# N0n extortion group claims data leak of Strategus (US connected TV advertising agency)

> The N0n extortion group listed Strategus, a US connected TV advertising agency, on its leak site (first anonymously as 'Company #183' on 2026-11-09) and claims to hold 3,551,083 conversion PII rows plus campaign data, with status 'NOT PAID - EXPOSED'. All details are the actor's unverified claims as relayed by the ransomware.live tracker.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T20:57:25Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T20:57:25Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6180
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6180.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6180
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 10 (2 shown free below)

## Description

ransomware.live recorded Strategus (United States, filed under Technology) as a victim of the N0n group. N0n first posted the victim anonymously on 2026-11-09 as 'Company #183'; ransomware.live discovered the named entry on 2026-11-16 12:34 UTC and lists the status as 'NOT PAID - EXPOSED'. No victim statement, independent confirmation, CVE, IOC or intrusion vector is stated for this specific incident, and the claims remain unverified.

Claimed data per the tracker entry: (1) a campaign conversion graph and attribution file archive covering April-September 2026 (sample of 47,955 records); (2) a September 2026 client completed-jobs conversion graph (22,095 records); (3) fresh campaign delivery data written 26-27 October 2026 (65,052 files, 14.2 GB, five campaign chains); and (4) 3,551,083 conversion PII rows counted across all PII parts. Claimed data types are transaction IDs, hashed emails, revenue figures, device advertising IDs and home IP addresses. Exposure of device IDs and home IPs linked to hashed emails could enable re-identification and targeted phishing of downstream consumers, and exposure of client campaign and revenue data creates commercial and contractual risk for the agency's advertising clients.

Context on the actor (SOCRadar, via The Register, 2026-10-30): N0n emerged in September 2026 (first activity 2026-09-18 per ransomware.live) as a financially motivated data-theft and extortion group. SOCRadar analysed an exposed operator server (Python HTTP file server on 185.157.161.148:8877, 1,719 files incl. attack scripts, locker source code and an AI agent environment) and found no vulnerability exploitation in documented cases: access relied on weak or stolen credentials, FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing through a residential SOCKS5 proxy pool, RDP scanning, and exposed cloud keys (an AWS key enabling S3 list/read/delete in a Fanatics-linked case). Reported post-access behavior includes hidden admin accounts disguised as services, covert proxies, session-token and mailbox theft, data and backup deletion, encryption with hardcoded keys, countdown-clock leak-site pressure and secondary extortion of third parties. The operator used the OpenCode AI coding agent to write and debug scripts. Researchers note the 'backup destruction' claims should be treated with caution and some question whether the group is true ransomware. SOCRadar believes the group is Russia-based but found no definitive attribution. None of these TTPs are confirmed for the Strategus intrusion itself; they are group-level context.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account
- T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**N0n FortiGate SSL-VPN Credential Stuffing Burst (T1110.004) - Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6180-SPL-001`)

