# Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows: Split-Tunnel Named-Pipe Abuse and SID Path Traversal Lead to SYSTEM Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-10739)

> Quarkslab researcher Lucas Laise documented a local privilege escalation in the Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows (CVE-2026-10739, CVSS 4.0 8.5). A low-privileged user impersonates a Cato-signed process to pass the \\.\pipe\cato-VPN named pipe's certificate check, supplies an attacker-controlled SID in a split-tunnel protobuf message to traverse the output path of a SYSTEM-level cleanup delete, redirects that delete via an NT object-manager symlink to C:\Config.Msi, and rides the resulting Windows Installer rollback to a SYSTEM shell. A working, publicly released proof of concept exists.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T09:11:05Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T09:11:05Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6226
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6226.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6226
- **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS 8.5)
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** PATCHED
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 10
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-10739, CVE-2026-10726, CVE-2025-48799

## Description

The Cato Networks SDP (Secure Distributed Perimeter) Client for Windows exposes a privileged named pipe, \\.\pipe\cato-VPN, served by winvpnclient.cli.exe running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The pipe's protobuf-based IPC protocol backs the GUI-to-service channel used for registration (UiRegister, command ID 34) and for the administrator-enabled split-tunnel upload feature (SplitTunnelUpload/UploadStFile, command ID 49), through which a user can upload a .ccst text file describing include/exclude routing ranges (e.g. "include 10.10.10.0/24").

When the pipe server validates a connecting client, it resolves the caller's process image via GetNamedPipeClientProcessId/GetNamedPipeClientSessionId and compares the image's signing certificate to Cato's expected certificate; an arbitrary unsigned process is rejected. Quarkslab's PoC defeats this by first launching the legitimately Cato-signed CatoClient.exe and then manually mapping a payload DLL into that process's address space (bypassing standard LoadLibrary-based loading so no on-disk DLL path is recorded for the mapped module), after which the DLL opens the pipe from inside the trusted, signed process and is accepted.

Once inside the trusted channel, the PoC sends a UiRegister message (C2sUiRegister, with UiProcessId, UiSessionId, and a client-supplied UserSidString field) carrying an attacker-chosen SID string rather than the caller's real token SID — the service does not verify the asserted SID against the actual process token. The service subsequently builds a per-user split-tunnel storage filename as <split-tunnel-storage>\ccst_<SID>.stp, embedding the unverified, attacker-controlled SID directly into a filesystem path with no sanitization of path-traversal sequences ("..\"), so a crafted SID value such as one ending in "..\..\poc\deleteme" causes Windows to normalize the resulting path to C:\poc\deleteme.stp.

Uploading a syntactically valid CCST file via this traversed path grants an arbitrary file WRITE as SYSTEM (constrained to a .stp suffix); uploading an invalid/unparseable CCST file causes the privileged backend's error-handling cleanup routine to DELETE the traversed .stp path as SYSTEM instead. Because the destination directory (C:\poc in the PoC) and the final path component are attacker-controlled up to the forced extension, the attacker pre-stages an NT object-manager symlink chain: C:\poc is redirected to \RPC Control, and \RPC Control\deleteme.stp is further redirected to \??\C:\Config.Msi. When the SYSTEM-level cleanup delete fires against C:\poc\deleteme.stp, the OS resolves the redirection chain and the privileged process instead deletes C:\Config.Msi — the directory in which Windows Installer stores rollback (.rbs/.rbf) state for in-progress installations. Removing C:\Config.Msi while a prepared rollback script is pending is a long-documented local-EoP primitive (credited by the authors to Zero Day Initiative's 2022 "Abusing Arbitrary File Deletes to Escalate Privilege" research and demonstrated previously by Quarkslab against Avira and K7 AV products): the Windows Installer service recreates the folder with weak/attacker-writable permissions and subsequently executes attacker-supplied rollback actions with SYSTEM privileges, yielding a SYSTEM shell.

Quarkslab's autonomous PoC chains all of the above automatically: it prepares the MSI rollback payload under a controllable Config.Msi state, creates the C:\poc\deleteme.stp -> C:\Config.Msi symlink redirection, manually maps the pipe-payload DLL into a freshly launched, legitimately signed CatoClient.exe, triggers the split-tunnel upload path with deliberately invalid CCST content to force the cleanup delete, waits for winvpnclient.cli.exe (SYSTEM) to delete C:\Config.Msi, and then runs the second MSI rollback stage to launch an attacker-chosen command as SYSTEM. Quarkslab confirmed the chain on Cato Windows Client versions 6.2.0 and 6.4.6; Cato Networks' advisory states all versions prior to 6.12.6 are affected, with 6.12.6 remediating the issue. The vendor advisory additionally lists a second CVE (CVE-2026-10726) alongside this one but does not describe it, and it is not covered by Quarkslab's write-up or this research. No in-the-wild exploitation has been reported; this is a disclosed research finding with public PoC code and demonstration video, not an observed campaign.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1559 Inter-Process Communication
- T1106 Native API
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Cato Client SDP Named Pipe Abuse — Non-Cato Pipe Client or CatoClient.exe Unexpected Parent (CVE-2026-10739)** (`TL-2026-6226-SPL-001`)

