# ShinyHunters: Evolution of a Data-Theft Extortion Brand (Vishing/OAuth, SaaS Supply-Chain Tokens, PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 Zero-Day)

> ShinyHunters is a financially motivated data-theft and extortion brand spanning multiple clusters. Its access methods evolved from exposed GitHub tokens and S3 buckets (2020) through infostealer credentials against MFA-less Snowflake accounts (2024) and Salesforce vishing/OAuth abuse (2025) to SaaS supply-chain token theft and the Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day CVE-2026-35273 (CVSS 9.8), exploited from May 27 to June 9, 2026, before Oracle's June 10 alert.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T01:34:28Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T01:34:28Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6196
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6196.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6196
- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** ShinyHunters
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-35273

## Description

Sekoia TDR (with Beazley Security incident-response data) traces ShinyHunters from precursor groups (TheDarkOverlord, GnosticPlayers) and the 2020 RaidForums-era database dumps, through the 2024 Snowflake campaign (Mandiant UNC5537, up to 165 customer organizations exposed, using infostealer-harvested credentials against accounts without MFA), to the 2025 Salesforce campaign (Google GTIG UNC6040/UNC6240) built on voice phishing of helpdesk/employees and malicious OAuth connected apps (including a Salesforce Data Loader lookalike named 'My Ticket Portal'). In August 2025 the 'Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters' (SLSH) persona appeared, promoting the shinysp1d3r ransomware-as-a-service; the source states shinysp1d3r had no known victims as of mid-2026. SaaS supply-chain token theft followed: Salesloft Drift (UNC6395, Aug 2025, 700+ organizations; Google did not attribute it to ShinyHunters), Gainsight (Nov 2025, 200+ Salesforce instances) and Anodot (Apr 2026, tokens reused against Snowflake/BigQuery). In 2026 the brand also used Salesforce Experience Cloud (Aura) scanning with a modified AuraInspector tool, and its claimed victims included the Instructure Canvas platform.

CVE-2026-35273 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in the Environment Management (PSEMHUB/EMHub) component of Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62. Observed exploitation consisted of external HTTP POSTs to /PSEMHUB/hub and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector. Sources disagree on root cause: TrendAI classifies it as SSRF (CWE-918), Mandiant describes SSRF as the mechanism for code execution, and other reporting describes a missing-authentication/auth-bypass condition. Exploitation ran from May 27 to June 9, 2026 (Mandiant); stolen data appeared on the ShinyHunters leak site on June 9; Oracle issued an out-of-band Security Alert/mitigation (CPU187) on June 10; Mandiant published on June 11; CISA added the CVE to KEV on June 12. Google notified 100+ organizations, about 68% in higher education, mostly in the US; ShinyHunters allegedly accessed about 300 instances.

Post-exploitation per Mandiant and Beazley: JSP backdoors (orau.jsp, webpack.js) under PSEMHUB.war, custom MeshCentral/MeshAgent agents disguised as Azure services (azurenetfiles.net) on Windows and Linux, a scheduled task 'MeshFwFix', a script (cs_disable.cmd) disabling CrowdStrike, obfuscated PowerShell run through scheduled tasks with PowerShell logging disabled, RDP with compromised credentials, Pass-the-Hash, Chisel tunnelling, SSH-based fan-out scripts, zstd/compressed staging and Rclone exfiltration, and README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT extortion markers. Sekoia suggests the same vector was probably used against Wynn Resorts in February 2026.

Attribution caution (from the source): the lineage from GnosticPlayers to ShinyHunters rests on researcher analysis; UNC5537 operators are not the historic 2020-2023 core; the ShinyHunters name has been repeatedly impersonated (including a fake 'UNC6040' comeback in July 2026); and several 2026 victim claims are disputed, inflated or unverified. A claim that 'ShinyHunters did X' often means the brand monetized X. Treat victim lists as claims, not confirmed compromises. BeaconBeagle checks for the network IOCs returned no matches (the domain config search returned an empty result; the IP beacon lookup returned 404).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1566.004 Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH
- T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
- T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**MeshFwFix Scheduled Task and Obfuscated PowerShell via Task Scheduler** (`TL-2026-6196-SPL-002`)

