# GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Hides Malware Processes and Sockets in IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR) Supply Chain Campaigns

> Aqua Nautilus identified GhostMap, an eBPF rootkit that hides malware processes, selected directory entries and network sockets from some Linux utilities, in samples from the IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR/npm) supply chain campaigns. In a privileged lab run the implant persisted via a systemd service. Aqua states the shared code does not establish that the same operators ran both campaigns.

- **Published:** 2026-11-18T13:21:07Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-18T13:21:07Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6340
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/TL-2026-6340.png
- **ID:** TL-2026-6340
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GhostMap is the name Aqua Nautilus gave to an eBPF-based concealment component embedded in Linux implants from two software supply chain campaigns. IronWorm, documented by JFrog on 2026-06-03, is a Rust credential-stealing worm distributed through npm packages republished from the compromised 'asteroiddao' account; a malicious preinstall hook executes a bundled ~976 KB UPX-packed Rust ELF (tools/setup). Atomic Arch, documented by Sonatype on 2026-06-11, hijacked orphaned Arch User Repository (AUR) packages and modified their PKGBUILDs to run 'npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk'; atomic-lockfile's preinstall hook executes a bundled native Rust ELF, and a second wave used js-digest and lockfile-js (some via Bun).

Aqua's lab analysis (article dated 2026-11-17) shows the installer copying itself to a randomly named path (e.g. /var/lib/glugi/glugi, /var/lib/havebi/havebi) and creating and enabling a matching systemd service; the service process, not the installer, loads GhostMap. At one checkpoint GhostMap had 13 eBPF programs, 10 maps and 13 attachments. Process hiding works by recording the getdents64 buffer address on enter (enter_getdents) and, in exit_getdents, using bpf_probe_write_user to change the low byte of a directory record's length field so readers skip the next entry, while the returned byte count is unchanged. An on_exec program adds PIDs whose comm matches the hidden_names map to hidden_pids; a fork-only child stays visible while a child that execs a matching program is hidden. Socket hiding (net_exit_read, exit_recvmsg, hidden_inodes map) omits the listener from /proc/net/tcp and rewrites netlink messages to NLMSG_NOOP, but the tested ss build (iproute2 6.1.0-1ubuntu6.4) still showed the listener. An anti-debugging program sends SIGKILL to a task that attempts PTRACE_ATTACH on a protected process. Per JFrog, process and TCP hiding rely on a memory-write helper that fails under kernel lockdown, while netlink filtering and anti-debugging still work.

IronWorm's wider behavior per JFrog and SafeDep: harvesting of ~86 environment variables (14 AI/ML API keys) and 20+ credential files (cloud, Kubernetes, Vault, AI coding assistant auth files, Exodus wallet seed phrases); Tor-based C2 (downloads the Tor expert bundle, writes its own torrc, beacons to /api/agent) with temp.sh as an unconfirmed fallback; self-propagation via stolen GitHub credentials (commits as claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, backdated to the repo's last legitimate commit) and npm Trusted Publishing OIDC token exchange. Atomic Arch targets GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, Vault tokens, browser cookie databases and Slack/Discord/Teams/Telegram stores and uploads via POST /upload. Aqua's lab run observed a loopback collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 accepting seven synthetic records stored in the 'user.d' extended attribute of the installed executable; no external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed. No public C2 IPs, domains, or onion addresses are published in the sources. The Atomic Arch payload shares the 13-program/10-map eBPF layout, a byte-identical 1,142-byte forged sudo wrapper and the 8738 loopback listener; Cornfield linked the campaigns via a shared embedded mnemonic. Severity is analyst-assigned; in-the-wild victims beyond reported package compromises are not established for GhostMap itself.

