# DragonForce Ransomware Cartel Windows Payload Analysis (.df_win, ChaCha20/RSA-4096, ARP/SMB Discovery)

> Seqrite Labs traces a 32-bit Windows DragonForce ransomware sample from process start to completion: security/backup process termination, WMIC shadow-copy deletion, ARP-cache-based SMB target discovery, 16-worker parallel ChaCha20 encryption with RSA-4096-protected per-file keys, and .df_win renaming. DragonForce is a RaaS operation (first observed August 2023) that moved to a white-label 'ransomware cartel' model on 2025-03-19; its payloads derive from leaked LockBit 3.0 code and later a customized Conti v3 codebase.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T02:02:35Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T02:02:35Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6198
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6198.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6198
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** DragonForce (Malaysia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21893, CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728, CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2024-21412

## Description

DragonForce is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed in August 2023 (Trend Micro) using a variant of the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder. An affiliate program offering 80% of proceeds launched on 2024-06-26, and its own encryptor, reportedly based on Conti v3, appeared around July 2024. A Linux/ESXi variant followed in November 2024. On 2025-03-19 the operators announced a 'ransomware cartel' model: affiliates may white-label the payload and run their own brand on DragonForce tooling and infrastructure. Related builds include the Devman (.devman) and Mamona variants. Seqrite's article, published 2026-10-01, says the leak site had claimed several hundred victims across dozens of countries by mid-2026. Trend Micro tracks the group as Water Tambanakua.

Seqrite's payload walkthrough covers a 32-bit sample running elevated on 64-bit Windows. Two TLS callbacks run before DragonForce_Main(). The sample manually resolves LoadLibraryA from kernel32 and loads eleven DLLs using decrypted names, although the APIs remain visible in the import table. Paths, registry keys, DLL/API/process names and switches are stored encoded with E(x) = (7x + 0x6A) mod 127. A single ChaCha20-encrypted, pipe-delimited configuration blob drives behavior. A log at C:\Users\Public\log.log starts with 16 plaintext bytes (build_key and instance_key, 8 bytes each), and later entries are ChaCha20-encrypted. The sample collects the user SID, token elevation and WOW64 state, then kills processes from a configurable list of 38 security, backup, database and productivity process names. In the trace, opening MsMpEng.exe failed with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED and Firefox.exe was terminated.

Before touching files, it initializes COM/WMI, queries Win32_ShadowCopy, and runs `cmd.exe /c C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe shadowcopy where "ID='<id>'" delete` for each shadow copy. Locked files are handled through the Windows Restart Manager. Local drives come from GetLogicalDriveStringsW(). Network targets come from the IPv4 ARP cache (GetIpNetTable), filtered against embedded prefixes, followed by NetShareEnum(), with no active subnet scan. The observed run logged 17 share discoveries, mostly C$. Sixteen workers run in two batches of eight, one for the local-drive queue and one for the network-share queue, and they start before discovery finishes.

Each file gets a 32-byte key and 8-byte ChaCha20 state from CryptGenRandom(). That material is encrypted with an embedded RSA-4096 public key (PUBLICKEYBLOB, exponent 65537) and appended as a 0x20C-byte record plus a 0x0D-byte footer holding the encryption percentage and original size. Recovered thresholds are full encryption below 2 MB, header-only encryption (3 MB) above 10 MB, and 20% chunk encryption for the over 200 hardcoded database and virtualization extensions. Files containing the DLOGFILE0001 marker and the configured readme.txt are skipped. Files are renamed to a random alphabetic name plus .df_win. The sample writes readme.txt in each directory ('The DragonForce Ransomware Cartel'), drops C:\Users\Public\icon.ico and wallpaper_white.png, creates HKCR\.df_win\DefaultIcon, and sets the wallpaper. The note claims data theft, but the analyzed run showed no exfiltration channel, so the claim is unverified from that trace.

