# OPTIMJACK: Malicious JavaScript Web Injection Across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and Other Sites via Third-Party (Optimizely-Hosted) Script Loader Targeting Crypto and Payment Data

> Cynet reported OPTIMJACK, a malicious JavaScript campaign observed 2026-11-16 in which a script resource served from cdn.optimizely.com (assessed as the likely injection point) appended attacker scripts from 1688360.cc to trusted sites including CNN and Zoom. Reported capabilities are cryptocurrency wallet-address replacement and payment-form collection; financial theft, site breach and attribution are unconfirmed.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T11:38:23Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T11:38:23Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6240
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6240.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6240
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 17 (3 shown free below)

## Description

OPTIMJACK is a third-party script injection (supply-chain style) campaign documented by Cynet researchers Joseph Bryant and Shivtej Tata on 2026-11-17. Cynet EDR alerts for browser connections to 1688360.cc on 2026-11-16 were correlated with browsing history and traced to a loader served from cdn.optimizely.com. The Optimizely-hosted resource contained instructions to append a script from 1688360.cc/track.js (an earlier analyst note references 1688360.cc/script.js; the report does not confirm the two are identical or from the same revision). Similar insertion code was seen while browsing Optimizely's own website. Browser captures were obtained for edition.cnn.com, Zoom (code inside an Optimizely-hosted script loaded alongside Zoom resources) and the Optimizely website. www.salesforce.com, www.foxnews.com and www.foxsports.com are listed as affected, but no independent request/response captures exist for them.

Reported script capabilities: (1) substitution of cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page content or through clipboard interactions, which could redirect a payment if the user accepted the altered destination; (2) payment-form collection that may transmit entered card details to external endpoints (1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php were identified in JavaScript review), overlapping with Magecart-style skimmer techniques; (3) collection of cookies and page data accessible to the page context (no evidence of HttpOnly, cross-origin or cross-tab access); (4) html2canvas-based rendering capture of page content; and (5) device-selective secondary payload loading. A Safari-like iPhone/iPad profile retrieved boot.js from .icu domains (5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, later eil786npto9u5bq.icu), with iOS-version checks and an iframe selecting a subsequent page (eil786npto9u5bq.icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html). This demonstrates conditional delivery only; no iOS exploit, CVE, affected iOS range or successful device compromise is asserted. Page JavaScript remains inside browser security boundaries unless a separate vulnerability is exploited.

What is not established: how the code was inserted into the Optimizely-hosted resource (compromised account, altered tag configuration, abused integration or another supply-chain path), any breach of Optimizely or of the named companies (Optimizely's CDN must not be treated as malicious), whether any card data or cryptocurrency was actually stolen, and attribution. A recheck about 30 minutes later did not reproduce the scripts on the tested sites, which is a point-in-time result and not confirmed removal. Cynet compares the delivery model to the earlier Adform advertising-script abuse. No file hashes were published. The 136.113.106.136 address is a historical association from an observed connection and should be validated for hosting and collateral impact before blocking. Severity is an analyst assessment (HIGH) not stated by the source.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from 1688360.cc — Exploitation (SPL)** (`TL-2026-6240-SPL-001`)

Detects browsers or proxies retrieving the OPTIMJACK injected script (1688360.cc/track.js, earlier-reported 1688360.cc/script.js) that the Optimizely-hosted loader appends to trusted sites such as CNN and Zoom. Fires on the attacker-controlled destination only; cdn.optimizely.com is a legitimate platform and is deliberately NOT matched. A hit shows the script was requested, not that card data or cryptocurrency was stolen.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1195, T1189, T1059.007, T1105
- **Data sources:** web_proxy (pan:threat, zscalernss-web, squid:access), splunk_cim_web_datamodel, microsoft_defender_endpoint (DeviceNetworkEvents), cef_proxy (CommonSecurityLog)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.http_referrer) as referrer values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agent from datamodel=Web.Web where earliest=-24h latest=now (Web.url="*1688360.cc/track.js*" OR Web.url="*1688360.cc/script.js*" OR Web.dest="1688360.cc" OR Web.dest="*.1688360.cc") by Web.src Web.user Web.dest Web.url
| rename Web.* as *
| eval first_seen=strftime(firstTime,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(lastTime,"%F %T"), detection="OPTIMJACK loader fetch"
| table first_seen last_seen src user dest url referrer user_agent count detection
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let loader_urls = dynamic(["1688360.cc/track.js","1688360.cc/script.js"]);
let edr = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (loader_urls) or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)(^|[/.])1688360\.cc(/|:|$)"
| project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="MDE", Device=DeviceName, Account=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Url=RemoteUrl, DestIP=RemoteIP;
let proxy = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any (loader_urls) or DestinationHostName endswith "1688360.cc"
| project TimeGenerated, Source="Proxy", Device=DeviceName, Account=SourceUserName, Process=RequestClientApplication, Url=RequestURL, DestIP=DestinationIP;
union edr, proxy
| summarize Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Urls=make_set(Url, 10), DestIPs=make_set(DestIP, 10) by Source, Device, Account, Process
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from 1688360.cc
id: e6d4c9b5-af70-4b3d-8d84-6240d3f4a004
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to the OPTIMJACK script host 1688360.cc for the injected loader script track.js (or the earlier-reported script.js). The script is appended by a script resource served from cdn.optimizely.com onto trusted sites; this rule matches only the attacker host, not Optimizely.
references:
    - https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1195
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.campaign.optimjack
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_url:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '1688360.cc/track.js'
            - '1688360.cc/script.js'
    selection_host:
        cs-host|endswith: '1688360.cc'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or sandboxes deliberately fetching the sample
    - Threat-intel enrichment tooling resolving the URL
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers, sandboxes or URL-scanning services intentionally requesting 1688360.cc
- Threat-intel enrichment or EDR cloud lookups that resolve the URL without browser rendering

**Tuning notes:** Schedule every 15 minutes over the last 24h. Exclude known analyst/sandbox source IPs. Do not extend the match to cdn.optimizely.com (benign platform). Pivot on the referrer field to identify which first-party pages loaded the script, then review Optimizely-hosted tags and account access for those sites.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from [indicator] — Exploitation (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Third-Party Script Loader Fetch from [indicator] — Exploitation (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Payment-Form and Page-Data Collection Endpoint Contact — Post-Exploitation (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OPTIMJACK Infrastructure Contact and iOS Device-Selective [indicator] Loader — C2 / Secondary Loader (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 17)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `136.113.106[.]136`
- Domain: `1688360[.]cc`
- Domain: `5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu`

Full set of 17 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [OPTIMJACK: Malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more (Cynet)](https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/)
- [CNN, Zoom and Salesforce Websites Exposed to OPTIMJACK JavaScript Attack Targeting Crypto and Payment Data (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/cnn-zoom-and-salesforce/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1195 - Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1189 - Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1565.002 - Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002/)
- [Optimizely: Implement the one-line JavaScript snippet (legitimate deployment reference)](https://support.optimizely.com/hc/en-us/articles/4411731640973)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6240
