# Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor cloud-service backdoor targeting government networks in Asia and Africa (Part 2)

> Kaspersky GReAT describes GraphDoor, a backdoor that uses Microsoft SharePoint via the Microsoft Graph API (Entra ID client-credentials OAuth) for plug-in retrieval, tasking and data upload, alongside the GitHub-based GitDoor variant and Ably-based relay/SOCKS5 proxy channels. Victims are mainly government networks in Asia and Africa; attribution is not definitive, with overlaps to the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T08:25:58Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T14:51:50.308Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6222
- **ID:** TL-2026-6222
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Salt Typhoon - G1045
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 64 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Operation ShadowCloud is a campaign, identified in early 2026 and publicly documented by Kaspersky GReAT on 17 November 2026 in two parts, that abuses legitimate cloud services as command-and-control. Part 1 covers GitDoor, which uses GitHub repositories and issues plus Ably messaging. Part 2 covers GraphDoor, its plug-ins and attribution. Victims were found in Asia and Africa, primarily in the government sector, including a Taiwanese organization.

Initial access is not known. In Part 1, the operators appear to have reused an existing foothold: two MeshCentral Agent instances found in a Taiwanese organization were hard-coded to a C2 at 27.102.66.162:443. Through the agent the operator dropped a legitimate signed binary, a malicious loader DLL for DLL sideloading, and an encrypted payload (config.ini or similarly named file). Observed sideloading pairs include start.exe (Sandboxie) with sbiedll.dll, a renamed Python app with python39.dll, javaw.exe with jli.dll, zoomit.exe with WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll. Type 1 loaders (e.g. jli.dll) decode the config with a custom Base64 alphabet, RC4 and XOR, abuse RtlEthernetAddressToStringA/RtlEthernetStringToAddressA for byte transformation, resolve APIs by CRC32 or FNV-1 hash, and reflectively load GraphDoor or Go binaries. Type 2 loaders use a vectored exception handler, clear DR7 and decrypt GitDoor.

GraphDoor (MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952, client_version 1.2.7) resolves APIs at runtime with DJB2 hashing and performs API calls indirectly through a vectored exception handler. It creates the named pipe \\.\pipe\p<PID> and the staging folder C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID>, collects host and network reconnaissance, and encrypts it with AES plus Base64. It has no hard-coded C2 domain. It authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com with an OAuth client-credentials grant (scope https://graph.microsoft.com/.default), using an application ID and secret decrypted from embedded strings against tenant 8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5. Victim data is uploaded through Graph PUT as main.<8-char-code>.js.map on a SharePoint document library, disguised as a JavaScript source map. Plug-ins scr.ts, pr.ts and kl.ts are fetched from a SharePoint list, and commands are polled from a list for items whose Title starts with main.<code> and whose extension is .js, .swp, .tmp, .kmap, .pmap or .apmap. Commands mirror GitDoor, with added 'shell' (cmd.exe /C) and 'adsmload' (MAC-address-encoded shellcode injected via RtlEthernetStringToAddressA, arguments passed through Local\sm<PID> shared memory).

The COFF/reflective plug-ins include a keylogger (output to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat, XOR-masked), process listing (SeDebugPrivilege), screenshot capture, moveDir.ts (relocates a legitimate executable, loader DLL and encrypted config, then kills the old instance via Global\ExitEvent), and proxy channels: channel.ts (Go reverse proxy derived from the open-source Erfrp/frp code), abchannel.ts (Ably Go SDK TCP relay) and ab2channel.ts (SOCKS5 over Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket, wss://main.pusher.ably.net/app/<APP_KEY>). The C2 hostname and port are delivered through the proxy channel or an Ably channel. GitDoor shellcode modules add process injection (CreateRemoteThread, SetThreadContext, NtQueueApcThread, KernelCallbackTable), service and scheduled-task management, registry operations, account manipulation, Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords, lsadump::sam), CookieKatz browser cookie theft, WhatsApp key extraction, PetitPotam-style EFSRPC coercion, and upload to gofile.io. The operators also deployed Cobalt Strike beacons on GraphDoor-infected machines, using the domains twnic.top and ekmt.tw.

