# Three Cybercrime Campaigns Targeting US Logistics: HelloFriends, NodeRemote, Fake Freight Portals (MeshCentral/CastleRAT)

> ANY.RUN reports three cybercrime campaigns aimed at US trucking and logistics workflows: HelloFriends (credential, OTP, SSN, EIN and fuel-card harvesting via fake SAFER/Motus portals, exfiltrated to Telegram), NodeRemote (a Node.js backdoor delivered through fake broker documents) and fake TIMOCOM/DAT freight portals (WebDAV shortcut delivering MeshCentral and CastleRAT).

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T12:06:15Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T12:06:15Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6242
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6242.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6242
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 11

## Description

On 2026-11-17 the ANY.RUN blog described three distinct cybercrime campaigns that exploit freight and carrier-verification workflows in the US logistics sector. No CVEs, named threat actors, or explicit IOC lists are published in the article; the technical indicators are held in ANY.RUN sandbox sessions and TI reports. This record therefore documents the campaign behaviors the article states and does not attribute the activity to any actor.

HelloFriends is a credential-harvesting campaign. Victims are lured to fake carrier verification portals that impersonate SAFER and Motus and are personalized with the target company's USDOT number to look legitimate. The pages request Social Security numbers, EINs, fuel-card credentials and passwords. Some pages ask for the password twice and present OTP prompts to capture second-factor codes. Harvested data is sent to the attackers via Telegram.

NodeRemote delivers a Node.js-based backdoor. Malicious files are disguised as broker or partner logistics documents and use ClickFix-style copy-and-paste instructions, PowerShell or VBS scripts for execution. The malware establishes persistence on the host and uses a C2 relay configuration involving blockchain, DNS and GitHub. A UAC bypass capability is visible in the control-panel code; ANY.RUN notes that not every capability was confirmed in observed infections.

The third campaign uses fake freight portals impersonating TIMOCOM and DAT. A WebDAV shortcut disguised as a business resource leads to deployment of MeshCentral, a legitimate remote administration tool abused for unauthorized access. Follow-on actions include attempts to obtain BitLocker recovery keys, configuring Windows Defender exclusions, and deploying CastleRAT. ANY.RUN also notes commodity Microsoft 365 phishing and ClickFix activity affecting logistics-related users. Separate public research (Recorded Future, The Hacker News) documents CastleRAT (C and Python variants, RC4-protected custom protocol) and other threat activity abusing freight-matching platforms such as DAT with ClickFix; the ANY.RUN article does not tie these campaigns to that reporting, so it is cited only as context.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
- T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**WebDAV Shortcut / ClickFix Script Host Execution — Exploitation (HelloFriends, NodeRemote, Fake TIMOCOM/DAT)** (`TL-2026-6242-SPL-001`)

