# Cloud Keys Leaked in Docker Hub Images Stolen Within Seconds by Automated 'ContainerBots' Scanners

> Stony Brook University researchers published 300 honeypot images across eight public container registries embedding AWS, OpenAI and Anthropic keys plus decoy SSH/database credentials. Planted AWS keys were first used 7.86 seconds after publication (median 51.19 s) and all 100 AWS keys were abused within 15 minutes, indicating automated static-analysis harvesting of image layers and registry APIs.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T04:23:22Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T04:23:22Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6293
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6293.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6293
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** CLOUD
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 10 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Researchers Billy Tsouvalas and Nick Nikiforakis (Stony Brook University) presented a four-month honeypot study at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) on 2026-11-16, reported by BleepingComputer on 2026-11-17. They published 300 honeypot container images across eight public container registries (Docker Hub and Harbor are named in the coverage; the other registries are not listed in the sources reviewed). The images embedded planted AWS, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys plus decoy SSH and database credentials, and the researchers deployed detection that would alert when an image was built, run, or had a shell opened.

The images were pulled more than 75,000 times. The planted AWS keys received over 140,000 API calls from about 5,000 unique IP addresses. All 100 planted AWS keys were used within 15 minutes of publication; the fastest first use came 7.86 seconds after publication and the median time to first API call was 51.19 seconds. Observed AWS activity ranged from checking whether the keys worked, to listing available resources, to sometimes consuming them. OpenAI and Anthropic keys were quickly used to exhaust test-account balances. Docker Hub accounted for nearly all AWS key activity; Harbor also saw some AWS key abuse.

The scanners were collectively labelled 'ContainerBots', a loose umbrella term: the researchers found no evidence that the scanning was coordinated by the same operators. Because the monitoring rarely detected anyone running the images, the researchers concluded the scanners overwhelmingly extract credentials statically, by unpacking image layers or querying registry APIs, without starting containers. No CVE, malware family, IP list or other indicator list is given in the coverage reviewed, so no network IOCs were available to correlate against BeaconBeagle.

Disclosure: the findings and full paper were reported to Docker in May 2026; Docker sent an acknowledgment and nothing further. A small-scale follow-up test in August 2026 showed no changes in the platform's defenses. The researchers recommend that Docker Hub scan images for secrets before they go live and warn publishers, and that access to the public feed of recently published or updated images be restricted or rate-limited to slow mass-scanning. Earlier independent work shows the exposure is widespread: an RWTH Aachen study (ASIA CCS 2023) found about 8.5% of 337,171 Docker Hub images and 8,076 private-registry images contained secrets, and Flare (December 2025) found 10,456 Docker Hub images uploaded in one month (November 2025) containing exposed keys, with roughly 75% of affected developers not revoking the underlying credential.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1593.003 Code Repositories
- T1589.001 Credentials
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
- T1496.004 Cloud Service Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ContainerBots Leaked AWS Key Validation Then Enumeration From External IP (TL-2026-6293)** (`TL-2026-6293-SPL-001`)

