# tcherber: FortiGate VPN Access Brokerage with Custom Malware (Rust Loader, Stealer, HVNC) and Enigma Ransomware

> Cyderes Howler Cell reports a Russian-speaking operator, "tcherber", who sells and uses stolen FortiGate/SonicWall VPN credentials to enter corporate networks and develops custom Rust malware (loader, stealer, HVNC) plus Enigma ransomware. A recovered toolkit held 500+ FortiGate credential entries and an unauthenticated C2 panel showed 178 active bots; no new Fortinet vulnerability is used.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T08:17:07Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T08:17:07Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6312
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6312.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6312
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Cyderes Howler Cell (report published 2026-11-17) tracks a threat actor under the handle "tcherber", assessed as a Russian-speaking operator running two businesses: an Initial Access Broker (IAB) service selling FortiGate, SonicWall, Cisco and Citrix VPN access (segmented by victim revenue above/below $10M, excluding CIS targets, advertised on the forum rehubcom[.]pro) and a Malware-as-a-Service operation (custom C2, loader and FUD crypting). Attribution rests on a leaked /home/tcherber/ build path in panic strings, Russian-language strings in the Go orchestrator, forum posts and the C2 panel UI, and a shared Tox ID. The report states a prior VMRay Labs report linked the same build path to Zer0day Stealer, HVNC tooling and ENIGMA Locker; the link between the actor and the Enigma ransomware rests on that shared build path rather than direct attribution.

Initial access involves no vulnerability. A Go toolkit (csicl.go orchestrator) automates connecting to FortiGate VPNs with OpenConnect (--protocol=fortinet, 30-second reconnect loop) using weak, default (e.g. guest/guest, admin/admin) and reused/leaked credentials; sonik.go provides a SonicWall path via NetExtender. After the tunnel is up the toolkit maps routes (route_parser.go), enumerates Active Directory over LDAP (nxc_ldap.go), lists SMB shares (smb_info.go), scans with nmap, and validates credentials with NetExec. processed_config.txt held 500+ FortiGate credentials across multiple countries. VPN logs show root-level tunnels into victim networks in May-June 2026, some lasting hours.

The malware chain starts with setup.exe, masquerading as a Windows Update installer. It drops setup.ps1 and run.bat in C:\Users\Public, uses a temporary scheduled task S0, adds C:\Users\Public to Defender exclusions, downloads loader.cer from 93.152.223.30:5000 and decodes it with certutil to svchost.exe (a 64-bit Rust loader, run via temporary task MU). The loader scores sandbox indicators (CPU count, RAM, disk, analysis tools such as procmon, wireshark, x64dbg, IDA), manually maps PEs in-process (VirtualAlloc RWX, LoadLibraryA/GetProcAddress, CreateThread), pulls stealer_raw.exe and hvnc_raw.exe from the C2, runs them hidden, deletes them after ~5 seconds, and persists via the HKCU Run value SecurityHealth.

The Rust stealer profiles the host (external IP via ipinfo.io), collects browser cookies/passwords, FTP, email, messaging, VPN data, crypto wallets, gaming data, Desktop/Documents/Downloads files and screenshots, stages <victim_id>_logs.zip, and exfiltrates via the Telegram Bot API and POST /api/stealer/report to 93.152.223.30:5000, registering through /api/c2/heartbeat. The Rust HVNC implant (default C2 93.152.223.30:5555, magic 0x48564e43, AES-256-GCM, build ID J9kzQ2Y0qO) exits on VM/low-resource checks, patches AmsiScanBuffer and EtwEventWrite, offers recon, browser credential theft, clipboard and screenshot commands, a hidden desktop (HVNC_Session), a fodhelper.exe UAC bypass, and persistence through a Run value, scheduled task and WMI event subscription all named WindowsUpdate*.

Enigma ransomware (Rust) deletes shadow copies (vssadmin, wmic, PowerShell), alters bcdedit recovery settings, disables System Restore, suppresses Defender via registry, clears event logs, force-stops Hyper-V VMs, kills 125 processes and stops/disables 53 services, then encrypts files with per-file ChaCha12 (key/nonce wrapped with ECIES), appends .ENIGMA, and drops _README_ENIGMA.txt (contact Enigma_1@aol.com). Cyderes found no exfiltration capability in the sample; persistence uses EnigmaUpdater, WindowsSecurityService and SystemRestoreAgent autoruns and a self-copy enigma_guard.exe with a watchdog.

Cyderes also found an unauthenticated "STANDALONE C2 Panel v3" at 158.94.209.138 (Russian-language UI, modules Victims, Builder, Cryptor, Delivery, Auto-Load, Config) with 178 bots at capture and builds dated September 2026, indicating the infrastructure was still active at publication. Cyber Security News additionally ties the campaign to the FortiBleed credential campaign and cites The Gentlemen ransomware group's use of Fortinet VPNs as a comparable pattern; that linkage comes from the news article, not the Cyderes primary report. Note: the two sources differ on the ransom-note name/email (_README_ENIGMA.txt / Enigma_1@aol.com in Cyderes; README_ENIGMA.txt / Enigma1@aol.com in the news article) and several SHA-256 values were split across line breaks in the source; the Cyderes forms are used here.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1078.001 Default Accounts
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
- T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1021.005 VNC
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Webhook
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**tcherber Fake Windows Update Loader Staging (certutil .cer Decode, Defender Exclusion, Public svchost.exe) - Exploitation** (`TL-2026-6312-SPL-001`)

