# SynkLoader: Modular Multi-Language Malware Loader Distributed via Microsoft Teams IT Service Desk Phishing

> SynkLoader is a modular Python/PowerShell/C#/C++ loader delivered through Microsoft Teams messages in which attackers impersonate an IT Service Desk and push a fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI hosted on Azure Blob Storage. Its modules profile Active Directory, harvest plaintext passwords with a fake Windows 11 lock screen (PhishLocker), and provide reverse-proxy, shell and VNC access for hands-on-keyboard activity; it is suspected to support initial access brokering or ransomware operations.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T15:09:45Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T15:09:45Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6255
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6255.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6255
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 29 (3 shown free below)

## Description

SynkLoader was discovered by Expel (analyst Marcus Hutchins) in August 2026 after EDR flagged a scheduled task in a customer environment (reported as 2026-08-18). Compile dates and file timestamps indicate the family was first compiled and distributed around 2026-07-28. Expel named it for its mix of languages: Python, PowerShell, C# and C++, sometimes up to three languages in a single module. Attackers choose which modules to deploy based on the victim environment and their objectives.

Initial access is Microsoft Teams phishing from an external Microsoft 365 (onmicrosoft.com) tenant displaying the name 'IT Service Desk' (reported vishing in some accounts). The victim is persuaded to install a 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) hosted on Azure Blob Storage (filereserve.blob.core.windows.net), which makes the download appear trustworthy and bypasses email attachment controls. The MSI runs PowerShell, extracts an obfuscated cleaner.ps1 and archive6.zip (a bundled Python framework, the malicious ss.py loader, precompiled libraries and fake Microsoft runtime DLLs such as msvcp150.dll / msvcp160.dll) to the user profile (OSEC reports most files under %APPDATA%\fl\ang\). The hash-gated, in-memory PowerShell decrypts the Python environment and launches ss.py under pythonw.exe.

The ss.py backdoor beacons every 90-120 seconds to one of several hard-coded .net C2 domains (reported hosting on ASN 399629), encrypts traffic with a modified ChaCha20 cipher keyed to a victim ID, and executes Python code returned by the C2 via exec(). Modules are delivered selectively from different C2s. Modules: System Profiler (hostname, user, privilege level, processes, services, AD domain, count of AD computers), Persistence Module (a DLL manually mapped in memory creates a randomly named, 12-character scheduled task through the Task Scheduler COM interface rather than schtasks.exe, triggering at logon and daily at 10:00), PhishLocker (full-screen borderless fake Windows 11 lock screen capturing the plaintext domain password; Alt+Tab reveals windows beneath it, and a default background on a customized machine is a tell), TrafficRedirector (backconnect reverse proxy letting attackers reach internal services or route internet traffic through the victim IP, defeating IP allow-lists and geo-anomaly alerting), Interactive Shell (remote PowerShell RAT), StreamMaster (VNC with remote mouse/keyboard) and a Module Status Script.

Module hashes are unique per infection, so hash IOCs have limited value; domains, the Azure blob URL, file artifacts and behaviors are more durable. Expel built an emulator for the shell module; the operator ran profiling commands and disconnected apparently after concluding the environment was not real. The emphasis on measuring AD size led Hutchins to assess likely ransomware use; Hive Pro assesses a ransomware group or initial access broker at low-to-medium confidence. OSEC notes similarities to TWINLOOT (fake lock screen, Python loaders, Azure abuse). Hutchins speculated developers used AI to write the code (unconfirmed). The same fake Teams identity was reportedly still in use two weeks after Expel's publication. No threat actor is named.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.006 Python
- T1559.001 Component Object Model
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1056.002 GUI Input Capture
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1090.002 External Proxy
- T1219 Remote Access Tools

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SynkLoader PowerShell Cleaner MSI Lure Execution (331.msi / Azure Blob)** (`TL-2026-6255-SPL-001`)

