# Malware-Laced Video Games Infect ~8,000 Gamers, ~$220,000 in Cryptocurrency Stolen (Federal Complaint)

> A federal criminal complaint filed July 10, 2026 (W.D. Washington) alleges eight malware-laden games, five named (DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters, Lampy), infected about 8,000 devices between May 2024 and February 2026, giving access to about 80 cryptocurrency wallets and at least $220,000 in stolen funds. The allegations are unproven.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T08:52:28Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T03:24:15.411Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6125
- **ID:** TL-2026-6125
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 36 (3 shown free below)

## Description

According to the criminal complaint and subsequent press coverage, a group allegedly published eight playable but trojanized games through a legitimate digital distribution platform between at least May 2024 and February 2026. The complaint does not name the platform; reporting (TechCrunch, Tom's Hardware, PC Gamer and others) identifies Steam. Developer accounts were allegedly opened with stolen identities of American citizens, which gave the operators access to the platform's publishing process. Five titles are named: DASHVERSE, Lunara, PirateFi, BlockBlasters and Lampy. Lampy allegedly received a malicious update in January 2026, i.e. existing software was modified after release.

Per the complaint, the malware was built to infect computers, steal passwords and other data, and drain crypto wallets. The stealers allegedly harvested account credentials, autofill data, user tokens and cookies, and participants reviewed the stolen data for material that could unlock cryptocurrency accounts. The complaint and the GBHackers article name no malware family, C2 infrastructure, domains, hashes or wallet addresses. Messages allegedly show that in November 2025 participants discussed buying a $10,000 remote-access Trojan to deploy alongside stealers; whether one was deployed is not confirmed. The complaint is not linked to Lumma Stealer and is not part of the separate Steam Workshop malware campaign.

Distribution and targeting: the games were promoted on Discord, Telegram, X and LinkedIn, and bots were used to identify cryptocurrency holders and send targeted messages to high-value victims. Reporting indicates one defendant allegedly financed and marketed the malware while an unidentified developer wrote it. Investigators allegedly traced a crypto account used to buy gift cards (including Uber Eats cards) to the defendant through Uber subpoena records, and seized devices on arrest. The charge is conspiracy to obtain information by computer for private financial gain; the defendant was arrested on July 14, 2026. None of this has been proven in court.

Technical context from separate public analyses of two named titles (these are NOT described in the complaint, so attribution of these artifacts to the same operators is inferred from the game names only): G DATA analysed the August 30, 2025 BlockBlasters patch (build 19799326) and found a multi-stage chain: a batch stealer (game2.bat) that queried ipinfo.io and ip.me, checked for AV processes, collected Steam login data and uploaded it to 203.188.171.156:30815/upload; VBS loaders (launch1.vbs, test.vbs) that ran 1.bat and test.bat hidden; password-protected archives (password 121); a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a folder under the game's Engine\Binaries\ThirdParty\Ogg\cwe path; a Python-compiled backdoor (Client-built2.exe, RemoteControlClient class) talking to 203.188.171.156; and a packed Win64 StealC stealer (Block1.exe) reporting to 45.83.28.99 and targeting Chrome, Brave and Edge Local State files. The real game executable was launched afterwards to mask activity. Separately, SECUINFRA identified the February 2025 PirateFi payload as Vidar, delivered via an InnoSetup installer by the developer account Seaworth Interactive; Valve removed the game on February 12, 2025 and notified roughly 1,500 users. BlockBlasters losses were estimated by ZachXBT and vx-underground at about $150,000 across several hundred victims. BeaconBeagle returned no record for the two C2 IPs at research time.

Defender relevance: trojanized games on trusted storefronts bypass reputation-based trust. Hunt for game-directory child processes spawning cmd/wscript/powershell, Defender exclusions added by non-admin tooling, browser Local State/Login Data/Cookies access by game processes, and outbound HTTP to bare IPs on non-standard ports.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware
- T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (SPL)** (`TL-2026-6125-SPL-003`)

