# Underground Crypto-Drain Operation: Aotera/Tedy Loader with Vidar-class Stealer Drains ~$100k in Crypto

> Netskope Threat Labs details 'Underground', a malware builder (loader telemetry since October 2023) that delivers an Aotera/Tedy-family loader and a Vidar-class stealer via a trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll in lure archives. The operation steals browser cookies, passwords and wallets, automates exchange account drains, rewrites withdrawal confirmation emails and swaps clipboard wallet addresses, taking roughly $100,000 in on-chain value from at least 350-430 victims. No named actor attribution.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T00:39:31Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T00:39:31Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6193
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6193.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6193
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Netskope Threat Labs (published 2026-10-01) tracks a financially motivated operation it labels 'Underground' (the label is the researchers', not a named actor). Victims receive a versioned lure archive (unencrypted 7z or zip) containing setup.exe, a trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll and an encrypted data.bin. The delivery vector is unknown. The setup binary runs the Underground loader (stable_superior_verified.exe, with a sibling build easy_exceptional_instant.exe), which belongs to the Aotera/Tedy loader family. The loader decrypts an embedded stage using per-build AES keys and uses section-based injection to place a self-decrypting payload into a suspended dllhost.exe. That process launches Chrome or Edge under the victim's own profile, and the stealer stage is never written to disk as a file. The loader logs to C:\ProgramData\Underground\, and the malware deletes this folder after use.

Before running, the loader checks running processes against a hard-coded list of 67 names covering debuggers and disassemblers, instrumentation frameworks, network sniffers, process monitors and VM/sandbox agents (the article shows 28, including x64dbg.exe, frida.exe, wireshark.exe, fiddler.exe and vmtoolsd.exe). The payload is Vidar-class: it collects Chromium and Gecko cookies and passwords, Discord and Telegram data, desktop and extension wallets, and screenshots. Unlike Vidar's usual dead-drop configuration, it uses a custom /api/machine/* protocol against a single hardcoded gate per sample. AV labels vary and may include Rhadamanthys, LummaStealer or Tedy.

The C2 gate runs nginx/FastCGI behind Cloudflare, returns 404 at the root and responds only on /api/machine/* paths. Each machine polls /api/machine/commands with a per-machine UUID. /api/machine/injections returns a roughly 9 MB JSON configuration containing injection scripts for more than 15 exchange and web targets, clipper rules and file-finder logic. Seven rotating gate domains were tracked from November 2025 to June 2026. Loader telemetry to 95.164.53.76 under /new/log/<build ID>/<stage>/<timestamp> (stages include startCrypt, startLoader, success) spans October 2023 to January 2026.

For Binance, the injected script displays a fake two-factor-style overlay in about 25 languages over the logged-in page, disables the withdrawal allow list, converts balances to USDC then BTC and withdraws to an 11-address Bitcoin pool (100% of small balances, 90% of large ones), reporting each step to a log endpoint on easybooters.com. A webmail injection covering Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo and Proton watches for withdrawal confirmations in about 24 languages and rewrites them so they look routine. A 32-rule clipboard clipper covering about two dozen coins swaps copied wallet addresses for operator addresses; the served configuration lists more than 80 destination addresses across about two dozen chains, identical on every gate tested.

Lifetime on-chain proceeds are estimated at about $100,000 (first-hop inbound transactions at spot prices, so conservative), with a mean receipt of about $82 and one Bitcoin address receiving about $18,800, mostly one 0.21 BTC deposit. At least 350-430 paying victims were identified; exchange-sourced withdrawals are excluded, so the true count is higher. Blocking a gate does not remove the implant: treat a blocked gate as an active infection. Note: a separate Cyderes report describes a different chain that also abuses a malicious msys-crypto-3.dll (Direct-Sys loader / CGrabber); it is not shown to be the same campaign.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1055.012 Process Hollowing
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Underground Loader Execution and setup.exe msys-crypto-3.dll Side-Loading (Aotera/Tedy)** (`TL-2026-6193-SPL-001`)