Kaspersky does not attribute the activity definitively. Several victims shared staging directories with GitDoor, and implants were deployed within a day of GitDoor deployment, in cases linked to FamousSparrow (excint.exe side-loading wtsapi32.dll, RC4 key iotrh^%4CFGTj) and CopperTurtle (pdfset.exe injecting PLEAD). The authors say this suggests, but does not prove, that a Chinese-speaking group develops or uses GitDoor and GraphDoor. GitHub infrastructure was created between 3 September 2024 and 5 December 2025, which suggests preparation began by the end of 2024. Severity is the analyst's assessment; the source does not state one.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1106 Native API
- T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- T1090 Proxy
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account
- T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call
- T1055.003 Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GraphDoor Host Artifacts — Intel_Log Staging Folder, logs.dat Keylogger Output, log.lock — Post-Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6222-SPL-002`)

Detects file creation of GraphDoor (client_version 1.2.7, MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952) on-disk artifacts: the staging folder C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID> holding AES/Base64-encrypted host and network reconnaissance, the XOR-masked keylogger output %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat written by the kl.ts plug-in (T1056.001), and the %APPDATA%\log.lock marker. Staging indicates reconnaissance (T1082, T1057) and screenshot/keylogger collection (T1113) in progress.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1056.001, T1113, T1082, T1057
- **Data sources:** sysmon:EventCode=11 (index=sysmon), microsoft_defender_xdr:DeviceFileEvents, sigma:windows/file_event
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 earliest=-24h (TargetFilename="*ProgramData*Intel_Log*" OR TargetFilename="*SystemCertificates*Cache*logs.dat" OR TargetFilename="*AppData*Roaming*log.lock")
| eval artifact=case(like(TargetFilename,"%Intel_Log%"),"graphdoor_staging_folder",like(lower(TargetFilename),"%logs.dat"),"graphdoor_keylogger_output",true(),"graphdoor_log_lock")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(TargetFilename) as files values(artifact) as artifact values(User) as user by Computer, Image
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where FolderPath has @"\ProgramData\Intel_Log\" or (FolderPath has @"\SystemCertificates\Cache\" and FileName =~ "logs.dat") or (FolderPath has @"\AppData\Roaming\" and FileName =~ "log.lock")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, WriterProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, WriterPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GraphDoor Staging Folder and Keylogger Artifacts
id: 5e9b2f08-a7c4-4d16-9b3e-0c8d1f4a6e04
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of GraphDoor artifacts - the Intel_Log staging folder under ProgramData, the SystemCertificates Cache logs.dat keylogger output and the log.lock marker in the roaming profile.
references:
  - https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1056.001
  - attack.t1113
  - attack.t1082
  - attack.t1057
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_staging:
    TargetFilename|contains: '\ProgramData\Intel_Log\'
  selection_keylog:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat'
  selection_lock:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Roaming\log.lock'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Third-party software that legitimately creates an Intel_Log directory under ProgramData
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Vendor diagnostic tooling that happens to create a folder named Intel_Log under ProgramData
- Software that stores a log.lock file in the roaming profile

**Tuning notes:** Treat the logs.dat path under SystemCertificates\Cache and the Intel_Log folder as high fidelity; log.lock alone is low fidelity, so require it alongside another artifact on the same host. Companion hunt not covered by these rules (single log source per Sigma rule): GraphDoor plug-ins report over the named pipe \\.\pipe\p<PID> (Sysmon EventCode 17/18) and use the named objects Global\ExitEvent and Local\sm<PID>. Confirm Sysmon FileCreate (EventCode 11) is not excluding ProgramData.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Unauthorized MeshCentral Agent Foothold and C2 to [indicator] — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mimikatz/CookieKatz Credential and Cookie Theft from Sideloaded Hosts — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Operation ShadowCloud Proxy C2 Infrastructure Connections (Reverse-Proxy and Cobalt Strike Hosts) — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MeshAgent Dropping Loader DLLs and Encrypted Config in Sideloading Staging Directories — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sideloaded Host Process Spawning cmd.exe /C (GraphDoor 'shell' Command) — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cobalt Strike, Ably Relay, gofile Exfiltration and GitHub C2 Name Resolution by Non-Browser Processes — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GraphDoor/GitDoor DLL Sideloading Loader (sbiedll.dll, jli.dll, WINMM.dll) from User-Writable Paths — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GraphDoor SharePoint/Graph OAuth C2 — Attacker Tenants and Non-Browser Entra/Graph Access — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 64)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `27.102.66[.]162`
- Domain: `twnic[.]top`
- URL: `hxxps://login[.]microsoftonline[.]com/8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5/oauth2/v2.0/token`

Full set of 64 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor backdoor, plug-ins and attribution (Part 2)](https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/)
- [Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor (Part 1)](https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/)
- [Microsoft identity platform: OAuth 2.0 client credentials grant flow](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/v2-oauth2-client-creds-grant-flow)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1102 Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6222
