# AuditTeam OpsAgent Framework: Ransomware Masked as 'Audit & Consulting' with Signed-Driver EDR Killer

> Kaspersky GReAT attributes, with high confidence, an OpsAgent campaign (January to at least October 2026) to the AuditTeam extortion group. OpsAgent is a C2 framework (C++ with a Rust rewrite, OpsAgent-rs) that includes an AV/EDR killer abusing a validly signed Beijing Jiangmin (KV) driver and a cryptor module; victims in at least seven countries are told to pay an 'Audit & Consulting fee' for a vulnerability report.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T07:36:46Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T07:36:46Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6308
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6308.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6308
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** AuditTeam
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 21 (3 shown free below)

## Description

AuditTeam is a double-extortion group first mentioned in open-source reporting in March 2026 (Data Breach Digest listed 'Audit Team' among ten new data-leaking ransomware operators). Kaspersky GReAT ties the OpsAgent framework to the group with high confidence based on the ransom note format, the Tor leak site and the 'remediation report' pretext. GitHub commit history places the start of the campaign at 5 January 2026; activity was still observed in October 2026. Kaspersky observed activity in China, the Philippines, Senegal, Italy, Finland, Hong Kong and Russia, with additional leak-site victims in Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain. Initial access is not described in the source.

OpsAgent is delivered through a succession of loaders: a C loader (April 2026, OLLVM control-flow-flattened) that injects shellcode into msiexec.exe via CreateProcessA/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread; a .NET loader (June 2026) that injects with NtQueueApcThread; and a Rust loader (September 2026) that fetches an encrypted payload from C2, decrypts it, parses the PE header and runs its Execute export in-process. Staged files are named syscache.dat and placed in several Windows cache/CLR directories. The C++ implant (v5.2.8) uses a main thread that monitors connection health and a worker thread that processes a command queue, with jobs (background tasks in separate processes fed shellcode over named pipes) and links (child agents for lateral movement over SMB, HTTP and TCP). Payloads are XOR-encrypted, APIs are resolved by hash, and a DbgInjector mode creates a process in a debug state, sets a hardware breakpoint on FileTimeToSystemTime and redirects RIP to shellcode without creating a new thread. Mimikatz, pass-the-hash payloads and .NET assemblies are fetched from C2 and run in spawned processes rather than being embedded.

C2 uses WebSocket over TLS with a framed protocol (heartbeat, command, chunked file upload, SOCKS proxy and child-agent forwarding frames). C2 addresses can be retrieved from a configuration page on GitHub (AES-CBC with a SHA-256-derived key in the C++ version, delimited by GetConfig/EndConfig markers). The Rust rewrite (OpsAgent-rs) starts with HTTP POST, upgrades to a persistent WebSocket over TLS, switches to AES-GCM with HMAC-SHA256-derived keys, uses numeric command IDs, adds interactive shells, and removes the pivot command set. Infrastructure observed: two CloudFront distributions and one IP in AS136557.

The EDR/AV killer abuses a legitimate, validly signed Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus (KV series) driver (kvcore.sys, filter port \KvCorePortX0): the user-mode component sends command 0x1D with a target process filename and the driver terminates the matching process. The roughly 220-entry kill list covers security products (e.g. MsMpEng, SecurityHealthService, avp, ekrn, ccSvcHst), remote access tools, monitoring (Sysmon, splunkd, wazuh-agent), backup (Veeam, Acronis, MBAM) and database services. The cryptor module encrypts with AES-CBC or ChaCha20 (selected by command-line flag) using a unique per-file key from RtlGenRandom, protected with X25519 key exchange against a static embedded public key. Before encryption it terminates database processes (SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis) and stops Veeam, deletes shadow copies, empties the recycle bin and wipes temp folders, overwriting content with random data before deletion. The ransom note is formatted as an audit log: pay the 'Audit & Consulting fee' for a vulnerability report and data purge, or face public disclosure on the Tor leak site. Kaspersky notes signs of LLM-assisted development in the code. Reported victim counts vary across third-party trackers; scale should be treated as 'dozens of organizations' per Kaspersky.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1106 Native API
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- T1090 Proxy
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1485 Data Destruction

