [indicator] Short-Link Redirect Landing on .sbs Host (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Historical Linkt Toll Phishing Infrastructure — DNS Lookups of Prior-Campaign Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Toll Phishing — DNS Resolution of [indicator] (Infrastructure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Linkt Toll Phishing — Email From [indicator] / [indicator] or 'outstanding toll balance' Subject (Delivery) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 17)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `linktaccount[.]sbs`
- Domain: `gtly[.]link`
- Domain: `dropazz[.]com`

Full set of 17 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Fake Linkt toll balance notice targets drivers with phishing scam](https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/fake-linkt-toll-balance-notice-targets-drivers-with-phishing-scam)
- [Fake Linkt Invoice Scam Targets Australian Drivers and Businesses](https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/fake-linkt-toll-invoice-scam-targets-australian-drivers-and-businesses)
- [Linkt 'Overdue Final Toll Invoice' phishing scam](https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/linkt-overdue-final-toll-invoice-phishing-scam)
- [Linkt email scam tricks users with fake toll payment alerts](https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/linkt-email-scam-tricks-users-with-fake-toll-payment-alerts)
- [Linkt - Security and latest scams](https://www.linkt.com.au/help/security/latest-scams)
- [Scamwatch (ACCC) - report scams](https://www.scamwatch.gov.au/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6116