Detects the SynkLoader initial execution stage (TL-2026-6255): msiexec installing the fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) from Azure Blob Storage (filereserve.blob.core.windows.net), or msiexec spawning PowerShell that runs the obfuscated cleaner.ps1 / drops into %APPDATA%\fl\ang\. Behaviour-first: the MSI hash is unique per infection, so the logic keys on the lure mechanics rather than hashes.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1204.002, T1566.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*msiexec.exe" (CommandLine="*.blob.core.windows.net*" OR CommandLine="*331.msi*"))
 OR (ParentImage="*msiexec.exe" (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe") (CommandLine="*cleaner.ps1*" OR CommandLine="*\\fl\\ang\\*")))
| eval lure=case(like(lower(CommandLine),"%331.msi%"),"331.msi PowerShell Cleaner lure",like(lower(CommandLine),"%filereserve.blob.core.windows.net%"),"filereserve Azure blob MSI",like(lower(CommandLine),"%.blob.core.windows.net%"),"Azure blob hosted MSI",true(),"msiexec-spawned PowerShell loader (cleaner.ps1 or fl/ang path)")
| table _time host User ParentImage Image CommandLine lure
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "msiexec.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".blob.core.windows.net" or ProcessCommandLine contains "331.msi"))
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "msiexec.exe" and FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "cleaner.ps1" or ProcessCommandLine contains @'\fl\ang\'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SynkLoader PowerShell Cleaner MSI Lure Execution
id: 6d1f0a52-3c7b-4e48-9a1d-2b5e8f7c3a10
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec installing the SynkLoader fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) from Azure Blob Storage, or msiexec spawning PowerShell that runs cleaner.ps1 or references the %APPDATA%\fl\ang\ drop directory.
references:
  - https://expel.com/blog/synkloader-when-you-throw-in-everything-but-the-kitchen-sink/
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-synkloader-malware-pushed-in-microsoft-teams-phishing-campaign/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.003
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_msi_lure:
    Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.blob.core.windows.net'
      - '331.msi'
  selection_child_ps:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'cleaner.ps1'
      - '\fl\ang\'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software deployment that installs MSI packages from the organisation's own Azure Blob Storage
  - Installers whose custom actions legitimately launch PowerShell
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- IT-managed MSI deployments that pull installers from the organisation's own Azure Blob Storage account
- Legitimate installers whose MSI custom actions launch PowerShell scripts

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list your own Azure storage account hostnames and software-deployment parent processes (SCCM/Intune). Keep the 331.msi and filereserve.blob.core.windows.net branches unfiltered as they are IOC-specific. Ensure Sysmon EventCode 1 captures full CommandLine.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SynkLoader Teams Phishing from External Tenant Impersonating IT Service Desk (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader Scheduled Task Persistence via Task Scheduler COM (pythonw.exe, 12-char Task Name) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader pythonw.exe 90-120 Second Beaconing to Public Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader Dropped Files in [indicator] and Fake msvcp150/160 DLLs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader Python Backdoor Spawning Shell and System/AD Profiling Commands (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader TrafficRedirector/StreamMaster pythonw.exe Connections to Internal Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader [indicator] Backdoor Launched by pythonw.exe from User Profile (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SynkLoader C2 Domain Resolution ([indicator] and related) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 29)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `neversoftmain[.]net`
- File hash: `151d2a7f52f047638ca8ad80c859c6bfe04d7510fb10933817fa0e3ba5d07a11`
- Domain: `rootfarmapp[.]net`

Full set of 29 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [SynkLoader: when you throw in everything but the kitchen sink (Expel)](https://expel.com/blog/synkloader-when-you-throw-in-everything-but-the-kitchen-sink/)
- [What's in a name? The story behind SynkLoader (Expel)](https://expel.com/blog/blog-synkloader-name-how-malware-gets-named/)
- [New SynkLoader malware pushed in Microsoft Teams phishing campaign (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-synkloader-malware-pushed-in-microsoft-teams-phishing-campaign/)
- [SynkLoader: When a Teams Message Fakes Your Lock Screen (Hive Pro)](https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/synkloader-when-a-teams-message-fakes-your-lock-screen)
- [Weekly Situation Report 8/31/26 (OSEC)](https://www.osec.com/resources/threat-briefs/weekly-situation-report-8-31-26/)
- [SynkLoader IOC feed (OffSeq Radar)](https://radar.offseq.com/threat/synkloader-when-you-throw-in-everything-but-the-kitchen-sink-3503834114e296c8)
- [SynkLoader combines multiple evasion and delivery techniques (SOC Prime)](https://socprime.com/active-threats/synkloader-combines-multiple-evasion-and-delivery-techniques/)
- [SynkLoader Deploying Multi-Stage Modules via Teams Phishing (DEV Community)](https://dev.to/anoymask/synkloader-deploying-multi-stage-modules-via-teams-phishing-1cal)
- [SynkLoader mimics IT support (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/synkloader-mimic-as-it-support/amp/)
- [Python implant hiding its entire C2 inside Microsoft 365 / Azure (Ontinue, TWINLOOT comparison)](https://www.ontinue.com/resource/python-implant-hiding-its-entire-c2-inside-microsoft-365-azure/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6255
