# QuoINT Weekly Snapshot W40 2026: RATHat Android Banker (Gemini-assisted), MCP Python SDK OAuth Issuer-Validation Flaw (GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99), Star Blizzard RedFlick/CosmicPulse, MSP360/ScreenConnect RMM Phishing

> QuoINT's Week 40 2026 snapshot (23-30 Sep 2026) bundles four independently corroborated items: the RatHat Android banking trojan and its MaaS web console, an MCP Python SDK OAuth flaw that lets a malicious MCP server steal client secrets and authorization codes, Star Blizzard's RedFlick scheduled-task delivery of the CosmicPulse Python backdoor against 100+ organizations, and phishing that abuses a signed MSP360 RMM installer to side-load ScreenConnect. The QuoINT page itself is headline-only; all technical detail below comes from the primary vendor and press reports it points to.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T02:32:51Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T02:32:51Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6200
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6200.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6200
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Star Blizzard (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

This record is a weekly roll-up. The QuoINT page (published 2026-10-01) lists four headlines with no body text, CVEs or IOCs, so each item was corroborated against vendor and press reporting. The items are independent of one another and should be tracked separately by defenders.

1) RatHat (Android banking trojan). Zimperium zLabs and Cleafy analyzed RatHat in September 2026. Lures arrive by SMS and online ads leading to third-party download sites; the victim sideloads an APK and grants Accessibility access. The app then uses Accessibility to enable Wireless Debugging, read the pairing code from the screen and pair with ADB, obtaining a shell as UID 2000. The operator clicks 'deploy' in a web console to start a Go program that connects back through a reverse tunnel and uses minicap/minitouch (in /data/local/tmp) for covert screen streaming and touch control. On Android 14+ those tools do not work and the app falls back to its own screen capture with a prompt. The Go program keeps running after the app is uninstalled until reboot, and Zimperium reports it can reinstall the app and re-enable Accessibility. The malware steals SMS and overlays banking apps to capture credentials and OTPs. Cleafy reports the newest console sends collected data to Google Gemini to estimate victim bank balance and rank victims, and the device side can send screen layouts to Gemini to keep wireless debugging working when scripted taps fail. Cleafy found no samples using the model to move money. The console family (Fisher, then BlackCat Remote Control Management, Panda Workshop V5 and V6) builds, signs and publishes the malware (including to Amazon S3), can rebuild on a schedule to change hashes, and is sold as malware-as-a-service; nearly 100 console deployments have been traced since April 2026. Nearly half of observed IPs sit on AS4907. Reports name no target countries beyond the QuoINT headline (Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia).

2) MCP Python SDK OAuth flaw (GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99; no CVE assigned as of 2026-09-29; a CVE-2026-115563 cited by one blog is unverified and not used here). Cycode reported that the SDK's issuer check only runs when a discovered authorization-server URL exists. A malicious HTTP MCP server returns 404 for the modern OAuth discovery request, forcing the fallback path, then supplies its own metadata naming the victim's real identity provider as issuer but an attacker-controlled token endpoint. The user sees a genuine login page; the client then sends the authorization code, client secret and PKCE code_verifier to the attacker, who exchanges them at the real provider. Affected: mcp 1.9.1-1.29.1 and 2.0.0-2.1.1 (OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider). Fixed in 1.30.0 and 2.2.0; the two machine-to-machine providers also need the issuer= argument. CVSS 7.5 (High) for the unattended providers, 6.5 for the interactive one (no vector published). Servers built with the SDK and stdio clients are not affected. No exploitation reported.

