# BubbleLoader malware turns copies of WinRAR and Windows Media Player into carriers

> ReversingLabs describes BubbleLoader, a loader that patches the entry point of legitimate Windows programs (WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox launcher, virtiofs), embeds two PNG images, and uses them to decrypt and reflectively load a payload in memory. Earliest samples date to February 2026, with two activity clusters in mid-September and early October 2026; the delivery method and final payloads are not stated.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T06:19:14Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T06:19:14Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6304
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6304.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6304
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

BubbleLoader is a loader family documented by ReversingLabs (Robert Simmons, 'Threat Researcher's Notebook: BubbleLoader', 17 November 2026) and summarized by Help Net Security on 18 November 2026. Rather than shipping as a standalone dropper, it takes a legitimate, benign host executable (WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, the Firefox launcher, virtiofs) and rewrites a few instructions at the host's PE entry point. ReversingLabs notes that any executable could be converted but names only these five hosts. The patched prologue is obfuscated, locates the image base with a GetPC-style trick, builds API calls from fragments and jumps (rather than call instructions) using the host's IAT offsets, reserves a memory block with VirtualAlloc, copies in two embedded PNG images, and transfers control to the second one.

The first PNG is a valid, variably sized red-to-blue gradient image that serves as a rolling XOR key. The second PNG is fake: it carries the correct PNG magic bytes but its IHDR chunk is truncated where the width field should be, and the encrypted third-stage data starts at that point. Second-stage shellcode in the fake PNG determines its own RIP via a return-address trick, runs an XOR check comparing the magic bytes of the two PNGs (if they do not match it falls through and attempts to run the next stage without decrypting), and then XOR-decrypts the next stage using the key PNG's bytes. Because the gradient contains long runs of null bytes it is a weak key, so parts of the loader (including readable strings such as 'kernel32') sit unencrypted in the file. A valid width's most significant byte should be 0x00; in the sample ReversingLabs shows it is 0x55, which is a simple structural check for defenders.

The third stage performs a reentry guard, finds the image base through the PEB (gs:0x60), and resolves five functions (ExitProcess, RtlAddFunctionTable, RtlPcToFileHeader, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect), using a placeholder value 0xfafafafafafafafa that is overwritten at bootstrap with the LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress addresses. It decrypts the final payload into memory, changes protection on ntdll with VirtualProtect, and installs an inline hook over the start of RtlPcToFileHeader (the payload's image base is written into the hook stub, which is memcpy'd into the function). It then calls RtlAddFunctionTable to register the payload's .pdata exception directory (size divided by 0xC per RUNTIME_FUNCTION entry), giving the in-memory payload working structured exception handling. The payload runs with DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH semantics and the loader then calls ExitProcess. The reentry guard stores the payload entry point to avoid loading twice, which DLL payloads require, even though the analyzed sample carried an EXE. The GetModuleHandle call tries an ASCII 'kernel32' first and falls back to a wide string, suggesting one code base for many host programs and payloads.

Anti-analysis features include opaque predicates in the decryption loop that always jump over an 'in' instruction (which would raise a privileged-instruction exception in user mode), and runtime polymorphism: the loader finds 0xCC-led compiler padding between functions and overwrites the padding bytes with values from RDTSC (keeping the leading 0xCC), so the payload's in-memory hash differs on every run. Analysts can recover the original by patching out the overwrite loop. The final payload varies by sample depending on the malware family being distributed; no family names are given. How the tampered programs reach victims is not described, and no attribution, C2 infrastructure, network IOC, CVE or CVSS is stated; no BubbleLoader YARA rule is published. The 24 published SHA-256 hashes identify the patched programs on disk, not the in-memory payload, and ReversingLabs does not map individual hashes to host programs. Severity is an analyst estimate.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads
- T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
- T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution
- T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1027.014 Obfuscated Files or Information: Polymorphic Code
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1106 Native API

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BubbleLoader Patched Host Program - Known Hash or Host Binary Outside Trusted Path** (`TL-2026-6304-SPL-001`)

