# Booba Project ransomware group claims Botelho & Rodrigues (Portugal) - 34 GB stolen data

> The Booba Project ransomware group has listed Botelho & Rodrigues (www.botelhorodrigues.pt), a Portuguese transportation, logistics, supply chain and storage company, as a victim, claiming 34 GB of stolen data on 2026-11-17. The claim comes from ransomware.live and has not been confirmed by the victim.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T16:19:58Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T16:19:58Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6259
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6259.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6259
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Booba Project
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 21 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Ransomware.live recorded a Booba Project leak-site claim against Botelho & Rodrigues (www.botelhorodrigues.pt, Portugal) discovered 2026-11-17 14:20 UTC, with an estimated attack date of 2026-11-17 (entry last updated 15:20 UTC) and 34 GB of data claimed as stolen. The victim is described as operating in transportation, logistics, supply chain and storage. No ransom amount, deadline, negotiation status, screenshots, file-tree proof, malware sample, hash or technical IOC is published in the listing, and the victim has not confirmed the incident. All attribution and details are limited to the ransomware.live entry and should be treated as an unverified extortion claim.

Booba Project (also tracked as 'Booba') is a comparatively new, low-volume, financially motivated crypto-ransomware operation. WatchGuard lists it as emerging and active, first seen June 2026, using direct extortion, double extortion and free data leaks, with a Tor extortion site (medium confidence) and an obfuscated email contact; its first recorded extortion (US food and beverage victim) is dated 2026-06-24. Strobes lists four .onion addresses and four leak sites. SOCRadar describes the group as emerging in July 2026 and reports that it typically draws on infostealer-harvested credentials, while cautioning that single third-party credential findings do not definitively prove use by the group. SOCRadar-cited MITRE mappings for the group include T1562 (Impair Defenses), T1047 (Windows Management Instrumentation) and T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact). Prior claimed victims span the US, Spain, Italy, Canada and Russia across construction, legal, IT services, architecture, healthcare, manufacturing and facilities services; for example Fonsan (Spain, 23.4 GB claimed on 2026-07-06, DeXpose). On 2026-11-17 ransomware.live also lists five US victims for Booba Project (Greater Elgin Family Care Center, Windcrest Fire Department, Cardinal Cushing Centers, Clinton Assessors Board, New England Orthopedic Surgeons), indicating batch posting.

Exposure context in the ransomware.live entry: HudsonRock infostealer data shows 5 compromised users (0 compromised employees, 0 third-party employee credentials) and 4 external attack-surface items; the ParanoidLab exposure report lists 74 exposed passwords (1 critical) and 0 cookies; Mailgun is the detected cloud/SaaS provider; MX records point to two Barracuda email-security gateway hosts and a Microsoft 365 protection host; the SPF record lists three IPv4 addresses (213.58.224.130, 213.58.224.132, 213.58.224.135) plus includes for anubisnetworks, eu.mailgun.org and Outlook, ending in a softfail (~all) policy. These are exposure indicators of the victim, not confirmed initial-access evidence.

A SecurityArsenal vendor blog (2026-07-28, no external sources cited) asserts that the group exploits perimeter devices (Check Point gateways, Cisco FMC) and ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708), cites an unverified CVE-2026-50751 for Check Point, claims a private RaaS/closed-group model, 3-7 day dwell time, RDP lateral movement, archiving with 7-Zip/WinRAR before exfiltration, possible VSS shadow-copy deletion and scheduled-task persistence, and says phishing is not a primary vector. SecurityArsenal's own technical content contains errors and none of these claims is corroborated by a primary source, so no CVE is listed as confirmed here and the related ATT&CK mappings reflect vendor assertions only. The initial access vector for this victim is unknown.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**RDP Lateral Movement — Single Source Logging Into 3+ Hosts Within One Hour** (`TL-2026-6259-SPL-003`)

Detects RDP fan-out (T1021.001): one source IP and account achieving RemoteInteractive logons on three or more distinct hosts in an hour, consistent with the RDP lateral movement asserted (uncorroborated) for Booba Project with a 3-7 day dwell time, and with valid-account abuse (T1078). Sigma form is single-event; apply the 3-host hourly threshold in the SIEM.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1021, T1021.001, T1078
- **Data sources:** windows_security
- **Severity:** medium
- **Confidence:** medium

