# OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Experimentation Compromise Injects Crypto Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit-Kit Loaders (Coruna, DarkSword) into Customer Sites

> On 2026-11-16 an unauthorized party exploited an undisclosed vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and added a malicious loader to the Project JavaScript of customer projects, so cdn.optimizely.com served attacker code on at least 178 organizations (188 snippets of 1,611 checked), including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce and HSBC. The payload (track.js) swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims card data and conditionally loads Coruna/DarkSword iOS exploit-kit stages. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T08:02:27Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T03:03:37.031Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6221
- **ID:** TL-2026-6221
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 53 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43510, CVE-2025-43520, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2026-20700

## Description

OPTIMJACK is a supply-chain compromise of Optimizely Web Experimentation. Optimizely snippets (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js) contain a projectJS field for customer custom code that runs on every page. The attacker wrote a loader into projectJS for many unrelated customer projects; the rest of each snippet was unchanged. Because the code was served from Optimizely's CDN with the vendor's valid certificate, it looked trusted, and allow-listing cdn.optimizely.com in a CSP gave no protection. Customers that self-host the snippet on their own domains (e.g. opt.scheels.com, www.vodafone.com.au) were also affected because the snippet is built from the same project. Optimizely's own www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com snippets carried the code. Optimizely's incident notice (2026-11-17 01:02 UTC) says an unauthorized party 'exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation', that it fixed the flaw, removed the code, secured affected accounts and added protections; it has not disclosed how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, or whether the attacker retains access. Smartsheet was cleaned and then re-infected with an atob()-obfuscated variant, suggesting continued access at that time. Report URI states the initial access method is unknown.

Three loader variants were seen: (1) a script element loading https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets); (2) the same URL hidden with atob() so a text search for the domain misses it; (3) a full inline copy of the payload run via eval if the domain is blocked (this also executes where CSP blocks track.js but allows 'unsafe-eval', e.g. HSBC). An earlier wave (first seen 2026-09-17 on Turkish sites via an SEO 'backlink panel' script on linkforge.cc, and 2026-11-13 to 11-16 via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts) used webshell.lol/get.js as the injector; the first Optimizely injection (BBC snippet, 2026-11-16 04:21 UTC) loaded webshell.lol.

track.js was rebuilt at least 26 times on 2026-11-16 (Report URI), growing from 28,877 to 30,430 bytes (StepSecurity), so no single hash covers all versions. Capabilities: (a) crypto-address swapper for BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE that validates checksums and only swaps addresses near payment words (wallet, deposit, send) in page text, form inputs, link/image attributes, copy events, the Clipboard API, navigator.share, window.open, navigation and fetch/XHR bodies, and wraps Function.prototype.call/apply; (b) after a swap, loads html2canvas.min.js and POSTs a JPEG screenshot, page URL, up to 8,000 chars of non-HttpOnly document.cookie and up to 20 original addresses to /hit.php; (c) from 13:43 UTC a card skimmer that wraps fetch/XHR and form submits, captures Luhn-valid card numbers with expiry and CVV and sends them with navigator.sendBeacon to /card.php (fields n, e, c, u), caching them in sessionStorage under cc_-prefixed keys; it cannot read cross-origin hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen); (d) on iPhone/iPad/iPod user agents it adds boot.js from .icu routers, reads the iOS version and loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna (iOS 13-17; /A8/ and /JIUJIU888/index.js), DarkSword (iOS 18.x; /B9/, /D11/, /D12/) and a fingerprint-only iOS 26 chain (/C10/). A hidden iframe loading /JIUJIU888/weifile.html is added for iOS 18.6 or earlier, and those pages reload every 60 seconds to retry. The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample from an October campaign, and kit comments indicate iOS 18.7.3+ and 26.3+ are patched. Cynet only observed conditional delivery to an emulated iPhone and did not confirm exploitation of a real device; StepSecurity did not verify the iOS payloads.

