# Ransomware Ecosystem Professionalization: Akira, Qilin, Play Business-Style Operations and Sicarii AI-Assembled Variant Lacking Working Decryptor

> Halcyon (Cynthia Kaiser) describes Akira, Qilin and Play operating like businesses (HR processes, victim customer-service lines, promotional discounts) inside a fragmented, supply-chain-style ecosystem of separate malware, initial-access, infrastructure and laundering providers. The Sicarii RaaS released an AI-assisted variant whose key-handling defect left paying victims without a working decryptor.

- **Published:** 2026-11-17T18:42:39Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-17T18:42:39Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6270
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6270.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6270
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Akira
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2020-3580, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082, CVE-2024-57727

## Description

Halcyon's 17 November 2026 post "Your Ransomware Adversary Has an HR Department" argues that ransomware crews now run like businesses. Akira, Qilin and Play are described as having HR processes, customer-service lines that help victims negotiate, promotional discounts and holiday schedules for members. Attacks are assembled like a supply chain, with malware, initial access, infrastructure and money laundering sourced from different providers. Halcyon says a few large groups dominated at the start of 2024, and law-enforcement takedowns then scattered them into smaller, more closed groups, which makes attribution harder because of fragmentation and overlapping signatures. Halcyon logged 70 brand-new ransomware variants in the prior year (citing an April 21, 2026 U.S. House Homeland Security hearing document), and reports that only about 60 percent of organizations that pay recover any data, with the decryptor failing outright or corrupting files in roughly one in five cases.

The article's technical content is behavioral: abuse of an organization's own legitimate tools, privilege escalation, data theft and file encryption. Halcyon recommends detecting behavior rather than signatures, planning for recovery instead of negotiation, and raising ransomware risk at board level. The article itself lists no CVEs, hashes, IPs or domains.

Sicarii is a ransomware-as-a-service operation first reported in December 2025. Halcyon's alert and blog (February 2026) found that the encryptor generates a new RSA key pair on each run, encrypts with it and discards the private key, so even a decryptor supplied by the operators cannot restore files. Halcyon assesses the poor integration of components as a strong indicator of AI-assisted development; Kaiser believes AI was used at every stage but the pieces were not integrated properly. Encrypted files receive a .sicarii extension, and the encryptor collects PowerPoint, PDF and Zip files into collected_data.zip for exfiltration. Halcyon notes later encryptor versions appear to fix the bug and that its key-material capture recovered files from both variants. According to the Nov 2026 article, after the Iran conflict began the group's leader reportedly said the ransomware did not work and told affiliates to encrypt everything anyway.

The named business-style groups are documented in primary advisories. CISA AA24-109A (updated 13 Nov 2025) describes Akira's use of VPN/remote-service initial access, exploitation of SonicWall, Cisco and Veeam flaws, BYOVD tooling (POORTRY, PowerTool/Zemana), RClone/WinSCP/MEGA exfiltration, Cloudflare Tunnel/Ngrok tunneling and .akira/.powerranges/.akiranew encryption. CISA AA23-352A (updated 4 Jun 2025) describes Play (Playcrypt), active since June 2022, using FortiOS, ProxyNotShell and SimpleHelp flaws, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Grixba, GMER/IOBit/PowerTool/HRsword defense evasion and .PLAY encryption with unique @gmx.de/@web.de contact addresses and phone calls to victims. Cisco Talos (Oct 2025) documents Qilin intrusions using leaked VPN admin credentials, dual encryptors (PsExec spread and network-share), the DarkKill/dark.sys EDR killer, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Cyberduck exfiltration and ESXi-focused impact actions.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Ransomware Defense Evasion and Impact — EDR Killer Driver (dark.sys, PowerTool, HRsword), Shadow Copy Deletion, Log Clearing** (`TL-2026-6270-SPL-002`)