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**OpsAgent syscache.dat Payload Staged in Windows Cache / CLR Directory** (`TL-2026-6308-SPL-001`)

Detects creation of the OpsAgent staging file syscache.dat in the Windows Caches, CLR_v4.0 or Temp directories (research IOCs for TL-2026-6308, AuditTeam OpsAgent loaders). The C, .NET and Rust loaders drop or fetch an encrypted payload under this name before injecting shellcode (initial access is not described in the source). The filename is behaviour-specific and has no legitimate Windows use, so any hit warrants triage.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1027, T1620
- **Data sources:** sysmon (EventCode 11, index=sysmon), DeviceFileEvents, windows file_event
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\syscache.dat" (TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Caches\\*" OR TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\CLR_v4.0\\*" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\*")
```Sysmon EID 11 FileCreate - OpsAgent staged payload syscache.dat (TL-2026-6308)```
| eval threat="OpsAgent loader payload staging"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(TargetFilename) as staged_paths values(Image) as writer_images values(threat) as threat by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FileName =~ "syscache.dat"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Microsoft\Windows\Caches", @"\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0", @"\Temp")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, MD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: OpsAgent syscache.dat Payload Staged in Windows Cache or CLR Directory
id: 7b3f1c2e-5a4d-4e8b-9c61-0d2f8a1b3c41
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of syscache.dat in the Windows Caches, CLR_v4.0 or Temp directories, the staging filename used by AuditTeam OpsAgent loaders.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/auditteam-opsagent-forced-audit/122031/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1620
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\syscache.dat'
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\'
            - '\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\'
            - '\Temp\'
    condition: selection_name and selection_path
falsepositives:
    - Unknown legitimate software reusing the syscache.dat filename
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Third-party software that legitimately uses a file named syscache.dat in a temp or cache folder (rare)
- Security researchers or sandboxes detonating OpsAgent samples

**Tuning notes:** Allow-list any verified internal software that writes syscache.dat. Add the SHA256/MD5 of confirmed benign files as exclusions. Pair hits with the msiexec.exe injection detections (KQL-001, SIG-001) to raise priority. The {modulepath} variant of the path is not enumerated in the source; extend the path filter if new locations are observed.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Remote Thread / APC Injection into msiexec.exe (OpsAgent Loaders) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Recovery Inhibition and Database/Backup Service Stop (AuditTeam Cryptor Pre-Encryption) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Injection Host Process (msiexec.exe / notepad.exe) Outbound Connection or GitHub Dead-Drop Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- msiexec.exe Launched Without Installer Arguments (OpsAgent Injection Host) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mimikatz Execution in Spawned Process (OpsAgent mimikatz_spawn) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Overpass/Pass-the-Hash Style Logon (Type 9 seclogo Negotiate) After Mimikatz (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Jiangmin kvcore.sys Signed Driver Load / Drop (OpsAgent EDR Killer BYOVD) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OpsAgent C2 Infrastructure Contact (CloudFront Domains and AS136557 IP) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 21)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `157.20.104[.]111`
- Domain: `d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net`
- URL: `hxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage`

Full set of 21 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The forced audit: how AuditTeam's OpsAgent framework masks ransomware as consulting (Kaspersky Securelist)](https://securelist.com/auditteam-opsagent-forced-audit/122031/)
- [Data-Leaking Ransomware Report: March 2026 (Data Breach Digest)](https://www.dbdigest.com/2026/04/data-leaking-ransomware-report-march-2026.html)
- [AuditTeam strikes Russian software leader I-SYS (DeXpose)](https://www.dexpose.io/auditteam-strikes-russian-software-leader-i-sys/)
- [AuditTeam ransomware group profile (ransomware.live)](https://www.ransomware.live/group/auditteam)
- [AuditTeam ransom note (RansomLook)](https://www.ransomlook.io/notes/auditteam)
- [AuditTeam ransomware 24 listings 2026 (tech-insider, secondary source)](https://tech-insider.org/auditteam-ransomware-24-listings-2026/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6308
