# GhostMap: Linux eBPF Rootkit in IronWorm (Shai-Hulud's Rusty Cousin) and Atomic Arch Payloads

> Aqua Nautilus describes GhostMap, a Linux eBPF rootkit shared by the IronWorm npm implant and the Atomic Arch AUR payload, which rewrites kernel-returned data so user-space tools omit selected processes and sockets. IronWorm is a Rust credential-stealing implant delivered through compromised npm packages; Aqua does not independently establish who operates it.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T13:58:54Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T13:58:54Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6249
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6249.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6249
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GhostMap is an eBPF rootkit recovered from the IronWorm Rust implant and found in a comparison payload from the Atomic Arch campaign. Aqua Security (Dolev Mizrahi, Ivan Kosarev; 2026-11-17) analysed a specimen of the npm package weavedb-sdk 0.45.3, whose preinstall hook runs ./tools/setup, a Rust ELF. On first run the specimen copied itself to /var/lib/glugi/glugi, created and enabled glugi.service, and the systemd-started successor process (same hash as the original) loaded the rootkit. A second run used /var/lib/havebi/havebi, so install names vary. The npm package page carries an author deprecation notice claiming compromise by the 'Mini Shai-Hulud worm (TeamPCP)'; Aqua flags this as the package author's claim and says its research does not establish who operates IronWorm.

GhostMap (active checkpoint: 13 programs, 10 maps, 13 links) conceals data by mutating kernel-returned buffers with bpf_probe_write_user. For process hiding, enter_getdents records the directory buffer address and exit_getdents (sys_exit_getdents64) walks linux_dirent64 records, matching numeric names against the hidden_pids map and enlarging the preceding record's d_reclen (low byte only) so readers skip the hidden entry; the returned byte count is unchanged. An on_exec hook compares the process comm to the hidden_names map and adds matching PIDs, so a child that execs a matching program is hidden even under a visible parent while a fork-only child stays visible. Socket hiding (hidden_inodes map, net_exit_read, exit_recvmsg) removes listeners from /proc/net/tcp and turns netlink diagnostic messages into NLMSG_NOOP; in testing, ss still showed the listener but without process-owner annotation. A controlled PTRACE_ATTACH against a protected process killed the attaching task with SIGKILL (anti-debugging). JFrog separately reports the process and TCP hiding depend on a memory-write helper that fails under kernel lockdown.

The implant runs a loopback collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 that stores records through setxattr into the user.d extended attribute on the installed executable; static analysis links the stored data to outbound C2 message construction. No successful external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed by Aqua, and no privilege-escalation exploit was demonstrated; severity is analyst-assigned. Stopping the service removed programs and links, while three pinned maps remained but did not keep hiding active. The Atomic Arch payload shares the 13 program names, 10 map names, helper-use bitmaps, a byte-identical 1,142-byte forged sudo wrapper and the port 8738 listener, which supports a shared rootkit implementation but not a common operator.

Broader context from JFrog (2026-06-03): IronWorm is a Rust, UPX-packed (modified magic) infostealer worm published from the compromised npm account asteroiddao across about 36-38 packages in the Arweave/WeaveDB ecosystem. It steals roughly 86 environment variables and 20+ credential files (cloud, Kubernetes, Vault, CI, npm/GitHub tokens, AI API keys, Exodus wallet via Electron hook), beacons to a Tor hidden service at /api/agent, falls back to temp.sh, and self-propagates by committing trojanized code to victims' GitHub repositories (spoofing claude@users.noreply.github.com and bot identities) and by abusing npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC). Atomic Arch (June 2026, reported by BleepingComputer, Sonatype and others) hijacked orphaned AUR packages and altered PKGBUILDs to install the npm package atomic-lockfile, which contains a Linux ELF named deps acting as a credential stealer with optional root-only eBPF rootkit features. Counts of affected AUR packages vary by source (20+ per Sonatype, 400+ per BleepingComputer, higher figures elsewhere). Hunt note: affected Atomic Arch versions are not established.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
- T1547.013 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1564.014 Hide Artifacts: Extended Attributes
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**IronWorm npm Preinstall Dropper - node_modules tools/setup and Atomic Arch deps ELF Execution** (`TL-2026-6249-SPL-001`)