Detects distributed credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN portals, the documented N0n initial-access method (SOCRadar via The Register: access via weak or stolen credentials through a 15-thread residential SOCKS5 proxy pool, e.g. the ChiBiTek case). Aggregates SSL VPN login failures per gateway in 10-minute windows and alerts on many failures across many distinct usernames and several source IPs, which catches proxy-pool rotation that per-IP thresholds miss. Group-level TTP, not confirmed for the Strategus intrusion itself (TL-2026-6180).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1110.004, T1133
- **Data sources:** fortinet:fortigate_event (index=fortinet), CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet CEF), fortinet fortigate logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=fortinet sourcetype=fortigate_event earliest=-1h (logid=0101039426 OR action="ssl-login-fail" OR logdesc="SSL VPN login fail")
```comment: one row per gateway and 10 minute window so rotating residential proxy IPs still aggregate```
| eval src_ip=coalesce(remip, srcip, src)
| bin _time span=10m
| stats count AS failed_logins dc(user) AS distinct_users dc(src_ip) AS distinct_sources values(src_ip) AS sources min(_time) AS first_seen by _time devname
| where failed_logins>=50 AND distinct_users>=10 AND distinct_sources>=5
| eval sample_sources=mvindex(sources,0,9), first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T")
| eval threat="TL-2026-6180 N0n FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing T1110.004"
| table first_seen devname failed_logins distinct_users distinct_sources sample_sources threat
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// N0n FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing (TL-2026-6180, T1110.004)
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where DeviceVendor =~ "Fortinet"
| where DeviceEventClassID == "0101039426" or Activity has "ssl-login-fail" or Activity has "SSL VPN login fail"
| summarize FailedLogins = count(), DistinctUsers = dcount(SourceUserName), DistinctSources = dcount(SourceIP), Sources = make_set(SourceIP, 10) by bin(TimeGenerated, 10m), DeviceName
| where FailedLogins >= 50 and DistinctUsers >= 10 and DistinctSources >= 5
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FailedLogins, DistinctUsers, DistinctSources, Sources
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: FortiGate SSL-VPN Login Failure - Credential Stuffing Indicator (N0n)
id: 7c1f0a52-3b6e-4d18-9a41-5e2d8b7f6c01
status: experimental
description: Single SSL-VPN authentication failure on a FortiGate. N0n performs credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN through a residential SOCKS5 proxy pool. Aggregate this rule (value_count of user and source IP per gateway over 10 minutes) in the SIEM to alert; the per-event rule feeds the aggregation.
references:
    - https://www.ransomware.live/id/U3RyYXRlZ3VzQE4wbg
    - https://www.theregister.com/a/5306754
    - https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1110.004
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: fortinet
    service: fortigate
detection:
    selection:
        - logid: '0101039426'
        - action: 'ssl-login-fail'
        - logdesc: 'SSL VPN login fail'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Users mistyping passwords
    - Password rotation or expired credentials after a policy change
    - Vulnerability scanners authorised against the VPN portal
level: medium

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate users failing logins after a password reset or lockout wave
- Authorised penetration test or VPN load test against the portal
- Misconfigured service or mobile VPN clients repeatedly retrying with stale credentials

**Tuning notes:** Tune thresholds (50 failures / 10 users / 5 sources per 10 minutes) to the gateway's normal baseline. Exclude pentest and scanner IPs via lookup. Add a follow-on correlation for a successful ssl-login (logid 0101039424 tunnel-up) from any source seen failing in the same window, and enrich sources with residential-proxy/ASN intelligence. Verify the logid and sourcetype match your FortiGate add-on version.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- N0n AWS Access Key S3 Enumeration From Previously Unseen IP (T1078.004) - Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n AWS S3 Mass Read And Delete By One Access Key (T1530, T1485) - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Covert Proxy And Tunnelling Tool Execution (T1090) - C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Mailbox Collection Via External Forwarding Or Inbox Rules (T1114) - Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Backup And Recovery Destruction Commands (T1490, T1485) - Impact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Bulk Data Exfiltration Via Rclone Or MEGA Clients (T1567) - Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Hidden Service-Named Local Admin Account Creation (T1136.001) - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Operator Server [indicator]:8877 Network Contact (T1090.002) - C2 / Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 10)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.157.161[.]148`
- URL: `hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/U3RyYXRlZ3VzQE4wbg`

Full set of 10 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ransomware.live victim entry: Strategus (N0n)](https://www.ransomware.live/id/U3RyYXRlZ3VzQE4wbg)
- [ransomware.live group profile: N0n](https://www.ransomware.live/group/n0n)
- [The Register: N0n ransomware group spends on AI tools, leaves server open (SOCRadar findings)](https://www.theregister.com/a/5306754)
- [SOCRadar: N0n ransomware AI-assisted extortion](https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/)
- [SOCRadar: N0n group global ports and shipping leak](https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/)
- [Fortra: What is n0n?](https://fortra.com/blog/n0n-ransomware-what-you-need-know)
- [Infosecurity Magazine: Emerging ransomware gang uses backup destruction threats](https://infosecurity-magazine.com/news/ransomware-gang-uses-backup)
- [SC Media: New ransomware group n0n escalates threats by targeting backups](https://www.scworld.com/brief/new-ransomware-group-n0n-escalates-threats-by-targeting-backups)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6180