Detects schtasks creation of the 'MeshFwFix' task (MeshAgent persistence, Sekoia/Beazley), schtasks referencing meshagent, azure-ops or azurenetfiles, and encoded PowerShell spawned by the Schedule service, the post-exploitation pattern after CVE-2026-35273. Covers T1053.005 persistence and T1059.001 execution.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1059.001
- **Data sources:** Sysmon EventCode 1 (index=windows), DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated), process_creation (windows)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    ((Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/create*" CommandLine="*MeshFwFix*")
  OR (Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine IN ("*meshagent*","*azure-ops*","*azurenetfiles*"))
  OR (Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe") ParentImage="*\\svchost.exe" ParentCommandLine="*Schedule*" CommandLine IN ("* -enc *","* -ec *","*-EncodedCommand*","*FromBase64String*")))
| eval signal=if(like(Image,"%schtasks.exe"),"meshagent_scheduled_task","obfuscated_powershell_via_task")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd by host, User, signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let proc = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
        and (ProcessCommandLine contains "MeshFwFix"
             or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("meshagent", "azure-ops", "azurenetfiles")))
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe"
        and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "Schedule"
        and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -enc " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -ec "
             or ProcessCommandLine contains "-EncodedCommand" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let task = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "ScheduledTaskCreated"
| where AdditionalFields has "MeshFwFix"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine = tostring(AdditionalFields), InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
union proc, task
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: MeshFwFix Scheduled Task and Obfuscated PowerShell via Task Scheduler
id: 5e2f8b14-7a09-4c3d-91b6-a4d8e0c6f144
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of the MeshFwFix scheduled task used for MeshAgent persistence and encoded/obfuscated PowerShell launched by the Task Scheduler service, post-exploitation behaviour reported by Beazley and Sekoia in ShinyHunters CVE-2026-35273 intrusions.
references:
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-active-exploitation-of-oracle-peoplesoft-zero-day-cve-2026-35273
  - https://www.sekoia.com/blog/gotta-breach-em-all-the-journey-of-shinyhunters
  - https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/active-exploitation-of-oracle-peoplesoft-environment-management
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1053.005
  - attack.t1059.001
  - cve.2026-35273
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_mesh_task:
    Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - '/create'
      - 'MeshFwFix'
  selection_mesh_generic:
    Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'meshagent'
      - 'azure-ops'
      - 'azurenetfiles'
  selection_ps_task:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    ParentCommandLine|contains: 'Schedule'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -enc '
      - ' -ec '
      - '-EncodedCommand'
      - 'FromBase64String'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Admin automation that runs encoded PowerShell from scheduled tasks
  - Legitimate MeshCentral deployments that register their own scheduled task
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrator automation that runs encoded PowerShell from scheduled tasks
- Sanctioned MeshCentral deployments that create their own tasks

**Tuning notes:** The MeshFwFix name match is high fidelity and can page on its own. For the encoded-PowerShell branch, allowlist known automation by task, account or script-signing hash, and review the decoded payload. If you also collect Windows Security 4698, add TaskName matches for the same strings.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- PeopleSoft Host Outbound SMB / Campaign IP Connection - CVE-2026-35273 SSRF Follow-on (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EDR Tampering (cs_disable.cmd) and PowerShell Logging Disabled (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Chisel Reverse Tunnel and RDP over Loopback Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PeopleSoft PSEMHUB.war JSP Webshell Creation (orau.jsp / webpack.js) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rclone Bulk Transfer and zstd Staging - ShinyHunters Data Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SSH Fan-out Script and Extortion Note on Linux - ShinyHunters PeopleSoft Intrusion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PeopleSoft PSEMHUB/PSIGW External POST - CVE-2026-35273 Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MeshAgent C2 to [indicator] and Campaign Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `142.11.200[.]186`
- Domain: `azurenetfiles[.]net`
- File hash: `fa210f015399de16bf7cb1e05856d179dfaabb1ecc9bb5fd277f94972a3bdc43`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Gotta Breach 'Em All: The Journey of ShinyHunters (Sekoia TDR with Beazley Security)](https://www.sekoia.com/blog/gotta-breach-em-all-the-journey-of-shinyhunters)
- [Critical Vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools Under Active Exploitation (CVE-2026-35273) - Beazley Security](https://beazley.security/alerts-advisories/critical-vulnerability-in-oracle-peoplesoft-enterprise-peopletools-under-active-exploitation-cve-2026-35273)
- [Active Exploitation of Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day CVE-2026-35273 - Rapid7 ETR](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-active-exploitation-of-oracle-peoplesoft-zero-day-cve-2026-35273)
- [CVE-2026-35273: Defending Against the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB Authentication Bypass - Qualys ThreatPROTECT](https://threatprotect.qualys.com/2026/06/18/cve-2026-35273-defending-against-the-oracle-peoplesoft-psemhub-authentication-bypass/)
- [Oracle mitigates PeopleSoft zero-day exploited in data theft attacks - BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/oracle-mitigates-peoplesoft-zero-day-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/amp/)
- [Active Exploitation of Oracle PeopleSoft Environment Management - Kudelski Security](https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/active-exploitation-of-oracle-peoplesoft-environment-management)
- [Patch Now: ShinyHunters extortion group actively exploiting Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day - Cyber Daily](https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13762-patch-now-shinyhunters-extortion-group-actively-exploiting-oracle-peoplesoft-zero-day)
- [CVE-2026-35273: UNC6240 Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day - Ampcus Cyber](https://www.ampcuscyber.com/shadowopsintel/unc6240-exploits-oracle-peoplesoft-zero-day/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6196
