# 8-Digits Team (INC / Lynx ransomware affiliate) member Roman Khlynovskiy extradited from Italy over data extortion campaign against U.S. hospitals, healthcare entities and schools

> On 2026-11-16 the U.S. DOJ announced the extradition from Italy of Roman Khlynovskiy, 43, a Kazakh national and alleged member of the '8-Digits Team', a group affiliated with INC and Lynx ransomware. The campaign hit schools, hospitals and healthcare entities in at least six states, with conspirators claiming over 50 TB stolen (including more than 70 million confidential health records) and over $500 million in total ransom demands.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T01:05:37Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T13:16:01.326Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6194
- **ID:** TL-2026-6194
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** 8-Digits Team
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 46 (3 shown free below)

## Description

According to DOJ Office of Public Affairs release 26-1363 (2026-11-16), Roman Khlynovskiy, a 43-year-old Kazakh national, was extradited from Italy and made his initial appearance in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Knoxville. The indictment alleges he was a member of the '8-Digits Team', a group affiliated with the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. The group is alleged to have gained access to victim networks, exfiltrated data, and then demanded payment in exchange for not releasing it, threatening to publicize sensitive medical information to pressure victims. Targets were schools, hospitals and healthcare entities in at least six states. The conspirators claimed to have stolen more than 50 terabytes of data, including more than 70 million confidential health records, and demanded over $500 million in total ransom. Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva described it as 'one of the largest healthcare data breaches in decades'.

Charges: conspiracy to commit computer fraud and identity theft; conspiracy to commit wire fraud; computer-related extortion; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and threats to disclose nonconsensual intimate images under the TAKE IT DOWN Act. The maximum penalty is 27 years in prison. The DOJ notes an indictment is only an allegation and the defendant is presumed innocent. The investigation was led by the FBI with DOJ CCIPS, the Office of International Affairs and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Tennessee, supported by Italian law enforcement, Ukraine's State Bureau of Investigation and Prosecutor General's Office, and Lithuanian authorities. The release does not state indictment, arrest or extradition dates, and gives no IOCs, infrastructure, hashes or detailed TTPs.

Technical context (INC/Lynx family, not specific to this defendant): public reporting on INC Ransom (MITRE G1032) describes a RaaS affiliate model. Initial access comes from spear-phishing, credentials bought from initial access brokers, and exploitation of public-facing applications (Citrix NetScaler CVE-2023-3519 and CVE-2025-5777, Fortinet EMS CVE-2023-48788, SimpleHelp CVE-2024-57727). Affiliates dump credentials (including an updated Veeam credential dumper), move laterally with RDP, PsExec and LOLBins, disable defenses using BYOVD drivers (filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, fildds.sys), establish remote access with Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect and TeamViewer, stage data in password-protected archives and exfiltrate with Rclone, then deploy Rust-based Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptors (the '--esxi' argument attempts to shut down VMs). INC's Windows and Linux encryptors were offered for sale in May 2024, and the related families Lynx and Sinobi show significant code overlap. The ACSC/NCSC-NZ advisory notes INC TTPs overlap with other RaaS operations, including Lynx. Defenders should not assume the same personnel operate INC and Lynx, and should treat the technique mapping as family-level context rather than evidence about this defendant's specific intrusions.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1566 Phishing
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping
- T1136.001 Create Account
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021.002 Remote Services
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1135 Network Share Discovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**TL-2026-6194 INC Ransom Edge Application Server Spawning Shell (Fortinet EMS / SimpleHelp / SQL Server) - Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6194-SPL-001`)

