# Retadup USB worm delivering new CoffeeLoader variant (Armoury packer, OpenGL-based)

> Kaspersky detected a new CoffeeLoader variant in August 2026 delivered via the Retadup USB worm, whose old C2 domains were re-registered around 2024 and began serving SmokeLoader and then, from early 2025, CoffeeLoader. The variant uses an NSIS installer dropping a patched 7z.dll run via rundll32.exe, packed with a new Armoury variant that decrypts on the GPU via OpenGL. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in Q1-Q3 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T07:16:18Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T20:40:45.318Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6118
- **ID:** TL-2026-6118
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 40 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Retadup is a worm first discovered in 2017, originally written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. In July 2019 French law enforcement took control of its C2 servers and disinfected more than 850,000 machines. Around 2024 someone re-registered the old Retadup C2 domains and began issuing download commands to still-infected hosts, first serving SmokeLoader packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer and, from early 2025, CoffeeLoader.

Retadup spreads through USB and external drives by copying itself as hidden files and LNK shortcuts; when a user opens the shortcut on another PC, that machine is infected. Infected hosts poll the C2 (for example GET /FD0C7EE872277F33E3335530299B836A/1/4/1/0/empty to noobminer.newblackage.com with User-Agent WinHttp/1.6.4.0). Replies are plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and then hex, such as 'sleep-600000-sleep' and 'download-http://rurjfvn.rs/update.exe:!:update.exe-download'.

The downloaded payload is an NSIS installer that drops a patched copy of 7z.dll into a temporary directory and runs it with rundll32.exe. Part of the 7-Zip code is replaced with self-decrypting shellcode, a new variant of the Armoury packer. Earlier Armoury versions ran the decryption routine on the GPU through OpenCL; the new variant uses OpenGL (compute shader XOR). The unpacked DLL holds a dropper shellcode, a stager shellcode and a further shellcode. The stager creates a dllhost.exe process and injects the main body. The CoffeeLoader downloader combines dropper, stager and downloader functions and fetches the main module from C2 with GET /payload?md5= over HTTPS (32 zeros on the first request, then the hash of the previous payload).

Responses are XOR-encrypted shellcode whose first 16 bytes are the key. The trojan verifies an X-Signature header against an embedded public key and an X-Content-MD5 header against the decrypted body, replacing certificate validation with signature checks. If both pass, the shellcode is written to executable memory in the trojan's own process and run. The new version uses new request/response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A) and a new protocol magic constant 0xD1D57871, abandoning 0xC0FFEE42, which gave CoffeeLoader its name. The main module accepts three commands from C2: inject into a process, save and run an EXE, or save and run a DLL via rundll32.exe. The downloader injects into one of dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe.

Persistence copies the DLL to C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll and C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\b79faace\b79faace.dll (the eight hex digits are derived from system volume information) and sets an HKCU Run value b79faace.dll to rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll",SetCodecs. A StartupApproved\Run value of 080000000000000000000000 prevents the entry being disabled from Task Manager.

Zscaler ThreatLabz documented CoffeeLoader in March 2025 (appeared around September 2024): call stack spoofing, indirect syscalls, RC4 sleep obfuscation via SystemFunction032, CFG exceptions, optional Windows fibers, a scheduled task such as AsusUpdateServiceUA, UAC bypass via the CMSTPLUA COM interface, a daily .com DGA fallback, and Rhadamanthys shellcode delivery. Those details describe the earlier CoffeeLoader generation and are not all confirmed for the 2026 variant. No threat actor is attributed in the sources. A BeaconBeagle domain search for internet-speed-check.com returned no matches.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1568.002 Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1059.010 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AutoHotKey & AutoIT

