# N0n ransomware group lists JPMorgan Chase & Co. on leak site (unverified data exposure claim)

> The N0n extortion group listed JPMorgan Chase & Co. (US, Financial Services) on its leak site, shown by ransomware.live as 'NOT PAID — EXPOSED', claiming cardmember engagement records for a premium Reserve program, a member directory and branded campaign emails. The claim is single-source, unverified and not confirmed by the victim; no sample files were provided.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T21:40:19Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-16T21:40:19Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6184
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6184.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6184
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 14 (2 shown free below)

## Description

ransomware.live recorded on 2026-11-16 12:09 UTC that the N0n group listed JPMorgan Chase & Co. (United States, Financial Services). The listing was first posted anonymously as 'Company #150' on 2026-11-09, which ransomware.live uses as the estimated attack date, and carries the status 'NOT PAID — EXPOSED'. The group claims cardmember engagement records for a premium Reserve program (hundreds of thousands of campaign interactions tied to tens of thousands of distinct email addresses), a member directory with program labels and postal codes, and campaign emails whose subjects and sender addresses carry the bank's branding. ransomware.live shows only a leak screenshot and no sample files. The claim is not independently confirmed by JPMorgan Chase, no CVE, malware sample, IOC or initial access vector is stated for this listing, and the described data (marketing and engagement records) is consistent with a third-party or marketing-platform data set rather than core banking systems. Treat it as an attacker accusation, not proof of breach.

N0n (also written n0n) is a data-theft and extortion group that emerged in September 2026. ransomware.live tracks 235 victims in 42 countries (108 in the United States) with the first estimated attack on 2026-09-18, and lists Transportation, Retail and E-Commerce, Healthcare, Financial Services and Technology as the top sectors. The Tor leak site showed 93 victims by mid-October with ransom demands totalling $283.7 million (individual demands roughly $2.4M-$25M). On 2026-10-12 the group posted 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations in one batch; at least 21 appear linked to customers of South Korean maritime software vendor CyberLogitec, which has not confirmed an intrusion. No confirmed ransom payments were reported, and some listings marked 'honored - data destroyed' were not verified on-chain.

Per SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit, which found an exposed Python HTTP file server (185.157.161.148:8877, Sweden) in late September 2026, the operator's access methods were credential-based rather than exploit-based: wide RDP scanning, automated credential stuffing against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances through a 15-thread residential SOCKS5 proxy pool testing ip:port:user:password combinations against /remote/login, exposed cloud credentials and reused hosting-portal sessions. An exposed AWS key in a Fanatics-linked case allowed listing, reading and deleting S3 objects. Post-compromise behavior included hidden admin accounts disguised as services, covert proxies, credential and session-token theft, mailbox and emailed-MFA-code access, data staging to central storage, firewall policy changes, and in some cases data and backup deletion. The server held 1,719 files including 829 attack scripts, source for five versions of a custom encryptor with hardcoded keys apparently reused across victims, and an OpenCode AI coding agent configured with 154 model entries from seven providers (over $7,216 of API spend by 2026-10-22). Researchers found no evidence of a fully autonomous AI attack system. Extortion relies on ransom notes, a leak-site countdown, negotiation rooms, and automated warnings to victims' service providers, clients and media; a secondary alert was sent to PayPal's security team after the Transcom incident. SOCRadar notes Russia-based is believed but unattributed definitively. One secondary SOCRadar summary lists Windows endpoint artifacts: staging directory C:\Users\Public\n0n\, *.n0n and *.n0n.tmp files, n0n_READ_ME* ransom notes, MSSQL/W3SVC/MySQL service stops and vssadmin shadow-copy deletion (this was seen only through search-result snippets, not the full report).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595 Active Scanning
- T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
- T1136 Create Account
- T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1090 Proxy
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**N0n FortiGate SSL-VPN Credential Stuffing (GET /remote/login) - Initial Access** (`TL-2026-6184-SPL-001`)

