# ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer

> Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net (2026-11-12) published a PCAP, notes and sample archive showing a ClearFake-served ClickFix lure delivering a macOS stealer it calls 'Essential'. The page has no written analysis, IOCs or attribution; the delivery chain below is inferred from corroborating public reporting on macOS ClickFix campaigns and is not confirmed for this sample.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T04:39:46Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T04:39:46Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6207
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6207.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6207
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 12 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Primary source: Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net entry dated 2026-11-12 titled 'ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer'. The entry offers three password-protected archives (notes.txt.zip 1.1 kB, a PCAP zip of 18.7 MB, and a files.zip of 13.9 kB) plus four screenshots. The page text names no domains, IPs, hashes, malware internals or attribution, and the archive contents were not accessible during this research. The name 'Essential macOS Stealer' could not be matched to any other public report, so no family-specific behaviour is asserted here.

Corroborating context (not specific to this sample): ClearFake is a compromised-website injection and fake-verification ecosystem whose affiliates, per Seqrite (2026-09-08), use traffic distribution systems such as Keitaro TDS to route visitors by User-Agent. Windows visitors go to LummaC2, Stealc or Vidar chains, and macOS visitors go to ClickFix funnels that deliver macOS stealers such as MacSync. Seqrite states that current evidence does not show that all MacSync ClickFix campaigns belong to one actor, or that MacSync infrastructure runs directly under ClearFake. ClickFix on macOS tells the victim to paste a command into Terminal, typically a curl-to-shell one-liner, which fetches a loader. The loader then runs AppleScript or a Mach-O stager. The stealer prompts for the user's password and collects Keychain data, browser data and cookies, SSH keys, Telegram sessions and crypto wallets. It then archives and uploads them over HTTP. Microsoft, Malwarebytes, Huntress, Netskope and Datadog reported similar macOS ClickFix chains during 2026 delivering MacSync, AMOS, Infiniti Stealer and a Go-based wallet drainer. Apple added a Terminal paste warning in macOS 26.4 and updated XProtect signatures.

Analyst caveat: severity and status are analyst defaults. The IOCs marked 'RELATED (unconfirmed)' come from the Seqrite MacSync report and are included for hunting context only. They are NOT confirmed to belong to the Essential sample. Analysts with the PCAP should replace or confirm them with the real indicators from the archives.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- T1059.002 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1555.001 Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Splunk SPL]** (`TL-2026-6207-SPL-002`)

Detects post-execution stealer behaviour reported for macOS ClickFix chains: an osascript hidden-answer password dialog, dscl authonly validation of the captured password, security keychain reads, copy or archive of browser credential and cookie stores, and the /tmp/osalogging.zip staging archive reported for the related MacSync family. Requires two or more signals in five minutes, or the staging archive on its own.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.002, T1555.001, T1539, T1560.001
- **Data sources:** crowdstrike_falcon:ProcessRollup2 (index=crowdstrike, sourcetype=CrowdStrike:Event:Streams:JSON), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceProcessEvents, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceInfo, sigma:macos/process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** medium