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CoffeeLoader Rundll32 Execution of Patched 7z.dll / SetCodecs Persistence DLL — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-6118-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the CoffeeLoader (Retadup-delivered, TL-2026-6118) execution chain: an NSIS installer drops a patched 7z.dll that rundll32.exe runs from a temp or ProgramData path, and the persistent copy b79faace.dll (eight hex digits derived from volume information) is launched through the SetCodecs export. Also flags ArmouryAIOSDK.dll, the typical Armoury-packed filename.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1218.011, T1027.002, T1036.005, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon (EventCode 1), windows_security (4688 with command line), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR OriginalFileName="RUNDLL32.EXE")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine)
| where (like(cl,"%7z.dll%") AND match(cl,"\\\\(temp|appdata|programdata)\\\\")) OR match(cl,"\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll") OR like(cl,"%,setcodecs%") OR like(cl,"%armouryaiosdk.dll%")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| eval threat="TL-2026-6118 CoffeeLoader/Retadup rundll32 patched 7z.dll or SetCodecs persistence DLL"
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "7z.dll" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\(temp|appdata|programdata)\\")
    or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll"
    or ProcessCommandLine has ",SetCodecs"
    or ProcessCommandLine has "ArmouryAIOSDK.dll"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: CoffeeLoader Rundll32 Execution of Patched 7z.dll or Hex-Named Persistence DLL
id: 6f1c2a9e-3b7d-4e58-9a41-0c5d7e8b1a21
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32.exe executing a patched 7z.dll from a user-writable path, the SetCodecs export used by the CoffeeLoader persistence DLL (b79faace.dll style), an eight-hex-digit named DLL in an eight-hex-digit folder, or ArmouryAIOSDK.dll as delivered by Retadup (TL-2026-6118).
references:
  - https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/
  - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coffeeloader-brew-stealthy-techniques
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1218.011
  - attack.t1027.002
  - attack.t1036.005
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
  selection_7z_name:
    CommandLine|contains: '7z.dll'
  selection_7z_path:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\Temp\'
      - '\AppData\'
      - '\ProgramData\'
  selection_setcodecs:
    CommandLine|contains: ',SetCodecs'
  selection_hexdir:
    CommandLine|re: '(?i)\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll'
  selection_armoury:
    CommandLine|contains: 'ArmouryAIOSDK.dll'
  condition: selection_img and ((selection_7z_name and selection_7z_path) or selection_setcodecs or selection_hexdir or selection_armoury)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software that runs a DLL from an eight-hex-digit folder via rundll32
  - Portable archiver tooling invoking 7z.dll from a temp folder
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate installers or admin scripts that run a DLL export from a hex-named folder via rundll32
- Portable archive utilities that load 7z.dll from a temp directory

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known software-deployment paths and signed publishers. Raise priority when the parent is an unsigned NSIS installer or the DLL sits in ProgramData or AppData\Local. The hex-directory regex does not enforce that folder and file names match; add that comparison if volume is high.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Retadup USB Worm Execution from Removable Drive and Hidden File Staging — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CoffeeLoader Process Injection Targets Spawned by Rundll32 — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CoffeeLoader Injected Process Network Activity and C2 Hosts — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CoffeeLoader NSIS Dropper File Writes ([indicator] and Hex-Named DLL) — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Armoury Packer GPU Decryption via Rundll32 OpenGL/OpenCL Load — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Retadup Check-in and CoffeeLoader /payload?md5= Requests in Web Proxy Logs — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CoffeeLoader Run Key and StartupApproved Persistence — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Retadup / CoffeeLoader C2 Domain and DGA Lookups — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 40)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `alphanoob[.]com`
- File hash: `2272dde17925d6179bea6fcf4d543d20`
- Domain: `newblackage[.]com`

Full set of 40 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [A USB worm's second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader](https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/)
- [CoffeeLoader: A Brew of Stealthy Techniques (Zscaler ThreatLabz)](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coffeeloader-brew-stealthy-techniques)
- [Securelist (Russian version): Retadup delivers CoffeeLoader](https://securelist.ru/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/117678/)
- [Securelist LATAM (Spanish version): Retadup delivers CoffeeLoader](https://latam.securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/102066/)
- [CoffeeLoader is a sophisticated malware (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/176046/malware/coffeeloader-is-a-sophisticated-malware.html)
- [Dangerous new CoffeeLoader malware executes on your GPU to get past security tools (TechRadar)](https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/dangerous-new-coffeeloader-malware-executes-on-your-gpu-to-get-past-security-tools)
- [CoffeeLoader related families: SmokeLoader, Rhadamanthys (PolySwarm)](https://blog.polyswarm.io/coffeeloader-1)
- [CoffeeLoader Detection (SOC Prime)](https://socprime.com/blog/coffee-loader-detection/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6118