TL-2026-6194 behaviour-first detection of the INC Ransom / Lynx (8-Digits Team affiliate) exploitation pattern: SQL Server, Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp server processes spawning cmd, PowerShell, certutil, curl or other LOLBins after exploitation of public-facing applications (CVE-2023-48788, CVE-2024-57727, ATT&CK T1190). Family-level context, not specific to the indicted individual.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1190, T1059.003, T1059.001, T1105
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
```TL-2026-6194 T1190 server application spawning a shell is the INC Ransom and Lynx affiliate exploitation pattern for Fortinet EMS CVE-2023-48788 and SimpleHelp CVE-2024-57727```
(ParentImage="*\\sqlservr.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\FcmDaemon.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\FortiClientEMS*" OR ParentImage="*\\SimpleHelp*" OR (ParentImage="*\\java.exe" AND ParentCommandLine="*SimpleHelp*"))
(Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\bitsadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe")
| eval attack_context="TL-2026-6194 INC Ransom edge application exploitation"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as child_commands values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_commands by host, User, ParentImage, Image, attack_context
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let childShells = dynamic(["cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","mshta.exe","curl.exe","rundll32.exe","wmic.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("sqlservr.exe","FcmDaemon.exe","FortiClientEMS.exe")
    or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\FortiClientEMS", @"\SimpleHelp")
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "java.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "SimpleHelp")
| where FileName in~ (childShells)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Server Application Spawning Shell - Fortinet EMS SimpleHelp SQL Server (INC Ransom Exploitation)
id: 7c3e1a52-4b9d-4f06-8a21-d5e90b1c6f37
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL Server, Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp server processes spawning a command shell or LOLBin, the post-exploitation pattern of CVE-2023-48788 and CVE-2024-57727 abuse reported for INC Ransom and Lynx affiliates.
references:
  - https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-member-8-digits-team-ransomware-group-extradited-italy-role-major-data-extortion
  - https://www.cyber.gov.au/advisory/inc-ransom-affiliate-model-enabling-targeting-of-critical-networks
  - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.execution
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1105
  - cve.2023-48788
  - cve.2024-57727
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\sqlservr.exe'
      - '\FcmDaemon.exe'
      - '\FortiClientEMS.exe'
  selection_parent_path:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\FortiClientEMS\'
      - '\SimpleHelp\'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\certutil.exe'
      - '\bitsadmin.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
  condition: 1 of selection_parent* and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - SQL Server Agent jobs or DBAs using xp_cmdshell
  - Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp upgrade and maintenance scripts
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- DBAs or SQL Server Agent jobs legitimately using xp_cmdshell
- Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp upgrade and maintenance scripts launching cmd.exe or powershell.exe

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list known maintenance command lines by ParentCommandLine for sqlservr.exe jobs. Restrict to Fortinet EMS and SimpleHelp servers via host groups to raise fidelity. Add other internet-facing application parents as needed.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Phishing Initial Access - Mail Client or Office Application Spawning Script Host (INC Ransom / Lynx) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Veeam Credential Dumper - VeeamBackup Credentials Table Query (INC Ransom Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lateral Movement and C2 - RDP Fan-Out, PsExec Service Execution and Cobalt Strike Named Pipes (INC Ransom) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Citrix NetScaler Exploitation Requests - CVE-2023-3519 gwtest formssso / CVE-2025-5777 doAuthentication (INC Ransom Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- INC Ransom Rust Encryptor ESXi Mode - --esxi Argument and esxcli VM Kill (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rclone Exfiltration to Cloud Storage and Password-Protected Archive Staging (INC Ransom) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- INC Ransom BYOVD Driver Activity - [indicator] / [indicator] / [indicator] Defense Impairment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unapproved Remote Access Tools and Community-Observed C2 Infrastructure (AnyDesk / ScreenConnect / TeamViewer / Cobalt Strike) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 46)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `213.111.185[.]108`
- Domain: `lynxblog[.]net`
- File hash: `571f5de9dd0d509ed7e5242b9b7473c2b2cbb36ba64d38b32122a0a337d6cf8b`

Full set of 46 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Alleged Member of '8-Digits Team' Ransomware Group Extradited from Italy for Role in Major Data Extortion Campaign (DOJ Press Release 26-1363)](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-member-8-digits-team-ransomware-group-extradited-italy-role-major-data-extortion)
- [Roman Khlynovskiy, Alleged Member of '8-Digits Team' Ransomware Group Extradited (DataBreaches.net)](https://databreaches.net/2026/11/16/roman-khlynovskiy-alleged-member-of-8-digits-team-ransomware-group-extradited-for-role-in-major-data-extortion-campaign-against-u-s-hospitals-healthcare-entities-and-schools/)
- [INC Ransomware Claims 830 Victims Since 2023 (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/inc-ransomware-claims-830-victims-since.html)
- [INC Ransom Affiliate Model Enabling Targeting of Critical Networks (ACSC)](https://www.cyber.gov.au/advisory/inc-ransom-affiliate-model-enabling-targeting-of-critical-networks)
- [INC Ransom Affiliate Model Enabling Targeting of Critical Networks (NCSC New Zealand)](https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/assets/guidance/Documents/INC-Ransom-Affiliate-Model-Enabling-Targeting-of-Critical-Networks.pdf)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: INC Ransom (G1032)](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032/)
- [Lynx Ransomware: A Deep Dive into the Successor of INC Ransomware (Xcitium)](https://threatlabsnews.xcitium.com/?p=28941)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6194
