# SC WordPress Malware: Self-Healing Mesh of Loaders, Drop-Ins and Ethereum-Smart-Contract-Controlled Backdoor

> Sucuri describes 'SC' (named for its 'SC_' markers), a WordPress infection whose payload exists in at least eight places on disk, in the database and in shared memory that can each rebuild the others. The backdoor hides from plugin lists and update checks, reads C2 instructions from an Ethereum smart contract via roughly twenty public RPC gateways, creates a hidden administrator with forged auth cookies, and can inject JavaScript, install PHP and remove security plugins.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T16:30:22Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T16:30:22Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6157
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6157.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6157
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 19

## Description

SC is a WordPress malware family named after the 'SC_' markers (e.g. the SC_AUTO_PREPEND constant, sc_-prefixed options and transients) found in injected content. Sucuri (Gabriel Barbosa, published 2026-09-30) found it during incident response and describes it as a 'self-healing mesh': the payload is held in at least eight on-disk locations plus off-disk copies, and a large set of hooks rewrites every other component whenever one is removed. The initial infection vector was not determined by Sucuri or by the secondary reporting; no CVE is tied to this infection chain.

On-disk components documented by Sucuri: (1) .user.ini (also possibly php.ini or .htaccess) setting auto_prepend_file to a shim; (2) a visible shim such as wp-content/c1b12371.php (name varies per site) that includes (3) a hidden dot-prefixed string-table loader, wp-content/.c1b12371.php, which rebuilds the mu-plugin and defines SC_AUTO_PREPEND; (4) wp-content/db.php, a bootstrap drop-in holding the full payload as gzip+base64 that redeploys the plugin when it is missing or too small; (5) wp-content/advanced-cache.php, the earliest drop-in (loaded when WP_CACHE is set), which rebuilds the plugin from five sources and hooks plugins_loaded; (6) a marker-fenced block appended to the active theme's functions.php (observed in theme folder 'khorshidi'); (7) wp-content/mu-plugins/hyper-engine-kit.php; and (8) an identical copy at wp-content/plugins/hyper-engine-kit/hyper-engine-kit.php with a fake settings page, shortcode and activation hook. A ZIP restore bundle with a random hex name may sit in wp-content, uploads or a theme folder, and an encoded stub may sit in the cache directory. Off-disk copies include a randomly named options row holding a gzip/base64 payload (read by advanced-cache.php over a direct DB connection built from the site's credential constants), sc_-prefixed options/transients, a System V shared-memory segment under a fixed numeric key (RAM-resident, possibly owned by another account on shared hosting), cron hooks with randomized names plus a known fetch hook triggered by system cron, and, in related variants, database triggers that recreate an administrator on insert. The payload has no eval and no readable function names, using a string table with a positional substitution cipher.

Backdoor behavior: it filters the plugin list, update transient and site/network plugin views to hide itself (with admin JavaScript as fallback); fingerprints the site (URL/host, WordPress and plugin versions, path hashes, active theme, mu-plugin list, administrator session tokens), encrypts the data and posts it to an endpoint resolved from an Ethereum smart contract read through ~20 public Ethereum RPC gateways (all must be blocked together). Replies may carry front-end JavaScript to inject (e.g. checkout skimming on stores), new PHP to install, and lists of security plugins to deactivate and delete (removal can wipe the plugin directory and reassign/elevate other accounts first). It adopts or creates a hidden administrator, writing directly to users/usermeta tables if the normal API is unavailable, hides the account from user lists, counts and role views, and forges valid authentication cookies so no password is needed. A magic request parameter is handled before WordPress fully loads as a beacon/liveness check.