Flags process creation (Sysmon EventCode 1) where the image SHA-256 matches one of the 24 ReversingLabs BubbleLoader patched-host hashes, or where a WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player or virtiofs executable runs outside Program Files and Windows. BubbleLoader (T1554) rewrites the entry point of legitimate host programs and hides an XOR-encrypted payload in embedded PNGs (T1027.009, T1027.003); the hashes identify patched programs on disk, not the in-memory payload.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1554, T1036.005, T1027.009, T1027.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval img=lower(Image), hashes_lc=lower(Hashes)
| eval known_hash=if(match(hashes_lc,"sha256=(4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14|3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710|a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a|053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917|d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626|df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be|f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029|e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56|07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8|08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd|8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37|1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d|ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5|c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b|aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae|70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a|776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf|fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a|d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f|17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15|ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333|184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c|e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f|da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3)"),1,0)
| eval host_outside_trusted=if(match(img,"(^|[^a-z0-9_.-])(winrar|x64dbg|wmplayer|virtiofs)[.]exe$") AND NOT match(img,"^c:.(program files|program files [(]x86[)]|windows)."),1,0)
| where known_hash=1 OR host_outside_trusted=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User, Image, Hashes, known_hash, host_outside_trusted
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let known_hashes = dynamic(["4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14", "3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710", "a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a", "053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917", "d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626", "df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be", "f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029", "e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56", "07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8", "08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd", "8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37", "1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d", "ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5", "c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b", "aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae", "70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a", "776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf", "fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a", "d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f", "17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15", "ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333", "184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c", "e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f", "da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3"]);
let host_names = dynamic(["winrar.exe", "x64dbg.exe", "wmplayer.exe", "virtiofs.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend known_hash = SHA256 in~ (known_hashes)
| extend host_outside_trusted = FileName in~ (host_names) and not(FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)^c:.(program files|program files [(]x86[)]|windows).")
| where known_hash or host_outside_trusted
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, known_hash, host_outside_trusted
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: BubbleLoader Patched Host Program - Known Hash or Host Binary Outside Trusted Path
id: 8f3c2a41-6b7d-4e1a-9c52-1d0e7a3b6c01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a BubbleLoader patched host program by SHA-256 (24 ReversingLabs hashes) or by a WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player or virtiofs binary running outside Program Files and Windows directories.
references:
    - https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/threat-researchers-notebook-bubbleloader
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1554
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1027.009
    - attack.t1027.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - '4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14'
            - '3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710'
            - 'a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a'
            - '053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917'
            - 'd5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626'
            - 'df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be'
            - 'f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029'
            - 'e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56'
            - '07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8'
            - '08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd'
            - '8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37'
            - '1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d'
            - 'ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5'
            - 'c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b'
            - 'aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae'
            - '70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a'
            - '776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf'
            - 'fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a'
            - 'd14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f'
            - '17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15'
            - 'ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333'
            - '184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c'
            - 'e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f'
            - 'da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3'
    selection_host:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\winrar.exe'
            - '\x64dbg.exe'
            - '\wmplayer.exe'
            - '\virtiofs.exe'
    filter_trusted:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Windows\'
    condition: selection_hash or (selection_host and not filter_trusted)
falsepositives:
    - Portable x64dbg or WinRAR copies unpacked in user directories by analysts or admins
    - Legitimate software deployed to a non-default install path
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Portable x64dbg or WinRAR copies unpacked into user directories by analysts or administrators
- Legitimate software deployed to a non-default install path (VDI images, software distribution shares)

**Tuning notes:** Sysmon must log SHA256 in the Hashes field (HashType includes SHA256). Add environment-specific install roots to the trusted-path regex. The known_hash branch is high fidelity; host_outside_trusted is a hunting branch - split it into a separate lower-severity alert if analyst-heavy hosts are noisy. Refresh the hash list when ReversingLabs updates the IOC set.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Launched by Office or Script Host (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Running Under a Different File Name (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Spawning Shell or LOLBin (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Written Outside Trusted Install Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Privileged or Illegal Instruction Fault (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program DNS Lookup to Non-Microsoft Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Host Binary Persisted via Run Key Outside Trusted Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BubbleLoader Carrier Program Outbound Public Network Connection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14`
- File hash: `3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710`
- File hash: `a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Threat Researcher's Notebook: BubbleLoader (ReversingLabs)](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/threat-researchers-notebook-bubbleloader)
- [BubbleLoader malware turns copies of WinRAR and Windows Media Player into carriers (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/18/winrar-bubbleloader-malware/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1027.009 Embedded Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1027.014 Polymorphic Code](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/014/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1027.003 Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6304