Attacker wallets (Report URI/StepSecurity): BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW; ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e; TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa; SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n; TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p; LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5; BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58; DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5. Reported receipts differ by source and cut-off time: about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 2026-11-16 (Report URI) versus about $6,600 (StepSecurity); the ETH and TRON addresses pre-date the campaign, so not all inflows are victim funds. Stolen cards, cookies and any iOS access are not visible on-chain. No threat actor has been named or attributed.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1608.004 Drive-by Target
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1592.004 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**OPTIMJACK Card, Cookie and Screenshot Exfiltration POST to 1688360.cc (/card.php, /hit.php)** (`TL-2026-6221-SPL-002`)

Detects HTTP POSTs to https://1688360.cc/card.php (card skimmer beacon: fields n, e, c, u) and /hit.php (non-HttpOnly cookies, page URL, original wallet addresses and html2canvas JPEG screenshot). A hit means the track.js payload executed in a user's browser and data left the session: input capture, screen capture and cookie theft (T1056, T1113, T1539, T1041).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1056, T1113, T1539, T1041
- **Data sources:** proxy:zscalernss-web, proxy:squid:access, pan:traffic, CommonSecurityLog
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("zscalernss-web","squid:access","pan:traffic") earliest=-24h http_method=POST (url="*1688360.cc/card.php*" OR url="*1688360.cc/hit.php*") | eval exfil_type=if(like(url,"%card.php%"),"card_skimmer","cookie_screenshot_address_swap") | stats count sum(bytes_out) as bytes_out min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by src_ip, user, exfil_type | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) | where RequestMethod =~ "POST" | where RequestURL has "1688360.cc" and RequestURL has_any ("/card.php", "/hit.php") | extend ExfilType = iff(RequestURL has "card.php", "card_skimmer", "cookie_screenshot_address_swap") | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestURL, RequestMethod, RequestClientApplication, ExfilType
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: OPTIMJACK Data Exfiltration POST to 1688360.cc card.php or hit.php
id: 9b2e4d18-6a37-4f05-8e1c-7a3d5c9f2b22
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to the OPTIMJACK exfiltration endpoints /card.php (card skimmer, sendBeacon) and /hit.php (cookies, screenshot, original wallet addresses) on 1688360.cc.
references:
    - https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
    - https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1056
    - attack.t1113
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_method:
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_host:
        c-uri|contains: '1688360.cc'
    selection_path:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/card.php'
            - '/hit.php'
    condition: selection_method and selection_host and selection_path
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers replaying the exfiltration endpoints in a lab
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or sandboxes replaying the exfiltration endpoints
- Automated URL-detonation services submitting the indicator URL

**Tuning notes:** This is near-zero-noise: any match should be treated as confirmed skimmer execution. Escalate immediately, identify the user and the page they were on (referrer), treat cards entered on 2026-11-16 as exposed and rotate secrets held in non-HttpOnly cookies. If bytes_out is not populated by your proxy sourcetype, drop that field from the stats clause.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- OPTIMJACK Hosting IP Connections ([indicator] and iOS Kit Infrastructure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Coruna weifile.html Retry Loop (60-second Reload) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Random-Label .icu Domain Lookup (Sibling Infrastructure Hunt) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Payload and Injector Domain DNS Resolution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK html2canvas Screenshot Library Fetched from [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Coruna and DarkSword Stage Paths on .icu Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Payload and Injector Domain Contact ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK iOS Exploit-Kit Router Contact (.icu Domains, [indicator], Coruna and DarkSword Stages) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 53)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `136.113.106[.]136`
- Domain: `webshell[.]lol`
- URL: `hxxps://cdn[.]optimizely[.]com/js/6395285578973184.js`

Full set of 53 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hijacked-optimizely-scripts-served-card.html)
- [Optimizely Web Experimentation Security Incident (status notice)](https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z)
- [Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/)
- [StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK - Optimizely-hosted scripts, crypto clipper and card skimmer](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer)
- [Cynet: OPTIMJACK malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more](https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/)
- [Coruna iOS exploit kit uses 23 exploits (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/coruna-ios-exploit-kit-uses-23-exploits.html)
- [DarkSword iOS exploit kit uses 6 flaws (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/darksword-ios-exploit-kit-uses-6-flaws.html)
- [Optimizely snippet documentation: order of activation](https://docs.optimizely.com/web-experimentation/docs/snippet-order-of-activation)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6221