Acronis (via BleepingComputer, 2025-12-03) reports a MinGW-built sample carrying Conti-derived InitializeApiModule/DisableHooks routines. Builder options include extension, skip lists, process kill list and an optional use_sys flag for BYOVD with truesight.sys and rentdrv2.sys, and the encryption scheme was revised to address flaws publicly documented for Akira. Affiliate intrusion TTPs reported by Acronis and Google GTIG include Scattered Spider-style social engineering, MFA fatigue, SIM swapping, RMM tool abuse (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Splashtop) and exfiltration to MEGA or Amazon S3. The group deployed DragonForce on Windows, Linux and ESXi in the Marks & Spencer incident. Trend Micro additionally lists affiliate exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21893), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57726/57727/57728), Log4Shell and CVE-2024-21412; these are affiliate-side initial-access vectors, not flaws in the payload. The Scattered Spider link is reported as likely, not confirmed. BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for the Mamona builder panel IP 185.158.113.114.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1106 Native API
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1491.001 Defacement: Internal Defacement

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DragonForce Ransomware Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC (T1490)** (`TL-2026-6198-SPL-001`)

Detects the pre-encryption recovery-inhibition step of the DragonForce ransomware payload (TL-2026-6198): WMIC.exe 'shadowcopy where ID=... delete' launched via cmd.exe once per Win32_ShadowCopy instance, plus the vssadmin 'delete shadows' equivalent. Seqrite traced this command before file encryption starts, so it is an early, high-fidelity warning.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1490, T1047, T1059.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security_4688, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*") OR (Image="*vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*"))
| eval spawned_by_cmd=if(like(ParentImage,"%cmd.exe"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host User ParentImage spawned_by_cmd
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ 'wmic.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadowcopy' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete')
    or (FileName =~ 'vssadmin.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_all ('delete', 'shadows'))
| extend SpawnedByCmd = InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SpawnedByCmd, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: DragonForce Ransomware Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC or VSSAdmin
id: 6f1c2a84-3b7e-4d59-9a10-5c8e2f7b4d01
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies with WMIC.exe 'shadowcopy ... delete' (as issued by the DragonForce ransomware payload, TL-2026-6198, via cmd.exe /c) or 'vssadmin delete shadows'. Precursor to mass file encryption.
references:
  - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/inside-dragonforce-how-a-ransomware-cartels-payload-actually-runs/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadowcopy'
      - 'delete'
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'delete'
      - 'shadows'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup or storage-management software that prunes shadow copies
  - Administrators reclaiming disk space
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Backup agents or storage-management tools that legitimately delete shadow copies
- Administrators manually reclaiming disk space with vssadmin or WMIC

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist approved backup service accounts and management hosts by User/AccountName. Raise priority when several deletions occur within one minute from the same host, or when followed by .df_win file creation (see TL-2026-6198-SPL-002).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- DragonForce Affiliate Initial Access: Ivanti Connect Secure and SimpleHelp Path-Traversal Requests (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce BYOVD Vulnerable Driver [indicator] / [indicator] Load or Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce Mamona Builder Panel IP and Onion Leak-Site Connections (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce Affiliate RMM Tool Execution (ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Splashtop) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce [indicator] File Association Registry Key and Ransom Wallpaper/Icon Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce Affiliate Exfiltration to MEGA or Amazon S3 by Non-Browser Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce Encrypted File Extensions, Ransom Note and Runtime Log Creation (T1486) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce SMB Administrative Share (C$) Fan-Out Across Many Hosts (T1135) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.158.113[.]114`
- Domain: `3pktcrcbmssvrnwe5skburdwe2h3v6ibdnn5kbjqihsg6eu6s6b7ryqd[.]onion`
- File hash: `4db090498a57b85411417160747ffd8d4875f98b3ca2b83736a68900b7304d2b`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Inside DragonForce: How a Ransomware Cartel's Payload Actually Runs (Seqrite Labs)](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/inside-dragonforce-how-a-ransomware-cartels-payload-actually-runs/)
- [DragonForce Ransomware: A Technical Analysis (Seqrite whitepaper)](https://www.seqrite.com/whitepaper/dragonforce-ransomware-a-technical-analysis/)
- [Deep dive into DragonForce ransomware and its Scattered Spider connection (Acronis TRU via BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/deep-dive-into-dragonforce-ransomware-and-its-scattered-spider-connection)
- [The DragonForce Cartel: Scattered Spider at the Gate (Acronis TRU)](https://www.acronis.com/en-us/tru/posts/the-dragonforce-cartel-scattered-spider-at-the-gate/)
- [Ransomware Spotlight: DragonForce (Trend Micro)](https://www.trendaisecurity.com/ru/resources-insights/research/ransomware-spotlight-dragonforce)
- [Inside DragonForce, the Group Tied to M&S, Co-op and Harrods Hacks (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/dragonforce-goup-ms-coop-harrods/)
- [Threat Profile: DragonForce Ransomware (Blackpoint Cyber)](https://blackpointcyber.com/threat-profile/threat-profile-dragonforce-ransomware/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6198