Detects the N0n group's automated ip:port:user:password credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN portals (/remote/login), distributed through a residential SOCKS5 proxy pool. Fires when one source IP produces 20+ SSL-VPN login failures (FortiOS logid 0101039426) across 10+ distinct accounts within 10 minutes. Access was credential-based, not exploit-based (no CVE), so this behaviour is the primary early signal. Source: SOCRadar research on TL-2026-6184 / n0n.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1110.004, T1133, T1078, T1595
- **Data sources:** fortigate_event (index=firewall), CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet CEF), FortiGate SSL-VPN logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=firewall sourcetype="fortigate_event" (action="ssl-login-fail" OR logid="0101039426") ```N0n TL-2026-6184 credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN /remote/login```
| eval src=coalesce(remip,srcip,src_ip), usr=coalesce(user,username)
| bin _time span=10m
| stats count AS failures dc(usr) AS distinct_users dc(devname) AS appliances_targeted values(usr) AS sample_users by _time src
| where failures>=20 AND distinct_users>=10
| sort - failures
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// N0n (TL-2026-6184): FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing (T1110.004) and any follow-on successful login (T1078, T1133)
let failed = CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where DeviceVendor =~ "Fortinet"
    | where DeviceEventClassID == "0101039426" or Activity has "ssl-login-fail" or Activity has "login fail"
    | summarize Failures=count(), DistinctUsers=dcount(SourceUserName), SampleUsers=make_set(SourceUserName, 20), Appliances=dcount(DeviceName), FirstFail=min(TimeGenerated), LastFail=max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, Window=bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
    | where Failures >= 20 and DistinctUsers >= 10;
let succeeded = CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where DeviceVendor =~ "Fortinet"
    | where Activity has_any ("tunnel-up", "ssl-login-succ", "login success")
    | summarize FirstSuccess=min(TimeGenerated), SuccessUsers=make_set(SourceUserName, 20) by SourceIP;
failed
| join kind=leftouter succeeded on SourceIP
| extend LoginSucceededAfterStuffing = isnotempty(FirstSuccess) and FirstSuccess >= FirstFail
| project Window, SourceIP, Failures, DistinctUsers, Appliances, SampleUsers, LoginSucceededAfterStuffing, SuccessUsers
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: FortiGate SSL-VPN Credential Stuffing - N0n (TL-2026-6184)
id: 6184a001-5c1e-4a52-9c0a-000000000001
name: n0n_fortigate_sslvpn_login_fail
status: experimental
description: Detects failed FortiGate SSL-VPN logins (logid 0101039426) used by the N0n group in automated credential stuffing against /remote/login. The companion correlation rule fires when one source fails against 10 or more distinct accounts within 10 minutes.
references:
    - https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/
    - https://www.theregister.com/a/5306754
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.004
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595
logsource:
    category: firewall
    product: fortinet
detection:
    selection_logid:
        logid: '0101039426'
    selection_action:
        action: 'ssl-login-fail'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Users mistyping passwords after a forced reset
    - Misconfigured VPN clients with stale saved credentials
level: high
---
title: FortiGate SSL-VPN Credential Stuffing Burst - N0n
id: 6184a001-5c1e-4a52-9c0a-0000000000c1
name: n0n_fortigate_sslvpn_stuffing_burst
status: experimental
description: One source IP failing SSL-VPN login against 10 or more distinct accounts within 10 minutes, consistent with N0n residential-proxy credential stuffing.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
correlation:
    type: value_count
    rules:
        - n0n_fortigate_sslvpn_login_fail
    group-by:
        - remip
    timespan: 10m
    condition:
        gte: 10
        field: user
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate users repeatedly mistyping passwords after a forced reset
- Vulnerability scanners or red-team exercises authorised against the SSL-VPN portal
- Shared NAT egress IP where many employees fail logins at once

**Tuning notes:** Adjust the 20 failure / 10 distinct-user thresholds to your VPN population. Exclude corporate NAT and pen-test egress IPs. Confirm your Fortinet add-on field names (remip vs srcip, user vs username). Pair with an SSL-VPN success event from the same source to escalate to confirmed compromise. Optionally enrich source IPs with residential-proxy reputation feeds.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- N0n Wide RDP Scanning - External Source Sweeping Many Hosts on TCP/3389 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Hidden Admin Account Disguised as a Service Account (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n RDP Lateral Movement - One Account Interactively Logging On to Many Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Ransomware Artifacts - .n0n Files, n0n_READ_ME Notes and C:\Users\Public\n0n Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Defense Evasion - Windows Firewall Disabled or Rules Modified (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Infrastructure Contact - Connection to [indicator] / Python Server Port 8877 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Pre-Encryption Impact - Shadow Copy Deletion and MSSQL/W3SVC/MySQL Service Stops (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- N0n Exposed AWS Key Abuse - S3 Listing, Reading and Deletion Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 14)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.157.161[.]148`
- URL: `hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/SlBNb3JnYW4gQ2hhc2UgJiBDby5ATjBu`

Full set of 14 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ransomware.live victim entry: JPMorgan Chase & Co. (group N0n)](https://www.ransomware.live/id/SlBNb3JnYW4gQ2hhc2UgJiBDby5ATjBu)
- [ransomware.live group profile: N0n](https://www.ransomware.live/group/n0n)
- [The Register: n0n ransomware / SOCRadar findings](https://www.theregister.com/a/5306754)
- [Crypto Briefing: N0n ransomware group spends $7K on AI tools, then leaves its own server wide open](https://cryptobriefing.com/n0n-ransomware-ai-tools-exposed-server/)
- [SOCRadar: n0n ransomware AI-assisted extortion](https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/)
- [SOCRadar: n0n group global ports and shipping leak](https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/)
- [SOCRadar: N0n Ransomware Group profile](https://socradar.io/data-breach/ransomware/n0n/)
- [Fortra: What Is n0n? And Is It Really Spelt Like That?](https://fortra.com/blog/n0n-ransomware-what-you-need-know)
- [SC World: New ransomware group n0n escalates threats by targeting backups](https://www.scworld.com/brief/new-ransomware-group-n0n-escalates-threats-by-targeting-backups)
- [Infosecurity Magazine: Emerging Ransomware Gang Uses Backup Destruction Threats to Pressure Victims](https://infosecurity-magazine.com/news/ransomware-gang-uses-backup)
- [DeXpose: N0n Ransomware Assaults Company #1](https://www.dexpose.io/n0n-ransomware-assaults-company-1/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6184