C2/exfiltration phase of TL-2026-6125. Detects connections to 203.188.171.156 (port 30815 /upload batch-stealer exfiltration and Python RemoteControlClient backdoor), 45.83.28.99 (StealC C2), and community-observed Vidar-linked sibling infrastructure (37.27.4.20 and throwaway-TLD domains), ipinfo.io/ip.me lookups from script hosts or game processes, and game-directory processes connecting to public IPs on non-web ports. Primary flavor: SPL.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1041, T1016
- **Data sources:** sysmon_eventcode_3_22, defender_for_endpoint_devicenetworkevents, windows_network_connection
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode=3 Initiated="true"
  (DestinationIp IN ("203.188.171.156","45.83.28.99","37.27.4.20")
   OR (Image="*\\steamapps\\common\\*" NOT DestinationPort IN (80,443))
   OR (DestinationHostname IN ("ipinfo.io","ip.me") (Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\steamapps\\common\\*"))))
 OR (EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("7k.iakmialor.web.id","klinhsrg.lol","sdefrsxcg.sbs","tgexvgtdsa.lol","xsvervd.sbs","vgyhtdxz.bond","ptrdfvc.sbs","slkrgtq.lol","mnyhde.sbs","lkmnhy.sbs","cdfers.sbs")))
| eval match_reason=case(
    EventCode=22, "community_stealer_domain",
    match(DestinationIp,"^(203\\.188\\.171\\.156|45\\.83\\.28\\.99|37\\.27\\.4\\.20)$"), "known_c2_ip_port_30815_upload",
    match(DestinationHostname,"(?i)^(ipinfo\\.io|ip\\.me)$"), "ip_lookup_from_script_or_game",
    true(), "game_process_nonstandard_port")
| eval is_private=if(cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",DestinationIp) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",DestinationIp) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",DestinationIp),1,0)
| where NOT (match_reason="game_process_nonstandard_port" AND is_private=1)
| fillnull value="-" DestinationIp DestinationPort DestinationHostname QueryName Image
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host, Image, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, DestinationHostname, QueryName, match_reason
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-6125 C2 / exfil: 203.188.171.156:30815/upload, 45.83.28.99 (StealC), community Vidar-linked infrastructure
let C2Ips = dynamic(["203.188.171.156", "45.83.28.99", "37.27.4.20"]);
let CommunityDomains = dynamic(["7k.iakmialor.web.id", "klinhsrg.lol", "sdefrsxcg.sbs", "tgexvgtdsa.lol", "xsvervd.sbs", "vgyhtdxz.bond", "ptrdfvc.sbs", "slkrgtq.lol", "mnyhde.sbs", "lkmnhy.sbs", "cdfers.sbs"]);
let GamePaths = dynamic(["\\steamapps\\common\\", "\\Engine\\Binaries\\ThirdParty\\Ogg\\cwe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt", "ConnectionFound")
| extend Reason = case(
    RemoteIP in (C2Ips), "known_c2_ip",
    RemoteUrl has_any (CommunityDomains), "community_stealer_domain",
    RemoteUrl has_any ("ipinfo.io", "ip.me") and (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "cmd.exe", "curl.exe", "powershell.exe") or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (GamePaths)), "ip_lookup_from_script_or_game",
    InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (GamePaths) and RemoteIPType == "Public" and RemotePort !in (80, 443), "game_process_nonstandard_port",
    "")
| where isnotempty(Reason)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Reason, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration Network Activity
id: 3f1c8a52-6d4e-4b7a-9c21-6125a0000003
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections matching the BlockBlasters stealer and backdoor infrastructure (203.188.171.156 on port 30815 /upload, StealC C2 45.83.28.99), community-observed Vidar-linked sibling infrastructure (37.27.4.20 and throwaway-TLD domains), victim IP lookups (ipinfo.io, ip.me) from script hosts or game processes, and game-directory processes connecting out on non-web ports.
references:
  - https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2025/09/38265-steam-blockblasters-game-downloads-malware
  - https://www.secuinfra.com/en/techtalk/infostealer-malware-vidar-spread-via-the-steam-store/
  - https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/17/fbi-arrests-man-accused-of-using-steam-games-to-drain-victims-crypto-wallets/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1041
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1016
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_ip:
    DestinationIp:
      - '203.188.171.156'
      - '45.83.28.99'
      - '37.27.4.20'
  selection_community_domain:
    DestinationHostname|endswith:
      - '7k.iakmialor.web.id'
      - 'klinhsrg.lol'
      - 'sdefrsxcg.sbs'
      - 'tgexvgtdsa.lol'
      - 'xsvervd.sbs'
      - 'vgyhtdxz.bond'
      - 'ptrdfvc.sbs'
      - 'slkrgtq.lol'
      - 'mnyhde.sbs'
      - 'lkmnhy.sbs'
      - 'cdfers.sbs'
  selection_lookup:
    DestinationHostname:
      - 'ipinfo.io'
      - 'ip.me'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
  selection_game_process:
    Image|contains: '\steamapps\common\'
    Initiated: 'true'
  filter_web_ports:
    DestinationPort:
      - 80
      - 443
  filter_private:
    DestinationIp|cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  condition: selection_ip or selection_community_domain or selection_lookup or (selection_game_process and not filter_web_ports and not filter_private)
falsepositives:
  - Games that use non-standard ports to reach public matchmaking or anti-cheat services
  - Administrators or scripts querying ipinfo.io or ip.me for legitimate diagnostics
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Games using non-standard ports for matchmaking, telemetry or anti-cheat on public IPs
- Admins or scripts legitimately querying ipinfo.io or ip.me