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 LogonType=10 earliest=-24h NOT (IpAddress="-" OR IpAddress="127.0.0.1" OR IpAddress="::1") | bin _time span=1h | stats dc(Computer) as dest_count values(Computer) as destinations count by _time, TargetUserName, IpAddress | where dest_count>=3 | sort - dest_count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 10
| where IpAddress !in ("-", "127.0.0.1", "::1")
| summarize DestCount = dcount(Computer), Destinations = make_set(Computer, 50), Logons = count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where DestCount >= 3
| order by DestCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: RDP Remote Interactive Logon from Non-Loopback Source
id: 9a3f7c20-5d14-4e8b-b6a1-3c4d5e6f7103
status: experimental
description: Detects successful RemoteInteractive (RDP, LogonType 10) logons from non-loopback sources. Booba Project lateral movement is asserted (uncorroborated) to use RDP. Apply a threshold of 3 or more distinct destinations per source and account per hour in the SIEM.
references:
  - https://www.ransomware.live/id/Qm90ZWxobyAmIFJvZHJpZ3Vlc0BCb29iYSBQcm9qZWN0
  - https://socradar.io/data-breach/ransomware/booba-project/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.001
  - attack.t1078
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType: 10
  filter_local:
    IpAddress:
      - '-'
      - '127.0.0.1'
      - '::1'
  condition: selection and not filter_local
falsepositives:
  - Administrators and jump hosts performing legitimate RDP administration
  - Helpdesk remote support via RDP
level: medium

```

**Known false positives:**

- Jump hosts and admin workstations that legitimately RDP to many servers
- Helpdesk or MSP staff performing multi-host maintenance

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known jump hosts, PAM gateways and admin accounts; tune the dest_count threshold to your baseline. Correlate with off-hours logons, first-seen source/account pairs and subsequent archive or VSS-deletion alerts. Requires 4624 auditing on servers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Valid Account Abuse — Successful Microsoft 365 Sign-In from New Country (Infostealer Credential Use) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Defense Impairment — Microsoft Defender Disabled or Excluded via PowerShell, sc.exe, reg.exe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Data Staging — 7-Zip/WinRAR Archive Creation with Password or in Staging Directory (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Data Exfiltration Tooling — Rclone Transfers and MEGA Clients (Double Extortion) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Impact Precursor — Shadow Copy Deletion and Boot Recovery Disabled (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Booba Project Tor Extortion Infrastructure — .onion Resolution and IOC Match (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect Spawning Shell or LOLBin — Booba Project Remote Management Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WMI Remote Execution — WmiPrvSE Shell Spawn and wmic /node Process Create (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 21)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `213.58.224[.]130`
- Domain: `7t3zi3e7ki6iseun77ofqtr6wmbpgnpc2ada6gstcxp54lw6q2zb7jad[.]onion`
- IP address: `213.58.224[.]132`

Full set of 21 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ransomware.live victim entry: Botelho & Rodrigues (Booba Project)](https://www.ransomware.live/id/Qm90ZWxobyAmIFJvZHJpZ3Vlc0BCb29iYSBQcm9qZWN0)
- [WatchGuard Ransomware Tracker: Booba Project](https://www.watchguard.com/wgrd-security-hub/ransomware-tracker/booba-project)
- [SOCRadar: Booba Project ransomware profile](https://socradar.io/data-breach/ransomware/booba-project/)
- [Strobes: Booba Project ransomware group](https://strobes.co/vi/ransomware-groups/Booba%20Project/)
- [SecurityArsenal: Booba Project critical infrastructure targeting and Check Point firewall exploitation analysis](https://securityarsenal.com/blog/booba-project-critical-infrastructure-targeting-and-check-point-firewall-exploitation-analysis)
- [DeXpose: Booba Project Targets Spanish Construction Firm Fonsan](https://www.dexpose.io/booba-project-targets-spanish-construction-firm-fonsan/)
- [SOCRadar: URA Group data breach (Booba Project ransomware)](https://socradar.io/blog/data-breach/ura-group-booba-project-ransomware-2026/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6259