3) Star Blizzard / RedFlick / CosmicPulse. Microsoft (2026-09-29) reports at least 13 large phishing campaigns since January 2026 affecting 100+ organizations, mostly US and UK, focused on Ukraine-linked civil society, government, think tanks and a financial organization. Government agencies assessed in Dec 2023 that Star Blizzard works for FSB Center 18. After rapport-building emails, a password-protected ZIP/RAR (password in an image) delivers a VHDX holding an LNK disguised as a PDF. The LNK shows a decoy and fetches an MSI (January: via the SSH client; July: via a PDF containing a hidden command). The MSI creates three scheduled tasks disguised as network components (Internet Quality Test Connection, Network Configuration Manager, System Health Monitor); the last uses control.exe to run a Control Panel (.cpl) downloader, NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH, which fetches Python 3.8 and a bootstrapper that decrypts the CosmicPulse payload (registry-held key plus embedded key, AES-ECB). CosmicPulse is a Python backdoor that runs attacker-supplied Python to download/run files and retrieve documents. This replaced 2025 ClickFix lures. Since March 2026 bulk phishing originates from accounts on compromised cPanel/WordPress sites. Credential phishing with Evilginx is also reported. A March Atlantic Council-themed campaign alternatively pointed to DarkSword, an iPhone exploit kit (medium confidence, no code recovered). Microsoft detections: Trojan:Script/RedFlick, Backdoor:Python/CosmicPulse.

4) MSP360/ScreenConnect phishing. Microsoft (2026-09-29, activity from July 2026) reports phishing delivering a legitimate, digitally signed MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer under lure filenames (meeting invites, Zoom/Adobe installers, SSA.GOV statements). The installer drops DLLs, re-launches via UAC, registers services RMM.Agent.exe and RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe, adds registry autoruns and a Windows Firewall rule allowing inbound UDP 48678 to RMM.Agent.exe. MSP360 then runs PowerShell to silently install a ConnectWise ScreenConnect client as a redundant channel, and further executables are run via ScreenConnect RunFile for tool delivery, collection and credential access. Staging abuses Amazon S3, Cloudflare R2, Dropbox, GitLab and Supabase. No software vulnerability is exploited. A separate July 2026 variant used the Faronics Deploy Agent. The activity is unattributed.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.006 Python
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1543.003 Windows Service
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1218.002 Control Panel
- T1553.002 Code Signing
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1417.002 GUI Input Capture
- T1636.004 SMS Messages
- T1513 Screen Capture

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**RedFlick LNK Chain: SSH Client ProxyCommand or Remote MSI Fetch (Star Blizzard Delivery)** (`TL-2026-6200-SPL-001`)