Detects the tcherber (TL-2026-6312) stage 1 and 2 execution chain: setup.exe/setup.ps1 masquerading as a Windows Update installer, certutil decoding loader.cer (downloaded from 93.152.223.30:5000) into a Rust loader named svchost.exe in C:\Users\Public, and Defender exclusions added for that folder. Behaviour-first, no IOC dependency.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1140, T1562.001, T1036, T1059.001, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    ((Image="*\\certutil.exe" CommandLine="*decode*" CommandLine="*.cer*")
    OR (Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*Add-MpPreference*" CommandLine="*ExclusionPath*" CommandLine="*Users\\Public*")
    OR (Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*setup.ps1*" CommandLine="*Bypass*")
    OR (Image="*\\Users\\Public\\svchost.exe"))
| eval stage=case(match(Image,"(?i)certutil\\.exe$"),"certutil_decode_loader_cer", match(CommandLine,"(?i)Add-MpPreference"),"defender_exclusion_users_public", match(CommandLine,"(?i)setup\\.ps1"),"setup_ps1_policy_bypass", true(),"svchost_masquerade_in_users_public")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stages values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host User
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen host User stages parent_images command_lines count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "certutil.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "decode" and ProcessCommandLine has ".cer")
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "Add-MpPreference" and ProcessCommandLine has "ExclusionPath" and ProcessCommandLine contains @"Users\Public")
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "setup.ps1" and ProcessCommandLine has "Bypass")
    or (FileName =~ "svchost.exe" and FolderPath startswith @"C:\Users\Public\")
| extend Stage = case(
    FileName =~ "certutil.exe", "certutil_decode_loader_cer",
    ProcessCommandLine has "Add-MpPreference", "defender_exclusion_users_public",
    ProcessCommandLine has "setup.ps1", "setup_ps1_policy_bypass",
    "svchost_masquerade_in_users_public")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Stage, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: tcherber Loader Staging - certutil Decode of cer File and Defender Exclusion on Users Public
id: 7c3e91a4-5b2d-4f6a-9e18-3a4d2c8b1f01
status: experimental
description: Detects the tcherber fake Windows Update chain (TL-2026-6312) - certutil decoding loader.cer into a Rust loader, Defender exclusions for the Users Public folder, setup.ps1 launched with execution policy bypass, or an svchost.exe running from Users Public.
references:
  - https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/exposing-tcherber
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1140
  - attack.t1562.001
  - attack.t1036
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_certutil:
    Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'decode'
      - '.cer'
  selection_exclusion:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'Add-MpPreference'
      - 'ExclusionPath'
      - 'Users\Public'
  selection_setup_ps1:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'setup.ps1'
      - 'Bypass'
  selection_public_svchost:
    Image|endswith: '\Users\Public\svchost.exe'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Administrators decoding certificates with certutil during PKI work
  - Backup or deployment tooling that adds Defender exclusions for a staging folder
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrators using certutil -decode on legitimate Base64 certificate bundles
- Software deployment scripts that add Defender exclusions for C:\Users\Public staging folders

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known PKI admin hosts and signed deployment tooling by ParentImage. Tighten the certutil branch to require a target path under C:\Users\Public or %TEMP% in high-noise estates. svchost.exe legitimately lives only in System32 and SysWOW64, so any other path is high fidelity. Replace index=sysmon with the index holding your Sysmon data.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- tcherber FortiGate VPN Access with Default Credentials (guest/admin) - Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Enigma Ransomware Pre-Encryption Recovery Inhibition and Log Clearing - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Enigma Ransomware Encryption Artifacts and Autoruns ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) - Impact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- tcherber Post-VPN Internal Enumeration - AD, SMB and Service Scanning from One Source - Lateral Movement / Discovery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- tcherber Malware Staging Files and Known Sample Hashes (setup.ps1, run.bat, loader.cer, stealer_raw, hvnc_raw) - Exploitation / Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- tcherber Stealer and C2 Panel Web Protocol (/api/stealer/report, /api/c2/heartbeat, agent.exe, Telegram Bot API) - C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- tcherber Persistence and UAC Bypass (Run Keys, S0/MU/Upd Tasks, WMI WindowsUpdate Subscription, fodhelper) - Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- tcherber C2 and Exfiltration Channels ([indicator] ports 5000/5555, sslip.io Panel, Telegram Bot API) - C2 / Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `93.152.223[.]30`
- Domain: `rehubcom[.]pro`
- File hash: `6bddf59e2a5065255cfc90d2e2e66e3bfd4a7cbf4e0b6341b4da93b574cc4f53`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Exposing tcherber: VPN Access Brokerage, Custom Malware, and an Exposed C2 Panel (Cyderes Howler Cell)](https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/exposing-tcherber)
- [Hackers Use Stolen FortiGate VPN Credentials to Access Corporate Networks and Deploy Custom Malware (Cyber Security News)](https://cybersecuritynews.com/stolen-fortigate-vpn-credentials/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1133 External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6312
