# Poisoned third-party scripts (Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, minute-ly) on BBC, Zoom and other major sites deliver financial-theft skimmer and iPhone exploit-loader router (Coruna / DarkSword-linked)

> Hudson Rock reports malicious code injected into third-party scripts (Optimizely projectJS, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, minute-ly) served on at least 21 named sites including BBC, Zoom, GitLab, HSBC UAE, CNN and Fox News. The code loads a browser financial-theft payload (track.js: crypto-address substitution, card skimming, conditional cookie/screenshot collection) and an iOS user-agent router that serves entry pages associated with Coruna and DarkSword exploit chains. Successful device exploitation, zero-day use, operator identity, initial compromise mechanism and victim counts are not established.

- **Published:** 2026-11-16T22:30:27Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T04:13:49.021Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6186
- **ID:** TL-2026-6186
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 49 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Between 2026-11-13 and 2026-11-16 (UTC), archived and live responses from four third-party script providers were observed carrying injected code: Optimizely customer projectJS files (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<id>.js and /public/<id>/s/<name>.js), Kissmetrics (i.kissmetrics.com/i.js, i.kissmetrics.io/i.js, scripts.kissmetrics.io), StorifyMe (storifyme-elements.min.js and custom widgets on storifyme.com/.xyz) and minute-ly (apv-static.minute-ly.com/resources/v2/loader.js?v=3). Hudson Rock names 21 affected properties as a documented subset (not a victim count): bbc.com, zoom.com, about.gitlab.com, hsbc.ae, hootsuite.com, talkwalker.com, virginmediao2.co.uk, stamps.com, tricentis.com, securitybank.com, buzzstream.com, chicagoitsupport.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, unibas.ch, vidaxl.co.uk, salesforce.com, edition.cnn.com, foxsports.com, mutualofomaha.com and foxnews.com. Researcher Kirk (Ohey) reports 51 traced sites overall; only 15 captures have body-level verification. Findings from Kirk were not independently re-executed by Hudson Rock.

The main payload, track.js from 1688360.cc (live variant 29,882 bytes), performs three browser-side functions. (1) Cryptocurrency address substitution: replaces EVM, Bitcoin, TRON, TON, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses in visible text, inputs, links, copy events and clipboard API calls using a 50 ms scan plus mutation observation; no seed extraction or automatic transfer logic was found. (2) Card skimming: hooks form submissions and fetch/XMLHttpRequest POST bodies, validates card prefix, Luhn, expiry and CVV, and sends n/e/c/u fields to 1688360.cc/card.php (sendBeacon when available); no actual card transmission was demonstrated and bypass of hosted-payment-frame isolation was not shown. (3) Conditional collection: posts page URL, document.cookie (JS-readable only, up to 8,000 chars), recorded address matches and an optional html2canvas viewport JPEG to 1688360.cc/hit.php. BBC and HSBC UAE assets embed a Base64 fallback copy (24,392 bytes) that runs if the remote track.js fails or has not completed after 2.5 seconds, so blocking the attacker domain alone does not neutralise the poisoned project code.

An iOS branch recognises iPhone/iPad/iPod user agents (and iPad-style Macintosh touch), injects two boot.js references with channel code 02111110, and for iOS 18.6 or lower adds JIUJIU888/weifile.html. Per Kirk's router logic, iOS 13-17 is routed to /A8/a.html (Coruna-associated), 18-25 to /D11/b.html (DarkSword-labelled), 26 to /C10/b.html (untested; C10 reported disabled earlier), above 26 no chain. URLScan captures with spoofed iOS 17.5 and 18.6 user agents received the A8 and D11 entry pages and packed JavaScript stages on eil786npto9u5bq.icu and 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu. JIUJIU888/index.js and the A8 script install globalThis.obChTK from a Base64 module map matching an existing Coruna detection rule; the D11 entry uses /api/gs_state and /api/pe_ok gates before loading frame.html, consistent with the public GTIG description of DarkSword delivery. Static markers include ds_vk, __DAILI_CFG, chainFrame with data-daili-gate=v1, XOR key d7K9mP2x, a 24-hour frame gate and a 30-minute pause after two failures. The infrastructure is linked to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 kit described in earlier Ohey research; this supports kit reuse, not operator identity.

Context from primary sources: Google GTIG (2026-03-03) documented Coruna as five full iOS chains / 23 exploits for iOS 13.0-17.2.1 used by a surveillance-vendor customer, UNC6353 (suspected Russian espionage) and UNC6691 (financially motivated, China-based), with PLASMAGRID wallet-theft payload. GTIG (2026-03-18) documented DarkSword (six vulnerabilities, iOS 18.4-18.7, patched by iOS 26.3) used by UNC6748, PARS Defense and UNC6353 with GHOSTKNIFE/GHOSTSABER/GHOSTBLADE payloads. Those kits are third-party reporting; no CVE is established as exploited in THIS campaign. Delivery, completed response, exploit execution and data theft are separate findings, and only delivery and code behaviour are established. The source recorded the poisoned BBC response disappearing by ~21:10 UTC on 2026-11-16 while GitLab, Zoom and minute-ly loaders were still present.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1588.005 Obtain Capabilities
- T1608.004 Stage Capabilities
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1659 Content Injection