TL-2026-6200: Detects the Star Blizzard RedFlick delivery hop in which an LNK disguised as a PDF (opened from a mounted VHDX) fetches the malicious MSI, either through the Windows OpenSSH client abused via ProxyCommand/LocalCommand (January 2026 variant) or through msiexec installing directly from an http(s) URL. ssh.exe carrying .msi/msiexec/http arguments, or msiexec /i against a remote URL launched by a shell, is rare in normal operations and precedes creation of the RedFlick scheduled tasks and the CosmicPulse backdoor.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.001, T1204.002, T1105
- **Data sources:** sysmon
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
((Image="*\\ssh.exe" (CommandLine="*ProxyCommand*" OR CommandLine="*LocalCommand*") (CommandLine="*.msi*" OR CommandLine="*msiexec*" OR CommandLine="*http*"))
OR (Image="*\\msiexec.exe" (CommandLine="*http://*" OR CommandLine="*https://*") (ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\powershell.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\ssh.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\conhost.exe")))
```comment: ssh.exe ProxyCommand/LocalCommand or msiexec pulling a remote MSI is the RedFlick LNK-to-MSI hop```
| eval chain=case(like(Image,"%\\ssh.exe"),"ssh_proxycommand_msi_fetch",like(Image,"%\\msiexec.exe"),"msiexec_remote_msi",true(),"other")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, User, chain
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "ssh.exe"
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ProxyCommand", "LocalCommand")
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any (".msi", "msiexec", "http"))
    or (FileName =~ "msiexec.exe"
        and ProcessCommandLine has "http"
        and ProcessCommandLine contains "/i"
        and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "ssh.exe", "explorer.exe", "conhost.exe"))
| extend Chain = iff(FileName =~ "ssh.exe", "ssh_proxycommand_msi_fetch", "msiexec_remote_msi")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Chain, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: RedFlick LNK Chain - SSH Client ProxyCommand or Remote MSI Fetch
id: 3b9d2f40-6a1e-4c58-9e71-6200a0000001
status: experimental
description: Detects the Star Blizzard RedFlick delivery hop where the OpenSSH client (ProxyCommand/LocalCommand) or msiexec fetches a remote MSI after a disguised LNK is opened from a mounted VHDX.
references:
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/russias-star-blizzard-targets-100.html
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-state-hackers-use-new-redflick-technique-to-push-malware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.001
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_ssh:
    Image|endswith: '\ssh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'ProxyCommand'
      - 'LocalCommand'
  selection_ssh_msi:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.msi'
      - 'msiexec'
      - 'http'
  selection_msiexec:
    Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\ssh.exe'
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\conhost.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - '/i'
      - 'http'
  condition: (selection_ssh and selection_ssh_msi) or selection_msiexec
falsepositives:
  - Administrators using ssh.exe ProxyCommand through jump hosts with MSI or URL arguments
  - Software deployment scripts running msiexec /i against an internal HTTP package share
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators using ssh.exe ProxyCommand through jump hosts with .msi or URL arguments
- Software deployment scripts that run msiexec /i against an internal http(s) package repository

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list internal package hosts in the msiexec branch and known jump-host ProxyCommand patterns by user or host group. Raise to critical when the process tree traces back to explorer.exe opening an LNK on a VHDX-mounted drive letter, or when the three RedFlick scheduled tasks appear on the same host within 30 minutes (see SPL-002).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Signed [indicator] Installer Executed Under Phishing Lure Filename (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MSP360 RMM Agent Spawning PowerShell to Install ScreenConnect and ScreenConnect RunFile Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NOROBOT/BAITSWITCH Control Panel Downloader and CosmicPulse Python Bootstrap (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MSP360 RMM Agent Service, Run-Key Autorun and Inbound UDP 48678 Firewall Rule (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RatHat Android minicap/[indicator] Screen Streaming Tools in /data/local/tmp (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vulnerable MCP Python SDK Installed (GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99 OAuth Issuer Validation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RedFlick Scheduled Tasks Disguised as Network Components (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RatHat, Star Blizzard and Community-Related C2 Domain/IP Contact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `8.231.120[.]246`
- Domain: `admin[.]chunhuating[.]best`
- URL: `hxxps://dramaspoolcoa[.]com/en.html`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [QuoINT Threat Intelligence Snapshot: Week 40, 2026](https://quointelligence.eu/2026/10/threat-intelligence-snapshot-week-40-2026/)
- [RatHat Android Malware Console Uses (The Hacker News, citing Cleafy and Zimperium)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/rathat-android-malware-console-uses.html)
- [Malwarebytes: New Android malware uses AI to steal bank logins and PINs](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/09/new-android-malware-uses-ai-to-steal-bank-logins-and-pins)
- [Zimperium RatHat IOC list](https://github.com/Zimperium/IOC)
- [Cycode: Account Takeover in MCP Python SDK](https://cycode.com/blog/mcp-python-sdk-oauth-account-takeover/)
- [Official MCP Python SDK Flaw (The Hacker News; GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/official-mcp-python-sdk-flaw-can-let.html)
- [Russia's Star Blizzard Targets 100+ Organizations With Fake Event Invites (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/russias-star-blizzard-targets-100.html)
- [Russian state hackers use new RedFlick technique to push malware (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-state-hackers-use-new-redflick-technique-to-push-malware/)
- [Field Effect: Star Blizzard scales phishing operations with RedFlick](https://fieldeffect.com/blog/star-blizzard-scales-phishing-operations)
- [Attackers Abuse MSP360 to Deploy ScreenConnect (The Hacker News, citing Microsoft Security Research)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/attackers-abuse-msp360-to-deploy.html)
- [Gridinsoft: MSP360 Phishing Turns One Fake Invitation Into Two Remote-Access Channels](https://blog.gridinsoft.com/msp360-phishing-screenconnect-two-access-channels/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6200
