# Typosquatters Target New Brand Domains Within 24 Hours of Registration

> Symantec (Broadcom) reports an ongoing campaign in which one-character lookalike domains are registered within the next working day of new brand campaign domains (patient-savings programs, sweepstakes, rebates, claims portals, legal settlements) held at CSC and MarkMonitor. The lookalikes are monetized through pay-per-click parking, deceptive search portals and ad-laden blogs, and could be switched to credential-harvesting pages.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T17:12:26Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T17:12:26Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6160
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6160.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6160
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 29 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Symantec's Threat Hunter team (David Tyler and Lionel Payet, Broadcom Enterprise Security Group) published research on 16 November 2026 describing an ongoing typosquatting campaign against clients of two brand-protection registrars, Corporation Service Company (CSC) and MarkMonitor. For each authentic domain, attackers registered a lookalike differing by a single character within the next working day, often before the brand had launched or publicized its site. New lookalikes were still being detected as recently as 11 November 2026. The sources report 25 lookalike domains in the text and 27 authentic/lookalike pairs; the published IOC list contains 27 domains.

Brands named as targets include Abbott Laboratories, Bayer, CarMax, McDonald's, Procter & Gamble and Sanofi; other authentic-domain registrants named are Arlo Technology, Beam Suntory, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Greystar, Immunovant, Ipsos and Kroll. Most authentic domains were campaign sites rather than corporate home pages: patient-savings programs, sweepstakes, rebates, claims portals and legal settlements. Such addresses are typed by hand from printed mailers, TV ads, pharmacy leaflets and court-ordered settlement notices, which is why single-character typos are productive. In the CarMax example the authentic domains (carmax.claims, carmaxclaims.com, kmxclaims.com) were registered through CSC on August 26 and the lookalikes the following day.

Edit patterns across the 27 pairs: 15 dropped a plural or possessive 's' (e.g. fyzadasavings to fyzadasaving), 6 omitted a single letter (greystarbenefits to greystarbenfits), 4 collapsed a double letter (mywayconnect to mywayconect), 1 added a letter and 1 swapped a vowel (yourmsdbenefits to yourmsdbenifits). Keyboard-adjacent swaps, homoglyphs and hyphen insertion were not observed. All lookalikes are .com, even where the authentic domain used .claims or .network (mcdonaldsmedia.network became mcdonaldmedianetwork.com). Registrations were made through China-based registrars: Cloud Yuqu LLC (IANA ID 3824) for 18 of 25 lookalikes and Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd. (IANA ID 1556) for the other 7. Registrant, nameserver, hosting and IP data were not published.

Observed monetization is parked pages serving pay-per-click ad feeds, deceptive search portals leading to scam blogs, and brand-themed ad blogs that route visitors to scam sites. Symantec warns the ad networks could be abused for malvertising and credential harvesting, and that a domain could flip to a fake claims form with a single DNS or content change; the lookalike pages are noted as primed for requests for names, addresses, claim numbers or health details. The researchers describe the operation as fast and likely automated (watch new registrations, filter for brand-protection registrars, generate a one-character variant, register it) but state the actors' tooling was not visible to them. No actor attribution was made. Symantec WebPulse categorizes the identified domains and detects new variants via shared patterns. A BeaconBeagle configs query for carmaxclaim.com returned no C2 matches.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1596 Search Open Technical Databases
- T1598 Phishing for Information

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Proxy Access to Typosquat Lookalike Brand Campaign Domains (Symantec IOC List)** (`TL-2026-6160-SPL-001`)