Detects the pre-encryption hygiene shared by Akira, Qilin and Play. Qilin installs the DarkKill driver via 'sc create dark type= kernel', Akira and Play use BYOVD or EDR-disabling tools (PowerTool, HRsword, GMER, IObit Unlocker, POORTRY), and all three delete volume shadow copies (vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet) and clear event logs before encryption.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1562.001, T1490, T1070.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation/windows
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h ((OriginalFileName="sc.exe" CommandLine="*create*" CommandLine="*kernel*") OR CommandLine="*dark.sys*" OR Image IN ("*PowerTool*.exe","*HRsword.exe","*gmer*.exe","*IObitUnlocker.exe") OR (OriginalFileName="vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*") OR (OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*") OR (OriginalFileName="wevtutil.exe" (CommandLine="* cl *" OR CommandLine="* clear-log *"))) | eval technique=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(shadows|shadowcopy)"),"T1490 Inhibit System Recovery",match(CommandLine,"(?i)wevtutil"),"T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs",true(),"T1562.001 EDR killer or BYOVD tooling") | stats count values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(User) as users by host Image ParentImage technique
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ 'sc.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'create' and ProcessCommandLine has 'kernel')
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'dark.sys'
    or FileName in~ ('PowerTool.exe','PowerTool64.exe','HRsword.exe','gmer.exe','IObitUnlocker.exe')
    or (FileName =~ 'vssadmin.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadows')
    or (FileName =~ 'wmic.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadowcopy' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete')
    or (FileName =~ 'wevtutil.exe' and (ProcessCommandLine contains ' cl ' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'clear-log'))
| extend Technique = case(ProcessCommandLine has_any ('shadows','shadowcopy'), 'T1490 Inhibit System Recovery', FileName =~ 'wevtutil.exe', 'T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs', 'T1562.001 EDR killer or BYOVD tooling')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, Technique
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Ransomware EDR Killer Driver, Shadow Copy Deletion and Log Clearing (TL-2026-6270)
id: 7a2d3b5f-9c4e-4f82-8b66-3d1e8f2c7b02
status: experimental
description: Detects kernel driver installation for DarkKill (dark.sys), known EDR-disabling tools used by Akira, Qilin and Play (PowerTool, HRsword, GMER, IObit Unlocker), shadow copy deletion and event log clearing, the typical pre-encryption sequence.
references:
  - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1562.001
  - attack.t1070.001
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_driver_install:
    Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'create'
      - 'kernel'
  selection_darkkill_file:
    CommandLine|contains: 'dark.sys'
  selection_edr_tools:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\PowerTool.exe'
      - '\PowerTool64.exe'
      - '\HRsword.exe'
      - '\gmer.exe'
      - '\IObitUnlocker.exe'
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'delete'
      - 'shadows'
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadowcopy'
      - 'delete'
  selection_wevtutil:
    Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' cl '
      - 'clear-log'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup or disk-management software that manages shadow copies
  - Legitimate kernel driver installation by vendor installers
  - Administrators clearing logs during troubleshooting
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Backup agents that create or delete VSS shadow copies
- Vendor installers that register kernel-mode drivers through sc.exe
- Administrators clearing event logs during maintenance

**Tuning notes:** Exclude the service accounts and parent processes of your backup software for the shadow-copy branch. Treat any sc.exe kernel-driver creation or dark.sys reference as high priority on servers. Pair with a Sysmon EventCode=6 (driver load) hunt for unsigned or vulnerable drivers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Ransomware Initial Access — Successful RDP Logon From Public IP (Valid Accounts / Remote Services) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Persistence — SYSTEM ONLOGON Scheduled Task (TVInstallRestore) and Domain Account Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Data Theft — Rclone, WinSCP, Cyberduck, MEGA Exfiltration and Password-Protected Archiving (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- VMware ESXi Authentication Bypass — 'ESX Admins' Group Created or Modified (CVE-2024-37085) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Credential Theft — LSASS Dumping via Mimikatz, comsvcs MiniDump, ProcDump and Qilin [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Impact Artifacts — Sicarii, Akira and Play Encrypted Extensions, Ransom Notes and [indicator] (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Initial Access — Veeam, SimpleHelp and Exchange Service Spawning Shell (CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2022-41082) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Ransomware Affiliate C2 and Tunnel Egress — Community Sibling Infrastructure, Ngrok and Cloudflare Tunnel (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `6DE8DD5757F9A3AC5E2AC28E8A77682D7A29BE25C106F785A061DCF582A20DC6`
- File hash: `47B7B2DD88959CD7224A5542AE8D5BCE928BFC986BF0D0321532A7515C244A1E`
- File hash: `C59F3C8D61D940B56436C14BC148C1FE98862921B8F7BAD97FBC96B31D71193C`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Your Ransomware Adversary Has an HR Department (Halcyon)](https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/ransomware-adversary-has-an-hr-department)
- [A Ransomware Reversal: Sicarii Can't Decrypt, But Halcyon Can](https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/a-ransomware-reversal-sicarii-cant-decrypt-but-halcyon-can)
- [Alert: Sicarii Ransomware Encryption Key Handling Defect (Halcyon)](https://www.halcyon.ai/ransomware-alerts/alert-sicarii-ransomware-encryption-key-handling-defect)
- [CISA #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a)
- [CISA #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware (AA23-352A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a)
- [Cisco Talos: Uncovering Qilin attack methods exposed through multiple cases](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/)
- [Acronis TRU: Inside Qilin ransomware - ESXi attacks, affiliate networks and double extortion](https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/inside-qilin-ransomware-esxi-attacks-affiliate-networks-and-double-extortion/)
- [BushidoToken: Tracking Adversaries - The Qilin RaaS](https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2024/06/tracking-adversaries-qilin-raas.html)
- [U.S. House Homeland Security BSECIP hearing document (cited by Halcyon)](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-21-BSECIP-Hearing.pdf)
- [Computer Weekly: Broken decryptor leaves Sicarii ransomware victims adrift](https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366637711/Broken-decryptor-leaves-Sicarii-ransomware-victims-adrift)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6270
