# Kaspersky ICS CERT: APT and Financial Attacks on Industrial Organizations in Q2 2026 (DAEMON Tools Supply Chain, Iran-Linked PLC Attacks, ZionSiphon, INC Ransomware)

> Kaspersky ICS CERT's Q2 2026 quarterly report aggregates APT and financially motivated activity against industrial organizations: Russia-focused, Chinese-speaking and Iran-linked clusters, INC ransomware and wipers, the trojanized DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise, and OT-targeting activity including Rockwell PLC attacks, Modbus scanning campaigns and the ZionSiphon malware. Many attributions in the report are stated as tentative.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T12:37:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T12:37:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6142
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6142.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6142
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-54068, CVE-2025-52691, CVE-2025-68613, CVE-2025-9316, CVE-2025-34291, CVE-2026-21509, CVE-2024-26229, CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082, CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777, CVE-2023-48788, CVE-2024-57727

## Description

The report is a quarterly aggregate rather than a single campaign. It covers Russia-focused clusters (Geo Likho, BO Team, PhantomCore, Eagle Werewolf, Cloud Atlas, Unicorn, CapFix, Fluffy Wolf, HeartlessSoul, Paper Werewolf, 4BID, Clubfoot Wolf), China-linked or Chinese-speaking activity (Silver Fox, a ShadowPad intrusion at a Russian manufacturer via a contractor service account on Check Point VPN, SHADOW-EARTH-053, FamousSparrow using ProxyNotShell against an Azerbaijani oil and gas firm, TencShell, Mustang Panda, CL-STA-1062) and Iran-linked activity (an unnamed APT hitting Rockwell PLCs, Nimbus Manticore, MuddyWater, Cyber Isnaad Front). It also covers Andariel, OceanLotus, Sednit, Sandworm wipers and the INC ransomware operation.

DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise: from 2026-04-08 the official site served signed, trojanized Windows installers (versions 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434). The backdoor beaconed over HTTP GET, including the computer name, to the typosquatted domain env-check.daemontools[.]cc. Thousands of payload deployments were seen in 100+ countries, with about 10% of affected systems belonging to businesses. A minimal backdoor reached about a dozen organizations in Russia, Belarus and Thailand, and a QUIC RAT reached a Russian education entity. The actor is unknown; artifacts suggest a Chinese-speaking actor. Disc Soft confirmed the issue on 2026-05-06 and shipped a clean build in under 12 hours.

OT-targeting activity: CISA advisory AA26-097A describes an Iranian-affiliated APT attacking internet-exposed PLCs (Rockwell CompactLogix and Micro850; also Schneider Modicon M340 and Siemens S7-1200 per the advisory) since at least March 2026, using leased third-party infrastructure and vendor programming software (Studio 5000, EcoStruxure Control Expert, TIA Portal) to extract project files and manipulate HMI/SCADA displays; a July 2026 update describes a malicious project file that kept normal ladder logic but overrode safety-maintaining instructions. ZionSiphon (Darktrace) targets Israeli water treatment and desalination, with USB propagation, ICS scanning (Modbus, DNP3, S7comm) and chlorine-configuration tampering, but is unfinished and self-deletes because of an XOR error in its Israeli-IP check. A Cato Networks-reported Modbus campaign (Sep-Nov 2025) targeted 14,426 unique IPs in 70 countries. A reported AI-assisted intrusion against a Mexican water utility showed no observed OT impact.