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**TL-2026-6186 Payment Card Exfiltration to 1688360.cc card.php - Post-Exploitation Collection** (`TL-2026-6186-SPL-002`)

Detects requests to 1688360.cc/card.php, the endpoint receiving skimmed payment-card fields (n, e, c, u) from the track.js card hook, which captures form submissions and fetch/XHR POST bodies and uses sendBeacon when available. A hit means a browser on your network ran the skimmer on a page where card data may have been entered (T1056, T1657, T1041). Transmission of real card data was not demonstrated in the source reporting, so confirm with proxy body logs or payment-page review.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1056, T1657, T1041
- **Data sources:** proxy, web_gateway, defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog","squid:access","stream:http") earliest=-24h
| eval dom=lower(coalesce(url_domain, dest_host, dest)), u=lower(coalesce(url, uri_path, "")), method=upper(coalesce(http_method, "UNKNOWN"))
| where dom="1688360.cc" AND match(u,"/card[.]php")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen sum(bytes_out) as bytes_out values(method) as methods values(http_referrer) as origin_pages by src, user, dom
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen src user dom methods origin_pages bytes_out count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let cardHost = '1688360.cc';
let endpointHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RemoteUrl has cardHost and RemoteUrl has '/card.php'
    | project Timestamp, Source = 'endpoint', Device = DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Method = '', Url = RemoteUrl;
let proxyHits = CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where RequestURL has cardHost and RequestURL has '/card.php'
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Source = 'proxy', Device = SourceIP, Account = SourceUserName, Process = RequestClientApplication, Method = RequestMethod, Url = RequestURL;
union endpointHits, proxyHits
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Hits = count(), Methods = make_set(Method), Urls = make_set(Url, 10) by Source, Device, Account, Process
| order by LastSeen desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: TL-2026-6186 Payment Card Exfiltration to 1688360.cc card.php
id: 2d9e6b84-5a17-4c3f-8e02-91f4b7a3d602
status: experimental
description: 'Detects requests to the 1688360.cc card.php endpoint used by the track.js skimmer to send card number, expiry, CVV and page URL (fields n, e, c, u) from compromised web pages (TL-2026-6186).'
references:
    - https://www.infostealers.com/article/poisoned-scripts-on-bbc-zoom-and-other-major-websites-linked-to-iphone-exploit-loaders/
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/coruna-powerful-ios-exploit-kit
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1056
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1657
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-host: '1688360.cc'
        c-uri|contains: '/card.php'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Researchers replaying the endpoint
    - Sandbox detonation of the known sample
level: critical

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or sandboxes replaying the known skimmer endpoint
- Internal red-team or web-skimmer simulation exercises

**Tuning notes:** Any hit is high priority: identify the user, the origin page (http_referrer) and whether a payment form was involved. If your proxy logs POST bodies, check for n/e/c/u fields. Escalate to fraud and PCI teams if the page processes card data. Also review web-server and CSP report logs for connect-src violations to this host.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- TL-2026-6186 iOS Exploit-Kit Router Entry Pages and [indicator] on .icu Hosts - Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 Cookie, URL and Screenshot Collection to [indicator] hit.php - Post-Exploitation Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 iOS Router Gate and Telemetry API Calls (gs_state, pe_ok, chain_log) - C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 Fetch of Known-Poisoned Optimizely and minute-ly Script Assets or Matching SHA256 - Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 Attacker Wallet Addresses From track.js Clipper Seen in Web Traffic - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 iOS User-Agent Fetch of JIUJIU888 Exploit-Chain Stages and frame.html - C2 and Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 Poisoned Third-Party Script Loads [indicator] track.js Skimmer - Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TL-2026-6186 DNS Resolution of Skimmer and iOS Router C2 Infrastructure - C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 49)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `136.113.106[.]136`
- Domain: `1688360[.]cc`
- URL: `hxxps://cdn[.]optimizely[.]com/public/4621041136/s/bbcx_prod.js`

Full set of 49 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Poisoned Scripts on BBC, Zoom and Other Major Websites Linked to iPhone Exploit Loaders (Hudson Rock / Infostealers.com)](https://www.infostealers.com/article/poisoned-scripts-on-bbc-zoom-and-other-major-websites-linked-to-iphone-exploit-loaders/)
- [Coruna: The Mysterious Journey of a Powerful iOS Exploit Kit (Google GTIG)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/coruna-powerful-ios-exploit-kit)
- [DarkSword iOS Exploit Chain (Google GTIG)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/darksword-ios-exploit-chain)
- [Coruna iOS Exploit Kit Uses 23 Exploits (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/coruna-ios-exploit-kit-uses-23-exploits.html)
- [Coruna: Inside the Nation-State Grade iOS Exploit Kit (iVerify)](https://iverify.io/blog/coruna-inside-the-nation-state-grade-ios-exploit-kit-we-ve-been-tracking)
- [DarkSword: Researchers uncover another iOS exploit kit (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/03/19/darksword-ios-exploit-iphone/)
- [A DarkSword hangs over unpatched iPhones (Malwarebytes)](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2026/03/a-darksword-hangs-over-unpatched-iphones)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6186