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=crowdstrike sourcetype="CrowdStrike:Event:Streams:JSON" event_platform=Mac event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval pw_prompt=if(FileName="osascript" AND match(cmd, "display dialog") AND match(cmd, "hidden answer"), 1, 0)
| eval dscl_auth=if(FileName="dscl" AND match(cmd, "authonly"), 1, 0)
| eval keychain=if(FileName="security" AND match(cmd, "(find-generic-password|find-internet-password|dump-keychain)"), 1, 0)
| eval browser_data=if(match(FileName, "^(cp|ditto|sqlite3|zip|tar|cat)$") AND match(cmd, "(login data|cookies[.]sqlite|cookies[.]binarycookies|login[.]keychain-db|key4[.]db|logins[.]json)"), 1, 0)
| eval staged=if(match(cmd, "/tmp/osalogging[.]zip"), 1, 0)
| bin _time span=5m
| stats sum(pw_prompt) as pw_prompt sum(dscl_auth) as dscl_auth sum(keychain) as keychain sum(browser_data) as browser_data sum(staged) as staged values(CommandLine) as command_lines by ComputerName UserName _time
| eval signals=if(pw_prompt>0,1,0)+if(dscl_auth>0,1,0)+if(keychain>0,1,0)+if(browser_data>0,1,0)+if(staged>0,1,0)
| where signals>=2 OR staged>0
| table _time ComputerName UserName signals pw_prompt dscl_auth keychain browser_data staged command_lines
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let macDevices = DeviceInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where OSPlatform =~ "macOS"
    | distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeviceId in (macDevices)
| extend cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend f_prompt = (FileName =~ "osascript" and cmd contains "display dialog" and cmd contains "hidden answer"),
         f_dscl = (FileName =~ "dscl" and cmd contains "authonly"),
         f_keychain = (FileName =~ "security" and cmd has_any ("find-generic-password", "find-internet-password", "dump-keychain")),
         f_browser = (FileName in~ ("cp", "ditto", "sqlite3", "zip", "tar", "cat") and cmd has_any ("login data", "cookies.sqlite", "cookies.binarycookies", "login.keychain-db", "key4.db", "logins.json")),
         f_staged = (cmd contains "/tmp/osalogging.zip")
| where f_prompt or f_dscl or f_keychain or f_browser or f_staged
| summarize Prompt = countif(f_prompt), DsclAuth = countif(f_dscl), Keychain = countif(f_keychain), BrowserData = countif(f_browser), Staged = countif(f_staged), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10) by DeviceName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| extend Signals = iff(Prompt > 0, 1, 0) + iff(DsclAuth > 0, 1, 0) + iff(Keychain > 0, 1, 0) + iff(BrowserData > 0, 1, 0) + iff(Staged > 0, 1, 0)
| where Signals >= 2 or Staged > 0
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signals, Prompt, DsclAuth, Keychain, BrowserData, Staged, Commands
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain Access and Staging Archive (TL-2026-6207)
id: 1b7e4a90-3c52-4d68-8f11-6207a0000004
status: experimental
description: Detects post-execution behaviour of macOS ClickFix stealers (Essential macOS Stealer, MacSync, AMOS-style AppleScript stealers) - an osascript hidden-answer password dialog, dscl authonly password validation, security keychain reads, and the /tmp/osalogging.zip staging archive reported for the related MacSync family.
references:
    - https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/12/index2.html
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/?p=11215
    - https://www.netskope.com/blog/macos-clickfix-campaign-applescript-stealers-new-terminal-protections
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.001
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_prompt:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'display dialog'
            - 'hidden answer'
    selection_dscl:
        Image|endswith: '/dscl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'authonly'
    selection_keychain:
        Image|endswith: '/security'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'find-generic-password'
            - 'find-internet-password'
            - 'dump-keychain'
    selection_stage:
        CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/osalogging.zip'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin or developer scripts that read keychain items with the security utility
    - Enterprise tools that prompt for a password through osascript with a hidden answer
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrator or developer scripts that read keychain items with the security utility
- Enterprise tools that prompt for a password through osascript with a hidden answer

**Tuning notes:** Raise the signal threshold or exclude signed management tooling (MDM agents, backup clients) by parent process. The staging path /tmp/osalogging.zip is a related-family indicator and may differ for the Essential sample, so update it from the PCAP and files archive when available.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Sigma] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Splunk SPL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Splunk SPL] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 12)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `drivinguber[.]com`
- File hash: `9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db68aeadc44eeb97c9aab11`
- Domain: `newsinweb[.]com`

Full set of 12 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer](https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/12/index2.html)
- [MacSync Stealer (Seqrite)](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/?p=11215)
- [ClickFix attacks deliver macOS stealer (The Hacker News, Huntress Go-based stealer)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/clickfix-attacks-deliver-macos-stealer.html)
- [Over 250 ClickFix domains use browser fingerprinting to hide macOS malware lures (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/over-250-clickfix-domains-use-browser.html)
- [ClickFix campaign uses fake macOS utilities lures to deliver infostealers (Microsoft)](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/06/clickfix-campaign-uses-fake-macos-utilities-lures-deliver-infostealers)
- [Infiniti Stealer: a new macOS infostealer using ClickFix and Python/Nuitka (Malwarebytes)](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/03/infiniti-stealer-a-new-macos-infostealer-using-clickfix-and-python-nuitka)
- [macOS ClickFix Campaign: AppleScript Stealers & New Terminal Protections (Netskope)](https://www.netskope.com/blog/macos-clickfix-campaign-applescript-stealers-new-terminal-protections)
- [ClickFix campaigns spread MacSync macOS infostealer (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/clickfix-campaigns-spread-macsync-macos.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6207
