# Leaked Credentials on Public Repositories: GitGuardian Enterprise Good Samaritan Program and Agentic-AI (ARTEX) Abuse of Exposed Secrets

> GitGuardian announced an Enterprise Good Samaritan Program that traces high-impact leaked credentials on public sources (GitHub, Docker Hub) to affected companies, citing 3,913+ high-impact leaks tied to 1,532 companies and only 35% of contacted organizations responding. Microsoft Threat Intelligence separately reported (2026-11-05) threat actors using the agentic AI framework ARTEX to mass-search GitHub for secrets and abuse them against Entra ID/Azure tenants, in one case going from GitHub search to Key Vault exfiltration in about five minutes.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T15:18:41Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T15:18:41Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6154
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6154.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6154
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 8 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Credential exposure on public code platforms remains a high-volume initial-access enabler. GitGuardian's 2026 State of Secrets Sprawl report counts about 28.65 million new hardcoded secrets on public GitHub in 2025 (+34% year over year), and the vendor states roughly 90% of valid secrets remain unrevoked one week after the leaker is alerted. On 2026-11-16 GitGuardian announced an Enterprise Good Samaritan Program (extending its developer-focused program running since 2018) that combines AI-driven attribution with human review to identify which organization a leaked credential affects, then discloses to multiple people at that organization (including security teams), regardless of customer status. Vendor-reported figures: 3,913+ high-impact leaks linked to 1,532 companies, follow-up reaching at least five people per organization, and a 35% response rate. These figures come from a vendor press release and were not independently verified.

A May 2026 case study illustrates the exposure blast radius: a public GitHub repository named 'Private-CISA' (844 MB; created 2025-11-13) contained CI/CD logs, Kubernetes manifests, ArgoCD files, Terraform, GitHub Actions workflows, internal documentation exports, plain-text passwords, AWS tokens, Entra ID SAML certificates, private keys, GitHub tokens, and instructions for disabling GitHub secret scanning; some credentials were still valid. Nine automated Good Samaritan emails to the commit author went unresolved; after reporting to CERT/CC on 2026-05-14 and escalating through personal contacts, the repository was taken offline on 2026-05-15, about 26 hours after detection.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (blog dated 2026-11-05) documents the offensive side: since August 2026 it observed large volumes of GitHub secret-search queries combining a target organization name with secret keywords, cloud-service keywords, or AI-provider keywords. Stolen still-valid application credentials were then used for service principal sign-ins to Entra ID tenants (earliest observed 2026-10-28 from 199.19.77.84), followed by discovery of subscriptions and resources, retrieval of storage account keys, App Service settings, connection strings and AKS credentials, ARM-based enumeration and exfiltration of Key Vault secrets, OAuth token theft for single-tenant apps, Azure DevOps secret searching, Azure VM Run Command execution, and SharePoint/OneDrive/mailbox collection via Microsoft Graph. The agentic framework ARTEX adapted failed ARM calls within roughly 28-80 seconds (e.g., correcting the API version to 2023-07-01). Microsoft did not name an actor for the GitHub scanning or the Entra/Azure activity; secondary coverage notes Storm-0940 previously used ARTEX and that CrowdStrike reported ARTEX-supported espionage against 200+ organizations since mid-October (secondhand, not verified here). BeaconBeagle lookups for the network IOCs returned HTTP 404 (no data available).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1593.003 Code Repositories
- T1589.001 Credentials
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1552.004 Private Keys
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1651 Cloud Administration Command
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1213.002 Sharepoint
- T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**TL-2026-6154 Leaked Secret Abuse - Entra Service Principal Failure-Then-Success and Multi-SPN Source IP** (`TL-2026-6154-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of leaked application credentials being abused (ARTEX / Private-CISA style exposure). Flags a single source IP that hits Entra service principal sign-ins with invalid/expired secret errors (AADSTS7000215/AADSTS7000222) and then succeeds, or authenticates to 3+ service principals, plus any contact from research IOC IPs such as 199.19.77.84 (earliest seen 2026-10-28).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1078.004, T1528
- **Data sources:** azure_entra_serviceprincipal_signin_logs, azure:monitor:aad
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=azure sourcetype="azure:monitor:aad" category="ServicePrincipalSignInLogs" earliest=-24h
``` TL-2026-6154: leaked app secret probing - AADSTS7000215/7000222 failures then success, one IP many service principals ```
| eval spn_id=coalesce('properties.servicePrincipalId', servicePrincipalId), src_ip=coalesce('properties.ipAddress', callerIpAddress), err=tonumber(coalesce('properties.status.errorCode', resultType, "0"))
| eval is_secret_fail=if(in(err,7000215,7000222),1,0), is_success=if(err=0,1,0)
| stats sum(is_secret_fail) as secret_failures sum(is_success) as successes dc(spn_id) as spn_count values(spn_id) as service_principals min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip
| eval known_ioc=if(in(src_ip,"199.19.77.84","199.19.77.18","65.87.223.26","157.22.126.128"),1,0)
| where known_ioc=1 OR (spn_count>=3 AND secret_failures>=1 AND successes>=1)
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table src_ip spn_count secret_failures successes known_ioc service_principals first_seen last_seen
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-6154 - Entra service principal sign-ins with leaked application credentials
let iocIps = dynamic(["199.19.77.84","199.19.77.18","65.87.223.26","157.22.126.128"]);
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend Err = toint(ResultType)
| summarize SecretFailures = countif(Err in (7000215, 7000222)), Successes = countif(Err == 0),
            SpnCount = dcount(ServicePrincipalId), ServicePrincipals = make_set(ServicePrincipalName, 25),
            FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by IPAddress
| where IPAddress in (iocIps) or (SpnCount >= 3 and SecretFailures >= 1 and Successes >= 1)
| project IPAddress, SpnCount, SecretFailures, Successes, ServicePrincipals, FirstSeen, LastSeen
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Entra Service Principal Sign-In Failure - Invalid or Expired Client Secret (TL-2026-6154)
id: 6f1a2c3e-4b5d-4e6f-8a7b-9c0d1e2f3a41
status: experimental
description: Detects Entra ID service principal sign-in failures AADSTS7000215 (invalid client secret) and AADSTS7000222 (expired client secret). Microsoft reports leaked-secret abuse by ARTEX-driven actors surfaces as these failures followed by a success from the same IP. Correlate per IP and app with later successful sign-ins.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/threat-actors-use-agentic-ai-tooling-to-find-and-abuse-exposed-secrets/
  - https://blog.gitguardian.com/how-we-got-a-cisa-github-leak-taken-down-in-26-hours/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1078.004
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1528
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    ResultType:
      - '7000215'
      - '7000222'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Application owners with stale or misconfigured client secrets after rotation
  - Automation or CI jobs still using a retired secret
level: medium

