# BubbleLoader: Loader/Packer Trojanizing Legitimate Windows Software (WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, virtiofs)

> BubbleLoader is a loader/packer that patches the entry point of a legitimate Windows executable and appends two PNG files, so the trojanized host decrypts and reflectively loads a secondary PE payload in memory. ReversingLabs observed early examples in February 2026 and two activity clusters in mid-September and early October 2026, and states adversaries are actively using it.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T13:35:41Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T13:35:41Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6248
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6248.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6248
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ReversingLabs (Threat Researcher's Notebook, 2026-11-17) describes BubbleLoader, a loader/packer that hijacks benign host PE files. Host programs named in the report are WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, a Firefox launcher and virtiofs. The first stage is a patch to the host's entry point, plus two PNG files added to the host. The report analyzes the most recent variant and notes that the entry point patch has changed over time. The final payload differs by sample and the report names no payload families.

Stage 1 (entry point patch): the host prologue is obfuscated with non-standard instructions standing in for push rbp, plus junk push/pop code. The image base is computed with a GetPC-style technique (0x400000 in the example sample). Obfuscated calls to GetModuleHandleW and GetProcAddress are built with a call/pop trick, a fabricated return address and a jump, reusing the host's IAT entries. The shellcode tries an ASCII 'kernel32' string first and falls back to a wide string, so one snippet works with hosts importing GetModuleHandleA or GetModuleHandleW. It then calls VirtualAlloc for executable memory, copies the next stage there and jumps to an offset inside the second PNG.

Stage 2 (PNG files): the first PNG is a valid, variably sized red-to-blue gradient image used as an XOR key. The second 'fake' PNG has valid magic bytes followed by a truncated IHDR chunk, and encrypted data begins where the width field should be; the width's most significant byte is 0x55 instead of the 0x00 a valid PNG would have, which is a detection opportunity. Position-independent shellcode in the fake PNG compares the magic bytes of both PNGs; if they match it decrypts with the key PNG's bytes as a rolling XOR key, otherwise it tries to run the next stage without decryption. Opaque predicates in the decryption loop always jump over an 'in' instruction that would raise a privileged-instruction exception in user mode, hindering analysis. Because the gradient key is sparse with long null runs, some third-stage strings remain unencrypted.

Stage 3 (loader): a reentry guard stores the payload entry point after loading and skips loading if already set, supporting DLL payloads that may be invoked repeatedly; it also appears in an EXE-payload sample, suggesting one codebase serves both payload types. The host image base is read from gs:0x60 (PEB). LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress are stored by overwriting the placeholder 0xfafafafafafafafa, and a generic resolver resolves ExitProcess, RtlAddFunctionTable, RtlPcToFileHeader, VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect. For runtime polymorphism the loader finds compiler padding bytes between functions and overwrites them with rdtsc-derived randomness (leaving the leftmost 0xCC byte intact), so the unpacked payload hash changes on every execution unless the loop is patched out. The reflective PE loader parses headers, allocates memory, copies headers and sections, applies base relocations, runs TLS callbacks, resolves imports and sets section protections with VirtualProtect. For structured exception handling it calls RtlAddFunctionTable on the payload's .pdata (size divided by 0xC) and patches the start of RtlPcToFileHeader in the loaded ntdll.dll with an inline hook stub containing the payload image base. It then calls the payload entry point with DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH semantics and calls ExitProcess on return.

Not stated in the source: attribution, CVEs, payload malware families, delivery vector, and domain/IP infrastructure. Severity HIGH is the analyst's assessment rather than a source rating. ReversingLabs lists 24 SHA256 hashes.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
- T1106 Native API
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
- T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution
- T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads
- T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type
- T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1622 Debugger Evasion