Behaviour-first detection of the CVE-2026-10739 entry point. Fires when a process other than CatoClient.exe or winvpnclient.cli.exe opens the privileged \\.\pipe\cato-VPN named pipe (Sysmon 17/18), or when the Cato-signed CatoClient.exe — the trusted host the Quarkslab PoC manually maps its payload DLL into — is started by an unexpected parent. Either condition indicates an attempt to reach the SYSTEM-level winvpnclient.cli.exe IPC channel (UiRegister / SplitTunnelUpload) and start the SID path-traversal to Config.Msi rollback privilege-escalation chain. Sigma flavour covers the pipe branch only; the KQL flavour covers both.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1559, T1068, T1055, T1055.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName="\\cato-VPN" NOT Image IN ("*\\CatoClient.exe","*\\winvpnclient.cli.exe"))
 OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\CatoClient.exe" NOT ParentImage IN ("*\\explorer.exe","*\\winvpnclient.cli.exe","*\\CatoClient.exe","*\\userinit.exe","*\\services.exe")))
| eval signal=if(EventCode=1,"catoclient_unexpected_parent","cato_vpn_pipe_non_cato_client")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ParentImage) as parent values(CommandLine) as cmd by host User Image signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let LegitCato = dynamic(["catoclient.exe","winvpnclient.cli.exe"]);
let ExpectedParents = dynamic(["explorer.exe","winvpnclient.cli.exe","catoclient.exe","userinit.exe","services.exe"]);
let PipeHits = DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent"
    | extend PipeName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
    | where PipeName has "cato-VPN"
    | where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in (LegitCato)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Signal = "cato_vpn_pipe_non_cato_client";
let ParentHits = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "CatoClient.exe"
    | where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in (ExpectedParents)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Process = FileName, ProcessPath = FolderPath, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, Signal = "catoclient_unexpected_parent";
union PipeHits, ParentHits
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Non-Cato Process Connects to cato-VPN Named Pipe
id: 5b0e7f3a-2c41-4d8e-9a67-1f3c8d2e6a01
status: experimental
description: Detects a process other than CatoClient.exe or winvpnclient.cli.exe creating or connecting to the privileged Cato Client named pipe \\.\pipe\cato-VPN, the IPC entry point abused in CVE-2026-10739 to forge a UiRegister SID and trigger a SYSTEM-level file delete.
references:
    - http://blog.quarkslab.com/cato-vpn-client-split-tunnel-and-privilege-escalation-cve-2026-10739.html
    - https://knowledge.catonetworks.com/docs/cve-2026-10726-cve-2026-10739-impacts-windows-client-versions-lower-than-6126
    - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1559
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2026.10739
logsource:
    category: pipe_created
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|endswith: '\cato-VPN'
    filter_main_cato:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\CatoClient.exe'
            - '\winvpnclient.cli.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_main_cato
falsepositives:
    - Cato-provided helper or diagnostic binaries not in the filter list
    - Endpoint security tools enumerating named pipes
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Cato-provided helper or diagnostic executables (e.g. updater, support tools) connecting to the pipe
- Cato Client launched by an enterprise software-deployment agent or RMM tool
- EDR/AV products that enumerate or probe named pipes

**Tuning notes:** Requires Sysmon EventID 17/18 (PipeEvent) to be enabled for the cato-VPN pipe in the Sysmon config. Add your software-deployment/RMM parent images to the ParentImage exclusion list and any Cato helper binaries to the Image list after a 7-day baseline. Index name 'sysmon' is a placeholder for your Sysmon index.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Remote Memory Injection / Manual DLL Mapping into CatoClient.exe (CVE-2026-10739 Trusted-Process Abuse) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Non-msiexec Process Writes Rollback Files in [indicator] (Windows Installer Rollback Hijack) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NT Object-Manager Symlink Tooling — '[indicator]' Redirection or Symlink Helper Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unsigned or Out-of-Path Module Loaded into CatoClient.exe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SYSTEM Shell or Script Host Spawned by msiexec.exe (Config.Msi Rollback Escalation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CVE-2026-10739 Public PoC Artifacts — CatoPipePayload, CatoEOP and [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] SYSTEM Writes or Deletes .stp File Outside Cato Storage (SID Path Traversal) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CVE-2026-10739 Exploit Chain Correlation — cato-VPN Pipe, Out-of-Storage .stp and Config.Msi Staging on One Host (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Cato VPN Client: Split-Tunnel and Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-10739) - Quarkslab (Lucas Laise)](http://blog.quarkslab.com/cato-vpn-client-split-tunnel-and-privilege-escalation-cve-2026-10739.html)
- [CVE-2026-10739 Record](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10739)
- [CVE-2026-10726 & CVE-2026-10739 Impacts Windows Client Versions Lower Than 6.12.6 - Cato Networks Knowledge Base Advisory](https://knowledge.catonetworks.com/docs/cve-2026-10726-cve-2026-10739-impacts-windows-client-versions-lower-than-6126)
- [Routing with the Cato Client - Split Tunnel Policy](https://support.catonetworks.com/hc/en-us/articles/16007802440349-Routing-with-the-Cato-Client-Split-Tunnel-Policy)
- [K7 Antivirus: Named Pipe Abuse, Registry Manipulation, and Privilege Escalation - Quarkslab](https://blog.quarkslab.com/k7-antivirus-named-pipe-abuse-registry-manipulation-and-privilege-escalation.html)
- [Avira: Deserialize, Delete, and Escalate - The Proper Way to Use an AV - Quarkslab](https://blog.quarkslab.com/avira-deserialize-delete-and-escalate-the-proper-way-to-use-an-av.html)
- [ZDI PoC: FolderOrFileDeleteToSystem](https://github.com/thezdi/PoC/blob/main/FilesystemEoPs/FolderOrFileDeleteToSystem/)
- [Abusing Arbitrary File Deletes to Escalate Privilege and Other Great Tricks - Zero Day Initiative](https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks)
- [CVE-2025-48799 (PoC automation technique credited by authors)](https://github.com/Wh04m1001/CVE-2025-48799)
- [CVE-2026-10739 Aggregated Record - OpenCVE](https://app.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2026-10739)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6226