**Tuning notes:** Do not block ipinfo.io or ip.me globally - alert only when initiated by script hosts or game processes. The three C2 IPs and community domains are hard indicators (high fidelity); the game_process_nonstandard_port branch is behavioral and should be baselined and allow-listed per title. Refresh community domains from TL_OSINT_Scan as the campaign evolves; the community-observed domains and 37.27.4.20 are medium-confidence sibling infrastructure.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Game Stealer C2 and Exfiltration - Known IPs, Community Domains, IP Lookups (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Game Loader Chain - Script Host Spawned From Game Directory (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Stealer Post-Exploitation - Defender Exclusion, AV Discovery and Browser/Wallet Data Collection (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 36)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `203.188.171[.]156`
- Domain: `ipinfo[.]io`
- File hash: `aa1a1328e0d0042d071bca13ff9a13116d8f3cf77e6e9769293e2b144c9b73b3`

Full set of 36 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Infect 8,000 Gamers With Malware-Laced Video Games, Steal $220,000 in Cryptocurrency](https://gbhackers.com/hackers-infect-8000-gamers-with-malware-laced-video-games/)
- [FBI arrests man accused of using Steam games to drain victims' crypto wallets (TechCrunch)](https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/17/fbi-arrests-man-accused-of-using-steam-games-to-drain-victims-crypto-wallets/)
- [Feds accuse Broward man in video game malware conspiracy; victims lost $220K in crypto (Local 10)](https://local10.com/news/local/2026/07/15/feds-accuse-broward-man-in-video-game-malware-conspiracy-victims-lost-220k-in-crypto/)
- [FBI arrests Florida man in Steam malware investigation after tracing stolen bitcoin to Uber Eats gift cards (Tom's Hardware)](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/fbi-arrests-florida-man-in-steam-malware-investigaton-after-tracing-stolen-bitcoin-to-uber-eats-gift-cards)
- [FBI arrests 21-year-old who allegedly stole $200,000 with malware-infected Steam games (PC Gamer)](https://www.pcgamer.com/gaming-industry/fbi-arrests-21-year-old-who-allegedly-stole-usd200-000-with-malware-infected-steam-games-and-spent-the-money-on-traceable-ubereats-gift-cards/)
- [Infected Steam game BlockBlasters downloads crypto stealer malware (G DATA)](https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2025/09/38265-steam-blockblasters-game-downloads-malware)
- [Hackers planted a Steam game with malware to steal gamers' passwords (TechCrunch, PirateFi)](https://techcrunch.com/2025/02/18/hackers-planted-a-steam-game-with-malware-to-steal-gamers-passwords/)
- [PirateFi game on Steam delivered Vidar infostealer in elaborate crypto-targeted attack (SecureBlink, citing SECUINFRA)](https://www.secureblink.com/threat-feeds/pirate-fi-game-on-steam-delivered-vidar-infostealer-in-elaborate-crypto-targeted-attack)
- [Infostealer Malware Vidar distributed via the Steam store (SECUINFRA)](https://www.secuinfra.com/en/techtalk/infostealer-malware-vidar-spread-via-the-steam-store/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6125