Monarx (2026-08-17) documented a related SC_-marker variant with additional specifics: SC_DB_BEGIN/SC_DB_END in db.php, SC_ADV_* in advanced-cache.php/object-cache.php, SC_TH_* in theme functions.php, hidden-admin usernames of the form admin_/adm_/administrator_/backup_ plus 6-10 hex characters with an email on the site's own domain, options bu/bp/ic (hidden admin credentials and harvested admin logins), sc_payload_persistent/sc_payload_t options, cron hooks sc_cron_fetch (~10 h) and r1ckj5tjyx1yjm (hourly reinstall), a C2 lookup via eth_call selector 0x3bc5de30 returning an XOR key and C2 URL list, forged ~14-day session cookies, mtime back-dating, a file mtime watermark (mtime % 100000 == 93819), and a browser Service Worker registered under /wp-admin/ and /wp-login.php that captures login POSTs and automates plugin upload/installation. These Monarx specifics are attributed to the Monarx report and may be variant-specific.

Neither source publishes the contract address, RPC gateway hostnames, C2 domains, IP addresses or file hashes, and no actor attribution is given. BeaconBeagle correlation was therefore not applicable (no network IOCs to query). Severity HIGH is analyst-assigned (hidden admin, remote code install, self-healing persistence) and is not stated by the sources. Recommended cleanup order per Sucuri: neutralize the auto_prepend target first (empty it to an inert stub before removing directives, since PHP caches the value up to 300 s), clear off-disk copies (options row, shared memory, sc_ options/transients), remove cron hooks and DB triggers, remove the hidden administrator and orphaned option, remove all files in one pass, then rescan and rotate credentials.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1136.001 Local Account
- T1053.003 Cron
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1070.006 Timestomp
- T1550.004 Web Session Cookie
- T1056.003 Web Portal Capture
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SC WordPress Malware - hyper-engine-kit, db.php/advanced-cache.php Drop-In and Hidden Loader File Placement** (`TL-2026-6157-SPL-001`)

Detects creation/modification of SC WordPress backdoor on-disk components (TL-2026-6157): wp-content/db.php (SC_DB_BEGIN), advanced-cache.php/object-cache.php (SC_ADV_*), the fake hyper-engine-kit mu-plugin and plugin copies, dot-prefixed hidden loaders such as wp-content/.c1b12371.php and .g_*.php guard stubs. Relies on auditd watch rules on wp-content. The self-healing mesh rewrites these files whenever one is removed, so repeated hits on the same host are a strong signal of incomplete cleanup.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1505.003, T1036.005, T1564
- **Data sources:** linux_audit (auditd PATH records, index=linux), Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceFileEvents, Sysmon for Linux FileCreate
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux sourcetype=linux_audit type=PATH
    (name="*/wp-content/db.php" OR name="*/wp-content/advanced-cache.php" OR name="*/wp-content/object-cache.php"
     OR name="*/wp-content/mu-plugins/hyper-engine-kit.php" OR name="*/plugins/hyper-engine-kit/*"
     OR name="*/wp-content/.*.php" OR name="*/wp-content/cache/.g_*.php" OR name="*/wp-includes/.g_*.php")
| eval ioc_class=case(
    like(name,"%hyper-engine-kit%"), "fake_plugin_hyper_engine_kit",
    like(name,"%/.g_%"), "guard_stub_g_php",
    match(name,"/wp-content/[.][^/]+[.]php$"), "hidden_dotfile_loader",
    match(name,"/wp-content/(db|advanced-cache|object-cache)[.]php$"), "dropin_SC_DB_SC_ADV",
    true(), "other")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(nametype) as nametype by host name ioc_class
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table host name ioc_class nametype count first_seen last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath has "/wp-content" or FolderPath has "/wp-includes"
| where (FolderPath endswith "/wp-content" and FileName in~ ("db.php", "advanced-cache.php", "object-cache.php"))
    or (FolderPath has "/wp-content/mu-plugins" and FileName =~ "hyper-engine-kit.php")
    or FolderPath has "/plugins/hyper-engine-kit"
    or (FolderPath endswith "/wp-content" and FileName matches regex @"^\.[^.]+\.php$")
    or FileName matches regex @"^\.g_.*\.php$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SC WordPress Malware Drop-In, Hidden Loader and Fake hyper-engine-kit Plugin File Placement
id: 3f9c2a71-5b8e-4d1a-9c60-7e2a1b4d8f01
status: experimental
description: Detects creation or modification of the SC WordPress backdoor on-disk components - db.php / advanced-cache.php / object-cache.php drop-ins, the fake hyper-engine-kit mu-plugin and plugin copies, dot-prefixed hidden loaders in wp-content and .g_*.php guard stubs.
references:
    - https://blog.sucuri.net/2026/09/sc-wordpress-malware-a-self-healing-mesh-of-loaders-drop-ins-and-a-blockchain-controlled-backdoor.html
    - https://www.monarx.com/press-news/the-wordpress-infection-that-rebuilds-itself-faster-than-you-can-delete-it
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_dropin:
        TargetFilename|re: '/wp-content/(db|advanced-cache|object-cache)\.php$'
    selection_fake_plugin:
        TargetFilename|contains: '/hyper-engine-kit'
    selection_hidden_loader:
        TargetFilename|re: '/wp-content/\.[^/]+\.php$'
    selection_guard_stub:
        TargetFilename|re: '/(wp-includes|wp-content|wp-content/cache)/\.g_[^/]*\.php$'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Caching plugins (W3 Total Cache, WP Super Cache, LiteSpeed Cache, Redis Object Cache) legitimately create advanced-cache.php, object-cache.php or db.php
    - Legitimate database drop-ins such as Query Monitor or HyperDB
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Caching/object-cache plugins legitimately create advanced-cache.php, object-cache.php and db.php
- Legitimate database drop-ins (HyperDB, Query Monitor) and deployment tooling writing to wp-content