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BubbleLoader Trojanized Host Utility Execution (IOC Hash or Untrusted Path)** (`TL-2026-6248-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of a BubbleLoader-trojanized host binary (TL-2026-6248). Behaviour clause: wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe, two hosts named by ReversingLabs that should only run from Program Files or Windows, running from any other path. IOC clause: process SHA256 matches one of the 24 BubbleLoader samples. BubbleLoader patches the host entry point (T1554) and unpacks a reflectively loaded PE (T1027.002), so the host keeps its normal name and the unpacked payload hash changes every run. The host and path are therefore the stable signals.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1554, T1027.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation/windows
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h@h
```BubbleLoader trojanized host utility - IOC SHA256 match or wmplayer and virtiofs outside trusted install paths```
| eval sha256=lower(mvindex(split(mvindex(split(Hashes,"SHA256="),1),","),0))
| eval ioc_hit=if(in(sha256,"4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14","3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710","a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a","053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917","d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626","df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be","f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029","e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56","07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8","08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd","8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37","1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d","ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5","c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b","aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae","70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a","776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf","fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a","d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f","17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15","ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333","184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c","e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f","da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3"),1,0)
| search ioc_hit=1 OR ((Image="*\\wmplayer.exe" OR Image="*\\virtiofs.exe") NOT (Image="C:\\Program Files\\*" OR Image="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*"))
| eval detection_reason=if(ioc_hit=1,"BubbleLoader sample SHA256 match","Host utility running outside trusted install paths")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine sha256 detection_reason
| sort - _time
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// BubbleLoader trojanized host utilities (TL-2026-6248)
let iocs = dynamic(["4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14","3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710","a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a","053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917","d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626","df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be","f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029","e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56","07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8","08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd","8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37","1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d","ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5","c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b","aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae","70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a","776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf","fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a","d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f","17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15","ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333","184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c","e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f","da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3"]);
let hosts = dynamic(["wmplayer.exe","virtiofs.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend IocHit = SHA256 in~ (iocs)
| extend OddPath = FileName in~ (hosts) and not (FolderPath startswith @"C:\Program Files" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows")
| where IocHit or OddPath
| extend Reason = iff(IocHit, "BubbleLoader sample SHA256 match", "Host utility running outside trusted install paths")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, Reason
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: BubbleLoader Trojanized Host Utility Execution - IOC Hash or Untrusted Path
id: 7c1a4e52-3b0d-4f6a-9e21-5a8d0c3b6f11
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a BubbleLoader trojanized host binary, either a process whose SHA256 matches a published BubbleLoader sample or wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe running outside Program Files and Windows.
references:
  - https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/threat-researchers-notebook-bubbleloader
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1554
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_ioc:
    Hashes|contains:
      - '4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14'
      - '3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710'
      - 'a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a'
      - '053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917'
      - 'd5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626'
      - 'df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be'
      - 'f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029'
      - 'e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56'
      - '07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8'
      - '08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd'
      - '8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37'
      - '1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d'
      - 'ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5'
      - 'c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b'
      - 'aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae'
      - '70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a'
      - '776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf'
      - 'fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a'
      - 'd14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f'
      - '17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15'
      - 'ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333'
      - '184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c'
      - 'e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f'
      - 'da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3'
  selection_path:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wmplayer.exe'
      - '\virtiofs.exe'
  filter_trusted:
    Image|startswith:
      - 'C:\Program Files\'
      - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
      - 'C:\Windows\'
  condition: selection_ioc or (selection_path and not filter_trusted)
falsepositives:
  - Portable or sideloaded copies of Windows Media Player or virtiofs in a lab or VM image
  - Software deployment tools staging these binaries in a temporary directory
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Portable or sideloaded copies of Windows Media Player or virtiofs in lab or VM images
- Software deployment tooling that stages wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe in a temp directory before install

**Tuning notes:** Change index=sysmon to your Sysmon index. The hash list is the 24 SHA256 values from the ReversingLabs report, so refresh it if the report is updated. The path clause covers only wmplayer.exe and virtiofs.exe, which have fixed install locations. WinRAR and x64dbg are left out because portable copies in user folders are common. Add your own Virtio-Win or custom install directory to the trusted list if it is outside Program Files.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- BubbleLoader Sample SHA256 Seen as File, Loaded Module or Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Spawning Script Interpreter or LOLBin (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Signed Host Utility with Invalid or Stripped Signature (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Binary Overwritten in Program Files by Non-Installer Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Making Unexpected Outbound Network Connection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Process Access from Unbacked Memory (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Launched by Script Interpreter or from Temp/Archive Staging Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader RWX Allocation and Protection Change Inside Host Utility Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14`
- File hash: `3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710`
- File hash: `a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Threat Researcher's Notebook: BubbleLoader](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/threat-researchers-notebook-bubbleloader)
- [ReversingLabs: The Patch Is the Attack Payload](https://www.reversinglabs.com/resources/the-patch-is-the-attack-payload)
- [ReversingLabs Blog](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.008 Masquerade File Type](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/008/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6248