INC ransomware (Acronis TRU): 800+ claimed victims since 2023, over 65% in the US; initial access through Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777), Fortinet EMS (CVE-2023-48788) and SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727), phishing and initial access broker credentials; post-compromise Veeam credential dumping, RDP, PsExec and RMM tools. The Kaspersky page contains no hashes or IP lists; those are in the linked PDF. Network IOCs here come from CISA AA26-097A and public DAEMON Tools reporting.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1110.003 Password Spraying
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1565 Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Trojanized DAEMON Tools Helper Binaries Beaconing, Dropping or Spawning Payloads (TL-2026-6142)** (`TL-2026-6142-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the DAEMON Tools supply-chain backdoor (installers 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434, trojanized from 2026-04-08). Fires when DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe or DTShellHlp.exe contact the typosquatted C2 env-check.daemontools.cc / 38.180.107.76 (community-corroborated by 2 sightings), write imp.tmp or piyu.exe (or any EXE) into C:\Windows\Temp, or spawn piyu.exe or a shell. Covers Kaspersky ICS CERT Q2 2026 reporting.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1195.002, T1204.002, T1071.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=22)
| eval proc=lower(coalesce(Image,"")), par=lower(coalesce(ParentImage,"")), tgt=lower(coalesce(TargetFilename,"")), dhost=lower(coalesce(DestinationHostname,QueryName,"")), dip=coalesce(DestinationIp,"")
| eval dt_proc=if(like(proc,"%dthelper.exe") OR like(proc,"%discsoftbusservicelite.exe") OR like(proc,"%dtshellhlp.exe"),1,0)
| eval dt_parent=if(like(par,"%dthelper.exe") OR like(par,"%discsoftbusservicelite.exe") OR like(par,"%dtshellhlp.exe"),1,0)
| eval signal=case(dt_proc=1 AND (like(dhost,"%daemontools.cc") OR dip="38.180.107.76"),"c2_beacon_to_typosquat_domain", dt_proc=1 AND EventCode=11 AND (like(tgt,"%windows%temp%imp.tmp") OR like(tgt,"%windows%temp%piyu.exe")),"backdoor_payload_drop", dt_proc=1 AND EventCode=11 AND like(tgt,"%windows%temp%.exe"),"exe_written_to_windows_temp", dt_parent=1 AND EventCode=1 AND (like(proc,"%piyu.exe") OR like(proc,"%cmd.exe") OR like(proc,"%powershell.exe") OR like(proc,"%wscript.exe")),"helper_spawned_payload_or_shell", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(TargetFilename) as dropped_files values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(CommandLine) as cmdlines by host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let dt_bins = dynamic(["dthelper.exe","discsoftbusservicelite.exe","dtshellhlp.exe"]);
let c2_ips = dynamic(["38.180.107.76"]);
let net = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where RemoteUrl endswith "daemontools.cc" or RemoteIP in (c2_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="c2_beacon_to_typosquat_domain", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=strcat(RemoteUrl, " ", RemoteIP), CommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let files = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\Temp"
| where FileName in~ ("imp.tmp", "piyu.exe") or FileName endswith ".exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="payload_drop_in_windows_temp", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=FolderPath, CommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let procs = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where FileName in~ ("piyu.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="helper_spawned_payload_or_shell", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=FileName, CommandLine=ProcessCommandLine;
union net, files, procs
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: DAEMON Tools Trojanized Helper Spawning Payload or Shell
id: 3f6c1a52-8d47-4b0e-9a1c-5e2b7d90a143
status: experimental
description: Detects the DAEMON Tools Lite helper binaries (DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, DTShellHlp.exe) from the trojanized 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434 installers spawning piyu.exe or a command interpreter, or piyu.exe executing from C:\Windows\Temp.
references:
    - https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/reports/2026/08/03/apt-and-financial-attacks-on-industrial-organizations-in-q2-2026/
    - https://securelist.com/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\DTHelper.exe'
            - '\DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe'
            - '\DTShellHlp.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\piyu.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_payload:
        Image|endswith: '\Windows\Temp\piyu.exe'
    condition: (selection_parent and selection_child) or selection_payload
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DAEMON Tools components launching a command shell during troubleshooting or custom scripted installs
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate DAEMON Tools components launching cmd.exe or PowerShell during update or repair routines
- Authorised sandbox or malware-analysis hosts that deliberately detonate the trojanized installer

**Tuning notes:** Change index=sysmon to the index that holds Sysmon in your environment. Pair with an inventory search for DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434 and the SHA1 9ccd769624de98eeeb12714ff1707ec4f5bf196d. Once clean build 12.6.0.2445 is deployed, the c2_beacon and payload_drop signals should be treated as confirmed compromise; the shell-spawn signal can be tuned against known admin scripts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ProxyNotShell Exchange Exploitation (CVE-2022-41040/41082) and IIS Worker Shell Spawn — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Veeam Backup Credential Dumping via SQL/PowerShell (INC Ransomware) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Service or Contractor Account RDP Fan-Out to Multiple Hosts — Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CapFix [indicator] Unsigned DLL Sideloading — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SimpleHelp RMM and PsExec Service Execution (INC Ransomware Tooling) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- External Access to PLC/ICS Ports and CISA AA26-097A Infrastructure Contact — C2 / OT Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- svchost.exe Masquerade Outside System32 (ZionSiphon USB Spread) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DAEMON Tools Backdoor C2 Domains and Community-Observed Sibling Infrastructure — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `38.180.107[.]76`
- Domain: `env-check[.]daemontools[.]cc`
- File hash: `9ccd769624de98eeeb12714ff1707ec4f5bf196d`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [APT and financial attacks on industrial organizations in Q2 2026 (Kaspersky ICS CERT)](https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/reports/2026/08/03/apt-and-financial-attacks-on-industrial-organizations-in-q2-2026/)
- [Kaspersky ICS CERT Q2 2026 report (PDF with full IOC list)](https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/media/Kaspersky-ICS-CERT-APT-and-financial-attacks-on-industrial-organizations-in-Q2-2026-En.pdf)
- [CISA AA26-097A: Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a)
- [DAEMON Tools backdoor (Securelist)](https://securelist.com/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/)
- [DAEMON Tools supply chain attack (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack.html)
- [DAEMON Tools backdoor enables targeted follow-on malware operations (PolySwarm)](https://blog.polyswarm.io/daemon-tools-backdoor-enables-targeted-follow-on-malware-operations)
- [Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace's analysis of OT malware targeting Israeli water systems](https://www.darktrace.com/blog/inside-zionsiphon-darktraces-analysis-of-ot-malware-targeting-israeli-water-systems)
- [ZionSiphon Malware Targets ICS in Water Facilities (SecurityWeek)](https://www.securityweek.com/zionsiphon-malware-targets-ics-in-water-facilities/)
- [ZionSiphon Malware Targets Water Infrastructure Systems (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/zionsiphon-malware-water/)
- [Popular DAEMON Tools utility exploited in supply chain attack (Techzine)](https://www.techzine.eu/news/security/141034/popular-daemon-tools-utility-exploited-in-supply-chain-attack/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6142