**Tuning notes:** Requires an auditd watch such as -w /var/www -p wa -k wp_files. Allow-list hosts/paths where a known caching plugin owns advanced-cache.php/object-cache.php by comparing file hashes. The visible shim (wp-content/c1b12371.php) varies per site, so pair this with the auto_prepend_file detection (KQL-001). Any hit on hyper-engine-kit or .g_*.php should not be tuned out.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SC WordPress Malware - auto_prepend_file Shim Directive and PHP mtime Back-Dating (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - Off-Disk wp_options Payload and WP-Cron Persistence Markers in MySQL Audit Logs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - PHP/Web Server Process Outbound Connection to Ethereum RPC Gateways (eth_call C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - Web Server Process Rebuilding mu-plugin, Drop-In or Hidden Loader (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - Hidden Administrator and SC Cron Hook Persistence via wp-cli / mysql Client (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - DNS Lookup of Ethereum Public RPC Gateways (Smart-Contract C2 Resolver) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - Hidden Administrator Creation and Users-Table Trigger in MySQL Query Log (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SC WordPress Malware - Ethereum Public RPC Gateway DNS Resolution (Smart-Contract C2 Dead Drop) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [SC WordPress Malware: A Self-Healing Mesh of Loaders, Drop-Ins, and a Blockchain-Controlled Backdoor (Sucuri, Gabriel Barbosa)](https://blog.sucuri.net/2026/09/sc-wordpress-malware-a-self-healing-mesh-of-loaders-drop-ins-and-a-blockchain-controlled-backdoor.html)
- [WordPress Backdoor Rebuilds Itself (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/wordpress-backdoor-rebuilds-itself.html)
- [The WordPress Infection That Rebuilds Itself Faster Than You Can Delete It (Monarx)](https://www.monarx.com/press-news/the-wordpress-infection-that-rebuilds-itself-faster-than-you-can-delete-it)
- [Восемь копий, каждая чинит остальные. Сайты на WordPress атакует самовосстанавливающийся бэкдор (SecurityLab)](https://www.securitylab.ru/news/578183.php)
- [WordPress Backdoor Reconstructs Itself Post-Cleanup by Utilizing Files, Database, and Shared Memory (RS Web Solutions)](https://www.rswebsols.com/?p=135553)
- [Self-Healing WordPress Backdoor Defies Standard Removal (Daily Security Review)](https://dailysecurityreview.com/cyber-security/self-healing-wordpress-backdoor-defies-standard-removal/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6157