```

**Known false positives:**

- Developers testing a rotated or expired secret from a corporate or CI egress IP
- Multi-tenant SaaS or MSP automation legitimately authenticating to several service principals from one IP

**Tuning notes:** Replace index/sourcetype with your Azure Monitor AAD input. Allow-list corporate/CI egress IPs and known automation SPNs; raise spn_count threshold for MSP tenants; keep the IOC list in sync with research.json.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- TL-2026-6154 App Service Exploitation - Shell Commands in User-Agent and Auth Token Probing (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 Post-Compromise - Key Vault Secret Enumeration Burst by Application Identity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 C2 / Proxy Infrastructure - Azure Activity From ARTEX-Linked IPs and Tor Exit (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 Credential Exposure - GitHub Repo Made Public or Secret Scanning Weakened (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 Cloud Administration Command - Azure VM Run Command by Service Principal (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 ARTEX Tooling - Headless Browser and Nmap Fingerprints Against Web Apps (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 Post-Compromise - ARM Secret Harvesting by Service Principal (Storage Keys, App Settings, AKS Credentials) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6154 Collection - App-Only Microsoft Graph Mail and SharePoint/OneDrive Reads by Service Principal (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 8)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `199.19.77[.]84`
- IP address: `199.19.77[.]18`
- IP address: `65.87.223[.]26`

Full set of 8 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Leaked Credentials Are an Enterprise Problem: GitGuardian Extends Its Good Samaritan Program to Security Teams](https://cybersecuritynews.com/leaked-credentials-are-an-enterprise-problem-gitguardian-extends-its-good-samaritan-program-to-security-teams/)
- [GitGuardian Enterprise Good Samaritan Program](https://www.gitguardian.com/enterprise-good-samaritan)
- [Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/threat-actors-use-agentic-ai-tooling-to-find-and-abuse-exposed-secrets/)
- [How we got a CISA GitHub leak taken down in 26 hours](https://blog.gitguardian.com/how-we-got-a-cisa-github-leak-taken-down-in-26-hours/)
- [The State of Secrets Sprawl 2026](https://blog.gitguardian.com/the-state-of-secrets-sprawl-2026/)
- [Cybersecurity Dive: Hackers use ARTEX to find exposed secrets in GitHub repositories](https://cybersecuritydive.com/news/hackers-artex-github-repositories-exposed-secrets/874007)
- [CSA Research Note: Five Minutes from Search to Key Vault - Agentic Secret Harvesting](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-agentic-secret-harvesting-rotation-windows/)
- [GitGuardian: Why we built the Good Samaritan Program](https://blog.gitguardian.com/why-we-built-the-good-samaritan-program/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6154