Detects web-proxy traffic to any of the 27 one-character lookalike domains (e.g. carmaxclaim.com, kmxclaim.com, fyzadasaving.com, yourmsdbenifits.com) that Symantec reports were registered within one working day of CSC/MarkMonitor-held brand campaign domains. Users reach these hand-typed lookalikes from printed mailers, TV ads and settlement notices; the pages monetise via pay-per-click parking and scam blogs and could flip to credential/PII harvesting with a single DNS or content change.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1583.001, T1656, T1598
- **Data sources:** proxy:zscalernss-web, proxy:bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog, proxy:pan:threat, DeviceNetworkEvents, sigma:proxy
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy (sourcetype="zscalernss-web" OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" OR sourcetype="pan:threat") earliest=-24h
| eval dom=lower(replace(coalesce(url_domain, dest_host, dest), ":[0-9]+$", ""))
| where match(dom, "(^|[.])(ontherockrebate[.]com|mypgsweep[.]com|asrelbisaving[.]com|fyzadasaving[.]com|ijornisavings[.]com|healthspringproducer[.]com|arlocareheath[.]com|hithebeamsweeps[.]com|mywayconect[.]com|sunharbosaving[.]com|getpgsoffer[.]com|celmodpharmacy[.]com|mcdonaldmedianetwork[.]com|aveirwirless[.]com|insulinsavingprogram[.]com|ukvaluestudy[.]com|greystarbenfits[.]com|carmaxclaim[.]com|kmxclaim[.]com|aildatasettlment[.]com|tradealgotcpassettlement[.]com|tradealgotcpsettlement[.]com|youmsdbenefits[.]com|yourmsdbenefit[.]com|yourmsdbenifits[.]com|myolinhuntsmanbenefit[.]com|myolinhuntsmanbenifits[.]com)$")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(http_method) as methods dc(src) as src_hosts values(user) as users by dom
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let lookalikes = dynamic(['ontherockrebate.com','mypgsweep.com','asrelbisaving.com','fyzadasaving.com','ijornisavings.com','healthspringproducer.com','arlocareheath.com','hithebeamsweeps.com','mywayconect.com','sunharbosaving.com','getpgsoffer.com','celmodpharmacy.com','mcdonaldmedianetwork.com','aveirwirless.com','insulinsavingprogram.com','ukvaluestudy.com','greystarbenfits.com','carmaxclaim.com','kmxclaim.com','aildatasettlment.com','tradealgotcpassettlement.com','tradealgotcpsettlement.com','youmsdbenefits.com','yourmsdbenefit.com','yourmsdbenifits.com','myolinhuntsmanbenefit.com','myolinhuntsmanbenifits.com']);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (lookalikes)
| summarize Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Urls=make_set(RemoteUrl, 10), RemoteIPs=make_set(RemoteIP, 10) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Hits desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Proxy Access to Typosquat Lookalike Brand Campaign Domains (TL-2026-6160)
id: 6f1a2b3c-6160-4d11-8a01-5e7c9b1d2f01
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to one-character lookalike domains of CSC/MarkMonitor-held brand campaign domains reported by Symantec (carmaxclaim.com, kmxclaim.com, fyzadasaving.com, yourmsdbenifits.com and others).
references:
  - https://www.security.com/blog-post/typosquatting-new-brand-domains
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.resource_development
  - attack.t1583.001
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1656
  - attack.reconnaissance
  - attack.t1598
logsource:
  category: proxy
detection:
  selection:
    cs-host|endswith:
      - 'ontherockrebate.com'
      - 'mypgsweep.com'
      - 'asrelbisaving.com'
      - 'fyzadasaving.com'
      - 'ijornisavings.com'
      - 'healthspringproducer.com'
      - 'arlocareheath.com'
      - 'hithebeamsweeps.com'
      - 'mywayconect.com'
      - 'sunharbosaving.com'
      - 'getpgsoffer.com'
      - 'celmodpharmacy.com'
      - 'mcdonaldmedianetwork.com'
      - 'aveirwirless.com'
      - 'insulinsavingprogram.com'
      - 'ukvaluestudy.com'
      - 'greystarbenfits.com'
      - 'carmaxclaim.com'
      - 'kmxclaim.com'
      - 'aildatasettlment.com'
      - 'tradealgotcpassettlement.com'
      - 'tradealgotcpsettlement.com'
      - 'youmsdbenefits.com'
      - 'yourmsdbenefit.com'
      - 'yourmsdbenifits.com'
      - 'myolinhuntsmanbenefit.com'
      - 'myolinhuntsmanbenifits.com'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Brand-protection, takedown or threat-intel staff investigating the domains
  - Security sandboxes or URL scanners detonating the published IOC list
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Brand-protection or threat-intel analysts visiting the lookalikes during investigation
- Sandboxes or URL scanners detonating the published IOC list

**Tuning notes:** Exclude analyst workstations and sandbox egress IPs. Adjust sourcetypes and field names (url_domain/dest_host) to your proxy vendor's CIM mapping. Any hit is high fidelity: sinkhole the domain and notify the user, because these pages can become credential or PII harvesters at any time. Refresh the list from the Symantec IOC feed as new lookalikes appear (new ones were seen as late as 2026-11-11).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Browser Launched from Mail/Document with Typosquat Lookalike URL on Command Line (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Resolution of One-Character Lookalikes of Known Brand Campaign Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Typo-Then-Correct Pivot: Lookalike Lookup Followed by Authentic Campaign Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Form or Data POST to Typosquat Lookalike Brand Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Resolution of Community-Observed Malvertising Sibling Domains (stream*.cyou and Related) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- First-Seen Campaign-Keyword .com Domain Typical of Brand Typosquats (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Email Link Clicks to Typosquat Lookalike Brand Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Redirect Chain from Typosquat Lookalike to Third-Party Ad/Scam Destination (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 29)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `ontherockrebate[.]com`
- Domain: `mypgsweep[.]com`
- Domain: `asrelbisaving[.]com`

Full set of 29 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Typosquatters Copy Big Brands' New Domains Within a Day of Registration - Symantec/Broadcom](https://www.security.com/blog-post/typosquatting-new-brand-domains)
- [Typosquatters Target New Brand Domains Within 24 Hours of Registration - Infosecurity Magazine](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/typosquatters-target-new-brand/)
- [Typosquatters Copy Big Brands' New Domains Within a Day of Registration - Malware News](https://malware.news/t/typosquatters-copy-big-brands-new-domains-within-a-day-of-registration/127321)
- [Typosquatters Clone Major Brands' New Domains Within a Day of Registration - Mallory](https://mallory.ai/stories/01a1e43f-63a0-76a4-8b80-b0d17b057406)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1656 Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6160