TL-2026-6242: detects PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA or cmd started from a WebDAV path (DavWWWRoot / @SSL), the delivery used by the fake TIMOCOM/DAT freight portal shortcut that leads to MeshCentral and CastleRAT, and ClickFix-style download-and-execute command lines launched from explorer or a browser as used by NodeRemote (T1204.002, T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.005).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.002, T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
  (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe" OR Image="*wscript.exe" OR Image="*cscript.exe" OR Image="*mshta.exe" OR Image="*cmd.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(ParentImage), parent_cl=lower(ParentCommandLine)
| eval webdav_lnk=if(like(cl,"%davwwwroot%") OR like(parent_cl,"%davwwwroot%") OR like(cl,"%@ssl%") OR like(parent_cl,"%@ssl%"),1,0)
| eval clickfix=if(match(parent,"(explorer|chrome|msedge|firefox)[.]exe$") AND match(cl,"(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-restmethod|frombase64string|-enc |-encodedcommand|mshta +http)"),1,0)
| where webdav_lnk=1 OR clickfix=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_command_lines by host User Image ParentImage webdav_lnk clickfix
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage Image command_lines parent_command_lines webdav_lnk clickfix count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "cmd.exe")
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine), pcl = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| extend WebDavLnk = cl contains "davwwwroot" or pcl contains "davwwwroot" or cl contains "@ssl" or pcl contains "@ssl"
| extend ClickFix = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe") and cl matches regex @"(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-restmethod|frombase64string|-enc |-encodedcommand|mshta +http)"
| where WebDavLnk or ClickFix
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, WebDavLnk, ClickFix
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: WebDAV Shortcut or ClickFix Script Host Execution (US Logistics Campaigns)
id: 7f3c1a52-4b8e-4d1a-9c6e-2a5d8b1e0f31
status: experimental
description: Script host or shell started from a WebDAV path (DavWWWRoot or SSL UNC) or launched from explorer or a browser with ClickFix-style download-and-execute command lines. Seen in the fake TIMOCOM/DAT portal (MeshCentral, CastleRAT) and NodeRemote campaigns.
references:
  - https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/us-logistics-cyber-threats-3-campaigns/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1204.004
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_webdav:
    - CommandLine|contains:
        - 'DavWWWRoot'
        - '@SSL'
    - ParentCommandLine|contains:
        - 'DavWWWRoot'
        - '@SSL'
  selection_clickfix_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
  selection_clickfix_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'iex '
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - ' -enc '
      - ' -EncodedCommand'
      - 'mshta http'
  condition: selection_img and (selection_webdav or (selection_clickfix_parent and selection_clickfix_cmd))
falsepositives:
  - Administrators running scripts from an internal WebDAV or SharePoint mapped drive
  - Legitimate software deployment wrappers using encoded PowerShell launched from explorer
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Admins running scripts from an internal WebDAV/SharePoint mapped drive
- Software deployment wrappers launching encoded PowerShell from explorer

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known internal WebDAV hosts and deployment tooling by ParentImage and User; keep the DavWWWRoot branch unfiltered for external hosts. Restrict the ClickFix branch to non-admin users first, then widen. Disable the WebClient service where WebDAV is not required.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Lookalike Carrier-Verification / Freight Portal Access — Exploitation (HelloFriends, Fake TIMOCOM/DAT) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NodeRemote Node.js Backdoor Execution and Persistence — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized MeshCentral Agent Deployment — C2 / Remote Access (Fake TIMOCOM/DAT Portals, CastleRAT) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Paste-and-Run via RunMRU — Exploitation (NodeRemote) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Windows Defender Exclusion Configuration Change — Post-Exploitation (Fake TIMOCOM/DAT Portals) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Telegram API Traffic From Non-Browser Process — Exfiltration / C2 (HelloFriends) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Defender Exclusions, BitLocker Key Retrieval and UAC Bypass Commands — Post-Exploitation (Fake Freight Portals, NodeRemote) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node.js / Script Host Relay Lookups (GitHub, Blockchain RPC) — C2 (NodeRemote) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [3 Cybercrime Campaigns Targeting US Logistics: How Attackers Exploit Freight Workflows (ANY.RUN)](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/us-logistics-cyber-threats-3-campaigns/)
- [ANY.RUN: ClickFix attacks analysis (Eric Parker)](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/click-fix-attacks-eric-parker-analysis/)
- [Recorded Future: GrayBravo's CastleLoader Activity Clusters Target Multiple Industries (context: logistics lures, DAT/Loadlink abuse, CastleRAT)](https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/graybravos-castleloader-activity-clusters-target-multiple-industries)
- [The Hacker News: TAG-150 Develops CastleRAT in Python](https://thehackernews.com/2025/09/tag-150-develops-castlerat-in-python.html)
- [ThreatDown: CastleRAT cyber attack is the first to abuse Deno JavaScript runtime](https://www.threatdown.com/blog/castlerat-cyber-attack-is-the-first-to-abuse-deno-javascript-runtime-to-evade-enterprise-security/)
- [WatchGuard: ClickFix + EtherHiding Targets Anglophone Countries with NightshadeC2/CastleRAT](https://www.watchguard.com/br/wgrd-security-hub/secplicity-blog/clickfix-etherhiding-targets-anglophone-countries-0)
- [Recorded Future Insikt Group report CTA-2025-1209](https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2025/cta-2025-1209.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6242