Detects Linux ELF execution launched from inside npm package directories as used by IronWorm (weavedb-sdk 0.45.3 preinstall hook running ./tools/setup, a Rust ELF) and the Atomic Arch delivery chain (atomic-lockfile, lockfile-js, js-digest shipping the deps ELF), plus the .github/scripts/precheck alternate dropper path and known IronWorm/GhostMap SHA256 hashes. Behaviour-first: a binary executed from node_modules/PACKAGE/tools/setup is anomalous for most packages and is the entry point of the chain that installs glugi.service and loads the GhostMap eBPF rootkit (TL-2026-6249, T1195.002). The SHA256 36abd242ddaa27f0 (prefix) is community-corroborated (1 sighting) and the MD5 178d327d87243a6d (prefix) is an OSINT-tier sibling indicator with unverified relation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1195.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon_for_linux (index=linux sourcetype=sysmon:linux EventCode=1)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1
    (Image="*/node_modules/*/tools/setup" OR Image="*/node_modules/atomic-lockfile/*" OR Image="*/node_modules/lockfile-js/*" OR Image="*/node_modules/js-digest/*" OR CommandLine="*.github/scripts/precheck*" OR Hashes="*36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36*" OR Hashes="*6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b*" OR Hashes="*178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e*")
| eval known_ironworm_pkg=if(match(Image, "(weavedb-sdk|weavedb-client|arnext|roidjs|atomic-notes|atomic-lockfile|lockfile-js|js-digest)"), "yes", "no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as image values(CommandLine) as cmdline values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmdline values(known_ironworm_pkg) as known_ironworm_pkg by host User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let ironworm_pkgs = dynamic(['weavedb-sdk','weavedb-client','arnext','roidjs','atomic-notes','atomic-lockfile','lockfile-js','js-digest']);
let ironworm_sha256 = dynamic(['36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36','6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b']);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath contains '/node_modules/' and (FolderPath endswith '/tools/setup' or FolderPath has_any ('atomic-lockfile','lockfile-js','js-digest')))
    or ProcessCommandLine contains '.github/scripts/precheck'
    or SHA256 in~ (ironworm_sha256)
    or MD5 =~ '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
| extend KnownIronWormPkg = FolderPath has_any (ironworm_pkgs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, MD5, KnownIronWormPkg
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: IronWorm npm Preinstall Dropper Execution from node_modules
id: 7b3e2c14-5a9d-4f61-8c0e-2d41a6b9f3a7
status: experimental
description: Detects Linux ELF execution from npm package directories matching the IronWorm weavedb-sdk preinstall tools/setup chain, the Atomic Arch atomic-lockfile deps payload, the .github/scripts/precheck dropper path and known IronWorm or GhostMap hashes
references:
  - https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/
  - https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1195.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_setup:
    Image|contains: '/node_modules/'
    Image|endswith: '/tools/setup'
  selection_atomic:
    Image|contains:
      - '/node_modules/atomic-lockfile/'
      - '/node_modules/lockfile-js/'
      - '/node_modules/js-digest/'
  selection_precheck:
    CommandLine|contains: '.github/scripts/precheck'
  selection_hash:
    Hashes|contains:
      - '36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36'
      - '6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b'
      - '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate npm packages that ship a tools/setup helper binary
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate npm packages that ship a native tools/setup helper executed from node_modules during install
- Internal build tooling that deliberately runs binaries from node_modules/*/ directories in CI

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist reviewed internal packages that legitimately ship tools/setup binaries (by package name and hash). Restrict to developer, build and CI Linux hosts to cut noise. Enable the Hashes field in the Sysmon for Linux config to use the hash branches. The MD5 178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e is a community-related sibling indicator (OSINT tier) - treat a match as a hunting lead, not confirmation. Use the known_ironworm_pkg field to prioritise alerts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Atomic Arch AUR Build Installing [indicator], [indicator] or [indicator] via npm (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm glugi.service Systemd Persistence and Self-Named /var/lib Installer (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm [indicator] Fallback Exfiltration and Hidden Loopback Collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Worm Propagation - Spoofed [indicator] Git Commits and precheck Dropper (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Credential Harvesting - Multi-Class Secret File Reads by Dropper Executable (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Tor Hidden-Service C2 Beacon Traffic via .onion Proxy Requests ([indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Load and user.d xattr Collector Activity from Non-Standard Executable (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Tor Expert Bundle Runtime Download and torrc Launch from Non-Standard Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `temp[.]sh`
- File hash: `0c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5f`
- File hash: `36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Uncovering GhostMap: The Rootkit Behind Shai-Hulud's Rusty Cousin](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/)
- [IronWorm: Shai-Hulud's rustier cousin (JFrog Security Research)](https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/)
- [IronWorm: eBPF Rootkit and Tor C2 Target npm Supply Chain (CSA research note)](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-npm-supply-chain-202/)
- [IronWorm campaign (SafeDep threat intelligence)](https://safedep.io/ti/campaigns/ironworm)
- [Over 400 Arch Linux packages compromised to push rootkit, infostealer (BleepingComputer)](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/over-400-arch-linux-packages-compromised-to-push-rootkit-infostealer/)
- [atomic-lockfile package analysis (SafeDep)](https://safedep.io/ti/packages/npm/atomic-lockfile)
- [Atomic Arch: AUR Supply Chain Attack Deploys eBPF Rootkit (CSA research note)](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-aur-supply-chain-ebpf-rootkit-20260614-csa/)
- [IronWorm Returns as jscrambler, Rustier Than Ever (JFrog)](https://research.jfrog.com/post/ironworm-returns-rustier-than-ever/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6249