Detects the observed ContainerBots post-theft progression on a long-term AWS access key: sts:GetCallerIdentity validity check followed by List/Describe enumeration from a non-corporate, non-AWS source IP within 15 minutes. Research showed all 100 planted AWS keys were abused within 15 minutes of image publication (first use 7.86 s, median 51.19 s), mostly key validation and resource listing. Maps to Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004), Cloud Service Discovery (T1526) and Cloud Infrastructure Discovery (T1580). Public SPL detection for this threat.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1078.004, T1526, T1580
- **Data sources:** aws:cloudtrail (index=aws), AWSCloudTrail (Microsoft Sentinel), AWS CloudTrail logsource (Sigma)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=aws sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" earliest=-4h userIdentity.type=IAMUser userIdentity.accessKeyId=AKIA*
| eval access_key='userIdentity.accessKeyId', iam_user='userIdentity.userName'
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",sourceIPAddress) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",sourceIPAddress) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",sourceIPAddress) OR like(sourceIPAddress,"%.amazonaws.com") OR sourceIPAddress=="AWS Internal")
| eval is_validate=if(eventName=="GetCallerIdentity",1,0)
| eval is_enum=if(match(eventName,"^(List|Describe|GetAccountAuthorizationDetails|GetAccountSummary)"),1,0)
| stats sum(is_validate) AS validate_calls sum(is_enum) AS enum_calls dc(eventSource) AS services dc(eventName) AS distinct_apis values(eventName) AS apis min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY access_key iam_user sourceIPAddress
| eval window_secs=last_seen-first_seen
| where validate_calls>=1 AND enum_calls>=5 AND window_secs<=900
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen access_key iam_user sourceIPAddress validate_calls enum_calls services distinct_apis apis
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(4h)
| where UserIdentityType == "IAMUser" and UserIdentityAccessKeyId startswith "AKIA"
| where ipv4_is_private(SourceIpAddress) == false and SourceIpAddress !endswith ".amazonaws.com" and SourceIpAddress != "AWS Internal"
| extend IsValidate = EventName == "GetCallerIdentity"
| extend IsEnum = EventName matches regex "^(List|Describe|GetAccountAuthorizationDetails|GetAccountSummary)"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), ValidateCalls = countif(IsValidate), EnumCalls = countif(IsEnum), Services = dcount(EventSource), Apis = make_set(EventName, 50) by UserIdentityAccessKeyId, UserIdentityUserName, SourceIpAddress
| where ValidateCalls >= 1 and EnumCalls >= 5 and (LastSeen - FirstSeen) <= 15m
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, UserIdentityAccessKeyId, UserIdentityUserName, SourceIpAddress, ValidateCalls, EnumCalls, Services, Apis
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: ContainerBots Leaked AWS Key - GetCallerIdentity By Long-Term IAM Key From External IP
id: 3f6a1c0e-6293-4a11-9b7d-0a1e5c2d7001
name: tl_6293_aws_key_validate
status: experimental
description: Long-term IAM access key (AKIA) validated with sts:GetCallerIdentity from a non-corporate, non-AWS source IP. First step of the ContainerBots-style post-theft progression (key validity check) in TL-2026-6293.
references:
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cloud-keys-leaked-in-docker-hub-images-are-stolen-within-seconds/
  - https://containerbots.github.io
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: 'sts.amazonaws.com'
    eventName: 'GetCallerIdentity'
    userIdentity.type: 'IAMUser'
    userIdentity.accessKeyId|startswith: 'AKIA'
  filter_internal:
    sourceIPAddress|cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  filter_aws_service:
    sourceIPAddress|endswith: '.amazonaws.com'
  filter_aws_internal:
    sourceIPAddress: 'AWS Internal'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Developers validating their own keys from home or VPN egress ranges
  - CI/CD runners outside AWS using long-term keys
level: informational
---
title: ContainerBots Leaked AWS Key - Read-Only Resource Enumeration By Long-Term IAM Key From External IP
id: 3f6a1c0e-6293-4a11-9b7d-0a1e5c2d7002
name: tl_6293_aws_key_enumeration
status: experimental
description: List/Describe enumeration APIs called with a long-term IAM key from a non-corporate, non-AWS source IP. Building block for the TL-2026-6293 correlation.
references:
  - https://containerbots.github.io
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1580
  - attack.t1526
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    userIdentity.type: 'IAMUser'
    userIdentity.accessKeyId|startswith: 'AKIA'
    eventName|startswith:
      - 'List'
      - 'Describe'
      - 'GetAccountAuthorizationDetails'
      - 'GetAccountSummary'
  filter_internal:
    sourceIPAddress|cidr:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  filter_aws_service:
    sourceIPAddress|endswith: '.amazonaws.com'
  filter_aws_internal:
    sourceIPAddress: 'AWS Internal'
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Cloud inventory and CSPM tooling using static keys from external SaaS ranges
  - Administrators browsing via external networks
level: informational
---
title: ContainerBots Leaked AWS Key - Key Validation Followed By Enumeration Within 15 Minutes
id: 3f6a1c0e-6293-4a11-9b7d-0a1e5c2d7003
status: experimental
description: Same long-term IAM access key validated via GetCallerIdentity and then used for enumeration from outside the corporate/AWS network within 15 minutes. Mirrors the observed ContainerBots progression (check key, list resources, sometimes consume) from TL-2026-6293. Event-count thresholds are enforced in the SPL and KQL flavors.
references:
  - https://containerbots.github.io
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1078.004
  - attack.t1580
  - attack.t1526
correlation:
  type: temporal_ordered
  rules:
    - tl_6293_aws_key_validate
    - tl_6293_aws_key_enumeration
  group-by:
    - userIdentity.accessKeyId
  timespan: 15m
falsepositives:
  - Newly onboarded automation that validates credentials before inventory runs
  - Penetration tests and red-team exercises using issued keys
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Developers or CSPM/inventory tools using static IAM keys from external or VPN egress IPs
- CI/CD runners outside AWS that validate credentials and then list resources

**Tuning notes:** Replace the RFC1918 exclusions with your corporate and VPN egress CIDRs (a lookup of known egress IPs is better). Exclude known automation access keys. Raise enum_calls or shorten the window to cut noise; lower them for keys that should never be used from outside the VPC. Any hit on a key that was ever embedded in a container image should be treated as compromise: revoke and rotate the key.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ContainerBots Established AWS Key Used From Never-Before-Seen External IP (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots Compute Resource Consumption With Long-Term AWS Key From External IP (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots Foreign Pull Within Seconds Of Image Push (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots Exposure: Container Build/Run/Push With Embedded Cloud or AI Credentials (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots LLM Service Hijacking: Bedrock Access With Long-Term AWS Key From External IP (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots-Style Static Secret Extraction From Container Image Layers (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots Multi-Region AWS Resource Enumeration With Long-Term Key (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ContainerBots Registry API Enumeration For Recently Published Images (TL-2026-6293) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 10)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `tsouvalas[.]xyz`
- URL: `hxxps://www[.]bleepingcomputer[.]com/news/security/cloud-keys-leaked-in-docker-hub-images-are-stolen-within-seconds/`
- Domain: `securitee[.]org`

Full set of 10 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cloud keys leaked in Docker Hub images are stolen within seconds](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cloud-keys-leaked-in-docker-hub-images-are-stolen-within-seconds/)
- [ContainerBots project page (Stony Brook University)](https://containerbots.github.io/)
- [Secrets Revealed in Container Images: An Internet-wide Study on Occurrence and Impact (RWTH Aachen, ASIA CCS '23)](https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/publication/2023/2023_dahlmanns_secrets-revealed-in-container/)
- [Secrets Revealed in Container Images (arXiv 2307.03958)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.03958.pdf)
- [Flare: Thousands of Exposed Secrets Found on Docker Hub](https://flare.io/learn/resources/docker-hub-secrets-exposed)
- [Trend Micro: Security Breaks - TeamTNT DockerHub Credentials Leak](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/security-breaks-teamtnts-dockerhub-credentials-leak.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6293