Defender guidance from Aqua: compare independent views (/proc enumeration vs direct /proc/PID access, /proc/net/tcp vs ss/netlink), correlate discrepancies with unexpected eBPF attachments (especially probe_write_user users) and new systemd services, preserve file metadata including extended attributes before cleanup, and avoid casual debugging of suspect processes. Aqua Tracee flagged the eBPF attachments but not individual buffer mutations.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1543.002 Systemd Service
- T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1564.014 Extended Attributes
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1552.004 Private Keys
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GhostMap/IronWorm/Atomic Arch Malicious Package Install and Preinstall Payload Execution** (`TL-2026-6340-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of package-manager commands or preinstall payloads tied to the IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR/npm) supply chain campaigns that deliver the GhostMap eBPF rootkit: installs of atomic-lockfile, js-digest, lockfile-js, weavedb-sdk, weavedb-lite and zkjson, execution of the bundled Rust ELFs (tools/setup, src/hooks/deps, lib/install-deps.mjs), and known SHA256/MD5 values (including the community-observed sample with SHA256 prefix 36abd242). Any hit means the host should be treated as credential-compromised.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1195.002, T1059.004
- **Data sources:** sysmon_for_linux, linux:process_creation, DeviceProcessEvents
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*atomic-lockfile*" OR CommandLine="*js-digest*" OR CommandLine="*lockfile-js*" OR CommandLine="*weavedb-sdk*" OR CommandLine="*weavedb-lite*" OR CommandLine="*zkjson*" OR CommandLine="*install-deps.mjs*" OR Image="*/tools/setup" OR Image="*/src/hooks/deps" OR Hashes="*36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36*" OR Hashes="*178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e*")
| eval install_cmd=if(match(CommandLine,"(npm|bun|pnpm|yarn) +(i|install|add)"),"yes","no"), payload_exec=if(match(Image,"/(tools/setup|src/hooks/deps)$"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as images values(install_cmd) as install_cmd values(payload_exec) as payload_exec by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage images command_lines install_cmd payload_exec count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let malicious_pkgs = dynamic(["atomic-lockfile","js-digest","lockfile-js","weavedb-sdk","weavedb-lite","zkjson","wao@0.41.2","install-deps.mjs"]);
let known_sha256 = dynamic(["36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36","8795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377c","6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b","3607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (malicious_pkgs)
    or FolderPath endswith "/tools/setup"
    or FolderPath endswith "/src/hooks/deps"
    or SHA256 in (known_sha256)
    or MD5 == "178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GhostMap IronWorm Atomic Arch Malicious Package Install and Preinstall Payload
id: 3f6a1c52-8b1e-4d0a-9c71-6e2a5d9b0f11
status: experimental
description: Detects installs of npm packages tied to the IronWorm and Atomic Arch supply chain campaigns, execution of their bundled preinstall Rust ELF payloads, and known sample hashes that deliver the GhostMap eBPF rootkit.
references:
    - https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/
    - https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/
    - https://www.sonatype.com/blog/atomic-arch-npm-campaign-adds-malicious-dependency
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_pkg:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'atomic-lockfile'
            - 'js-digest'
            - 'lockfile-js'
            - 'weavedb-sdk'
            - 'weavedb-lite'
            - 'zkjson'
            - 'wao@0.41.2'
            - 'install-deps.mjs'
    selection_payload:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/tools/setup'
            - '/src/hooks/deps'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - '36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36'
            - '8795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377c'
            - '6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b'
            - '3607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01'
            - '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or package-reputation scanners installing the named packages in a sandbox
    - Legitimate unrelated projects that happen to ship a file named tools/setup
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers analysing the named packages in an isolated lab
- Unrelated internal projects that ship a script at tools/setup

**Tuning notes:** Exclude lab/sandbox hosts via a host lookup. Package-name matches are strong on their own; the tools/setup path match is broader, so require install_cmd=yes or a node_modules parent for lower-fidelity alerting. Update the hash and package lists as vendors publish further affected versions. The MD5 is a community-tier (TL_OSINT_Scan) sibling indicator, so treat it as corroboration, not ground truth.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Atomic Arch Hijacked AUR PKGBUILD Spawning Malicious npm/Bun Dependency Install (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Loading: bpf() Syscall from Non-Approved or Self-Named /var/lib Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Tor Expert Bundle Download and Tor Client Launched with Custom torrc (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm Spoofed claude@users.noreply.github.com Commit Identity or npm OIDC Token Exchange (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm and Atomic Arch Credential File Harvesting by Non-Standard Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tor SOCKS Proxy Use by Non-Tor Process from Writable Path (IronWorm Multi-hop C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GhostMap Implant Persistence: Self-Named systemd Service Binary Under /var/lib and user.d xattr Use (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IronWorm/Atomic Arch Loopback Collector on [indicator]:8738 and [indicator] Fallback Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `temp[.]sh`
- URL: `hxxps://registry[.]npmjs[.]org/-/npm/v1/oidc/token/exchange/package`
- File hash: `0c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5f`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Abuse Linux eBPF Technology to Hide Malware Processes and Evade Detection](https://gbhackers.com/linux-ebpf-technology/)
- [Aqua Nautilus: IronWorm eBPF Rootkit GhostMap on Linux](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/)
- [JFrog: IronWorm, Shai-Hulud's Rustier Cousin](https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/)
- [Sonatype: Atomic Arch - Attackers Hijack Trusted AUR Packages (npm campaign adds malicious dependency)](https://www.sonatype.com/blog/atomic-arch-npm-campaign-adds-malicious-dependency)
- [SafeDep: IronWorm campaign threat intelligence](https://safedep.io/ti/campaigns/ironworm)
- [BleepingComputer: New IronWorm malware hits 36 packages in npm supply-chain attack](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ironworm-malware-hits-36-packages-in-npm-supply-chain-attack/)
- [The Hacker News: Over 400 Arch Linux AUR packages compromised](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/over-400-arch-linux-aur-packages.html)
- [StepSecurity: 400 AUR packages hijacked - Atomic Arch campaign](https://stepsecurity.io/blog/400-aur-packages-hijacked-atomic-arch-campaign)
- [Privacy Guides: Around 1,500 AUR packages compromised with rootkit-like malware](https://www.privacyguides.org/news/2026/06/12/around-1-500-aur-packages-compromised-with-rootkit-like-malware/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-6340