Detects the Underground operation's initial execution stage: the Aotera/Tedy-family loader builds stable_superior_verified.exe / easy_exceptional_instant.exe running, or the lure-archive launcher setup.exe loading a co-located trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll from a user-writable directory (legitimate MSYS2/Git copies live under usr\bin or msys64 and are excluded). The loader then injects a self-decrypting Vidar-class stealer into a suspended dllhost.exe, so this stage is the earliest behavioural opportunity.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.002, T1027
- **Data sources:** sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational (EventCode 1, 7), DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceProcessEvents
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
    ((EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\msys-crypto-3.dll" Image="*\\setup.exe") OR (EventCode=1 (Image="*\\stable_superior_verified.exe" OR Image="*\\easy_exceptional_instant.exe")))
    NOT (ImageLoaded="*\\Git\\usr\\bin\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\msys64\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\msys2\\*")
```signal 1 = Underground loader build executed; signal 2 = setup.exe side-loading a co-located trojanized msys-crypto-3.dll (TL-2026-6193)```
| eval img_dir=lower(substr(Image,1,len(Image)-len(mvindex(split(Image,"\\"),-1))))
| eval dll_dir=if(EventCode=7,lower(substr(ImageLoaded,1,len(ImageLoaded)-len(mvindex(split(ImageLoaded,"\\"),-1)))),null())
| eval signal=case(EventCode=1,"underground_loader_build_executed", EventCode=7 AND img_dir==dll_dir AND match(Image,"(?i)\\\\(Users|ProgramData|Temp)\\\\"),"setup_sideloads_msys_crypto_3_dll", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(Signed) as dll_signed values(CommandLine) as command_line values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User, Image, signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let LoaderBuilds = dynamic(["stable_superior_verified.exe", "easy_exceptional_instant.exe"]);
let SideLoad = DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "msys-crypto-3.dll" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "setup.exe"
    | where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\(Users|ProgramData|Temp)\\"
    | where FolderPath !has "msys64" and FolderPath !has "msys2" and FolderPath !has @"\Git\usr\bin"
    | extend DllDir = tolower(substring(FolderPath, 0, strlen(FolderPath) - strlen(FileName)))
    | extend ExeDir = tolower(substring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 0, strlen(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) - strlen(InitiatingProcessFileName)))
    | where DllDir == ExeDir
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal = "setup_sideloads_msys_crypto_3_dll", ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256;
let LoaderExec = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ (LoaderBuilds)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = AccountName, Signal = "underground_loader_build_executed", ProcessName = FileName, Path = FolderPath, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256;
union SideLoad, LoaderExec
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Underground Aotera/Tedy Loader Build Execution
id: 3f7a1c52-8d4e-4b09-a6f3-2c91e5d07b18
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the Underground loader builds stable_superior_verified.exe and easy_exceptional_instant.exe (Aotera/Tedy loader family) tracked as TL-2026-6193. Covers only the loader-build branch; the msys-crypto-3.dll side-load branch is covered by the image_load rule.
references:
    - https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/09/underground-crypto-drain-operation
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\stable_superior_verified.exe'
            - '\easy_exceptional_instant.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, file names are build-specific; a renamed legitimate tool reusing the name would be the only source
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Portable MSYS2/Git/Cygwin-style toolchains unpacked in a user profile that ship a legitimate msys-crypto-3.dll next to a binary named setup.exe
- A legitimate installer named setup.exe bundled with an MSYS2 runtime DLL by a software vendor

**Tuning notes:** Requires Sysmon EventCode 7 (image load) enabled for setup.exe or unsigned DLLs. Add vendor-approved installer paths to the NOT clause. Loader build names rotate per build, so treat the file-name branch as a high-precision supplement and keep the side-load branch as the durable behaviour. The Sigma flavor covers the loader-build branch only; the side-load branch is in TL-2026-6193-SIG-001.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Underground Lure Archive Extraction ([indicator] + [indicator] + [indicator] Co-located) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Underground Loader Artifacts - ProgramData\Underground Log Folder and PNG-Named Droppings (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Connections to Underground Gate Domains, Loader Telemetry IP and Drain Log Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious [indicator] Loaded From User-Writable Path (DLL Side-Loading) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Chrome/Edge Spawned by dllhost.exe - Section-Injected Stealer Host (Underground) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Resolution of Underground Gate Domains and Binance Drain Log Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Non-Browser Process Harvesting Browser Credentials and Cookies (Vidar-class Stealer) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Underground C2 Gate Polling ([indicator], /injections) and Loader Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `95.164.53[.]76`
- Domain: `quick-neo[.]com`
- Domain: `slow-sky[.]com`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [$100k in Crypto Drained by the Underground Operation](https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/09/underground-crypto-drain-operation)
- [$100k in Crypto Drained by the Underground Operation (republished copy)](https://www.hendryadrian.com/?p=114703)
- [Netskope Threat Labs IOC repository (Malware/Underground)](https://github.com/netskopeoss/NetskopeThreatLabsIOCs)
- [Cyderes: Direct-Sys loader / CGrabber stealer five-stage chain (separate msys-crypto-3.dll abuse, not shown to be related)](https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/direct-sys-loader-cgrabber-stealer-five-stage-malware-chain)
- [Unit 42: Vidar Stealer and XMRig miner campaign analysis (Vidar background)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vidar-stealer-xmrig-miner-campaign-analysis/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1185 Browser Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1055.012 Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6193
